Recurring concern

Unreliable investigation of serious infection causes

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First reported 2 Oct 2014•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical or governance processes specifically intended to investigate and establish the cause, source, origin or treatment relationship of a serious infection, including investigation of whether an infection pre-existed treatment or arose from treatment and investigation of the source of a progressing infection.

Not included

  • Excludes routine infection testing, monitoring or treatment failures where the asserted concern is not investigation of the infection's cause or source.
  • Excludes generic incident, death or root-cause investigations unless the investigation specifically concerns establishing the cause or source of a serious infection.
  • Excludes failures to recognise, escalate or treat infection where the causal-investigation process is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes the quality of clinical care or the occurrence of an infection where no failure to investigate its cause or source is identified.
Reports
6

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
6

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
13

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Department of Health and Social Care2
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Care Quality Commission1
Darwin Medical Practice1
Good Hope Hospital1
NHS Bath and North East Somerset, Swindon and Wiltshire Integrated Care Board1
Queen's Hospital, Burton1
Royal United Hospitals Bath NHS Foundation Trust1
UK Health Security Agency1
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Ioannou, a 61-year-old non-verbal man receiving 24-hour residential care, died after a cardiac arrest on 24 June 2025 following treatment for a problem with his PEG apparatus. An autopsy identified an infection at the PEG site that spread to his small intestine and caused peritonitis. The principal concerns were that the death was not investigated under NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework, and that the cause and timing of the infection and possible communication failures were not fully explored.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish the aetiology and timing of a fatal infection

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Barts Health Trust chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mr Ioannou’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Firstly, despite an autopsy, the aetiology and precise timing of Mr Ioannou’s fatal infection was not fully understood. In a functioning clinical governance setting, both the possibility of the trust having missed a pre-existing infection at the time of the treatment on 23rd June 2025 or the prospect that the treatment itself caused the infection should have been explored. Secondly, in the context of the treatment of a patient with a profound learning disability where communication failures may have contributed to poor care, a valuable learning opportunity was missed. ”

    Source location

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Creagan, an 81-year-old woman with heart failure, underwent emergency abdominal surgery in February 2025 and was later admitted with breathing difficulties, anaemia and a suspected gastrointestinal bleed. She died in hospital on 17 March 2025; the inquest determined that untreated and undiagnosed infective endocarditis caused her death. Concerns included the failure to investigate the source of her worsening infection, the missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, inadequate monitoring of her heart failure, and the decision not to conduct a Patient Safety Framework investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate the source of a progressing infection after pneumonia resolves

    Wider context from the report

    “1. BHRUT chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mrs Creagan’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Decisions were reached at two clinical governance meetings that meaningful learning could not flow from a governance investigation into the circumstances of Mrs Creagan’s care. Such decisions appear to be incongruous with; a. The inaccurate cause of death initially offered by the Trust, b. The failure to investigate the seat of Mrs Creagan’s burgeoning infection after her pneumonia resolved. c. The missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, d. The failure to monitor the development of Mrs Creagan’s heart failure during her inpatient treatment. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BHRUT is responsible for responding to the broader concerns raised about Mrs Creegan’s care and the application of PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to ensure we adequately address your concerns on PSIRF. I note you have also copied your report to Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust (BHRUT) who will respond to the broader concerns you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further invasive or extensive investigation was not considered clinically appropriate because it was unlikely to alter management or improve outcomes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A multidisciplinary review involving the Consultant Geriatrician workforce concluded that further invasive or extensive investigations were unlikely to alter management or improve outcomes and were therefore not clinically appropriate. This decision was made in line with best interest principles and realistic treatment goals.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Laura Lesley FARMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laura Farmer was admitted to hospital after a diarrhoeal illness and was diagnosed with HUS caused by Shiga toxin-producing E. coli. She suffered an unexpected stroke while thought to be recovering and died as a consequence. The report raises concerns about public-health investigation and communication, including limited information-gathering, lack of feedback to clinicians and family, and insufficient advice on infection-control and safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain relevant exposure information from household contacts during E coli source investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The UKHSA did not at any stage ask ████████ for information to assist in attempting to determine the source of the E coli infection that ultimately killed his wife. If asked, Mr Farmer would have explained that on 6 April 2024, not only did he and his wife visit a local restaurant, they also had drinks at a nearby club, and they had recently eaten and drunk at local military establishments. None of that information appears to have been considered by the UKHSA. ”

    Source location

    Laura Lesley FARMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share UKHSA regional team contact details with immediate family so they can ask questions or provide further information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “41. The review identified one learning point in relation to dealing with unwell cases, namely that where a case is known to die during investigation a risk assessment should be undertaken in collaboration with the clinical team treating the case to determine whether additional contact should be made with the next of kin. Any consideration of the need for a grieving family for privacy should be weighed against the potential need for information. The contact details of the UKHSA regional team will be shared with immediate family so they can contact the regional team if they have any questions or would like to provide any further information.”

    Source location

    Response from UK Health Security Agency
    Page 8 · response
    Published 17 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Community outbreak investigations do not fall directly within the Trust’s infection prevention and control teams’ scope of practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The UCLH Trust response has been led by the Division of Infection, in recognition that the concerns raised by the coroner were principally about communication about the STEC outbreak investigation between UKHSA and the patient and family, a topic for which our Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) teams form the Trust’s local expertise and point of contact, although a community outbreak investigation does not fall directly within their scope of practice.”

    Source location

    Response from UCLH
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 September 2024

    Open published response
  4. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Geoffrey Duke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Geoffrey Duke became unwell repeatedly after a pacemaker box change in June 2016 and was later found to have infection involving the pacemaker wires. The principal concerns were that the pacemaker was not considered as a possible source of infection, no cardiology referral was made, and there was no evidence of a referral process for patients who became unwell after pacemaker surgery. He died in hospital on 20 December 2017 after deterioration during treatment and surgery.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider pacemaker box change as a potential source of infection

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr. Duke underwent pacemaker box change on 15th June 2016. He was subsequently unwell on a number of occasions. He visited Good Hope Hospital on 6th February 2017, his GP on a number of occasions and Burton Queens Hospital in August 2017. No consideration appears to have been given that the pacemaker box change may have been the source of his undiagnosed infections. No referral was made to a Cardiologist. His problem was diagnosed on his first admission on 27th October 2017. At inquest there was no evidence of a referral process for patients having undergone pacemaker surgery who subsequently become unwell. ”

    Source location

    Geoffrey Duke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the case and discuss its learning at a clinical governance meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The clinicians at Darwin Medical Practice have met and discussed in depth this case on Thursday 20 June 2019, as part of our regular Clinical Governance Meeting.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-Darwin-Medical-Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider infection arising from pacemaker leads as a possible cause in future similar presentations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the GP who was responsible for seeing Mr Duke during most of his visits to the surgery ahead of his death, I have been tasked to write this report, advocated by the coroner at his inquest, given that it was felt there needs to be a structured plan to consider this possibility, should there be any further future instance thereof in any other individual.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-Darwin-Medical-Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review endocarditis guidelines to confirm coverage of device-related infection and endocarditis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having reviewed our referral process to our cardiology teams, we are satisfied that we have in place an effective referral process as a result of your report we have undertaken a review of our endocarditis guidelines to ensure they are robust and we are assured that our guidelines are comprehensive and include specific reference to device related infection and endocarditis and therefore do not require any amendment.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver grand-round education to acute physicians on recognising pacemaker-related endocarditis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our review of the literature suggests that one of the key issues in the delay in diagnosing device related endocarditis is a lack of awareness amongst both patients and acute physicians.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a Lesson of the Month email to staff on pacemaker-related endocarditis signs and symptoms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will also be sending out a 'Lesson of the Month' which is an email which goes out to all staff with the aim to raise awareness of the signs and symptoms of pacemaker related endocarditis. This will be circulated within the next 4 weeks.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update pacemaker patient leaflets with instructions to seek medical attention and alert clinicians when fever exceeds 38°C.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also reviewed the patient information leaflets which are provided to all patients following pacemaker insertion. The leaflets already contain information on symptoms which might represent possible infection and provide details of who the patient should contact if they are concerned. Whilst we are satisfied that the information leaflets contain sufficient information for patients, we will be updating them to include additional instructions where patients have symptoms of possible infection, in particular the leaflet will indicate that if the patient has a fever and temperature above 38 degrees Celsius, then they should a) seek medical attention and b) inform their treating clinician that they have a pacemaker and that device related endocarditis should be considered. Our aim is to update the leaflets by the beginning of November 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete governance approval of the cardiac device infection guideline.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that the enclosed (appendix 1) Cardiac Implantable Electronic Device Lead Infection Microbiology Hospital Guideline has been developed by the Antimicrobial Pharmacist, Cardiology Consultants and Microbiology Consultants. The document provides guidance on the detection and treatment of Subacute Bacterial Endocarditis (SBE) related to cardiac rhythm devices. This is now subject to the Trust's governance process to formally sign the guidance off.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-Derby-and-Burton-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Link the cardiac device infection guideline to existing pyrexia-of-unknown-origin guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once formally signed off, this guidance will be linked to the Trust's existing guidance for Pyrexia of Unknown Origin (PUO) as guidance for patients presenting with pyrexia (temperature) of unknown origin with a cardiac rhythm device in place.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-Derby-and-Burton-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the approved guideline through the intranet and divisional clinical leadership meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The final draft and final signoff in conjunction with a communication plan will be complete by 30th September 2019. Once sign off has been completed, the guidelines will be accessible to all staff through the Trust's intranet (called 'Flo'). In addition, the Divisional Medical Director and Divisional Nursing Director will ensure that this information is disseminated to all Clinical”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-Derby-and-Burton-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share inquest learning with the Department of Medicine to raise staff awareness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The development of this guideline supports the previous learning board shared with all Doctors in the Department of Medicine and the discussion at the Acute Medicine Mortality meeting in May 2019, in raising awareness with the relevant teams. For ease, I have also enclosed a further copy of the learning board (appendix 2), Statement of ████████ (appendix 3) and SI report (appendix 4) to confirm the steps that the Trust is taking.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-Derby-and-Burton-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review organisational guidance for identifying and diagnosing cardiac rhythm device infections.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has shared the learning from the inquest with the department of medicine to raise awareness. This has been supported by a review of the guidance available to clinicians, within the Organisation, relating to the identification and diagnosis of infection associated with a cardiac rhythm device. Following this review guidance has been developed and will be linked to the guidance relating to pyrexia of unknown origin.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-Derby-and-Burton-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight the learning and related guidelines in the monthly Patient Safety Brief newsletter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This will be further supported at the Trust-wide Quality Summit on 26 September 2019 where ████████ with discuss this case and the learning that has been undertaken. It is hoped that aspects of the summit will be captured on videos and podcasts that will be available on Flo. Finally, ████████ will also highlight this learning within his monthly 'Patient Safety Brief' newsletter (August 2019) that is sent to all staff to further highlight the guidelines and the learning following this case.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-Derby-and-Burton-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The infection could not have been identified earlier within primary care because symptoms were nonspecific and appropriate steps were taken.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practice shared the information from HM Coroner and looked back, in detail, through Mr Duke’s medical record. It was agreed that this was an extremely unusual occurrence. It was agreed that the clinicians concerned in Primary Care had made all appropriate steps to try and elucidate. However, during his attendances at the surgery, there could be seen no way that this could have been picked up earlier within Primary Care. Mr Duke had attended on a number of occasions with relatively non-specific symptoms of malaise, with the only finding being of raised inflammatory markers; rightly this had been noted and documented and was being addressed and followed up. In fact, at the last time he was seen at the surgery, he had improved in himself, as indeed had these clinical markers. It was noted that he was concurrently having hospital admissions and attendances.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-Darwin-Medical-Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for the final diagnosis lay probably more within secondary care than primary care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Given the rareness and the unexpected nature of the eventual outcome, the learning from this in Primary Care was that this is now perceived as a possibility, where it may not have been considered before; the cause for Mr Duke’s malaise. It was felt the remit for the final diagnosis lay probably more within Secondary Care, but that the lesson to be learned from this was that situations, even as unusual as this, are possible and should be considered if any future similar scenario.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-Darwin-Medical-Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing endocarditis guidelines are considered comprehensive, including device-related infection and endocarditis, and require no amendment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Action Plan”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing patient leaflets are considered sufficient regarding infection symptoms and contact details, although additional fever instructions will be added.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also reviewed the patient information leaflets which are provided to all patients following pacemaker insertion. The leaflets already contain information on symptoms which might represent possible infection and provide details of who the patient should contact if they are concerned. Whilst we are satisfied that the information leaflets contain sufficient information for patients, we will be updating them to include additional instructions where patients have symptoms of possible infection, in particular the leaflet will indicate that if the patient has a fever and temperature above 38 degrees Celsius, then they should a) seek medical attention and b) inform their treating clinician that they have a pacemaker and that device related endocarditis should be considered. Our aim is to update the leaflets by the beginning of November 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0256-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response
  5. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Mr. Terence Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr. Terence Brooks, who was being treated for acute myeloid leukaemia, developed Legionella pneumophila pneumonia and died on 23 July 2015. The report raised concerns that the hospital misinterpreted microbiological testing, conducted its investigation on a false premise, and had no procedure for investigating the cause of a Legionella infection.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to correctly interpret microbiological water-sample results and testing limitations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Those who conducted the investigation and root cause analysis on the part of the hospital did not appreciate that notwithstanding the absence of the specific subgroup of Legionella serotype 1 in the water samples from the ward as compared to samples from the deceased that this was not conclusive as to the ward not being the source of the infection. (2) There was a lack of understanding on the part of the hospital as to how to interpret the results of the microbiological analysis of the water samples and the limitations of testing including the meaning of any results obtained, the reliability which may be placed on those results and any conclusions which may be drawn from those results. (3) As a result of this lack of understanding the hospital misinterpreted the results and conducted their investigation and root cause analysis on a false premise which led them to conclude incorrectly that the William Budd ward was not the source of the Legionella infection. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Terence Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. London (East)

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Pether · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Pether was admitted after a fall that caused a right femur peri-prosthetic fracture, with a pre-existing infection and an open fracture increasing the risk of infection. Transfer for complex surgery was delayed, and records identified no focused medical or nursing checks of limb viability between 11 and 20 December 2012. The wound was found to be infected and necrotic on 20 December; despite surgery, amputation and intensive care, Mr Pether deteriorated and died from left ventricular failure after developing multi-organ failure.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify the source of infection during clinical deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Even on the 20 December 2012 when Mr Pether’s clinical condition significantly deteriorated (acute kidney injury and chest infection now clearly manifesting), the orthopaedic team failed to identify the source of the infection. It would appear that it was the family that raised concerns about Mr Pether’s breathlessness which led to a review by the Medical Registrar. The Medical Registrar carried out a very full assessment and identified the likely source of sepsis in the right leg. She involved the microbiology team and requested a review by ITU and the orthopaedic registrar. After this time, Mr Pether received a good standard of care, but at this stage, his prognosis was very poor. ”

    Source location

    Mr Pether · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026