Unreliable MOSOVO management of sexual and violent offenders
First to latest report 15 Sep 2022 — 11 Mar 2025
Reports that mention this concern
2
Times this concern has been raised
2
Stated actions linked to this concern
6
What this concern includes
Includes failures in the named MOSOVO offender-management process, including adoption and updating of relevant guidance, provision and use of violence-risk assessment tools, management of escalating violence risk, staff understanding and application of MOSOVO requirements, and dedicated assurance that the process operates effectively.
What is not included
Excludes generic offender-management, policing, probation or risk-assessment deficiencies where MOSOVO is not the identified system.
Excludes failures in managing offenders outside sexual or violent offender management unless the assertion explicitly concerns the MOSOVO process.
Excludes downstream supervision, release or public-protection failures where MOSOVO guidance and risk-management arrangements operated reliably.
Excludes generic training, communication or documentation deficiencies unless they directly impair the operation of MOSOVO offender-management arrangements.
Trends
Reports over time
Reports mentioning this concern, over time
Reports about this concern issued each year.
* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.
Most frequent recipients
Most frequent recipients
Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.
College of Policing2
National Police Chiefs’ Council2
Department of Health and Social Care1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Home Office1
Metropolitan Police Service1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
NHS England1
National policing body2
Executive agency1
Executive non-departmental public body1
Integrated care board1
Ministerial department1
Police force1
Reports and published responses 2 reports
See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response
Dorset
Concerns raised1
Lack of guidance and tools for assessing violence risk in MOSOVO-managed offenders
This report raised 4 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Linked responses
College of Policing
National Police Chiefs’ Council
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.4
National Police Chiefs’ Council
Request a review of MOSOVO authorised professional practice and training materials to strengthen consideration of violence in risk assessments and management plans.
National Police Chiefs’ Council
Reiterate the request for a full review of the Active Risk Management System process.
College of Policing
Consult the NPCC MOSOVO lead and relevant subject-matter experts on improving guidance for assessing violence risk.
College of Policing
Liaise with Dorset Constabulary to ensure awareness of current MOSOVO guidance and available material for managing violent-offender risks.
Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.1
National Police Chiefs’ Council
The established ARMS assessment and risk management process should identify serious violence risks when known to and properly assessed by the assessor.
Existing arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.
Bedfordshire and Luton
Concerns raised1
Failure to adopt MOSOVO guidance for managing sexual and violent offenders, particularly PDPs
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Linked responses
College of Policing
Department of Health and Social Care
Metropolitan Police Service
National Police Chiefs’ Council
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.2
Metropolitan Police Service
Review existing MAPPA processes, including the feasibility of introducing a Potentially Dangerous Person process.
College of Policing and National Police Chiefs’ Council
Develop risk principles and vulnerability and risk guidelines for identifying, assessing and managing potentially dangerous persons and serial domestic-abuse perpetrators.
Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.5
Metropolitan Police Service
The volume of potential PDPs in London makes implementing a PDP process unworkable, even after applying strict filtering parameters.
Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.
Metropolitan Police Service
The absence of a legislative framework makes implementing a PDP process problematic, particularly for partnership working.
Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.
Department of Health and Social Care
Police and Home Office matters were addressed directly by those bodies, so this response does not undertake further work on them.
Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.
College of Policing and National Police Chiefs’ Council
The 2010 ACPO guidance is superseded by current APP, which sets out up-to-date professional practice for potentially dangerous persons.
Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.
College of Policing and National Police Chiefs’ Council
Individual chief constables retain operational independence and responsibility for implementing or departing from APP guidance.
Redirects responsibilityThe respondent said that another organisation was responsible for deciding or taking action.
Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.
Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.