Recurring concern

Unreliable police emergency-vehicle siren controls

First to latest report 8 Jan 2020 — 4 Jun 2021

Reports that mention this concern
2
Times this concern has been raised
2
Stated actions linked to this concern
0

What this concern includes

Includes failures in controls governing activation, operation, indication, verification and use of sirens on police emergency vehicles when those failures can prevent effective warning or create uncertainty about whether the siren is operating.

What is not included
  • Excludes general police driver training, speed, journey planning and vehicle-operation failures that do not directly concern the emergency-vehicle siren control system.
  • Excludes vehicle lighting, lamps, indicators and visual warning devices unless the assertion directly concerns indication or verification of siren activation.
  • Excludes failures occurring after the siren has operated reliably, including unrelated emergency-response, collision or enforcement outcomes.

Reports and published responses 2 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    David Conway ORMESHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Conway ORMESHER's death was investigated from 5 September 2017, with the investigation concluding at the end of an inquest on 17 May 2021. Concerns identified included the use of the in-car radio and siren, handling of the personal radio, excessive speed, and the need to reinforce driver-training requirements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to deploy the siren when required

    Wider context from the report

    “In the light of Inspector ████████ evidence and from the conclusions of the Jury, the following points were identified as being relevant: (1) The in-car radio should be switched on at all times (2) The siren should have been deployed (3) The personal radio should not be handed to the passenger in the police vehicle and not returned immediately (4) The speed was found to be excessive and drivers in training need reminding of the Regulations: ‘Drive appropriately and justify the manner of driving’ ‘Plan the journey using all available information’ Perhaps this tragic case will prompt a review of the existing driver training. ”

    Source location

    David Conway ORMESHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing response-driver training is considered commensurate with College of Policing and NPCC standards, so fundamental training changes are not required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having reviewed the training that is delivered to response drivers by Sussex Police I am satisfied that we are delivering training that is commensurate with direction given by the College of Policing and the NPCC Driver Training lead.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 June 2021

    Open published response

  2. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Carroll · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Carroll, aged 70, was struck by a police vehicle while crossing Scotland Road A59 in Liverpool on 25 December 2018 and was pronounced dead after being taken to hospital. The report raised concerns about public understanding of police emergency vehicle speed limits and the absence of a visual indicator showing whether the siren was activated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a visual indication of police emergency vehicle siren activation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. During the Course of evidence, the police driver and the police passenger believed the sirens were activated and sounding. Analysis of the Siemens VDO Incident Data Recorder demonstrated that in the heat of the emergency both were mistaken and the sirens were not activated. Has a warning light in the cab been considered as a visual indicator or the lights and siren being activated been considered? ”

    Source location

    Anthony Carroll · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing emergency-equipment indicators and siren controls are considered sufficient; additional cab indicators could distract officers during emergency driving.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although many police response vehicles are similar throughout the United Kingdom, not all of the emergency equipment or control units are standardised within these vehicles. They all have a control panel or switches to operate the emergency equipment and usually a corresponding light to indicate that the equipment has been activated. This is described as a warning light and serves in addition to the noise and pressure waves of the sirens themselves.”

    Source location

    2020-0018-Response-from-NPCC_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 February 2020

    Open published response

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026