Recurring concern

Unreliable safety arrangements for organised motorsport events

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First reported 9 Jan 2020•Latest report 5 Feb 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in safety arrangements for organised motorsport events and track activities, including event-specific risk assessment, participant registration and briefing, access and capacity control, segregation of riders or vehicles, stewarding and supervision, emergency and first-aid provision, pedestrian control during vehicle movements, and implementation of applicable safety standards.

Not included

Excludes generic event-management, staffing, communication or training deficiencies where no organised motorsport safety arrangement is identified.
Excludes ordinary road-traffic, vehicle-maintenance or driving failures outside an organised motorsport event.
Excludes the underlying occurrence of a crash, injury or death where no continuing deficiency in motorsport-event safety arrangements is asserted.
Excludes safety concerns in non-motorsport sporting events, including hunting, water activities and ordinary contact sports, unless the assertion explicitly concerns the same organised motorsport safety system.

Reports: 3
Individual concerns: 9
Date range: 2020–2025
Stated actions: 6

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Auto Cycle Union Limited1

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport1

Department for Transport1

Incarace Limited1

ORCi Limited1

Recipient name withheld1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

5 Feb2025
Somerset
Concerns raised4
1. Absence of safety briefings for riders before track use
2. Failure to control track access and maximum rider numbers
3. Failure to segregate riders by skill, ability and bike power
1. Failure to obtain riders’ next-of-kin and medical information before track access
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Respondent positions 3
1. Position
  Responsibility for concerns about a racetrack bike crash lies with DCMS rather than the Department for Transport.
  Stated by Department for TransportRedirects responsibility
1. Position
  Individual motor sport event organisers are responsible for protecting participants’ safety and wellbeing.
  Stated by Department for Digital, Culture, Media and SportRedirects responsibility
2. Position
  Event and venue operators have workplace health and safety duties under HSWA and associated regulations.
  Stated by Department for Digital, Culture, Media and SportRedirects responsibility
AI-generated summary

Simon Timothy Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Simon Timothy Harding died after becoming separated from his motocross bike during a jump at Granfield Moto-Cross Track on 10 September 2022; the bike landed on his head, causing catastrophic and unsurvivable head injuries. Concerns included limited rider registration, no safety briefing, inadequate track regulation and stewarding, lack of rider segregation, and no first-aid training for venue staff. The report also identified a lack of mandatory minimum safety and risk-management standards for motocross venues as a risk of future deaths.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Absence of safety briefings for riders before track use
Wider context from the report
“(a) There did not appear to be any method meaningful of rider registration before participants could access the Track. The only requirement placed on riders was provide their name and phone number before accessing the track. They were not required to provide details of a Next of Kin and/or medical information to assist paramedics or other professionals in safely and accurately treating them should they be unconscious and unable to communication and give this information for themselves. There appeared to be an assumption that those accompanying the rider on the day would know this information. (b) There did not appear to be any kind of safety briefing for the riders before using the Track. (c) The Track itself was largely unregulated. There was one operative ‘Marshall’ at site who was not wearing the high-vis clothing provided and remained confident that he could be clearly identified within the 4 acre site due to carrying a clip-board. At the time of the incident the steward was in the on-site burger van. Despite having a maximum number of riders at any one time, this was not checked or regulated due to the uncontrolled nature of Track access and absence of effective stewards. Adult riders of all skill sets with all speeds of bike could ride together. There was no attempt to segregate riders based on their skill, ability or power of their bike. (d) Following on from the above point, there was one Marshall to cover the entire Track site which limited the ability to provide immediate and effective assistance in the event of an incident or accident at or on the Track. (e) Staff at the venue (on the day of the incident, the one Marshall) had no first aid training. By pure chance, two spectators at the Track on the day were medically qualified professionals and coordinated the CPR between themselves until paramedics arrived. Whilst I am satisfied on the evidence that the layout and organisation of the Track did not, in and of itself, contribute to Simon’s death, the areas of concern highlighted above do, in my opinion, create an enhanced and unmitigated risk that death may occur, over and above the usual risk associated with this type of recreational activity. It was highlighted during the Inquest that there is an absence of mandatory regulation and implementation of minimum standards that moto-cross venues must confirm to. Whilst various organisations exist that seek to promote and raise minimum standards for such venues, membership of these organisations and compliance to any standards is entirely optional and at the discretion of the venue operator. The owners and operators of the Track appears to be entirely unaware of any such organisations of Minimum Standards documents. I am concerned that without minimum standards for safety and risk management, there is a risk of future deaths. ”
Source location
Simon Timothy Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 3 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to control track access and maximum rider numbers
Wider context from the report
“(a) There did not appear to be any method meaningful of rider registration before participants could access the Track. The only requirement placed on riders was provide their name and phone number before accessing the track. They were not required to provide details of a Next of Kin and/or medical information to assist paramedics or other professionals in safely and accurately treating them should they be unconscious and unable to communication and give this information for themselves. There appeared to be an assumption that those accompanying the rider on the day would know this information. (b) There did not appear to be any kind of safety briefing for the riders before using the Track. (c) The Track itself was largely unregulated. There was one operative ‘Marshall’ at site who was not wearing the high-vis clothing provided and remained confident that he could be clearly identified within the 4 acre site due to carrying a clip-board. At the time of the incident the steward was in the on-site burger van. Despite having a maximum number of riders at any one time, this was not checked or regulated due to the uncontrolled nature of Track access and absence of effective stewards. Adult riders of all skill sets with all speeds of bike could ride together. There was no attempt to segregate riders based on their skill, ability or power of their bike. (d) Following on from the above point, there was one Marshall to cover the entire Track site which limited the ability to provide immediate and effective assistance in the event of an incident or accident at or on the Track. (e) Staff at the venue (on the day of the incident, the one Marshall) had no first aid training. By pure chance, two spectators at the Track on the day were medically qualified professionals and coordinated the CPR between themselves until paramedics arrived. Whilst I am satisfied on the evidence that the layout and organisation of the Track did not, in and of itself, contribute to Simon’s death, the areas of concern highlighted above do, in my opinion, create an enhanced and unmitigated risk that death may occur, over and above the usual risk associated with this type of recreational activity. It was highlighted during the Inquest that there is an absence of mandatory regulation and implementation of minimum standards that moto-cross venues must confirm to. Whilst various organisations exist that seek to promote and raise minimum standards for such venues, membership of these organisations and compliance to any standards is entirely optional and at the discretion of the venue operator. The owners and operators of the Track appears to be entirely unaware of any such organisations of Minimum Standards documents. I am concerned that without minimum standards for safety and risk management, there is a risk of future deaths. ”
Source location
Simon Timothy Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 3 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to segregate riders by skill, ability and bike power
Wider context from the report
“(a) There did not appear to be any method meaningful of rider registration before participants could access the Track. The only requirement placed on riders was provide their name and phone number before accessing the track. They were not required to provide details of a Next of Kin and/or medical information to assist paramedics or other professionals in safely and accurately treating them should they be unconscious and unable to communication and give this information for themselves. There appeared to be an assumption that those accompanying the rider on the day would know this information. (b) There did not appear to be any kind of safety briefing for the riders before using the Track. (c) The Track itself was largely unregulated. There was one operative ‘Marshall’ at site who was not wearing the high-vis clothing provided and remained confident that he could be clearly identified within the 4 acre site due to carrying a clip-board. At the time of the incident the steward was in the on-site burger van. Despite having a maximum number of riders at any one time, this was not checked or regulated due to the uncontrolled nature of Track access and absence of effective stewards. Adult riders of all skill sets with all speeds of bike could ride together. There was no attempt to segregate riders based on their skill, ability or power of their bike. (d) Following on from the above point, there was one Marshall to cover the entire Track site which limited the ability to provide immediate and effective assistance in the event of an incident or accident at or on the Track. (e) Staff at the venue (on the day of the incident, the one Marshall) had no first aid training. By pure chance, two spectators at the Track on the day were medically qualified professionals and coordinated the CPR between themselves until paramedics arrived. Whilst I am satisfied on the evidence that the layout and organisation of the Track did not, in and of itself, contribute to Simon’s death, the areas of concern highlighted above do, in my opinion, create an enhanced and unmitigated risk that death may occur, over and above the usual risk associated with this type of recreational activity. It was highlighted during the Inquest that there is an absence of mandatory regulation and implementation of minimum standards that moto-cross venues must confirm to. Whilst various organisations exist that seek to promote and raise minimum standards for such venues, membership of these organisations and compliance to any standards is entirely optional and at the discretion of the venue operator. The owners and operators of the Track appears to be entirely unaware of any such organisations of Minimum Standards documents. I am concerned that without minimum standards for safety and risk management, there is a risk of future deaths. ”
Source location
Simon Timothy Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 3 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to obtain riders’ next-of-kin and medical information before track access
Wider context from the report
“(a) There did not appear to be any method meaningful of rider registration before participants could access the Track. The only requirement placed on riders was provide their name and phone number before accessing the track. They were not required to provide details of a Next of Kin and/or medical information to assist paramedics or other professionals in safely and accurately treating them should they be unconscious and unable to communication and give this information for themselves. There appeared to be an assumption that those accompanying the rider on the day would know this information. (b) There did not appear to be any kind of safety briefing for the riders before using the Track. (c) The Track itself was largely unregulated. There was one operative ‘Marshall’ at site who was not wearing the high-vis clothing provided and remained confident that he could be clearly identified within the 4 acre site due to carrying a clip-board. At the time of the incident the steward was in the on-site burger van. Despite having a maximum number of riders at any one time, this was not checked or regulated due to the uncontrolled nature of Track access and absence of effective stewards. Adult riders of all skill sets with all speeds of bike could ride together. There was no attempt to segregate riders based on their skill, ability or power of their bike. (d) Following on from the above point, there was one Marshall to cover the entire Track site which limited the ability to provide immediate and effective assistance in the event of an incident or accident at or on the Track. (e) Staff at the venue (on the day of the incident, the one Marshall) had no first aid training. By pure chance, two spectators at the Track on the day were medically qualified professionals and coordinated the CPR between themselves until paramedics arrived. Whilst I am satisfied on the evidence that the layout and organisation of the Track did not, in and of itself, contribute to Simon’s death, the areas of concern highlighted above do, in my opinion, create an enhanced and unmitigated risk that death may occur, over and above the usual risk associated with this type of recreational activity. It was highlighted during the Inquest that there is an absence of mandatory regulation and implementation of minimum standards that moto-cross venues must confirm to. Whilst various organisations exist that seek to promote and raise minimum standards for such venues, membership of these organisations and compliance to any standards is entirely optional and at the discretion of the venue operator. The owners and operators of the Track appears to be entirely unaware of any such organisations of Minimum Standards documents. I am concerned that without minimum standards for safety and risk management, there is a risk of future deaths. ”
Source location
Simon Timothy Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 3 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Responsibility for concerns about a racetrack bike crash lies with DCMS rather than the Department for Transport.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Our officials have advised that the matters of concerns raised would not be appropriate for DfT to respond but is for DCMS, as the bike crash happened on a racetrack and not on the public highway.”

Source location
Response from Department for Transport
Page 1 · response
Published 6 February 2025
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Individual motor sport event organisers are responsible for protecting participants’ safety and wellbeing.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The safety and wellbeing of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount. There will always be risks associated with participating in motor sports, but it is important that robust measures are in place to reduce the risk of major injuries and health issues. It is the responsibility of individual motor sport event organisers to ensure that they protect the safety and wellbeing of their participants.”

Source location
Response from Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Page 1 · response
Published 6 February 2025
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Event and venue operators have workplace health and safety duties under HSWA and associated regulations.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Regardless of whether an event is regulated or authorised by a governing body, it is important to be clear that health and safety laws apply. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) applies workplace health and safety law in relation to those with duties under the Health and Safety at”

Source location
Response from Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Page 1 · response
Published 6 February 2025
Open published response
1 Apr2024
Worcestershire
Concerns raised2
1. Lack of a requirement for a recorded event-specific safety plan at National and Club events
2. Failure of the grass-track event risk assessment process to produce event-specific assessments and meaningful conclusions about risk control
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 2
1. Action
  Require a documented Safety Plan for all ACU-permitted events from the start of the 2025 season.
  Stated by Auto Cycle Union LimitedStated planned
2. Action
  Review grass-track event risk-assessment proformas to address event-specific assessment and input requirements.
  Stated by Auto Cycle Union LimitedStated in progress
AI-generated summary

Christopher William Townsend · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Christopher William Townsend died on 8 June 2023 after sustaining multiple chest and abdominal injuries in a motor accident during an organised grass-track motorcycle and side-car race. The report identified concerns about the lack of event-specific risk assessments and a requirement for recorded safety plans at ACU track-racing events, creating a risk of future deaths.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of a requirement for a recorded event-specific safety plan at National and Club events
Wider context from the report
“(2) However, in my questions to ████████ he confirmed that there is no requirement for organisers of events held under the ACU Regulations to prepare an event-specific Safety Plan at either National or Club events. There is such a requirement for ACU events held on an international/European permit (paragraph 3.26 National Sporting Code 2023). ████████ confirmed that whilst it is not an ACU requirement to prepare such a plan for Club/National events it is open to organisers to do so. Appendix 3 of the ACU’s publication provides an example of contents list of an event safety plan. (3) Planning for safety at motorsport events to which the public are admitted must be thorough, comprehensive and verifiable by being recorded. This allows organisers to record and disseminate safety arrangements for their events. The risks may differ in scale, but not substantially in nature, as between international and national/club events. (4) In my opinion, in the absence of such methodical planning and recording there is a risk of future deaths arising from the current arrangements for safety planning at ACU track race events. (5) I have carefully considered ████████ evidence as to the reviews that are being undertaken by the ACU of their procedures and guidance. This was provided in his written evidence, his answers in oral evidence and in the letter from him dated 5 April 2024. I have also carefully considered the cogent submissions on behalf of the ACU by ████████ of DWF, in particular as to Chief Coroner’s Guidance Note 5 (November 2020), especially paragraph 7 thereof. Nonetheless, I remain of the opinion that in the absence of a requirement for a recorded safety plan for each event there is a risk that future deaths will occur. ”
Source location
Christopher William Townsend · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of the grass-track event risk assessment process to produce event-specific assessments and meaningful conclusions about risk control
Wider context from the report
“(1) The risk assessment prepared for the grass-track event on 4 June 2024 was a downloaded proforma from the ACU publication “ACU Requirements for Safety Precautions At All Track Race Events Held Under An ACU Permit” (p.19 of 26). This document listed pre-populated control measures to address a list of pre-populated risks. The control measures were ticked “yes” or “no” by the organiser to indicate whether they were in place. The assessment of the level of that risk as high, medium or low was also pre-populated. This did not amount to a process that could produce an event specific risk assessment nor did it encourage organisers to record meaningful conclusions about controlling risk at their event. I was told by ████████ that this was a pro-forma for grass track events and that more complex, event specific risk assessments were produced for other types of event. He also confirmed that the risk assessment pro-forma were under review by the ACU and he produced an example of a potential new pro-forma requiring significantly more individual assessment and input. I accept that the ACU is taking steps to address the inadequacy of the grass track event risk assessment process. ”
Source location
Christopher William Townsend · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Require a documented Safety Plan for all ACU-permitted events from the start of the 2025 season.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The ACU's Board of Directors have considered the concerns raised and will ensure that a document entitled Safety Plan is a requirement for all ACU permitted events from the start of the 2025 season. The content of the Safety Plan will continue to be discussed by the relevant people within the ACU to ensure that comprehensive guidance is provided to event organisers in readiness for the 2025 season.”

Source location
Response from Auto Cycle Union
Page 2 · response
Published 31 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Review grass-track event risk-assessment proformas to address event-specific assessment and input requirements.

Verbatim wording from the response
“He also confirmed that the risk assessment pro-forma were under review by the ACU and he produced an example of a potential new pro-forma requiring significantly more individual assessment and input. I accept that the ACU is taking steps to address the inadequacy of the grass track event risk assessment process.”

Source location
Response from Auto Cycle Union
Page 1 · response
Published 31 May 2024
Open published response
9 Jan2020
Birmingham and Solihull
Concerns raised3
1. Failure to control pedestrian access to and movement on the track during vehicle movements
2. Prize giving procedure taking place on the track amongst moving vehicles
3. Risk assessment failing to adequately protect pedestrians on the track
This report raised 2 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 4
1. Action
  Produce and distribute interim pedestrian-vehicle segregation controls requiring recovery vehicles to enter only after pedestrians leave the race arena.
  Stated by ORCi LimitedStated completed
2. Action
  Prohibit pedestrians from the track during race events through the revised risk assessment.
  Stated by Incarrace LtdStated completed
3. Action
  Conduct prize giving only when no vehicles are moving on the track.
  Stated by Incarrace LtdStated completed
1. Action
  Consult members, review recommendations, and cascade appropriate risk-control recommendations for individual implementation after the industry risk assessment is finalised.
  Stated by ORCi LimitedStated planned
Respondent positions 1
1. Position
  The prohibition on pedestrians entering the track while vehicles are moving makes designated protected walkways unnecessary.
  Stated by Incarrace LtdExisting arrangements considered sufficient
AI-generated summary

Colin Alan North · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Colin North attended a Stock Car racing event at Birmingham Wheels on 16 November 2019 to present trophies. He was struck from behind by a large tractor while walking on the track and died at the scene; the medical cause of death was multiple injuries from a road traffic collision. The concerns included a lack of pedestrian control, protected walkways and safe areas, and inadequate consideration of the risks to pedestrians and staff on the track.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to control pedestrian access to and movement on the track during vehicle movements
Wider context from the report
“1. The TV recording of the event shows that as soon as the race is concluded the gate to the only entry and exit point is opened. Pedestrians (in using this term I include those working at the event and others) and several recovery vehicles then come through the gate. At the same time Stock Cars remain on the track some undertaking “doughnuts”. There are many pedestrians moving around the track area whilst large recovery vehicles are moving, some at speed, onto the track. There is a complete absence of control of any pedestrians onto and those already on the track. There is no pedestrian walkway on the track and no designated pedestrian safe area. There is a complete lack of awareness of the risk to pedestrians on the track who are in very close proximity to large recovery vehicles. Urgent action is required to review when and how pedestrians should be allowed on the race track at any time during a race event. 2. Urgent action is required to ensure pedestrians on the track have clear protected walkways and safe areas away from large recovery vehicles. 3. Urgent action is required to review the risk assessment document to ensure it adequately protects any pedestrians that need to be on the track. 4. Urgent action is required to review the prize giving procedure and to consider moving this to the “Public Area” as there appears to be no need for it to be undertaken in the middle of the track amongst moving vehicles. 5. Urgent action is required to consider the safety of staff working during the races and whether they should remain on the track given that they are completely unprotected should a vehicle in the race lose control. ”
Source location
Colin Alan North · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 1 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Prize giving procedure taking place on the track amongst moving vehicles
Wider context from the report
“1. The TV recording of the event shows that as soon as the race is concluded the gate to the only entry and exit point is opened. Pedestrians (in using this term I include those working at the event and others) and several recovery vehicles then come through the gate. At the same time Stock Cars remain on the track some undertaking “doughnuts”. There are many pedestrians moving around the track area whilst large recovery vehicles are moving, some at speed, onto the track. There is a complete absence of control of any pedestrians onto and those already on the track. There is no pedestrian walkway on the track and no designated pedestrian safe area. There is a complete lack of awareness of the risk to pedestrians on the track who are in very close proximity to large recovery vehicles. Urgent action is required to review when and how pedestrians should be allowed on the race track at any time during a race event. 2. Urgent action is required to ensure pedestrians on the track have clear protected walkways and safe areas away from large recovery vehicles. 3. Urgent action is required to review the risk assessment document to ensure it adequately protects any pedestrians that need to be on the track. 4. Urgent action is required to review the prize giving procedure and to consider moving this to the “Public Area” as there appears to be no need for it to be undertaken in the middle of the track amongst moving vehicles. 5. Urgent action is required to consider the safety of staff working during the races and whether they should remain on the track given that they are completely unprotected should a vehicle in the race lose control. ”
Source location
Colin Alan North · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Risk assessment failing to adequately protect pedestrians on the track
Wider context from the report
“1. The TV recording of the event shows that as soon as the race is concluded the gate to the only entry and exit point is opened. Pedestrians (in using this term I include those working at the event and others) and several recovery vehicles then come through the gate. At the same time Stock Cars remain on the track some undertaking “doughnuts”. There are many pedestrians moving around the track area whilst large recovery vehicles are moving, some at speed, onto the track. There is a complete absence of control of any pedestrians onto and those already on the track. There is no pedestrian walkway on the track and no designated pedestrian safe area. There is a complete lack of awareness of the risk to pedestrians on the track who are in very close proximity to large recovery vehicles. Urgent action is required to review when and how pedestrians should be allowed on the race track at any time during a race event. 2. Urgent action is required to ensure pedestrians on the track have clear protected walkways and safe areas away from large recovery vehicles. 3. Urgent action is required to review the risk assessment document to ensure it adequately protects any pedestrians that need to be on the track. 4. Urgent action is required to review the prize giving procedure and to consider moving this to the “Public Area” as there appears to be no need for it to be undertaken in the middle of the track amongst moving vehicles. 5. Urgent action is required to consider the safety of staff working during the races and whether they should remain on the track given that they are completely unprotected should a vehicle in the race lose control. ”
Source location
Colin Alan North · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 1 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Produce and distribute interim pedestrian-vehicle segregation controls requiring recovery vehicles to enter only after pedestrians leave the race arena.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• Prior to this, interim control measures (attached) had been produced by the ORCi in conjunction with Incarace and Speedworth following the tragic death of Colin North and these were sent to all ORCi members on or around 25th November 2019. Amongst a global review of procedures, these sought to address the matter of pedestrian / vehicle segregation which were raised in your Regulation 28 Report. We invite your attention to the third to eighth bullet points within these Interim Control Measures which identify the sequence to be followed at the end of a race, requiring recovery vehicles only to enter the track once all pedestrians have exited the race arena, thereby safeguarding them.”

Source location
2020-0003-Response-from-ORCi-Redacted-1
Page 1 · response
Published 8 February 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Prohibit pedestrians from the track during race events through the revised risk assessment.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The revised Risk Assessment prohibits any pedestrians on the track during a race event.”

Source location
2020-0003-Response-from-Incarace-Ltd-Redacted
Page 1 · response
Published 8 February 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Conduct prize giving only when no vehicles are moving on the track.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The prize giving is now undertaken when there are no moving vehicles on the track.”

Source location
2020-0003-Response-from-Incarace-Ltd-Redacted
Page 2 · response
Published 8 February 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Consult members, review recommendations, and cascade appropriate risk-control recommendations for individual implementation after the industry risk assessment is finalised.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• The ORCi recognises that, as identified by your Report, appropriate control measures need to be kept under review to ensure practices are safe. We can confirm that we are aware that Incarace are continuing to undertake a process of consultation with experts and professionals to produce a Risk Assessment, including the appropriate control measures, for application across the industry. Once this”

Source location
2020-0003-Response-from-ORCi-Redacted-1
Page 1 · response
Published 8 February 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
The prohibition on pedestrians entering the track while vehicles are moving makes designated protected walkways unnecessary.

Verbatim wording from the response
“2. Urgent action is required to ensure pedestrians on the track have clear protected walkways and safe areas away from large recovery vehicles”

Source location
2020-0003-Response-from-Incarace-Ltd-Redacted
Page 2 · response
Published 8 February 2020
Open published response

Data last updated 7 September 2026

What this concern includes

Not included

Reports over time

Concerns raised4

Absence of safety briefings for riders before track use

Failure to control track access and maximum rider numbers

Failure to segregate riders by skill, ability and bike power

Failure to obtain riders’ next-of-kin and medical information before track access

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.3

Concerns raised2

Lack of a requirement for a recorded event-specific safety plan at National and Club events

Failure of the grass-track event risk assessment process to produce event-specific assessments and meaningful conclusions about risk control

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.2

Concerns raised3

Failure to control pedestrian access to and movement on the track during vehicle movements

Prize giving procedure taking place on the track amongst moving vehicles

Risk assessment failing to adequately protect pedestrians on the track

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.4

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.1

Respondent positions 3

Actions described in response 2

Actions described in response 4

Respondent positions 1