Recurring concern

Unreliable safety controls for shooting-range operations

First to latest report 14 Nov 2013 — 10 Jun 2021

Reports that mention this concern: 3
Times this concern has been raised: 6
Stated actions linked to this concern: 0

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated shooting-range operational safety controls, including range-officer assurance checks, competent supervision, weapon or ammunition control, shooter oversight, first-aid readiness and other controls specifically intended to make shooting-range operations safe.

What is not included

Excludes generic training, staffing, planning or time-pressure deficiencies unless they directly impair a dedicated shooting-range safety control.
Excludes firearm, ammunition or weapons-control concerns outside shooting-range operations.
Excludes general workplace or public-safety deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the safe operation of a shooting range.
Excludes the underlying activity of shooting or the occurrence of an incident without an identified deficient range-safety control.

Trends

Reports over time

Reports mentioning this concern, over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Ministry of Defence2

BAE Systems plc1

Home Office1

Reports and published responses 3 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

10 Jun2021
Manchester South
Concerns raised4
1. Failure to provide continuous competent range officer supervision of shooters
2. Failure to control weapon loading and account for ammunition
3. Failure to provide first-aid-trained staff and a first-aid kit
1. Failure to keep weapons and ammunition secure, controlled and supervised at all times
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
No linked response statements
No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
AI-generated summary

Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Emiel Ariel Malinski attended a miniature rifle range on 2 November 2020, where he fired a rifle in the direction of his right temple and later died in hospital. The report recorded that he died as a consequence of suicide and raised concerns about the limited regulation of miniature rifle ranges, including the absence of requirements for supervision, secure weapons, ammunition control and first-aid provision.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide continuous competent range officer supervision of shooters
Wider context from the report
“It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”
Source location
Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to control weapon loading and account for ammunition
Wider context from the report
“It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”
Source location
Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide first-aid-trained staff and a first-aid kit
Wider context from the report
“It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”
Source location
Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to keep weapons and ammunition secure, controlled and supervised at all times
Wider context from the report
“It is a matter of concern that the continued existence and operation of s11 (4) Firearms Act 1968 enables miniature rifle ranges to operate with no minimal regulation, with attendees able to fire miniature rifles and ammunition not exceeding .23 calibre and air weapons in a largely unregulated environment. In addition, it is a matter of particular concern that the following specific requirements do not currently apply to miniature rifle ranges: 1) Requirement for the user to sign a prohibited person (Section 21) declaration on each and every visit; 2) Requirement for the weapon to be securely tethered so that any projectile discharged from it can only be ‘down range’; 3) Requirement for a competent Range Conducting Officer (“RCO”) to be present on the range at all times to enable effective supervision of the shooter; 4) Requirement for the weapon to be loaded for the customer by the RCO or other member of staff so ammunition may be accounted for; 5) Requirement for the RCO or other member of staff present to be first aid trained with a first aid kit present; 6) Requirement for any weapon or ammunition used on the range to be kept secure, controlled and supervised by a member of staff at all times. ”
Source location
Emiel Ariel Malinski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
18 Jul2018
Birmingham and Solihull
Concerns raised1
1. Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Linked response

Ministry of Defence
Respondent positions 2
1. Ministry of Defence
  Requiring the RCO to keep contemporaneous tank-status records or maintain a centrally managed system would be impractical and distract from range safety duties.
  Unable to act
1. Ministry of Defence
  Crew responsibility, training, revised drills and repeated component checks make the risk of firing without safety-critical components acceptably low.
  Existing arrangements considered sufficient
AI-generated summary

Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Cpls Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing hot pressurised gases to enter the turret, the breech block to explode and a subsequent fire. The substantive concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate information about tank status available to the Range Conducting Officer, and insufficient risk assessment of the gun’s ability to fire without the BVA assembly.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of the person in charge of live firing exercises to maintain up-to-date knowledge of tank status on the range
Wider context from the report
“2. One of the contributing factors to this tragedy was that the RCO, the person in charge of the live firing exercise, did not know the state of the tanks on the range and therefore allocated a stripped down tank for a live firing exercise. I remain concerned that it is vital that the person in charge of such exercises has up to date knowledge about the status of the tanks on the range. The MOD should look at what communication can be put in place to ensure the RCO is in fact in charge and has all the correct information to make decisions during the exercise. ”
Source location
Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 3 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Requiring the RCO to keep contemporaneous tank-status records or maintain a centrally managed system would be impractical and distract from range safety duties.

Verbatim wording from the response
“It is essential that the RCO is focused on delivering a safe live firing exercise. Any requirements for the RCO to keep contemporaneous records on the state of the tanks would detract from his focus on the safety of the range as a whole.”

Source location
2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 5 · response
Published 23 September 2018
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Crew responsibility, training, revised drills and repeated component checks make the risk of firing without safety-critical components acceptably low.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The Army judges that any potential risk presented by the RCO not being aware of the state of tanks on the range is ALARP. As indicated above the revised drills and procedures ensure that there is no scenario in which a crew could proceed to fire the main gun without first having completed the ‘prove the gun’ drill which mandates a specific check for the presence of the BVA, obturator and shim (Paragraph 6.19). Even if the ‘prove the gun’ drill was not adequately completed the presence of the BVA, obturator and shim would be checked again upon ‘going to action’ and if necessary again upon receiving a ‘TVEDU – Red Indication or No Display’ (an inevitable consequence if the BVA is missing).”

Source location
2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
Page 6 · response
Published 23 September 2018
Open published response
14 Nov2013
Central and South East Kent
Concerns raised1
1. Insufficient time for the Range Conducting Officer’s final assurance check
No linked response statements
No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
AI-generated summary

Dean Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Dean Griffiths died during a live-firing exercise at Lydd Ranges in September 2011 after a shot passed through a target and perimeter wall and struck him. The principal concern was time pressure to complete exercises, with a need for sufficient time for the Range Conducting Officer to complete a final assurance check.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Insufficient time for the Range Conducting Officer’s final assurance check
Wider context from the report
“There were time pressures of completing the exercises within the allocated time available to the Range Conducting Officer. I believe that the Exercise Director must ensure that the Planning Officer allows sufficient time for the RCO to complete his final assurance check. ”
Source location
Dean Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report