Recurring concern

Unreliable sharing of safety-critical risk information within prisons

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First reported 14 Aug 2013•Latest report 8 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures within prison processes to communicate, transfer, receive, read or make available safety-critical risk information to staff responsible for a prisoner's care, supervision or risk management, including verbal and written information and information shared during custody or care handovers.

Not included

  • Excludes the separate prison healthcare-to-prison-staff interface when that narrower named process is the supported concern.
  • Excludes generic staff training, communication or documentation deficiencies unless they directly impair sharing safety-critical risk information within a prison.
  • Excludes failures to assess or manage risk after relevant information was reliably shared.
  • Excludes information-sharing with probation, families or external agencies unless the assertion also concerns the internal prison sharing process.
  • Excludes general prison staffing, supervision or observation deficiencies where no risk-information-sharing failure is identified.
Reports
19

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
25

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
32

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service12
Ministry of Justice5
HM Prison Service3
Care UK2
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust2
Hewell Prison2
Nottingham Prison2
Belmarsh Prison1
Bristol Prison1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Elmley Prison1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
HCRG Care Services Ltd1
HM Inspectorate of Prisons1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jonathan Mark Thornton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jonathan Mark Thornton died at Queens Medical Centre in Nottingham on 12 July 2024 after sustaining a severe head injury in an attack by a fellow inmate at HMP Nottingham on 28 June 2024. The report raises concerns about inadequate information sharing between community forensic, prison healthcare and operational prison staff, and about the categorisation and visibility of risk alerts on NOMIS/DPS, creating a risk of future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficiently detailed and visible NOMIS/DPS risk-alert categorisation for operational prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Categorisation and visibility of alerts on NOMIS/DPS I heard that NOMIS/DPS has preset categorisation of alerts. The categories are limited and broad. This means that ‘violent’ prisoners – regardless of the particulars of that violence – will all be categorised together. This case illustrated quite clearly that there are certain categories of offender who require better particularisation of their risk. In this case, that was those prisoners with a history of assaulting fellow inmates. I was told that unless a prisoner has assaulted a cellmate, which would be subject to its own assessment, the operational prison staff would not necessarily know whether their violent behaviour was aimed at prison officers, other prisoners or simply a genera violent behaviour linked to their offending. Clearly, each of these categories gives rise to a particular risk within a prison setting. I am concerned that if more detailed categorisation and/or information is not provided to the operational prison staff within NOMIS/DPS alerts, with clear visibility, this gives rise to a risk of future death. I understand that this is controlled nationally. Moreover, I understand that the Healthcare Staff are unable to view NOMIS/DPS alerts. This gives rise to the same risk. ”

    Source location

    Jonathan Mark Thornton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review NOMIS/DPS alerts later in 2026 with safety, digital and policy experts to improve their consistency, clarity, visibility and usability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current system already contains more granularity than a single “violent” categorisation. However, we recognise that improvements are needed in consistency, clarity and visibility. A dedicated programme of work is scheduled to review alerts later this calendar year, subject to prioritisation, and will be undertaken in collaboration with safety experts, digital and policy colleagues. This work will strengthen both the quality and usability of alerts in order to reduce risk and support safer decision-making. We will ensure that the findings from this review inform future enhancements and address the matters you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure findings from the NOMIS/DPS alerts review inform future enhancements addressing the identified concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current system already contains more granularity than a single “violent” categorisation. However, we recognise that improvements are needed in consistency, clarity and visibility. A dedicated programme of work is scheduled to review alerts later this calendar year, subject to prioritisation, and will be undertaken in collaboration with safety experts, digital and policy colleagues. This work will strengthen both the quality and usability of alerts in order to reduce risk and support safer decision-making. We will ensure that the findings from this review inform future enhancements and address the matters you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Ministry of Justice is responsible for NOMIS/DPS alerts, so it will lead the response to concerns about their categorisation and visibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report acknowledges that the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is responsible for the NOMIS/DPS and states that you have sent a copy of this report to the Ministry of Justice for their response. We shall therefore defer to the MoJ in responding to your concerns about alerts within NOMIS/DPS.”

    Source location

    Response from Northampton Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NOMIS/DPS already provides more granularity than a single “violent” categorisation, although improvements in consistency, clarity and visibility are needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current system already contains more granularity than a single “violent” categorisation. However, we recognise that improvements are needed in consistency, clarity and visibility. A dedicated programme of work is scheduled to review alerts later this calendar year, subject to prioritisation, and will be undertaken in collaboration with safety experts, digital and policy colleagues. This work will strengthen both the quality and usability of alerts in order to reduce risk and support safer decision-making. We will ensure that the findings from this review inform future enhancements and address the matters you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 April 2026

    Open published response
  2. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Ronald William MEIKLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ronald William Meikle was found unresponsive in his single-occupancy cell at HMP Woodhill on 30 April 2024 and was pronounced dead at 09:43. The report identified concerns about illicit substances, inconsistent responses to suspected intoxication, fragmented information-sharing, inadequate welfare observations, management of self-isolation and vulnerability, absence of ACCT proceedings, mental-health input, emergency response, staffing, and recurring systemic problems at the prison.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably consolidate and share relevant prisoner risk information

    Wider context from the report

    “Concern 3: Fragmented information-sharing and record keeping The evidence demonstrated that relevant risk information was spread across multiple recording systems and was not always shared effectively between operational staff and clinical teams. This included information relevant to substance misuse, mental health, debt, bullying or coercion, self-isolation, intelligence about threats, recent presentation under the influence. Where critical safety information is held in separate systems and not reliably brought together, there is a foreseeable risk that warning signs will be missed and protective action delayed with obvious risk of harm or death. ”

    Source location

    Ronald William MEIKLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise handover documentation, including a prompt to identify information requiring sharing with prison colleagues.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 3: Information sharing and record keeping. Handover documentation has been revised. This has improved identification and escalation of concerns to prison colleagues. We are ensuring that healthcare attend multidisciplinary forums, weekly Safety Intervention Meetings, and daily wing briefings. We have added a prompt to our handover to ensure that staff consider what information needs to be shared with prison colleagues.”

    Source location

    Response from Central & North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure healthcare participation in multidisciplinary forums, weekly Safety Intervention Meetings and daily wing briefings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 3: Information sharing and record keeping. Handover documentation has been revised. This has improved identification and escalation of concerns to prison colleagues. We are ensuring that healthcare attend multidisciplinary forums, weekly Safety Intervention Meetings, and daily wing briefings. We have added a prompt to our handover to ensure that staff consider what information needs to be shared with prison colleagues.”

    Source location

    Response from Central & North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Healthcare services alone cannot mitigate all risks within custody.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Thank you for bringing your concerns to our attention. While healthcare services alone cannot mitigate all risks within custody, the Trust is committed to learning from Mr Meikle’s death and to strengthening how vulnerability is identified and responded to across Health and Justice services. Should you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me.”

    Source location

    Response from Central & North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY, who had a history of mental health issues and significant cocaine misuse, was remanded to HMP Chelmsford on 27 January 2024 after expressing an intention to end his life. He was found suspended in his cell about seven hours after arrival and died at Broomfield Hospital on 1 February 2024; the medical cause of death was hanging and the jury concluded suicide. The principal concerns included failures in mental-health care, communication and risk documentation, failure to share information about his extreme suicide risk, inadequate assessment and supervision in prison, and the accessibility of cell-window ligature points.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share critical suicide-risk information with prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “In addition to failing to share crucial and obviously relevant information regarding Mr Berry’s extreme risk of suicide provided by the CPN at Court with prison staff, the jury found that the reception nurse, in the context of the clear information known to her, failed to: (a) document his risk of self-harm and suicide in the Systm One records and (b) failed to refer Mr Berry, that day, for an urgent review by the Mental Health team. CONCERN: Such comprehensive shortcomings in performance in respect of information sharing, conduct of assessments, basic documentation and escalation/referral on to relevant colleagues indicates (a) a failure in training of a very concerning kind, alongside (b) a failure in HCRG monitoring of standards, supervision and quality assurance processes to identify and address such extensive failures in performance. ”

    Source location

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish and staff a dedicated Early Days in Custody Nurse role to oversee reception screening, risk assessment, information sharing, escalation, supervision, and quality assurance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are focusing on strengthening the interfaces between healthcare and custodial services, retraining reception nurses, and introducing a dedicated Early Days in Custody (EDiC) Nurse role.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a formal Prisoner Warning Notice communication logbook and train relevant staff to record, communicate, and acknowledge custody-related risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Prisoner Warning Notices (PWN): The PWN is received into the prison via secure email and it is the responsibility of the Reception Nurse to review this notification on receiving a patient into custody, consider it in their assessment of patient risk and take immediate appropriate action, including sharing with Custodial Managers and Officers covering reception.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response
  4. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Martin COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martin Collins, a 66-year-old male serving a prison sentence, died by suicide after being found suspended in his cell at HMP Highpoint on 25 November 2023. The report raises concerns that the prison telephone system could not automatically identify unusually high call volumes and alert staff or healthcare, potentially missing opportunities to identify risk triggers and intervene.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify prison staff or healthcare of high or unusual prisoner telephone-call volumes

    Wider context from the report

    “The available telephone system for prisoners does not presently have the capability, in an automated manner, to recognise high or unusual volumes of calls by prisoners - and then to notify prison staff or healthcare in the event of such a pattern. This is despite the fact that the data on telephone calls made by a particular prisoner is available and is readily capable of being obtained, such that patterns of calls could be monitored manually by staff. The lack of system for monitoring of volumes of prisoners' telephone calls may lead to missed opportunities to identify risk triggers and so missed opportunities to intervene and prevent suicide. ”

    Source location

    Martin COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin John McDonnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin John McDonnell was discovered deceased in his prison cell on 29 September 2022, having died by ligature asphyxiation; the inquest concluded that he had died by suicide. The principal concerns included failures to conduct planned ACCT reviews and checks, share identified suicide-risk information, provide necessary mental-health support, and preserve accurate documentary evidence after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share risk pertinent information with all staff caring for a prisoner

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Prison staff have not read and understood the July 2021 annex to PSI 64/2011. There was a failure to share risk pertinent information about Kevin to all staff caring for him that day. ”

    Source location

    Kevin John McDonnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a trigger database accessible to all staff to share pertinent risk information about individuals in crisis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of information sharing, the Governor informs me that HMP Nottingham have introduced a ‘trigger’ database which contains any important/pertinent information that may impact on an individual’s risk. This database is accessible to all staff and enables the sharing of information specific to those in crisis ensuring they are supported during this time.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 August 2024

    Open published response
  6. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    James Devenny · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Devenny died in his cell at HMP Elmley on 2 September 2019, having been found hanging from a light fitting using a bedsheet ligature. The jury identified concerns including staff not being aware of his previous self-harm history, the absence of a medical assessment before his separation from other prisoners, an inappropriate response to mental health referrals, and inadequate access to phones and support services. The report also records concerns about prison officers not being routinely briefed about prisoners’ previous significant self-harm and related patterns of thoughts, feelings, events and behaviours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely brief Prison Officers about prisoners’ previous significant self-harm in custody

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Prison Officers are not routinely briefed as to prisoners who have previously significantly self harmed in custody. It is not clear as to the threshold of severity required before prison staff will be informed sae that they will be informed if a prisoner arrives with an open ACCT. Prison Officers are not routinely briefed as to a prisoner’s previous or antecedent pattern of thoughts, feelings, events and behaviours which have led to incidents of significant self-harm. ”

    Source location

    James Devenny · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear threshold for informing prison staff about significant self-harm risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Prison Officers are not routinely briefed as to prisoners who have previously significantly self harmed in custody. It is not clear as to the threshold of severity required before prison staff will be informed sae that they will be informed if a prisoner arrives with an open ACCT. Prison Officers are not routinely briefed as to a prisoner’s previous or antecedent pattern of thoughts, feelings, events and behaviours which have led to incidents of significant self-harm. ”

    Source location

    James Devenny · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely brief Prison Officers about prisoners’ antecedent patterns leading to significant self-harm

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Prison Officers are not routinely briefed as to prisoners who have previously significantly self harmed in custody. It is not clear as to the threshold of severity required before prison staff will be informed sae that they will be informed if a prisoner arrives with an open ACCT. Prison Officers are not routinely briefed as to a prisoner’s previous or antecedent pattern of thoughts, feelings, events and behaviours which have led to incidents of significant self-harm. ”

    Source location

    James Devenny · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement ACCT version 6 across the male estate, including strengthened risk-identification requirements and revised staff training and awareness materials.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will recall that evidence was given at the inquest about the updated version of Assessment Care in Custody and Teamwork version 6 (ACCT v6), which was due to be rolled out shortly after the inquest. I am pleased to confirm that ACCT v6 went live across the male estate in July 2021. Along with updates and improvements made to the ACCT document there is also an increased emphasis placed on up-skilling staff in relation to risk identification, and revised training modules and awareness materials have been made available to all staff at the prison.”

    Source location

    2021-0179-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide and routinely use an updated safety diagnostic tool consolidating violence, self-harm and other relevant risk information for staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An updated safety diagnostic tool which provides information about individuals is available to all staff. This includes information on violence and self-harm, and other relevant information drawn from NOMIS. The tool makes it easier to access all relevant risk information in one place and is routinely used by safer custody staff who flag any new receptions and any individuals they are concerned about to wing staff and other relevant departments within the prison.”

    Source location

    2021-0179-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Key Worker scheme, providing each person in custody with a dedicated worker and weekly meetings to identify risks, triggers and changes in self-harm or suicide risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The prison also now operates the Key Worker scheme, whereby all people in custody have a dedicated Key Worker who meets with them on a weekly basis. The intention of Key Work is to enable better relationships between staff and people in prison, and to support those in custody to settle into prison life. Key Workers are expected to be aware of an individual’s history and to work with them to help and support them with any issues. As part of this role key workers review National Offender Management Information System (NOMIS) case notes and look at any previous issues or risks, including self-harm. They are therefore well placed to recognise any changes in the level of an individual’s risk of self-harm or suicide and to be aware of any potential trigger dates which may indicate that an ACCT should be opened to provide increased support.”

    Source location

    2021-0179-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Previous self-harm incidents will not always be relevant to identifying current self-harm risks and triggers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your second concern is that prison officers are not routinely briefed about people who have previously significantly self-harmed in custody. While a knowledge of previous self-harm can be useful, and this information will be noted if it is available either on “National Offender Management Information System” the system used for informing about those in custody, or disclosed by the individual in question, previous incidents will not always be relevant in identifying current risks and triggers. As HMP Elmley is a busy local prison with a high turnover of people in their care, there is a focus on recognising risk and triggers for self-harm and suicide and being alert to any changes in an individual which may indicate an increase in risk.”

    Source location

    2021-0179-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing risk-recognition practices focus staff on current self-harm and suicide risks and changes indicating increased risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your second concern is that prison officers are not routinely briefed about people who have previously significantly self-harmed in custody. While a knowledge of previous self-harm can be useful, and this information will be noted if it is available either on “National Offender Management Information System” the system used for informing about those in custody, or disclosed by the individual in question, previous incidents will not always be relevant in identifying current risks and triggers. As HMP Elmley is a busy local prison with a high turnover of people in their care, there is a focus on recognising risk and triggers for self-harm and suicide and being alert to any changes in an individual which may indicate an increase in risk.”

    Source location

    2021-0179-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2021

    Open published response
  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Jason O’Rourke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jason O’Rourke died by suicide in his cell at HMP Belmarsh after hanging himself with a bedsheet ligature between 7.28 pm on 1 April 2019 and 9.33 am on 2 April 2019. The jury identified possible contributing factors including inadequate follow-up of his mental health, insufficient sharing and understanding of information about his mental health and self-harm history, and inadequate safety intervention meetings. The report also raised concerns about unclear self-harm and suicide risk assessments on arrival and the lack of robust auditing of nightly roll checks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the prisoner arrival form to sufficiently highlight self-harm and suicide risk to wing staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The ‘immediate needs’ form completed for prisoners on arrival at HMP Belmarsh does not facilitate a clear assessment of any risk of self-harm or suicide and the actions to be taken if such a risk is identified. The form poses a question: “Is there any specific concerns re self-harm or suicide?” and then gives the guidance “if yes, amend care plan”. However, this guidance is only effective for those prisoners who already have a care plan, meaning those who are already on an Open Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (‘ACCT’) plan. The action to be taken for those prisoners where specific concerns regarding self-harm or suicide are identified, but who do not already have a care plan, is unclear from the form. It is also unclear how the above question interacts with further questions below it which address any past ACCTs/F2052SHs, the level of support available to the prisoner and the answer the prisoner gives to the question “Do you feel suicidal now?” Accordingly, this form does not sufficiently highlight prisoners who are in fact suicidal, or where there are concerns about their risk of self-harm or suicidal, to those on the wing. ”

    Source location

    Jason O’Rourke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a revised immediate-needs form with clearer guidance for identifying, communicating and documenting suicide or self-harm risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following evidence heard at the inquest you have raised concerns in relation to the ‘immediate needs’ form completed for prisoners on arrival at HMP Belmarsh. This is a locally produced document created in line with the Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 07/2015 Early days in Custody. You will be aware that the early days in custody is a period in which risk of self-harm or suicide is heightened and the wellbeing of prisoners in our care is the primary concern of staff throughout the reception and first night process. Following the inquest a review of the form has taken place, and a new version is now in use.”

    Source location

    2021-0032-Response-from-HMPPS-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 February 2021

    Open published response
  8. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Anthony Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Anthony Brown, a prisoner at Dovegate, was pronounced dead in his cell on 25 December 2018. The inquest recorded accidental death, with aspiration of gastric contents and synthetic cannabinoid receptor antagonists identified as the causes; a concern was that relevant information held in different prison systems was not available to all staff who might have benefited from it.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make significant relevant prisoner information available to all staff

    Wider context from the report

    “Although there was no finding by the Jury that this was causative in respect of the death at times during the inquest it appeared that information in the central NOMIS records, information in the medical System 1 records and information available to the security department at the prison was not available to all staff at the prison who may have benefitted from having it. I did hear helpful evidence from the Head of Safer Custody ████████ that nationally efforts are being made to develop a system whereby significant relevant information about a prisoner is available to all staff. There is however no timescale for this. It strikes me that this would be very helpful and might prevent deaths in the future. I wonder if you can give me a progress report about this planned development and an indication as to when it might be implemented. ”

    Source location

    Robert Anthony Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automate patient administration data transfer from NOMIS to SystmOne through phase-one interoperability development.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you know, the commissioning of healthcare in English prisons is the responsibility of NHS England and NHS Improvement, and they are leading on work with HMPPS to implement inter-operability between SystmOne and NOMIS, in order to enable better sharing of information between prison and healthcare staff. This is a big project and there are three phases of implementation. Approximately fifty percent of the planned development work on phase one, which is automating patient administration data sent from NOMIS to SystmOne, has been completed.”

    Source location

    2020-0065-Response-from-the-Director-General-of-Prisons
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement phase-three interoperability to share risk information between NOMIS and SystmOne.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you know, the commissioning of healthcare in English prisons is the responsibility of NHS England and NHS Improvement, and they are leading on work with HMPPS to implement inter-operability between SystmOne and NOMIS, in order to enable better sharing of information between prison and healthcare staff. This is a big project and there are three phases of implementation. Approximately fifty percent of the planned development work on phase one, which is automating patient administration data sent from NOMIS to SystmOne, has been completed.”

    Source location

    2020-0065-Response-from-the-Director-General-of-Prisons
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Safer Custody Zone to enable prison, mental health and substance misuse staff to collaborate and routinely share key information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While this IT project is underway, and forms an important part of the solution to the challenges presented by the information sharing in the prison environment, work is also being done at a local level to ensure that prison staff and NHS staff work together more effectively. At Dovegate, the Safer Custody Zone was formed in 2019 to provide an area in which prison staff, the Mental Health Team and the Integrated Substance Misuse Team are able to work together each day to ensure that key information is routinely shared. The introduction of the new system will further enhance this collaborative work and will enable information to be readily accessible to all staff.”

    Source location

    2020-0065-Response-from-the-Director-General-of-Prisons
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England and NHS Improvement lead implementation of the information-sharing project and should provide further updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you know, the commissioning of healthcare in English prisons is the responsibility of NHS England and NHS Improvement, and they are leading on work with HMPPS to implement inter-operability between SystmOne and NOMIS, in order to enable better sharing of information between prison and healthcare staff. This is a big project and there are three phases of implementation. Approximately fifty percent of the planned development work on phase one, which is automating patient administration data sent from NOMIS to SystmOne, has been completed.”

    Source location

    2020-0065-Response-from-the-Director-General-of-Prisons
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further information-sharing project work is temporarily halted because the supplier was directed to prioritise COVID-19-related work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, further work on this initiative has been temporarily halted by Total Phoenix Partnership (TPP), the supplier responsible for SystmOne, who have been directed to focus on COVID-19 related work. This will cause a delay, currently estimated at 8 weeks, meaning delivery of the completed phase one work is now forecast for August 2020. The sharing of risk information between NOMIS and SystmOne will form part of phase three of the project implementation, and it is forecast to be completed in 2021. If you would like any further information or updates on the project, then I would suggest contacting NHS England and NHS Improvement, as they are the lead organisation for the implementation process.”

    Source location

    2020-0065-Response-from-the-Director-General-of-Prisons
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 March 2020

    Open published response
  9. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Shaun William Dewey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shaun William Dewey, a remand prisoner, was found hanging in his cell at HMP Bristol and died on 13 April 2018 after suspending himself from a ligature tied to the bed frame. The inquest identified anxiety, depression, separation from family, uncoordinated supervision, erratic medication use, and insufficient application of prison, healthcare and mental health systems as contributory factors. Concerns included whether remand prisoners’ higher risk of self-harm or suicide should be reflected in staff training, prisoner care, ACCT documentation and national guidance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to highlight the higher risk of self-harm or suicide among remand prisoners to prison and healthcare staff

    Wider context from the report

    “My concern is therefore whether the risk of remand prisoners being at higher risk of self-harm or suicide should be: • considered by those designing the training for staff; • a factor generally highlighted to those caring for prisoners including prison staff and healthcare teams that is both the mental and physical health teams. • a risk highlighted on the ACCT document or • reflected in any re-draft of PSI 64/2011 national guidance – “Management of prisoners at risk of harm to self, to others and from others (safer custody)” ”

    Source location

    Shaun William Dewey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminated guidance identifying remand status as a suicide and self-harm risk factor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you rightly point out, whilst Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 64/2011 ‘Safer Custody’ contains lists of identified risks and triggers for suicide and self-harm that include factors that are relevant to many remand prisoners (such as early days in custody), it does not mention remand status itself. However, we frequently supplement the list in the PSI with additional information for staff, and this has included references to the increased risk posed by remand prisoners. For instance, the April 2014 Prison and Probation Ombudsman learning bulletin, from which you have quoted in your report, was disseminated widely within prisons, and more recent guidance issued by our prison safety team and made available to staff on the HMPPS intranet includes remand status as a risk factor for suicide. Training based on this more recent guidance has also been provided to staff in a number of prisons.”

    Source location

    2019-0398-Response-from-Director-General-of-Prisons_Redacted-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provided staff training based on guidance recognising remand status as a suicide and self-harm risk factor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you rightly point out, whilst Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 64/2011 ‘Safer Custody’ contains lists of identified risks and triggers for suicide and self-harm that include factors that are relevant to many remand prisoners (such as early days in custody), it does not mention remand status itself. However, we frequently supplement the list in the PSI with additional information for staff, and this has included references to the increased risk posed by remand prisoners. For instance, the April 2014 Prison and Probation Ombudsman learning bulletin, from which you have quoted in your report, was disseminated widely within prisons, and more recent guidance issued by our prison safety team and made available to staff on the HMPPS intranet includes remand status as a risk factor for suicide. Training based on this more recent guidance has also been provided to staff in a number of prisons.”

    Source location

    2019-0398-Response-from-Director-General-of-Prisons_Redacted-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise suicide and self-harm prevention training and update its risk-and-trigger recognition module to reflect the new policy framework and ACCT changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “evaluation report and expect to make some further changes before the national rollout. I will ensure that your point about the need to bring attention to the risks associated with remand status is considered as we do so. We will also be revising the Introduction to Suicide and Self Harm Prevention training (a course that is undertaken by all staff with prisoner contact) to reflect and support the new policy framework and changes to ACCT. Again, we will use this opportunity to ensure that the module on recognising risks and triggers is reviewed and updated.”

    Source location

    2019-0398-Response-from-Director-General-of-Prisons_Redacted-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2019

    Open published response
  10. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Davey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Davey, aged 21, died at John Radcliffe Hospital on 12 January 2018 after deliberately overdosing on propranolol in his cell at HMP Bullingdon Prison. The report raises concerns about healthcare attendance at ACCT reviews, risk assessments and management of in-possession medication, cell searches, and failures to share and act on information relevant to his safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate advance notification and information sharing for ACCT reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Healthcare attendance at ACCT reviews – This concern relates to both the prison and healthcare. It was clear from evidence from prison and healthcare staff that it was not routine for healthcare to attend ACCT reviews. This is a significant concern and it is not in accordance with local and national policy. I understand that there were occasions when prison staff requested healthcare attendance, but no one was available. The system of providing advance notification to healthcare about the date of ACCT reviews was not comprehensive. It resulted in ACCT reviews, as in this case, taking place without information being available to the assessor/reviewer. For example, information about suicidal ideation/attempts and other information disclosed to healthcare and also information about ‘in possession medication’. Encouragingly, the evidence from prison and healthcare staff was that ACCT reviews no longer take place without healthcare attendance and/or input (perhaps over the telephone). It would be helpful if there could be a further level of reassurance provided, firstly, communications between prison and healthcare staff in the conduct of ACCT reviews and, secondly, a process of auditing ACCT reviews in order to pick up cases where there is no healthcare input. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Davey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop escalation procedures with Care UK and the prison for occasions when healthcare cannot attend an ACCT review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Local Operating Procedure identifies there is an expectation that the staff attending the ACCT record this on SystmOne and future reviews are diarised for attendance. We will actively contribute to quality assurance checks of compliance with this Local Operating Policy including those done as part of the PROTECT audits and are committed to improving our service delivery in response to any actions identified within these checks. In addition we will work with Care UK and the prison in the development of procedures for escalation should healthcare, for any reason, be unable to attend an ACCT review.”

    Source location

    2019-0267-Response-by-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff to update medication-in-possession risk assessments during medication reviews so changes feed into ACCT information for dispensing and prison staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: As was stated at the inquest, our prescriber’s always record on the prescription form whether the medication they are prescribing should be held in possession. We have reminded our staff to ensure when they are reviewing any medication that they, where necessary, include an update of the ‘Medication In possession risk assessment’ which goes onto SystmOne, which in turn will feed into the ACCT. This ensures that both dispensing staff and prison staff are aware of any changes and respond accordingly, this will include the removal of any medicines currently being held.”

    Source location

    2019-0267-Response-by-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the new ACCT case-management process, including dedicated case managers, review booking oversight and daily healthcare attendance allocation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In June 2019, a new way of operating the ACCT case management system was implemented at Bullingdon, with a specific case manager being allocated to each ACCT case. This system allows ACCT reviews to be booked by the case managers on a spreadsheet that is overseen by the safer custody department. Reviews can be organised earlier through this booking system, giving healthcare better capability to ensure attendance at all reviews, and each day an identified member of healthcare staff is responsible for attending each review or allocating an attendee to go in their place. If there are any issues with healthcare attendance, case managers are asked to inform the safer custody department and remedial action is taken.”

    Source location

    2019-0267-Response-by-HM-Prison-Probation-Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 October 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026