Recurring concern

Unreliable tracking and completeness checking of faxed referrals and information

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First reported 29 Jul 2016•Latest report 14 May 2018

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated faxed-information transfer process, including logging sent or received faxes, confirming receipt, checking completeness and retaining an audit trail where those failures could result in missing or unrecognised safety-critical information.

Not included

  • Excludes generic clinical or administrative record-keeping deficiencies not concerning faxed information transfer.
  • Excludes failures of scrutiny or assessment of information after a reliably completed fax transfer.
  • Excludes unrelated failures involving other communication channels, documents or systems unless the report explicitly ties them to the faxed-information transfer process.
Reports
3

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
4

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2016–2018

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
5

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Avenue House Nursing and Care Home1
Care Quality Commission1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Kettering General Hospital1
Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Three Chequers Medical Practice1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Gladys Kathleen Rich · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gladys Kathleen Rich suffered repeated falls after moving into Avenue House Nursing and Care Home, culminating in a fall on 28 December 2016 that caused traumatic subdural and subarachnoid haemorrhages and a skull fracture. She died on 3 March 2017; the medical cause of death included chest infection, intracranial haemorrhage and a fall, with rectal cancer and liver metastases also recorded. The principal concerns related to failures to identify and manage her falls risk, ineffective referral and follow-up by the care home and Falls Prevention Service, inadequate resources and equipment, and the absence of an effective system to ensure required falls-prevention input was delivered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transmit and resubmit completed falls action plans through the required process

    Wider context from the report

    “c) Once a referral was made, and a falls risk action plan was received the advice within does not appear to have been properly considered or actioned. Furthermore, the action plan was returned to the Falls Prevention Service by post rather than the required method of facsimile. Although the care home was notified that the Falls Prevention Service had not received the completed action plan, it was not resubmitted. Despite Mrs Rich then suffering a series of further falls, no new referrals were made to the Falls Prevention Service. ”

    Source location

    Gladys Kathleen Rich · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact the Falls Team after sending referrals and action plans, confirm receipt and intended action, and record each contact in residents’ care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although we believe we followed normal and reasonable procedures in this case, in future to further mitigate against shortcomings of the Falls Team, we will contact them after sending them referrals and action plans. This will be done to ensure that the Falls Team have received them and to find out what action they intend to take. All contact will be recorded in our residents’ Care plans under the visiting professionals’ information section.”

    Source location

    2018-0149_Redacted-Response-by-Avenue-House-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    After submitting referrals and action plans, the care home must wait for the Falls Team’s input and decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “C) The management of the home completed the falls risk assessment and action plan and sent this by post, and not by the fax facility. There was a copy of this in the resident’s file for reference. There was no information in the resident’s file to say that the falls team hadn’t received this information. Mrs Rich had also been referred to the Falls Team prior to admission to Avenue House and again this was not followed up by the Falls Team. Once falls risk action plans are received by the falls team, they do not typically give the home even a rough estimate of how long it will be before it is followed up and the resident is seen. Therefore the care home simply has to wait for the Falls’ Team’s input.”

    Source location

    2018-0149_Redacted-Response-by-Avenue-House-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
  2. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Christopher Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Christopher Roberts, a music student with a history of psychosis and a previous intentional insulin overdose, took a large overdose of insulin and prescribed psychotropic medication after returning to Sussex. He was admitted to intensive care in a coma with significant hypoxic brain damage and later died from a major haemorrhage at the tracheostomy site caused by acute arteritis of the innominate artery. Concerns included failures to log and scrutinise referral faxes, consider written clinical and risk information before assessing urgency, confirm the date of first contact, and formally review the death and seek relevant learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to log and scrutinise faxes received by the Bognor EI team for missing pages and information

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That there was no relevant policy, procedure or practice requiring faxes to the Bognor EI team be logged and scrutinised on receipt so that it might be noted if faxed pages were missing and potentially important information not received. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Christopher Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Display fax-handling guidance above EIP fax equipment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust staff must complete Information Governance training annually to ensure that information received and sent is managed safely and effectively. The training includes clear guidance on receiving and sending faxes. 88% of staff employed in our Early Intervention in Psychosis Services (EIPS) have completed this training within the last year. Following Mr Roberts’ inquest, the Senior EIP Management Team identified the need to supplement this training to ensure the Information Governance Principles were being followed by their staff. Therefore, the team designed and produced posters setting out the key guidance around the receipt of faxes. These are displayed above all fax equipment used by EIP staff.”

    Source location

    2017-0028-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure 100% completion of Information Governance training among EIP staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust staff must complete Information Governance training annually to ensure that information received and sent is managed safely and effectively. The training includes clear guidance on receiving and sending faxes. 88% of staff employed in our Early Intervention in Psychosis Services (EIPS) have completed this training within the last year. Following Mr Roberts’ inquest, the Senior EIP Management Team identified the need to supplement this training to ensure the Information Governance Principles were being followed by their staff. Therefore, the team designed and produced posters setting out the key guidance around the receipt of faxes. These are displayed above all fax equipment used by EIP staff.”

    Source location

    2017-0028-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Finalize, approve, disseminate and embed shared EIP referral standards covering information review, risk assessment, contact planning and recordkeeping.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The EIP Team Leaders and Senior Clinicians within the EIP service have reflected on this and have developed a clear set of shared standards for accepting referrals. Key elements of the standards are:”

    Source location

    2017-0028-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  3. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Miles Benedict Abel · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 14 January 2016, Miles Benedict Abel died after placing a ligature around his neck while at home. The concerns related to the referral process from a GP surgery to the Community Mental Health Team, including the absence of an audit trail confirming that referral faxes were sent and inconsistent follow-up calls to check receipt.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an audit trail for faxed referrals to the Community Mental Health Team

    Wider context from the report

    “(1)The procedure in place at the time of Miles death where a GP from the surgery wished to refer a patient to the Community Mental Health Team was to fax the request but no audit trail was kept to show the fax had been sent. (2 ) Although a telephone call was supposed to be made by the surgery to check that the fax had been received this was not always followed. (3) Hence if for any reason the fax was not sent and the follow up telephone call was not made the Community Mental Health Team would be unaware of the fact a patient had been referred to them. ”

    Source location

    Miles Benedict Abel · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consistently telephone the Community Mental Health Team to confirm receipt of faxed referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “(1)The procedure in place at the time of Miles death where a GP from the surgery wished to refer a patient to the Community Mental Health Team was to fax the request but no audit trail was kept to show the fax had been sent. (2 ) Although a telephone call was supposed to be made by the surgery to check that the fax had been received this was not always followed. (3) Hence if for any reason the fax was not sent and the follow up telephone call was not made the Community Mental Health Team would be unaware of the fact a patient had been referred to them. ”

    Source location

    Miles Benedict Abel · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Institute an urgent-fax SOP requiring sender logging, transmission and recipient confirmation, record scanning, and automatic notification to the referring doctor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Critical Reporting Incident that followed the recent death of a patient, we have reviewed the system above and have instituted the new system – (Standard Operating Procedure - SOP enclosed):”

    Source location

    2016-0277-Response-by-The-Endless-Street-Doctors-Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The strengthened and robust local referral system is considered sufficient to address referrals to the Community Mental Health Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your concern relates to the process followed at the Endless Street Surgery for referring patients to the Community Mental Health Team. I am aware that the Surgery has responded to your concerns, confirming that a strengthened and robust system for referral of patients to the Community Mental Health Team is now in place.”

    Source location

    2016-0277-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for addressing the referral process rests locally with the surgery rather than centrally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your concern relates to the process followed at the Endless Street Surgery for referring patients to the Community Mental Health Team. I am aware that the Surgery has responded to your concerns, confirming that a strengthened and robust system for referral of patients to the Community Mental Health Team is now in place.”

    Source location

    2016-0277-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2016

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026