Recurring concern

Unreliable tracking and transfer of completed mental health-related forms

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First reported 16 Apr 2015•Latest report 6 Jul 2021

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated process for tracking, transferring, receiving or confirming the disposition of completed mental health-related forms, including mental health proformas and completed Appropriate Adult forms where they support mental-health or custody-related care and safeguarding.

Not included

  • Excludes generic clinical record-keeping or information-sharing deficiencies not specifically concerning the tracking or transfer of completed mental health-related forms.
  • Excludes failures to complete, assess or act on the substantive clinical content of a form when the form's tracking or transfer is not deficient.
  • Excludes unrelated referral, appointment, investigation or administrative forms without a supported mental-health or custody-related form-control connection.
Reports
3

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
3

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2021

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
1

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care UK1
Crown Prosecution Service1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Durham Prison1
G4S Forensic & Medical Services (UK) Ltd1
GeoAmey PECS Limited1
Greater Manchester Combined Authority1
Greater Manchester Police1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Home Office1
Lancashire County Council1
Lincolnshire Police1
Medacs Healthcare Limited1
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government1
National Police Chiefs’ Council1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Levi Craig Don Pettit · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Levi Craig Don Pettit was reported to police as having suicidal ideations on 8 December 2019. Four days later, he died by suicide; concerns included the handling of the police response, including the failure to complete or make required referrals and uncertainty about relevant policy and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to track the disposition of completed mental health proformas

    Wider context from the report

    “(III) DS ████████ when asked did not know what happened to the mental health proforma when completed ”

    Source location

    Levi Craig Don Pettit · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Officers need not understand the mental-health proforma data workflow because it does not affect care; existing training and administrator checks suffice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would not expect DS ████████ to know what happens to the mental health proforma once completed. Officers are trained (see below) to understand that the mental health proforma provides a statistical return that is used by the Home Office and other stakeholders to understand the local data for mental health policing. It is not a referral mechanism. We do have an administrator who checks against our incidents to ensure that mental health proforma have been completed when required. Understanding the mechanics of the workflow of this statistical submission would not contribute to officers’ work “on the ground”.”

    Source location

    2021-0231-Response-from-Lincolnshire-Police_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 July 2021

    Open published response
  2. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Thomas · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Thomas died by suicide while in HMP Durham after arriving on remand and undergoing reception and first-night induction. Information suggesting suicidal intent was not adequately communicated or identified because of failures involving the SASH and PER forms across escort, prison reception and healthcare staff. The report raised concerns about procedures failing under demanding but foreseeable conditions, unclear inter-agency responsibilities, inadequate tracking of information, and poor interoperability between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a detailed, documented and tracked account of SASH form transmission

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) That Prison reception staff in their evidence were adamant that a SASH form could never have been overlooked. However, prison staff at every level could provide no detailed, documented and tracked, account for how the SASH form had reached the prison records for Mr Thomas. There is an over reliance on the fidelity of the system, even when it has failed. No questions were asked at any stage on 21st July 2014, when it it passed from GEOAmey staff, to reception staff, to healthcare, or thereafter as to how a SASH form had arrived in the prison without being previously noticed. ”

    Source location

    Derek Thomas · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require reception staff to physically check, read, cross-reference and jointly sign prisoner documentation before escort departure, with daily staffing records and routine observation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reception – The Head of Operations at HMP Durham has instructed all staff working in reception that, prior to the escort contractor leaving the reception area, all documentation must be physically checked and read. The PER and all documentation must be cross referenced. It will be signed for by both staff. A daily detail is published which clearly identifies the members of staff who are working in reception on any given day and these are retained. The escort contractor has been informed of the process and is aware that the warrant and the SASH need to be handed to the supervising officer and the PER and property to the officer. All staff working in reception are expected to be competent in all areas of the process, both are situated side by side. A custodial manager and the Head of Operations will routinely observe this process.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unable to address individual staff and local HMP Durham issues because it no longer provides healthcare there.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware Care UK Clinical Services Limited (“Care UK”) ceased to be the providers of primary healthcare services at HMP Durham and for the North East cluster of prisons on 31st March 2015 and as of 1st April the providers appointed was G4S Medical Services who I note are also copied into your letter.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-Care-UK
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The contractor has no remit over HMP Durham staff compliance with Prison Service Instructions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The PER and any other available documentation including the SASH Form must be examined and prisoner interviewed in prison reception to assess the risk of self-harm or harm to others as part of the Cell Sharing Risk Assessment (paragraph 2.18). The information is recorded and shared with other departments and agencies (e.g. Healthcare) internally and externally and actions are to be documented (paragraphs 2.19 and 2.20). We have no remit over HMP Durham staff (who are MOJ employees) and their compliance with the PSIs.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-GEOAMEY
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Ministry of Justice has final responsibility for policy, procedures and documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The final say on policy, procedures and documentation is with the MOJ to whom we are contracted.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-GEOAMEY
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Kesia Lena Mary Leatherbarrow · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kesia Lena Mary Leatherbarrow, aged 17, died on 3 December 2013 after tying a ligature around her neck. The report describes missed opportunities among multiple agencies to obtain and share information, assess risks, and provide appropriate support, including concerns about her care and information handling while in police custody.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to return completed Appropriate Adult forms to Social Services

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence from Tameside Social Services indicated that they did not receive the completed form in relation to Kesia and that it was not unusual not to receive the completed forms in any cases. ”

    Source location

    Kesia Lena Mary Leatherbarrow · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026