Recurring concern

Unreliable vehicle suspension safety controls

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First reported 28 Apr 2015•Latest report 19 Mar 2019

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes deficiencies in the safety controls for vehicle suspension systems, including design or load-suitability review, inspection guidance, detection and management of component failure, maintenance, repair and assurance of suspension fitness for the operating load.

Not included

  • Excludes general vehicle approval or type-approval deficiencies where suspension safety is not the material concern.
  • Excludes generic vehicle maintenance or repair failures that do not specifically affect suspension safety controls.
  • Excludes failures involving unrelated vehicle systems, such as braking, steering, tyres or occupant restraints.
  • Excludes road, driving and operational hazards where no vehicle suspension-control failure is identified.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
2

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2019

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
6

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Health and Safety Executive1
Ministry of Defence1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Keith PARRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Keith Parry died on 2 March 2017 after being struck on the head by an ejected air-suspension component while repairing a heavy goods vehicle. The report raised concern that there were no published Health and Safety Executive guidelines for mechanics and their employers on working with air suspensions on heavy goods vehicles.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of published guidance for mechanics and their employers on working with air suspensions on heavy goods vehicles

    Wider context from the report

    “That there are no published guidelines by the Health and Safety Executive to mechanics and those companies that employ mechanics on how to work with or approach working with Air Suspensions on Heavy Goods Vehicles. The value of such guidance is that it would signpost strategies and risks attached to such work. ”

    Source location

    Mark Keith PARRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a safety alert identifying control measures and air-suspension risks across all vehicle types, then publish and publicise it through industry channels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HSE therefore plan to issue a safety alert, identifying the required control measures and emphasising the risks are present on all vehicle types with air suspension systems. As you can appreciate, this will take some time, as it will require consultation with industry; I hope this will be finalised by August 2019. The safety alert will be published on the HSE website and publicised through trade associations and e-bulletins.”

    Source location

    2019-0094-Response-by-HSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend PM85 to address control measures for ejection hazards from air-suspension systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Longer term, I will amend PM85 to address control measures in relation to ejection; and will review whether this guidance can be renamed to relate to all large vehicles with air suspension systems. I hope to complete this by the end of March 2020. HSG261 is also being updated and revised and the content relating to air suspension systems will be reviewed, though as a longer term project.”

    Source location

    2019-0094-Response-by-HSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review whether PM85 should be renamed to cover all large vehicles with air-suspension systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Longer term, I will amend PM85 to address control measures in relation to ejection; and will review whether this guidance can be renamed to relate to all large vehicles with air suspension systems. I hope to complete this by the end of March 2020. HSG261 is also being updated and revised and the content relating to air suspension systems will be reviewed, though as a longer term project.”

    Source location

    2019-0094-Response-by-HSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and revise HSG261, including reviewing its content on air-suspension systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Longer term, I will amend PM85 to address control measures in relation to ejection; and will review whether this guidance can be renamed to relate to all large vehicles with air suspension systems. I hope to complete this by the end of March 2020. HSG261 is also being updated and revised and the content relating to air suspension systems will be reviewed, though as a longer term project.”

    Source location

    2019-0094-Response-by-HSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

  2. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Colour Sergeant Martyn HORTON and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 23 June 2010, four service personnel died by drowning after their Ridgeback vehicle collided with a parked Afghan National Police vehicle, left the road and overturned in a canal in Afghanistan. The report raised concerns about the Ridgeback and related vehicle fleet, including suspension fitness, driver and gunner height restrictions, lighting effectiveness, tyre-pressure equipment, maintenance documentation, emergency lighting and recognition of recurring component failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review the whole suspension system for the additional operational load of UK specification vehicles

    Wider context from the report

    “(I) Suspension issues. During the course of the Inquest I heard how Ridgeback had been introduced into UK operational service as part of an urgent operational requirement to provide greater protection to UK service personnel on operation in Afghanistan due to the ever increasing threat that had been developing from improvised explosive devices. I heard how the original shell vehicle provided by the US manufacturer was modified to UK specifications by UK Government contractors and I heard that the resultant additional weight appears to have in particular resulted in an unusually large number of failures to the front spring hanger assembly, mounting bracket as well as leaf spring failures with four of those failures. Morgan Advanced Materials have been contracted to remedy the problem and I understand that additional information following the involvement of ████████ and members of the team of 710 Naval Squadron will be helpful in trying to find a solution. I have been provided with a timetable in respect of which various steps will be covered leading to a solution being found and rolled out which will exceed the usual 56 day time period to respond to a Regulation 28 Report. As part of my Regulation 28 duty I would like to monitor the resolution of the issue relative to the failures in the front suspension area and I am sure that the families of the four who died on 23 June 2010, even though that the failure to that particular vehicle (Spring hanger bolt failure) did not cause or contribute to their deaths, would also like to be appraised of developments insofar as sensitive material is not disclosed. I am however still concerned that the focus appears to be solely on the front suspension where the vast majority of the failures occurred. I would therefore ask for confirmation that given the modifications affected the overall operational load of the vehicle that the whole suspension system is reviewed with a view that ultimately it is fit for purpose having regard to the additional operational load that UK specification vehicles are required to deal with as compared to its American counterparts. In this respect I have suggested quarterly updates as a way forward. For the avoidance of any doubt although the inquest focussed on the Ridgeback, I am aware from the same Cougar family that the problem affected Wolfhound and Mastiff as well which of course the UK Government purchased as well. ”

    Source location

    Colour Sergeant Martyn HORTON and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review suspension data to determine the Cougar fleet maintenance schedule and issue a safety notice with findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your concerns we are conducting a review of the whole vehicle suspension system with consideration also being given to the rest of the Cougar fleet of vehicles (Mastiff and Wolfhound). This includes:”

    Source location

    2015-0164-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Ridgback suspension system and options for implementation, then make recommendations to Army Headquarters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. A full vehicle review of the Ridgback vehicle to determine the most effective suspension system and options for implementation. This is a more complex piece of work with a direct read-across from Ridgback to Mastiff and Wolfhound and will involve extensive physical prototyping and trialling before design and testing of the safety and operational”

    Source location

    2015-0164-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026