Recurring concern

Unsafe diving operations

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First reported 16 Sep 2016•Latest report 30 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to safe diving operations, including diver training and competence requirements, breathing-apparatus safety requirements, diver recovery or removal arrangements, and other operational controls intended to prevent or respond to diving emergencies.

Not included

  • Excludes generic training, equipment or emergency-response deficiencies not explicitly tied to diving operations.
  • Excludes hazards involving swimming, water sports or water rescue where diving operations are not the named safety concern.
  • Excludes the underlying condition or outcome of a diving incident when no deficiency in a dedicated diving-safety control is identified.
  • Excludes unrelated organisational, regulatory or occupational-safety failures without a direct connection to safe diving operations.
Reports
6

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
14

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2016–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
21

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

British Diving Safety Group2
British Sub-Aqua Club2
Health and Safety Executive2
Dulwich Dive Club1
Ministry of Defence1
N.D.A.C. Limited1
St Richard's Hospital1
Sub-Aqua Association1
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Lapwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin Lapwood, aged 63, was acting as a volunteer safety diver at Wraysbury Dive Centre on 12 February 2022 after failing an HSE medical in October 2021. He got into difficulty in very cold water and died at Wexham Park Hospital the next day; the recorded cause of death was immersion pulmonary oedema, hypertension and coronary artery disease. Concerns included medical requirements and awareness for volunteer divers, awareness of immersion pulmonary oedema risks, the guidance on shore support, and potential ambiguity in HSE legislation and guidance concerning volunteers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient guidance on the duties of shore support or surface cover

    Wider context from the report

    “3. I am concerned about whether there is sufficient guidance regarding what the role of shore support /surface cover entails. Specifically, should that include having eyes on the water? ”

    Source location

    Kevin Lapwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambiguity in legislation and guidance about applicability to volunteer divers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Clarity of the approved code of practice (‘ACOP’) entitled “Recreational diving projects – Diving at Work Regulations 1997”, published in 2014, in the following respects: a. The title of the document – does this document adequately reflect that it also covers volunteers? Is there a risk that, on reading the initial heading of the document, it may be felt that it is not relevant to volunteers working in the capacity that Kevin did? b. Would the reference to “associated guidance” on the title page be better with the use of a hyperlink to guidance such as the volunteer diver guidance note? c. The definition of “diver” in the ACOP is “a person at work who dives”. The definition of “at work” is (in summary) an employee or a self-employed person. Although the guidance does go on to deal separately with those in a diving role as part of a project, there is some potential ambiguity here. For instance, it may be possible to look at the guidance on Regulation 12 which states that no “diver” shall dive in a diving project unless he has an HSE medical. If “diver” is defined as being somebody at work, then there is a risk that the regulations could be interpreted in the way it appears they were here – ie only applying to somebody who is paid. A careful reading of the guidance should make the position clearer, but I believe there is a remaining risk of misinterpretation without very careful analysis of this document. 2. All the titles of the relevant legislation and guidance refer to diving “at work”. It is easily foreseeable that someone looking at this may assume that it is not relevant for volunteers used as part of a diving project. I appreciate that naming legislation is not within the gift of the HSE, but it may be something that could be communicated in relation to future legislation, and taken into account in HSE guidance – particularly the titles of any future guidance. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Lapwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Rewrite shore-cover guidance defining the roles and responsibilities of shore support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Agency | Role Definition & Guidance Structure | Current Action / Status IANTD UK | Utilizes a historical code of conduct for instructors to bridge the gap between training standards and UK law. Demands a strict localized risk assessment for every operation. | Mandates that the surface brief must include explicit "eyes on the water" protocols, kit management, emergency plans, and verbal IPO awareness briefings. ScotSAC | Mandates appropriate shore cover for all training activities, grounding the surface team's responsibilities directly in the dive's risk assessment. | The exact text detailing the specific roles and responsibilities of Shore Cover is currently undergoing a comprehensive rewrite. SAA | Uses a Dive Marshal framework, assigning this individual complete responsibility for the dive team and the monitoring of divers for the day.”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Dive Management guidance to address the concern that shore support should maintain eyes on the water.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Report #3: Agency Response BSAC Role Definition & Guidance Structure Uses 'BSAC Safe Diving Practices' code of conduct which includes having an appropriate dynamic risk assessment and a suitable Dive Management. Dive Management is integral to the BSAC Diver Training Programme training expanded on with each diver grade.”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 14 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Dive Marshal guidance to incorporate explicit eyes-on-the-water requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SAA utilizes a Dive Marshal system to monitor divers but acknowledges their current guidance does not explicitly state the phrase "having eyes on the water." They have committed to reviewing their standards to address the Coroner's specific concern.”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Form a working group to define recommended qualifications and good practices for shore cover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As BDSG we will put together a working group to define a set of recommendations of qualifications and good practices for all shore cover”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 7 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise resources to strengthen instructors’ awareness and enforcement of Diving at Work Regulations medical requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Considering the Coroner's report, PADI is actively revising its resources to heavily stress and enforce awareness of these specific DWR medical requirements. | Requires all Divemasters and Instructors to be examined and declared fit to dive by a physician prior to qualifying. SAA | Warns members that any element of reward/payment triggers DWR and voids SAA insurance. Acknowledges that commercial volunteer projects are too complex for their expertise, advising contractors to seek formal legal advice. | Utilizes the UKDMC self-cert recreational screening system (requiring medical declarations for conditions like immersion-induced pulmonary oedema).”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a UK-specific addendum training SSI professional trainers on UK Diving at Work Regulations and Approved Code of Practice requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Organization | Volunteer Protocols & Project Awareness | Medical Screening & Enforcement Standards IANTD | No separate standards exist for project volunteers. Duty of care and qualification requirements are left entirely to the subjective inclinations of individual project organizers. | Dependent on localized project risk assessments and task loading. All professional members must upload HSE medicals annually. SSI | Advises UK commercial facilities that all team members should have HSE medicals, as it is highly unlikely a commercial business can legally escape the DWR. | All professionals must upload a doctor-signed medical clearance annually. SSI is implementing a UK-specific addendum to explicitly train instructors on UK DWR laws and ACOPs. PADI | Provides summaries of HSE rules upon instructor qualification.”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and publish volunteer diver guidance clarifying medical fitness requirements for volunteers essential to diving projects.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To address this HSE has taken several steps:-”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with PADI to promote guidance helping recreational diving members comply with the Diving at Work Regulations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. HSE have worked with the Professional Association of Diving Instructors (PADI) as the largest provider of recreational diver training in GB, where the instructor or other divers are likely to be at work. Since 2004 PADI have published on their own website guidance on how its members should ensure compliance with DWR. This guidance contains near identical wording to the HSE volunteer diver guidance above. http://apsto.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2022-Diving-at-Work-Regulations-advice-from-PADI-2022.pdf”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update volunteer diving guidance to provide clear, unambiguous information, taking account of the coroner’s concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HSE is currently in the process of reviewing and updating its guidance including the volunteer diving guidance document. HSE is committed to ensuring that it provides clear, unambiguous guidance and will be cognisant of the matters you have raised when the ACoP is next reviewed.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The relationship between the deceased and the commercial diving project falls outside the organisation’s expertise to advise on.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The relationship between the deceased and the commercial diving project he had volunteered to assist is not the type of event that the SAA have the expertise to advise on. Based on HSE guidance for “Using volunteers in diving at work projects” this is a complex area, and their advice is that the diving contractor should consider seek legal advice.”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 10 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The diving contractor should seek legal advice about applying volunteer safety requirements to the commercial diving project.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The relationship between the deceased and the commercial diving project he had volunteered to assist is not the type of event that the SAA have the expertise to advise on. Based on HSE guidance for “Using volunteers in diving at work projects” this is a complex area, and their advice is that the diving contractor should consider seek legal advice.”

    Source location

    Response from British Diving Safety Group
    Page 10 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The recreational diving ACoP applies only to diving projects under DWR, not purely leisure dives by members of the public.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the “Recreational diving projects – Diving at Work Regulations 1997” approved code of practice (ACoP), the title of the document reflects that it is applicable only to diving projects which come under DWR, and not to dives conducted purely for leisure purposes by members of public.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 June 2026

    Open published response
  2. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Dominic Edward Arthur HURLEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 8 July 2024, Dominic Hurley became unwell during an offshore dive, made a rapid uncontrolled ascent, became unconscious, and later died in hospital. The principal concern was that he had not disclosed a previous serious diving incident and cardiac history when renewing his diving licence, with reliance on self-declaration questionnaires without further enquiry or access to previous medical history identified as a potential risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Overreliance on self-declaration questionnaires without further enquiry or access to previous medical history

    Wider context from the report

    “In 2018 Mr Hurley suffered shortness of breath and pulmonary oedema during a dive in Malta. This led to him having a heart bypass on his return to the UK. There was significant family history of cardiac related issues. Time passed but in 2021 and 2023 Mr Hurley sort to renew his diving licence. Mr Hurley completed his self declaration questionnaire. At no stage did he declare the events in 2018 in relation to his dive and nor did he discuss this with the Dr assessing him. It is likely that he Dr been aware of the previous diving incident a different course of action may have taken. There is currently too much reliance placed on the self declaration questionnaire without any further enquiry or access to previous medical history. This leads to a false sense of reality and put the diver and others at potential risk of death on further dives. ”

    Source location

    Dominic Edward Arthur HURLEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include immersion pulmonary oedema in the diving medical screening declaration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SAA use the medical screening system managed by the UKDMC (United Kingdom Diving Medical Committee) (https://www.ukdmc.org/). I have checked my medical form archive and note that “immersion induced pulmonary oedema” was introduced in the May 2020 version of the declaration at question 17. The current version, May 2024, of the form has this at question 16.”

    Source location

    Response from Sub Aqua Association Space Solutions Business Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind members at renewal and through periodic newsletters to complete medical declarations accurately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I believe that the SAA has advised its membership and revised their training programme in such a manner as to have already implemented the changes required to mitigate the risk of IPO when diving, in so far as any risk can be mitigated. However, the SAA will ensure that the membership is reminded of the importance of accurately completing medical by emphasising the fact at renewal and with periodic reminders in their newsletters.”

    Source location

    Response from Sub Aqua Association Space Solutions Business Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revised medical screening forms and existing training changes are considered sufficient to mitigate the risk of immersion pulmonary oedema in diving.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I believe that the revision to the current dive medical screening forms now meet the change you are now seeking to make.”

    Source location

    Response from Sub Aqua Association Space Solutions Business Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  3. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    BENJAMIN DAVID MCQUEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin McQueen drowned on 14 November 2018 during a military diving exercise in Portland Harbour, Dorset, after experiencing complications during the dive and being recovered unconscious from the seabed. The concerns included the lack of a spare breathing-apparatus cylinder for the stand-by diver, accelerated safety-critical training, the absence of a dedicated defibrillator, and inconsistent minimum safety-pressure guidance for breathing apparatus.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistency in minimum safety pressure requirements for diver breathing apparatus

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) There is an inconsistency regarding the minimum safety pressure level for the relevant diver’s breathing apparatus as between the maintenance manual which DE&S is responsible and all other policy and safety guidance. ”

    Source location

    BENJAMIN DAVID MCQUEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of spare breathing apparatus cylinders in the safety boat

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) A stand-by diver was present at the dive exercise and he was deployed to try to find and rescue Ben. However, the stand-by diver had to surface having run out of breathable gas before Ben was found. A spare breathing apparatus cylinder was not carried in the safety boat for the stand-by diver (or other divers) to use in the event that the stand-by diver’s main cylinder ran out. ”

    Source location

    BENJAMIN DAVID MCQUEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Align minimum abort-pressure figures across diving policies and maintenance guidance at 50 bar, and cascade the resulting direction across the dive community.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MOD Response. Recognising that the Divers Policy (JSP286) stipulated an increase in abort pressure to that given in the Maintenance Policy (BR2807) as an added safety measure, MDCC and DE&S have now reviewed these Policies and aligned their figures. Direction has now cascaded across the dive community highlighting the changes within these Policies, stating the minimum abort pressure as 50 Bar. This change to the maintenance manual aligns across all diving systems within Defence for commonality and ease of reference, preventing any potential confusion.”

    Source location

    Response from Ministry of Defence
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 August 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update JSP 286 with minimum standby-diver cylinder requirements and guidance on immediate availability of a second diving life-support set.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MOD Response. The MOD has conducted a comprehensive examination of all MOD diving activities, reviewing the lateral freedoms in policy that allowed a dive supervisor to choose the most appropriate cylinder for the standby diver to conduct his duties (including the search for a lost diver). The conclusion was this shall be replaced with clearer direction. The following update to Policy (JSP 286) has now been conveyed to all stakeholders in a Dive Related Instruction (DRI), stating:”

    Source location

    Response from Ministry of Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 August 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carrying a second dive set in safety boats is not required where doing so is impracticable, with the nearest safe location acceptable instead.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• ‘When SCADE is employed by the standby diver within un-marked swimming operations, consideration within the Dive Project Plan / Risk Assessment must be given as to the availability of a second Diving Life Support Equipment (DLSE) at immediate notice. The second DLSE should be located within the dive safety boat, however, if this is not practicable, then at the nearest safe location to the dive site’.”

    Source location

    Response from Ministry of Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 August 2023

    Open published response
  4. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Paul Victor Sanders · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Sanders, an experienced diver aged 52, became unresponsive during a dive to 45 metres on 11 April 2019 and was pronounced deceased at the scene. The concerns included awareness of immersion pulmonary oedema risks, the need for fitness-to-dive medical certification, and methods for removing divers from the water.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inefficient diver removal methods and techniques at the diving centre

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Whether more efficient methods and/ techniques of diver removal from the water could be employed at the diving centre. ”

    Source location

    Richard Paul Victor Sanders · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require suitably crewed safety boats at third-party operations based on controls identified through diving-operation risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Moving forward any 3rd Party will have a suitably crewed safety boat in attendance which would derive from the diving operation risk assessment control measures, to provide a quick response to an incident and an efficient means of transferring a casualty to a suitable place of safety for treatment, if the incident location was appropriate to do so.”

    Source location

    2022-0003-Response-from-National-Diving-Activity-Centre_Published-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for current diving-operation safety arrangements lies with DTSL, the new operator, which should be contacted for further information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Until 23 December 2021, the Diving Centre was operated by N.D.A.C. Limited (NDAC) at Dayhouse Quarry (also known as Tidenham Quarry). However, in connection with the sale of Dayhouse Quarry to a third party, NDAC’s rights to operate the Diving Centre at the quarry were terminated as from 23 December 2021.”

    Source location

    2022-0003-Response-from-National-Diving-Activity-Centre_Published-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 January 2022

    Open published response
  5. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Robert Miles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin Robert Miles was undertaking a re-breather diving course at Stoney Cove on 25 September 2018 when he experienced difficulties underwater. He was brought to the surface, but resuscitation attempts failed and he was declared deceased at the scene; the cause of death was recorded as unascertained. The report raised concerns about the absence of a requirement to obtain divers’ GP records or otherwise verify medical advice when assessing fitness to dive, and about the risks to divers and potential rescuers or dive buddies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reliance on divers’ self-reporting failing to ensure disclosure of salient health facts

    Wider context from the report

    “An Occupational Health Physician, who is also a UK Sport Diving Medical Referee and an HSE Approved Medical Examiner of Divers certified Mr Miles as fit to dive for two years on the 30 January 2018 based on the information given to her by Mr Miles himself in the medical questionnaire and on her physical examination of him. There is currently no requirement to obtain the diver’s General Practitioner records (which are often a ‘hub’ of various information regarding treatment by both hospital and/or private clinic) or otherwise personally enquire into treatment or advice given by any other medical practitioner. In my opinion this system is open for misreporting of health problems or, in fact, failing to report them at all. If there had been a requirement to obtain Mr Miles GP records it would have been quite clear that he had been advised that he should not dive again and presumably the certificate would not have been granted. My concerns are that not only may divers be risking their own lives by not disclosing salient health facts (that is at their own risk) but that they are also putting the lives of potential rescuers/dive buddies at risk as well. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Robert Miles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of requirement to obtain divers’ General Practitioner records or enquire into other practitioners’ treatment or advice

    Wider context from the report

    “An Occupational Health Physician, who is also a UK Sport Diving Medical Referee and an HSE Approved Medical Examiner of Divers certified Mr Miles as fit to dive for two years on the 30 January 2018 based on the information given to her by Mr Miles himself in the medical questionnaire and on her physical examination of him. There is currently no requirement to obtain the diver’s General Practitioner records (which are often a ‘hub’ of various information regarding treatment by both hospital and/or private clinic) or otherwise personally enquire into treatment or advice given by any other medical practitioner. In my opinion this system is open for misreporting of health problems or, in fact, failing to report them at all. If there had been a requirement to obtain Mr Miles GP records it would have been quite clear that he had been advised that he should not dive again and presumably the certificate would not have been granted. My concerns are that not only may divers be risking their own lives by not disclosing salient health facts (that is at their own risk) but that they are also putting the lives of potential rescuers/dive buddies at risk as well. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Robert Miles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The current self-certification system, including requests for further information and specialist advice, is considered sufficient; no change is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At present, any diving referee [doctor with extra training in diving medicine] who is approached by a diver who declares a problem on the current self certification form, can ask them to provide further medical information prior to seeing them. The self certification process was brought in for sport divers in 1999 after a review of the previous system of regular medical examinations was shown to have a very low pick up of problems. The form is reviewed and altered if necessary every 2-3 years.”

    Source location

    Response from UKDMC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtaining full, unadjusted medical records for all divers is impractical because general practitioners refuse non-NHS forms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a committee, we have had a lengthy discussion about the points raised by ████████. We were all agreed that in an ideal scenario all divers or potential divers should bring copies of a full and non adjusted medical record to all consultations. However we already have a situation where our hard pressed general practitioner colleagues are refusing to sign or even fill in any forms which are none NHS work.”

    Source location

    Response from UKDMC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 May 2019

    Open published response
  6. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Denis William Patrick Cronin drowned after a dive at Stoney Cove on 26 April 2015. The report identifies concerns about inadequate risk assessment, training and supervision, dive planning, failure to follow BSAC guidance, and weight-belt configuration that created a foreseeable risk it could not be released.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to match permitted dive depth to diver experience and currency

    Wider context from the report

    “7) Mr Cronin had previously dived to a maximum depth of 16.5yet he was permitted to dive to 20 metres after an 8 month gap since his last open water dive. ”

    Source location

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly plan dives

    Wider context from the report

    “6) The dive was not properly planned. A Safety and Development Manager employed by BSAC said he would not have done the final dive in the way that it was planned and conducted. ”

    Source location

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Training failing to comply with BSAC Sports Diver training requirements

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Training was not in accordance with BSAC Sports Diver training ; ”

    Source location

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Foreseeable risk of difficult release from the belt configuration

    Wider context from the report

    “9) The belt configuration meant that there was a foreseeable risk that it could not easily be released. ”

    Source location

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete written dive risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “5) No written risk assessments / templates were completed to ensure those responsible for the dive have focused their minds to relevant circumstances; ”

    Source location

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to read important safety information displayed at the dive centre

    Wider context from the report

    “8) Signs containing important information and clearly displayed at several sites at the Dive Centre were not read. Evidence was heard that it was believed that there was not a need because it was not the first visit to the Dive Centre and a map of the site had been printed off the internet in advance of the visit. One witness said that if he had seen the signs then it would possibly have made him think twice about doing the DSMB inflation exercise on another day. ”

    Source location

    Denis William Patrick Cronin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue educating divers and instructors about dive planning through member emails, instructor bulletins and SCUBA Magazine articles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. The dive was not properly planned. A Safety and Development Manager employed by BSAC said he would not have done the final dive in the way that it was planned and conducted.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind instructors to follow BSAC training-programme guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) The plan in the briefing was for DC to inflate the DSMB with an Assistant Instructor on hand when ascending from the Stangarth within sight of the fixed shot line (20 metres max or 15 metres from Deck). We had been assured Denis had completed dry practice, used a DSMB in the pool and confirmed to the instructor that he had done it “many times”. We will remind all instructors to follow BSAC guidance in the training programme.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind instructors to follow Diver Training Programme guidance for skills through Instructor News.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The plan for the second dive was for Mr Cronin to inflate the DSMB from a depth of around 17 metres. It took place at 20 metres. The BSAC instructions for Sports Diver are for the exercise to be conducted at 10 metres.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue encouraging students and qualified divers to follow training and practise regularly with their chosen equipment configuration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9) The weight belt and kit configuration is personal choice there are no existing guidelines governing this, the correct procedure for removal of DC’s weights was discussed in the briefing before the divers entered the water and DC informed Phil of the need to remove the harness crotch strap before the weights can be removed. DC also participated in a weight removal exercise that morning were he demonstrated the correct procedure for dumping weights to another diver, stressing the importance of ensuring they are held at arms length away from the body before being jettisoned. It had also been practiced dry and in the pool. We will continue to encourage students and qualified divers to follow their training and to practice regularly with their chosen configuration.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce guidance explaining the importance of weightbelt removal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9. The belt configuration meant that there was a foreseeable risk that it could not easily be released.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind instructors through Instructor News to teach weightbelt removal as required by the Diver Training Programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9. The belt configuration meant that there was a foreseeable risk that it could not easily be released.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review website risk-assessment information and assess interactive materials through the new digital platform.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. No written risk assessments/templates were completed to ensure those responsible for the dive have focussed their minds to relevant circumstances.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The second dive was considered safe because correct nitrogen calculations and surface-interval procedures complied with current guidelines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7) This is incorrect, he had dived to 18 metres over 3 hours before, the correct calculations for Nitrogen uptake were carried out before the second dive to ensure a sufficient and safe surface interval for a second dive at 2 metres deeper. This meant the second dive to a maximum of 20 metres was safe in accordance with the current guidelines. Denis was qualified to dive to 20 metres and Phil to 35 metres. It is our usual practice to dive the deeper dive first particularly when the first dive is for instance - a boat dive at 35 metres and the second dive may well be restricted to a 15 metre dive as the surface interval may be restricted due to tides etc. This was not considered an issue when the second dive was only 2 metres deeper than the first and the correct calculations to ensure a safe surface interval were carried out.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Progressing from 16.5 to 20 metres after a gap was not considered unreasonable, and no evidence showed the recommendation posed diver risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Mr Cronin had previously dived to a maximum depth of 16.5 yet he was permitted to dive to 20 metres after an 8 month gap since his last open water dive.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No single or simple message could highlight the specific dive-planning concern because dives vary with conditions and individual skills.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. The dive was not properly planned. A Safety and Development Manager employed by BSAC said he would not have done the final dive in the way that it was planned and conducted.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conducting Sports Diver lessons out of sequence was considered reasonable because prerequisite skills are taught at Ocean Diver level.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Training was not in accordance with BSAC Sports Diver training.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Weight-belt and equipment configuration was considered a matter of personal choice because no governing guidelines exist and training covered weight removal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9) The weight belt and kit configuration is personal choice there are no existing guidelines governing this, the correct procedure for removal of DC’s weights was discussed in the briefing before the divers entered the water and DC informed Phil of the need to remove the harness crotch strap before the weights can be removed. DC also participated in a weight removal exercise that morning were he demonstrated the correct procedure for dumping weights to another diver, stressing the importance of ensuring they are held at arms length away from the body before being jettisoned. It had also been practiced dry and in the pool. We will continue to encourage students and qualified divers to follow their training and to practice regularly with their chosen configuration.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The weightbelt and BCD configuration was considered uncommon as a safety concern.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9. The belt configuration meant that there was a foreseeable risk that it could not easily be released.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing training requires practising removal of divers’ own and buddies’ weightbelts at every stage and encourages regular practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The weightbelt and BCD configuration is not uncommon. BSAC training already requires practice of removal (own and buddy’s) at every stage of the Diver Training Programme (DTP) and encourages regular practice (especially with new equipment). BSAC will feature weightbelt removal and its importance by producing a guidance document by February 2017 and subsequently remind instructors in the next issue of BSAC Instructor news about the importance of teaching this skill as outlined in the DTP.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Written risk assessments are not considered necessary at known sites because current guidelines and established dive-planning and briefing practices apply.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) No written risk assessments are currently required when visiting a known site, this is in line with the current guidelines. We always produce a dive plan, log the dive and use a marshalling slate and follow BSAC safe diving practices with a full briefing and buddy checks before the dive.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Free-flow was not considered a special risk below five degrees Celsius, and existing cold-water regulators and briefing arrangements were considered adequate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8) The site is very large and 3 small signs were apparently displayed, one on the back of a door one in the lavatory and one on a map of the lake, none of these areas were visited by any of the divers, it is not a case of ignoring them, it is a case of not having seen them at all. Even if they had seen them the divers were briefed by their Instructor before the dive on what to do if they have a free flow, we do not consider it a “special” risk until 5 degrees C as it can happen at any time. All divers on the day were using regulators designed for cold-water use. There is no temperature ceiling in any BSAC safety diving guidelines. We currently consider it unsafe not to use a DSMB, we are seeking clear guidance on what the best practice is going forward.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Site signs were considered awareness measures, while operators acknowledged their warnings were overly cautious for year-round cold-water DSMB practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8. Signs containing important information and clearly displayed at several sites at the Dive Centre were not read. Evidence was heard that it was believed that there was not a need because it was not the first visit to the Dive Centre and a map of the site had been printed off the internet in advance of the visit. One witness said that if he had seen the signs then it would possibly have made him think twice about doing the DSMB inflation exercise on another day.”

    Source location

    Denis-Cronin-Response2
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 September 2016

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026