20 May 2015 Irene HAMILTON-PARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report Staffordshire South
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Concerns raised 1 Easy inflammability of clothing made from man-made fabrics View source
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Irene HAMILTON-PARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Irene HAMILTON-PARKER died in hospital in the early hours of 10 February 2015 after being found at home with clothing on fire while attempting to light a cigarette with an inappropriate lighter. The principal concern was the flammability of man-made clothing fabrics and whether steps could reduce the flammability of clothing manufactured or imported in the country.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Easy inflammability of clothing made from man-made fabrics
Wider context from the report “The Fire Investigator found that Mrs Hamilton-Parker had been wearing clothes which consisted of man-made fabrics that were easily inflammable . I write to enquire if it is possible for any steps to be taken to reduce the flammability of clothing either manufactured or imported in this country . I believe that this is not an isolated case.
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Keep clothing flammability risks under review.
Verbatim wording from the response “Action to reduce flammability of clothing therefore needs to be based on an assessment of the various risks. Within the UK, there are specific additional flammability requirements for certain children’s nightwear and for children’s clothing which is classified as a toy, such as fancy dress costumes. I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to extend these requirements to other types of clothing at present and I therefore do not propose to take further action at this time. However, I thank you for raising your concerns and my officials will keep this issue under review.” Source location 2015-0197-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-and-Skills
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient evidence currently supports extending flammability requirements to other clothing types, so no further action is proposed at present.
Verbatim wording from the response “Action to reduce flammability of clothing therefore needs to be based on an assessment of the various risks. Within the UK, there are specific additional flammability requirements for certain children’s nightwear and for children’s clothing which is classified as a toy, such as fancy dress costumes. I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to extend these requirements to other types of clothing at present and I therefore do not propose to take further action at this time. However, I thank you for raising your concerns and my officials will keep this issue under review.” Source location 2015-0197-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-and-Skills
Open published response
Concerns raised 6 Failure to include required CLP hazard statements View source Hazardous inhalation and swallowing of isopropyl nitrite vapour or liquid View source Failure to use CLP-standard hazard pictograms View source Failure to include the CLP signal word “danger” View source Failure to include required precautionary statements View source Failure to provide a tactile warning on the container View source See 3 more concerns
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Stephen Paul Myers · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
On Christmas Eve 2014, Stephen Paul Myers drank a bottle of isopropyl nitrite (“Poppers”) purchased from a local shop, collapsed, and died after resuscitation was attempted. The concerns included the product’s toxicity if swallowed and the adequacy of its labelling and packaging, including the need for updated hazard information, precautionary statements, pictograms, a signal word and a tactile warning.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to include required CLP hazard statements
Wider context from the report “(1) Isopropyl nitrite is sold as a liquid in a small (25ml) bottle as “English Room Odoriser”. It is known that some inhale the vapour which is thought to cause a short-lived “rush” / euphoria. The label on the bottle says “do not inhale”. It is classified in accordance with 67/548/EEC: R 23: toxic by inhalation R28: very toxic if swallowed.
(2) I have received a report from West Yorkshire Analytical Services which states
“The labelling was examined with respect to the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP) and the Regulation Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 2008 (CLP) with the following observations:-
Need upgrading for CLP to include the signal word “danger”. Pictograms need updating to CLP standard. Need to include the hazard statements suggested H225 Highly Flammable Liquid and Vapour, H301 Toxic if Swallowed, H331 Toxic if Inhaled. Precautionary statements suggested P210 Keep Away From Heat/Sparks/Open Flames/Hot Surfaces – No smoking, P261 Avoid breathing Vapours, P301 and P310 IF SWALLOWED : Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or Doctor/Physician. The container requires a tactile warning.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Hazardous inhalation and swallowing of isopropyl nitrite vapour or liquid
Wider context from the report “(1) Isopropyl nitrite is sold as a liquid in a small (25ml) bottle as “English Room Odoriser”. It is known that some inhale the vapour which is thought to cause a short-lived “rush” / euphoria . The label on the bottle says “do not inhale”. It is classified in accordance with 67/548/EEC: R 23: toxic by inhalation R28: very toxic if swallowed .
(2) I have received a report from West Yorkshire Analytical Services which states
“The labelling was examined with respect to the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP) and the Regulation Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 2008 (CLP) with the following observations:-
Need upgrading for CLP to include the signal word “danger”. Pictograms need updating to CLP standard. Need to include the hazard statements suggested H225 Highly Flammable Liquid and Vapour, H301 Toxic if Swallowed, H331 Toxic if Inhaled. Precautionary statements suggested P210 Keep Away From Heat/Sparks/Open Flames/Hot Surfaces – No smoking, P261 Avoid breathing Vapours, P301 and P310 IF SWALLOWED : Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or Doctor/Physician. The container requires a tactile warning.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to use CLP-standard hazard pictograms
Wider context from the report “(1) Isopropyl nitrite is sold as a liquid in a small (25ml) bottle as “English Room Odoriser”. It is known that some inhale the vapour which is thought to cause a short-lived “rush” / euphoria. The label on the bottle says “do not inhale”. It is classified in accordance with 67/548/EEC: R 23: toxic by inhalation R28: very toxic if swallowed.
(2) I have received a report from West Yorkshire Analytical Services which states
“The labelling was examined with respect to the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP) and the Regulation Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 2008 (CLP) with the following observations:-
Need upgrading for CLP to include the signal word “danger”. Pictograms need updating to CLP standard. Need to include the hazard statements suggested H225 Highly Flammable Liquid and Vapour, H301 Toxic if Swallowed, H331 Toxic if Inhaled. Precautionary statements suggested P210 Keep Away From Heat/Sparks/Open Flames/Hot Surfaces – No smoking, P261 Avoid breathing Vapours, P301 and P310 IF SWALLOWED : Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or Doctor/Physician. The container requires a tactile warning.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to include the CLP signal word “danger”
Wider context from the report “(1) Isopropyl nitrite is sold as a liquid in a small (25ml) bottle as “English Room Odoriser”. It is known that some inhale the vapour which is thought to cause a short-lived “rush” / euphoria. The label on the bottle says “do not inhale”. It is classified in accordance with 67/548/EEC: R 23: toxic by inhalation R28: very toxic if swallowed.
(2) I have received a report from West Yorkshire Analytical Services which states
“The labelling was examined with respect to the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP) and the Regulation Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 2008 (CLP) with the following observations:-
Need upgrading for CLP to include the signal word “danger” . Pictograms need updating to CLP standard. Need to include the hazard statements suggested H225 Highly Flammable Liquid and Vapour, H301 Toxic if Swallowed, H331 Toxic if Inhaled. Precautionary statements suggested P210 Keep Away From Heat/Sparks/Open Flames/Hot Surfaces – No smoking, P261 Avoid breathing Vapours, P301 and P310 IF SWALLOWED : Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or Doctor/Physician. The container requires a tactile warning.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to include required precautionary statements
Wider context from the report “(1) Isopropyl nitrite is sold as a liquid in a small (25ml) bottle as “English Room Odoriser”. It is known that some inhale the vapour which is thought to cause a short-lived “rush” / euphoria. The label on the bottle says “do not inhale”. It is classified in accordance with 67/548/EEC: R 23: toxic by inhalation R28: very toxic if swallowed.
(2) I have received a report from West Yorkshire Analytical Services which states
“The labelling was examined with respect to the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP) and the Regulation Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 2008 (CLP) with the following observations:-
Need upgrading for CLP to include the signal word “danger”. Pictograms need updating to CLP standard. Need to include the hazard statements suggested H225 Highly Flammable Liquid and Vapour, H301 Toxic if Swallowed, H331 Toxic if Inhaled. Precautionary statements suggested P210 Keep Away From Heat/Sparks/Open Flames/Hot Surfaces – No smoking, P261 Avoid breathing Vapours, P301 and P310 IF SWALLOWED : Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or Doctor/Physician. The container requires a tactile warning.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide a tactile warning on the container
Wider context from the report “(1) Isopropyl nitrite is sold as a liquid in a small (25ml) bottle as “English Room Odoriser”. It is known that some inhale the vapour which is thought to cause a short-lived “rush” / euphoria. The label on the bottle says “do not inhale”. It is classified in accordance with 67/548/EEC: R 23: toxic by inhalation R28: very toxic if swallowed.
(2) I have received a report from West Yorkshire Analytical Services which states
“The labelling was examined with respect to the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP) and the Regulation Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 2008 (CLP) with the following observations:-
Need upgrading for CLP to include the signal word “danger”. Pictograms need updating to CLP standard. Need to include the hazard statements suggested H225 Highly Flammable Liquid and Vapour, H301 Toxic if Swallowed, H331 Toxic if Inhaled. Precautionary statements suggested P210 Keep Away From Heat/Sparks/Open Flames/Hot Surfaces – No smoking, P261 Avoid breathing Vapours, P301 and P310 IF SWALLOWED : Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or Doctor/Physician. The container requires a tactile warning.
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Send the coroner’s report and recommendations to Darlington Trading Standards for investigation of the product’s labelling.
Verbatim wording from the response “The appropriate body with the power to enforce the requirements of CHIP/CLP in the case of the labelling and other requirements of these products is the local Trading Standards Authority, in this case, Darlington. The local authority Trading Standards Service will investigate whether the product was mis-labelled in accordance with CHIP/CLP legislation and decide on an appropriate course of action. We are sending them a copy of your report and recommendations.” Source location 2015-0150-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Darlington Trading Standards is responsible for investigating compliance with CHIP/CLP labelling requirements and deciding enforcement action.
Verbatim wording from the response “The appropriate body with the power to enforce the requirements of CHIP/CLP in the case of the labelling and other requirements of these products is the local Trading Standards Authority, in this case, Darlington. The local authority Trading Standards Service will investigate whether the product was mis-labelled in accordance with CHIP/CLP legislation and decide on an appropriate course of action. We are sending them a copy of your report and recommendations.” Source location 2015-0150-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Responsibility for CHIP/CLP labelling of poppers lies with the Health and Safety Executive, not this Department.
Verbatim wording from the response “You have suggested that action could be taken by this Department in order to ensure clear labelling of products like poppers in an attempt to avoid repetitions of this tragic accident. I should clarify that BIS is not responsible for the CHIP/CLP legislation regarding the labelling of bottles of Poppers (isopropyl nitrite). This is the policy of the Health and Safety Executive. The CLP labelling on this product would depend on the concentration of isopropyl nitrite and the nature and concentration of other ingredients, and follows prescribed ‘rules’ set under EU single market legislation. Whether or not certain label statements such as ‘If swallowed: Immediately call a Poison Centre or doctor/physician’ are used depends on the classification of the product, which is based on scientific data.” Source location 2015-0150-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The General Product Safety Regulations were not breached because the product was used contrary to its instructions.
Verbatim wording from the response “All products intended for use by consumers are regulated under the General Product Safety Regulations (GPSR) 2005 which implements the EU’s General Product Safety Directive (GPSD). This Department has responsibility for this legislation. A producer must not supply a consumer product unless it satisfies the requirement that the product is safe (regulation 5 of the General Product Safety Regulations 2005). However it appears that the instructions for use were not followed in this case. The requirement that it should be safe for its intended use would not have been breached in this case.” Source location 2015-0150-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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5 Nov 2014 Santosh Benjamin Muthiah · Prevention of Future Deaths report North London
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Concerns raised 10 Insufficient capacitor safety requirements to prevent hazards on failure View source Lack of requirements to isolate or protect refrigeration-appliance insulation from ignition View source Failure to identify appliance fire causes and appliance identifiers after fire damage View source Lack of second-hand market controls for recalled or safety-notice products View source Failure to routinely pass identified domestic appliance fire information to Trading Standards or manufacturers View source Underestimation of capacitor-related fire risk in Beko fridge-freezer risk assessment View source Inconsistent guidance on product risk notification and corrective action View source Lack of awareness of the safety notice for recalled Beko fridge-freezer models View source Inconsistent product safety risk assessments omitting or variably weighting serious injury factors View source Lack of requirements for less flammable or better-contained plastic materials in refrigeration appliances View source See 7 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Santosh Benjamin Muthiah · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Santosh Benjamin Muthiah died after a fire spread through his home while he and his family were sleeping, with the medical cause recorded as cerebral anoxia due to inhalation of fire fumes. The report raised concerns about the identification and communication of appliance-fire information, risks from recalled and second-hand refrigeration appliances, product safety risk assessments, guidance and notification practices, and the construction and components of refrigeration appliances, including capacitors.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient capacitor safety requirements to prevent hazards on failure
Wider context from the report “24. I heard evidence for the LFB witnesses, in particular ████████, who gave evidence about the serious concerns they hold about the ongoing risk posed by capacitor failures resulting in fires. These concerns are twofold, relating generally to capacitors and the industry standards and in relation to Beko appliances.
25. Paragraph 24.8 of British Standard BS EN 60335-1:2012 ‘Household and similar electrical appliances; Safety; Part 1 - General requirements.’ applies to the type of capacitors used in refrigeration appliances. It states that they shall not cause a hazard in the event of failure.
26. This requirement is considered to be met by one or more of the following conditions:
a. The capacitors are of a class of safety protection P2 according to IEC 60252-1;
b. The capacitor is housed within a metallic or ceramic enclosure that will prevent the emission of flame or molten material resulting from failure of the capacitor;
c. The distance of separation of the outer surface of the capacitor to adjacent non-metallic parts exceeds 50mm;
d. Adjacent non-metallic parts within 50 mm of the outer surface of the capacitor withstand the needle-flame test of Annex E;
e. Adjacent non-metallic parts within 50 mm of the outer surface of the capacitor are classified as at least V-1 according to IEC 60695-11-10, provided that the test sample used for the classification was no thicker than the relevant part of the appliance.
27. I accept and agree with the concern raised by the LFB that the above requirement does not ensure that capacitors do not pose a hazard . This creates a risk to the safety of consumers.
28. The LFB FIT has experience of failures of P2 capacitors and failures leading to ignition of metal casing capacitors (contrary to a. and b. above).
29. Further, it is clear that the mechanisms of failure of a capacitor can bypass the required 50mm distance (contrary to c. above). Furthermore, in the case of a refrigeration appliance, the base of the compressor compartment is often two metal bars used for mounting components, leaving the floor surface exposed (for example a flammable carpet).
30. The LFB believes that the requirements regarding capacitors referred to in paragraph 50 above (citing paragraph 24.8 British Standard BS EN 60335-1 : 2012) are not robust enough to prevent capacitors from presenting a hazard , which creates a risk to the safety of consumers.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of requirements to isolate or protect refrigeration-appliance insulation from ignition
Wider context from the report “20. I heard evidence from the LFB witnesses who gave evidence concerning the inherent risks that refrigeration appliances present due to their construction. The polyurethane insulation material used in most refrigeration appliances represents a high fuel load, is highly flammable and when on fire burns to create dangerous gases.
21. There is no legal requirement or industry standard that this insulation material is isolated from or protected from ignition by a failure in another component within the appliance , which represent a risk of ignition, such as the compressor, capacitor or ancillary components. This represents a serious risk to the safety of consumers .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to identify appliance fire causes and appliance identifiers after fire damage
Wider context from the report “1. I heard evidence from various witnesses, including the LFB but also from Beko and ████████ formerly of Intertek, that there are often problems in identifying, not just the specific cause of an appliance fire, but even the manufacturer, model and serial number of the appliance in question due to the severity of the fire damage . This has a knock on effect on Fire & Rescue Services’ (“FRS’s”), Trading Standards (“TS”) and manufacturers’ ability to accurately identify a pattern or trend within fires from appliances which may evidence a specific manufacturing or component problem.
2. This creates a risk that the nature and extent of a potential problem with a particular manufacturer or particular appliance is not fully known and therefore underestimated with the consequence that the risk to the lives of consumers may also be underestimated.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of second-hand market controls for recalled or safety-notice products
Wider context from the report “8. I heard evidence from the LFB witnesses who gave some evidence that defective products on the second hand market pose a continuing risk to consumers.
9. There is no clear system in place to ensure that products subject to a safety notice or recall are not sold, unmodified, on the second hand market . By way of example, the LFB has recently identified several unmodified Beko fridge freezers which are subject to the safety notice, for sale in a second hand retailer. This lack of regulation or market surveillance of the second hand market poses a risk to consumers .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to routinely pass identified domestic appliance fire information to Trading Standards or manufacturers
Wider context from the report “6. This is not the case routinely elsewhere in the country. There may be a variety of reasons for this, including the difficulty in identifying the appliances due to fire damage, and the more limited resources and expertise in the investigation of the causes of fires that other FRS’s have in contrast to the fortunate position of the LFB.
7. Whatever the reasons there is a risk in existence where such information that is gathered by FRS’s in relation to fires involving domestic electrical appliances (where the appliance can be identified) is not routinely passed to the appropriate TS Home or Primary Authority or indeed to the manufacturer . TS is taking decisions on whether to take any action in relation to a particular manufacturer or a particular appliance on less than all the available information. If they were provided with more accurate information about the incidences of appliance fires they would be in a better position to take action where necessary.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Underestimation of capacitor-related fire risk in Beko fridge-freezer risk assessment
Wider context from the report “31. I heard evidence from LFB witnesses who gave evidence of their concerns that serious failures in Beko Frost Free Fridge Freezers (“FFFF’s”) manufactured between 2000 and 2006 are continuing resulting in a serious risk to the safety of consumers. ████████ gave evidence of the numbers of fires which the LFB FIT have investigated to date, the appliance models and the causes of the fires. The LFB have written to Beko concerning these fires and the risk the appliances represent. This concern relates in large part to capacitor failures.
32. Although it is right to say that there was some evidence that there may be an “industry wide problem” i.e. that this risk is not specific to Beko, this alone does not address the risk which exists in Beko products and nor have the LFB been concerned enough in relation to the risk presented by other manufacturer’s products to write to any of them.
33. The LFB were provided with a risk assessment from Beko dated 26 April 2012 which states that the risk is “low” such that no action is necessary or proposed. The LFB is concerned that this underestimates the risk to the safety of consumers , particularly as Beko witnesses’ own evidence seemed to highlight that they consider the capacitor as a potential ignition source in fires .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inconsistent guidance on product risk notification and corrective action
Wider context from the report “16. I heard from Beko witnesses and also, in particular, ████████ that there are inconsistencies between the EU Commission Guidance and the UK Trade Association Guidance on corrective action and the requirement to notify an enforcement authority .
17. The AMDEA guidance says that if the outcome of the risk assessment is that there is a “moderate” risk, the manufacturer is not required to notify TS but the BIS guidance says that a “moderate” risk outcome requires notification to TS.
18. Manufacturers therefore are in difficulty in consistently applying guidance and in carrying out their notification obligations where there is the requisite level of risk to consumers.
19. I accept the LFB submissions that such inconsistency creates a risk that TS not being notified and therefore action not being taken in circumstances when it arguably should be highlighting a risk to consumers.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of awareness of the safety notice for recalled Beko fridge-freezer models
Wider context from the report “10. I heard evidence from the LFB witnesses of their concerns that serious failures in Beko Frost Free Fridge Freezers (“FFFF’s”) manufactured between 2000 and 2006 are continuing resulting in a serious risk to the safety of consumers. ████████ gave evidence of the numbers of fires which the LFB FIT have investigated to date, the appliance models and the causes of the fires.
11. The LFB submits that there remains a risk in relation to the lack of or minimal awareness of the current safety notice in relation to these Beko models .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inconsistent product safety risk assessments omitting or variably weighting serious injury factors
Wider context from the report “12. I heard a great deal of evidence concerning the process of risk assessment and the factors to be taken into account when considering the potential seriousness of injury and the likelihood of a risk eventuating.
13. It is the view of the LFB that the following matters should always be taken in to account when carrying out a product safety risk assessment:
a. Sleeping risk – i.e. the fact that a person is more vulnerable to the risks of fire when asleep;
b. The most serious consequence of a product failure i.e. in the case of fire, serious injury or death;
c. The potential long term physical impact on persons who have suffered burns injuries;
d. The possible psychological impact on persons who have suffered the trauma of a fire.
14. It was clear from the evidence that there have been and continue to be different approaches to risk assessment adopted . The evidence from ████████ and the evidence from the face of the Arcelik and Intertek Risk Assessments (in documentary form) made at the material times over a period of a number of years show that some of these factors are not taken into account and some may be taken into account to a variable degree .
15. Failing to take these factors into account expressly creates a risk that the seriousness of injury, and consequently, potentially the seriousness of the overall risk is underestimated .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of requirements for less flammable or better-contained plastic materials in refrigeration appliances
Wider context from the report “23. The plastic materials which are used for filling, strengthening and insulating refrigeration appliances are highly flammable and increase the fuel load of these appliances posing a continuing risk to consumers . It is possible to use alternate, non-flammable or less flammable materials. It is also possible to better contain such combustible components or insulation. There is no such requirement at present which creates a risk to the safety of consumers .
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue promoting best practice and drawing attention to Prosafe risk-assessment guidance.
Verbatim wording from the response “The first two concerns you have addressed to me relate to differences in approach to undertaking risk assessments of products (paragraphs 26-29), and inconsistencies in the related guidance (paragraphs 31-34). My view on this is that the legislation itself is clear, and that this is underpinned by equally clear guidance (produced by Prosafe, a non-profit making organisation which draws together European Market Surveillance Authorities to spread and develop best practice, with support from the UK). The Government plays a leading role in discussions on risk assessment and corrective action in the EU, and we will continue to promote best practice and draw attention to the Prosafe guidance on this basis.” Source location 2014-0476-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue supporting industry efforts to develop globally agreed fire-resistant identification plates or equivalent key-information markings for white goods.
Verbatim wording from the response “Your second concern in this section relates to white goods carrying key information on a fire-resistant plate or similar. I understand that this idea has a number of practical challenges associated with it, but I believe that industry are looking into it in some detail and are seeking to make a proposal with the aim of securing global agreement. BIS will continue to support their efforts in this area.” Source location 2014-0476-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Undertake the independent product-recalls review, considering guidance consistency, recall-registration website feasibility, a potential recall code, and other reported concerns, then report recommendations to ministers.
Verbatim wording from the response “However, we are aware that there may be additional guidance in the public domain that is not fully consistent with Prosafe advice. Whilst it is important to note that risk assessment is an inherently subjective activity, I share your concern that any apparent divergence in approach could cause confusion for manufacturers in relation to their obligations. As a result, consistency of guidance and sharing of best practice is something that will be considered as part of the independent review of consumer product recalls recently announced by Baroness Neville-Rolfe during a House of Lords debate on the Consumer Rights Bill. The review will incorporate views from a range of Market Surveillance Authorities and other business and non-government stakeholders.” Source location 2014-0476-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Industry is pursuing a proposal for fire-resistant product information plates and seeking global agreement, while BIS supports those efforts.
Verbatim wording from the response “Your second concern in this section relates to white goods carrying key information on a fire-resistant plate or similar. I understand that this idea has a number of practical challenges associated with it, but I believe that industry are looking into it in some detail and are seeking to make a proposal with the aim of securing global agreement. BIS will continue to support their efforts in this area.” Source location 2014-0476-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Legislation and Prosafe guidance are considered sufficiently clear despite possible inconsistent additional guidance elsewhere.
Verbatim wording from the response “The first two concerns you have addressed to me relate to differences in approach to undertaking risk assessments of products (paragraphs 26-29), and inconsistencies in the related guidance (paragraphs 31-34). My view on this is that the legislation itself is clear, and that this is underpinned by equally clear guidance (produced by Prosafe, a non-profit making organisation which draws together European Market Surveillance Authorities to spread and develop best practice, with support from the UK). The Government plays a leading role in discussions on risk assessment and corrective action in the EU, and we will continue to promote best practice and draw attention to the Prosafe guidance on this basis.” Source location 2014-0476-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Innovation-Skills
Open published response
16 Oct 2014 David Alan Thomson · Prevention of Future Deaths report Liverpool
View report summary
Concerns raised 1 Failure to restrict micro USB charger compatibility for e-cigarette lithium-ion batteries View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
David Alan Thomson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
David Alan Thomson, who had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and was using home oxygen, died at home after an e-cigarette battery reportedly exploded and ignited an oxygen pipe. The report raises concern that incompatible or incorrect micro-USB chargers may cause e-cigarette batteries to explode, particularly in proximity to oxygen equipment.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to restrict micro USB charger compatibility for e-cigarette lithium-ion batteries
Wider context from the report “It is understood that e-cigarettes rely on Lithium-Ion batteries, which are charged using standard micro usb chargers. Unfortunately, any chargers with a micro usb plug will fit and, if the wrong current is fed to the e-cigarette, the battery will “explode” .
” Open source report
1 Jul 2014 Sindy Louise Woodhall · Prevention of Future Deaths report Manchester North
View report summary
Concerns raised 3 Lack of regulation of the sale of large amounts of toxic or potentially fatal gases View source Risk to public health from toxic or potentially fatal gases View source Lack of Trading Standards powers to take action or prosecute View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Sindy Louise Woodhall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Sindy Louise Woodhall had longstanding addictions to alcohol and butane and propane, which she misused regularly. She was found collapsed in the street on 24 October 2013, was taken to hospital, and subsequently died; the concerns included the sale of large amounts of potentially fatal gases to her by retailers aware of her addiction, along with lack of regulation and limited Trading Standards powers.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of regulation of the sale of large amounts of toxic or potentially fatal gases
Wider context from the report “1. During the course of the inquest, it transpired that cans of the aforementioned gases were being sold to the deceased by local retailers who were fully aware of her addiction/problems. Whilst morally reprehensible, there was no law to prevent them from selling large amounts of the toxic/potentially fatal gases to the deceased .
2. Lack of regulation.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Risk to public health from toxic or potentially fatal gases
Wider context from the report “4. Risk to public health.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of Trading Standards powers to take action or prosecute
Wider context from the report “3. No powers afforded to Trading Standards to take action/prosecute.
” Open source report
19 Jun 2014 Shaun MASLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report Surrey
View report summary
Concerns raised 2 Dangers involved in pressure testing gas pipelines View source Lack of national retraining and re-testing requirements for gas industry operatives View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Shaun MASLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Shaun Maslin died after a pressurised gas-pipeline test failed at a worksite on 21 October 2011, when bracing broke and an end cap struck him. The report raised concerns about specific qualifications for gas-pipeline pressure testing and the absence of a national requirement for regular retraining and re-testing of gas-industry operatives.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Dangers involved in pressure testing gas pipelines
Wider context from the report “1. By reason of the dangers involved in pressure testing gas pipelines , consideration should be given to making such tests the subject of their own specific qualifications.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of national retraining and re-testing requirements for gas industry operatives
Wider context from the report “2. There is no national requirement for operatives within the gas industry to be retrained and tested once they have obtained their initial qualifications . Consideration should be given to imposing a national requirement that all operatives in the gas industry be subject to a five yearly review and re-testing of their qualifications.
” Open source report
19 Jun 2014 Names not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report West Somerset
View report summary
Concerns raised 9 Failure to position lookouts for smoke or fog approaching nearby highways or railway lines View source Lack of immediate communication access to emergency services during firework displays View source Failure to assess humidity and wind conditions immediately before firework displays View source Lack of firework-firer training on recognising risks arising from high humidity View source Failure to prepare a comprehensive firework-display risk assessment View source Failure of road-safety-equipment deployment criteria to provide special consideration below six personal injury collisions in three years View source Lack of fog detection devices to identify reduced visibility before an initial incident View source Insufficient use of overhead gantries displaying reduced-visibility warnings View source Failure to ensure immediate stopping of firework displays when emergencies arise View source See 6 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Names not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Seven people died when 34 vehicles collided in thick fog on the M5 motorway near Taunton on 4 November 2011; 51 others were injured. The concerns related to preventing vehicles entering areas of severely reduced visibility, detecting and warning of fog, and managing risks from firework displays that may increase fog or smoke near highways.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to position lookouts for smoke or fog approaching nearby highways or railway lines
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity .
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of immediate communication access to emergency services during firework displays
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to assess humidity and wind conditions immediately before firework displays
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display ,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of firework-firer training on recognising risks arising from high humidity
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose .
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to prepare a comprehensive firework-display risk assessment
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents .
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of road-safety-equipment deployment criteria to provide special consideration below six personal injury collisions in three years
Wider context from the report ““A”
I am concerned that the Highway Agency's proposals whilst possibly preventing further vehicles entering an accident scene or a large area of reduced visibility would not prevent the initial incident and that this can only be achieved by the erection of fog detection devises and greater use of overhead gantries displaying signs warning of events that may cause reduced visibility.
AND as the criterion for deploying road safety equipment is six personal injury collisions in three years the present incident would not qualify for special consideration .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of fog detection devices to identify reduced visibility before an initial incident
Wider context from the report ““A”
I am concerned that the Highway Agency's proposals whilst possibly preventing further vehicles entering an accident scene or a large area of reduced visibility would not prevent the initial incident and that this can only be achieved by the erection of fog detection devises and greater use of overhead gantries displaying signs warning of events that may cause reduced visibility.
AND as the criterion for deploying road safety equipment is six personal injury collisions in three years the present incident would not qualify for special consideration.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient use of overhead gantries displaying reduced-visibility warnings
Wider context from the report ““A”
I am concerned that the Highway Agency's proposals whilst possibly preventing further vehicles entering an accident scene or a large area of reduced visibility would not prevent the initial incident and that this can only be achieved by the erection of fog detection devises and greater use of overhead gantries displaying signs warning of events that may cause reduced visibility .
AND as the criterion for deploying road safety equipment is six personal injury collisions in three years the present incident would not qualify for special consideration.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure immediate stopping of firework displays when emergencies arise
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report
5 Jun 2014 Sophie Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report Sunderland
View report summary
Concerns raised 2 Insufficient public awareness of blind-cord risks among infants, grandparents and carers View source Existing blind cords posing a risk of death to children View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Sophie Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Sophie Allen, aged 2 years, was found at home with a blind cord wrapped around her neck and was pronounced dead on 26 April 2014 after hospital transfer. The report highlighted the continuing risk of blind cords to young children, including risks from existing cords in homes and the need for wider public awareness.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient public awareness of blind-cord risks among infants, grandparents and carers
Wider context from the report “Sophie's death was yet another example of the dangers that blind cords pose to the lives of young children. I understand that since 1999 there have been 28 such deaths in the UK due to looped cords (15 of them since 2010).
I am aware that following reports from Coroners and other representations the new EN13120 released in February 2014 strengthened the child safety elements of the standard and that your Department continues to actively support safety campaigns which would include the distribution of leaflets and the provision of cleats and cord shorten.
Sadly and despite these efforts public awareness and the need to act promptly to eliminate the risks associated with blind cords not only needs to continue but perhaps should be extended to cover a greater element of the population including infants, grandparents and carers . Although the new standard applies to new installations there will be millions of blind cords already fitted in homes occupied (or visited by children) that pose a very real risk of death as in Sophie's case. It may be that Sophie's family may also write to you.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Existing blind cords posing a risk of death to children
Wider context from the report “Sophie's death was yet another example of the dangers that blind cords pose to the lives of young children . I understand that since 1999 there have been 28 such deaths in the UK due to looped cords (15 of them since 2010).
I am aware that following reports from Coroners and other representations the new EN13120 released in February 2014 strengthened the child safety elements of the standard and that your Department continues to actively support safety campaigns which would include the distribution of leaflets and the provision of cleats and cord shorten.
Sadly and despite these efforts public awareness and the need to act promptly to eliminate the risks associated with blind cords not only needs to continue but perhaps should be extended to cover a greater element of the population including infants, grandparents and carers. Although the new standard applies to new installations there will be millions of blind cords already fitted in homes occupied (or visited by children) that pose a very real risk of death as in Sophie's case. It may be that Sophie's family may also write to you.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue supporting partner-led blind-cord safety awareness campaigns through funding and collaboration.
Verbatim wording from the response “BIS supports the BBSA’s “Make It Safe Campaign” which is run primarily with RoSPA through widespread distribution of the Make It Safe brochure, press releases, TV and radio programmes and interviews and use of social networking. Since 2011 the BBSA has produced and distributed 1.6 million Make It Safe leaflets (many through RoSPA). They have also produced a video, poster, vehicle and shop window stickers – more information can be found on their website http://www.makeitsafe.org.uk/ The leaflet has gone to every local authority in Wales and to the main children’s organisations (statutory and NGOs).” Source location 2014-0256-Response
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Preventive delivery is led by the BBSA and RoSPA through partnerships and networks rather than undertaken solely by government.
Verbatim wording from the response “However, I believe there is an already established and effective network of partners who are well placed to take preventative action forward, led by the British Blind and Shutters Association (BBSA) and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA). Below I outline some of the campaigns planned or already underway.” Source location 2014-0256-Response
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Established partner campaigns and networks are considered an effective response to increasing awareness of blind-cord safety risks.
Verbatim wording from the response “However, I believe there is an already established and effective network of partners who are well placed to take preventative action forward, led by the British Blind and Shutters Association (BBSA) and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA). Below I outline some of the campaigns planned or already underway.” Source location 2014-0256-Response
Open published response
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations