Hammerson PLC

Private and voluntary organisations · Public limited company

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First report 30 Jul 2014•Latest report 30 Jun 2015

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
2

Naming this recipient

Published responses
50%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
1

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
4

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Hammerson PLC linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Colette Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Colette Hughes died on 7 July 2014 after jumping from the top storey of a multi-storey car park at Centrale Shopping Centre in Croydon. Concerns were raised that the accessible perimeter wall had been involved in at least two previous deaths, posed a danger to people using it as seating, and that notices about Samaritans services might not be sufficient without physical modifications.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Hammerson PLC; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficiency of notices advising visitors of Samaritans services

    Wider context from the report

    “The wall is easy to access and at least two previous deaths have occurred in similar circumstances since 2006. Whilst recognising that barriers cannot be provided at every location above ground, and the fact that the building complies with regulations , there is a concern that others may die in the same manner. There is also a concern that the wall presents a danger to those who may decide to use it as a seating area, particularly after taking drink or drugs. In the absence of some physical modifications, the notices advising visitors of the services of the Samaritans recently installed may not be sufficient. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Hammerson PLC; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to physically modify an easily accessible wall to prevent dangerous use as a seating area

    Wider context from the report

    “The wall is easy to access and at least two previous deaths have occurred in similar circumstances since 2006. Whilst recognising that barriers cannot be provided at every location above ground, and the fact that the building complies with regulations , there is a concern that others may die in the same manner. There is also a concern that the wall presents a danger to those who may decide to use it as a seating area, particularly after taking drink or drugs. In the absence of some physical modifications, the notices advising visitors of the services of the Samaritans recently installed may not be sufficient. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install hostile planting around lower parapet walls on Levels 3 and 3A where potential falls exceed five metres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.2. Generally to prevent the lower (less than 1.8m) level walls on levels 3 and 3A (rooftop level) which are under 1.8m in height potentially being used by members of the public to lever themselves up onto the perimeter ledge, we are installing similar hostile planting which will prevent access in those areas where the potential fall distance is over 5 metres i.e. beyond the next car park level.”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install vehicle stopping barriers beside relevant lower parapet walls to prevent vehicles being used as steps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.3. In order to prevent cars from parking close to any lower level parapet walls we are installing vehicle stopping barriers along the floor adjacent to the walls in the relevant locations. This will prevent cars being used as a step up to a perimeter wall by members of the public (Appendix A).”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue exploring the feasibility of raising parapet walls on Levels 3 and 3A, including required planning and building-regulations approvals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Following receipt of the Report we commissioned structural engineers to advise on the feasibility of raising the height of the parapet walls on levels 3 and 3A. Their report (received on 14th August 2015) in summary advised how this could be achieved but would involve regulatory planning and building regulations approval. This is currently being explored.”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install hostile planting to make access to the Level 3 corner parapet walls more difficult.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1. We are making access to the parapet walls to the corner of the car park from which Colette Hughes fell (Level 3) more difficult with ‘hostile planting’ being introduced which in particular will assist in preventing access. For an example of how hostile planting is introduced see Appendix A.”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

  2. Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    LYNN MARGARET GRAHAM GORMLEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    At approximately 12:20 on 23 December 2013, Lynn Margaret Graham Gormley jumped from level 11 of Queensgate Car Park and died of multiple injuries. The report raises concerns that the car park design did not provide effective barriers to jumping, that falls also posed a risk to pedestrians, and that there had been a number of suicides from the car parks since 2006.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Hammerson PLC; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk of pedestrian death from falls from car parks into public pavements

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There have been a number of suicides from 2006 onwards, where individuals have taken their own lives by jumping from the Queensgate Car Parks. The current design of the car park is not effective in preventing jumps and the recent refurbishment of the car parks did not lead to the erection of barriers/increasing the height of the walls. Of note is the paper (attached) by ████████ and others (BMC Public Health 2013, 13:214) which concluded that notwithstanding certain limitations of the review undertaken, reducing access to means through the installation of barriers can be effective in averting suicides at hotspots and does not lead to substitution effects. (2) The car park at Peterborough City Hospital which was opened in 2010 and is therefore of modern design, was constructed in such a way as to provide a significant obstacle to jumping as the wall on the top floor is approximately 3 meters high. By contrast, the walls at the upper floors of the Queensgate Car Parks and other City Centre car parks, are at a low level and do not operate as an effective barrier to jumping. (3) Falls from the car parks have been into areas where the public use pavements and there is clearly a risk of death to pedestrians also. (4) There is evidence in the medical notes and records of some of those who have taken their own lives, that car parks are seen as a means of effecting death by jumping. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Hammerson PLC; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Queensgate and other City Centre car park barriers to prevent jumping

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There have been a number of suicides from 2006 onwards, where individuals have taken their own lives by jumping from the Queensgate Car Parks. The current design of the car park is not effective in preventing jumps and the recent refurbishment of the car parks did not lead to the erection of barriers/increasing the height of the walls. Of note is the paper (attached) by ████████ and others (BMC Public Health 2013, 13:214) which concluded that notwithstanding certain limitations of the review undertaken, reducing access to means through the installation of barriers can be effective in averting suicides at hotspots and does not lead to substitution effects. (2) The car park at Peterborough City Hospital which was opened in 2010 and is therefore of modern design, was constructed in such a way as to provide a significant obstacle to jumping as the wall on the top floor is approximately 3 meters high. By contrast, the walls at the upper floors of the Queensgate Car Parks and other City Centre car parks, are at a low level and do not operate as an effective barrier to jumping. (3) Falls from the car parks have been into areas where the public use pavements and there is clearly a risk of death to pedestrians also. (4) There is evidence in the medical notes and records of some of those who have taken their own lives, that car parks are seen as a means of effecting death by jumping. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026