Jv Limited

Private and voluntary organisations · Private limited company

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First report 2 Mar 2020•Latest report 2 Mar 2020

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Jv Limited linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Gary Dean Webster · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gary Dean Webster died after a boat capsized while he was attempting to retrieve a propane gas cylinder from turbulent water at a weir. He was immersed for approximately 15 minutes, suffered cardiac arrest and multi-organ failure, and died in hospital. The principal concerns were the absence of a suitable risk assessment and approved method statement, ineffective permissioning and competence checks for safety-boat operation, and design shortcomings that exposed workers to hazardous water during debris-retrieval tasks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verify competence for operating the safety boat and its outboard motor

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) A permissioning system was in operation at the site which restricted the operation of the safety boat to identified persons who had been trained and authorised. Despite this, the safety boat was being operated at the time of the incident by a worker who was neither authorised nor trained. He had operated the boat on previous occasions but had no experience of doing so in the turbulent water conditions encountered. Whilst he was controlling the boat it became engulfed with water cascading over the weir and overturned. A second aspect of this concern relates to Gary Webster who was expected by the Works Manager to be operating the safety boat and hence can be inferred to be expressly authorised to do so. He was qualified and had many years’ experience operating large boats. It was assumed that by virtue of qualifications obtained elsewhere on other vessels that he could be taken to be competent to operate a small craft such as this safety boat. The evidence taken at the Inquest indicated he was not competent to operate the boat’s outboard motor. These factors indicate that the permissioning system was ineffective on 30/10/17. The concern here is that unless a permit system is enforced, with appropriate checks made for verity credentials, a further death may occur if individuals are allowed to stray beyond the boundaries of their competence. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to appreciate hazards of inherently hazardous tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) To retrieve the gas cylinder the two men approached a hazardous area of turbulent water, without a formal risk assessment having taken place or a method statement approved. The two men involved had not undertaken this task before. It required them to approach a hazardous area of turbulent water. Despite this they were permitted to proceed without a risk assessment being undertaken or a method statement being approved. The task was merely delegated to them and they were left to devise a method for themselves. The concerns arising from this are (1) the failure of the Senior Engineer and Manager involved to appreciate the hazards involved (2) require a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks involved before proceeding and (3) consider whether alternative methods of accomplishing the task might reduce or eliminate the risks to their safety. Such an approach to inherently hazardous tasks gives rise to the risk that another death may occur in the organisations named due to inadequate planning procedures. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to design safe debris-removal arrangements for weir maintenance

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) It was a known phenomenon that flotsam and debris would float down the River Aire, pass over the weir gates on occasions and then remain in the vicinity of the swirling water at the foot of the 2.6m cascade at the weir gates. Such debris may create the potential for monitoring devices near the weir gates to be damaged or cause environmental harm. Such a phenomenon should have been foreseen at the time the weir installation was designed. If it was deemed necessary for debris to be removed then a safe working platform should have been incorporated into the design in order that the task of retrieving offending items could be accomplished without workers being exposed to hazardous of working in close proximity to turbulent water. Alternatively, a procedure should have been devised to enable debris to be freed by the operation of the steel weir gates or underlying neoprene bladders. The concern here is that shortcomings in the designs of this nature may expose workers to potentially fatal risks in the course of future maintenance tasks. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of suitable and sufficient risk assessment before hazardous tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) To retrieve the gas cylinder the two men approached a hazardous area of turbulent water, without a formal risk assessment having taken place or a method statement approved. The two men involved had not undertaken this task before. It required them to approach a hazardous area of turbulent water. Despite this they were permitted to proceed without a risk assessment being undertaken or a method statement being approved. The task was merely delegated to them and they were left to devise a method for themselves. The concerns arising from this are (1) the failure of the Senior Engineer and Manager involved to appreciate the hazards involved (2) require a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks involved before proceeding and (3) consider whether alternative methods of accomplishing the task might reduce or eliminate the risks to their safety. Such an approach to inherently hazardous tasks gives rise to the risk that another death may occur in the organisations named due to inadequate planning procedures. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to enforce permit controls and verify operator credentials

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) A permissioning system was in operation at the site which restricted the operation of the safety boat to identified persons who had been trained and authorised. Despite this, the safety boat was being operated at the time of the incident by a worker who was neither authorised nor trained. He had operated the boat on previous occasions but had no experience of doing so in the turbulent water conditions encountered. Whilst he was controlling the boat it became engulfed with water cascading over the weir and overturned. A second aspect of this concern relates to Gary Webster who was expected by the Works Manager to be operating the safety boat and hence can be inferred to be expressly authorised to do so. He was qualified and had many years’ experience operating large boats. It was assumed that by virtue of qualifications obtained elsewhere on other vessels that he could be taken to be competent to operate a small craft such as this safety boat. The evidence taken at the Inquest indicated he was not competent to operate the boat’s outboard motor. These factors indicate that the permissioning system was ineffective on 30/10/17. The concern here is that unless a permit system is enforced, with appropriate checks made for verity credentials, a further death may occur if individuals are allowed to stray beyond the boundaries of their competence. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider lower-risk methods for hazardous tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) To retrieve the gas cylinder the two men approached a hazardous area of turbulent water, without a formal risk assessment having taken place or a method statement approved. The two men involved had not undertaken this task before. It required them to approach a hazardous area of turbulent water. Despite this they were permitted to proceed without a risk assessment being undertaken or a method statement being approved. The task was merely delegated to them and they were left to devise a method for themselves. The concerns arising from this are (1) the failure of the Senior Engineer and Manager involved to appreciate the hazards involved (2) require a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks involved before proceeding and (3) consider whether alternative methods of accomplishing the task might reduce or eliminate the risks to their safety. Such an approach to inherently hazardous tasks gives rise to the risk that another death may occur in the organisations named due to inadequate planning procedures. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Jv Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to approve method statements for hazardous tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) To retrieve the gas cylinder the two men approached a hazardous area of turbulent water, without a formal risk assessment having taken place or a method statement approved. The two men involved had not undertaken this task before. It required them to approach a hazardous area of turbulent water. Despite this they were permitted to proceed without a risk assessment being undertaken or a method statement being approved. The task was merely delegated to them and they were left to devise a method for themselves. The concerns arising from this are (1) the failure of the Senior Engineer and Manager involved to appreciate the hazards involved (2) require a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks involved before proceeding and (3) consider whether alternative methods of accomplishing the task might reduce or eliminate the risks to their safety. Such an approach to inherently hazardous tasks gives rise to the risk that another death may occur in the organisations named due to inadequate planning procedures. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026