Lowdham Grange Prison

Justice · Prison or young offender institution

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First report 3 Aug 2022•Latest report 20 May 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports: 4
Published responses: 25%
Concerns addressed: 6
Stated actions: 13

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Lowdham Grange Prison linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

20 May2026
Nottinghamshire
Concerns raised6
1. Failure to retain evidence pertinent to deaths
2. Failure to ensure a safe and productive working relationship between prison and healthcare staff
3. Failure to maintain an appropriately staffed and resourced Safer Custody function
1. Failure to provide a safe Care and Separation Unit meeting expected policy and minimum standards of decency
2. Persistent failure to maintain a robust system for learning from deaths
3. Failure to maintain a robust system for managing the safer custody telephone line
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Ricky Crosher and Matthew Osborne were prisoners at HMP Lowdham Grange who died by suicide in October and November 2023, respectively. Both had been identified as at increased risk of suicide and self-harm and placed on ACCT plans, but the plans and welfare checks were not managed in accordance with policy. The report identified concerns about Safer Custody staffing and systems, the safety and management of the Care and Separation Unit, learning from deaths, retention of evidence, and cooperation between prison and healthcare staff.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to retain evidence pertinent to deaths
Wider context from the report
“5. Failure to retain evidence pertinent to the death ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to ensure a safe and productive working relationship between prison and healthcare staff
Wider context from the report
“6. Failure to ensure a safe and productive working relationship between prison and healthcare staff ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to maintain an appropriately staffed and resourced Safer Custody function
Wider context from the report
“1. Failure to have in place an appropriately staffed and resourced Safer Custody function ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide a safe Care and Separation Unit meeting expected policy and minimum standards of decency
Wider context from the report
“3. Failure to provide a safe Care and Separation Unit which adhered to expected policy and minimum standards of decency ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Persistent failure to maintain a robust system for learning from deaths
Wider context from the report
“4. Persistent failure to have in place a robust system for learning from deaths ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to maintain a robust system for managing the safer custody telephone line
Wider context from the report
“2. Failure to have in place a robust system for managing the safer custody telephone line ”
Open source report
7 Feb2025
Nottinghamshire
Concerns raised14
1. Inadequate basic training, supervision and mentoring of prison staff
2. Inadequate prison and healthcare staffing levels
3. Failure to act with candour in post-death investigations
1. Use of inaccessible email channels for risk pertinent information
2. Failure to identify and share risk pertinent information between prison and healthcare staff
3. Insufficient safety scrutiny during prison contract transfer
4. Failure to reduce isolation of foreign national prisoners
5. Failure to embed learning from deaths and monitor safety culture
6. Failure to provide a nurse during night state
7. Unreliable and delayed access to interpretation services for foreign national prisoners
8. Lack of an effective system for gathering, retaining, reviewing and disclosing investigation material
9. Failure to retain sufficient experienced prison and healthcare staff
10. Lack of effective NPS-specific drug policy
11. Lack of a formal prison-to-prison transfer management system
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Anthony Binfield and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Anthony Binfield, David William Richards and Rolandas Karbauskas died at HMP Lowdham Grange in March 2023 after using ligatures; Anthony’s and Rolandas’s deaths were suicides, while David’s death was accidental. The report identified missed opportunities to recognise and share risk information, shortcomings in prison and healthcare staffing, training and systems, and concerns about prisoner transfers, isolation, the prison contract transfer, and learning from previous deaths.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Inadequate basic training, supervision and mentoring of prison staff
Wider context from the report
“All of the prison staff had completed the ITC programme, and yet there was widespread evidence of failures to do the basics. Staff failed to ensure the welfare of prisoners at roll count, failed to challenge flagrant breaches of Prison rules such as passing items under cell doors, and did not know how to properly deal with obscured cell observation hatches. This calls into question the adequacy of their basic training, and the system for supervision and mentoring during the early years of practice. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Inadequate prison and healthcare staffing levels
Wider context from the report
“The inadequate prison and healthcare staffing levels led to a restricted regime and healthcare provision. The prison was unable to offer keywork to all men, and the mental health team could no longer offer a named nurse service. Both of these aspects of care are fundamental to supporting the most vulnerable prisoners. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to act with candour in post-death investigations
Wider context from the report
“The Healthcare Trust are subject to a statutory duty of candour. HMPPS, Serco and Sodexo failed to embrace the same ethos during these investigations. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Use of inaccessible email channels for risk pertinent information
Wider context from the report
“I am also concerned by the use of email to convey risk pertinent information. In this case, prison staff communicated their concerns about Anthony’s mental health to individual nursing Sodexo email inboxes, which the nurses were not expected to regularly access. The use of email means that such concerns are not accessible to other members of staff as they would be if they were recorded in PNOMIS or Systemone. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to identify and share risk pertinent information between prison and healthcare staff
Wider context from the report
“There was a complete breakdown in the system of risk identification and information sharing. Prison and healthcare staff did not routinely consider information captured within the electronic systems, nor did they update the systems with risk pertinent information gathered during interactions with the prisoners. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Insufficient safety scrutiny during prison contract transfer
Wider context from the report
“Safety was not front and centre of the Mobilisation and Transfer project. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to reduce isolation of foreign national prisoners
Wider context from the report
“I heard evidence that the Big Word translation service did not work on multiple occasions across multiple sites within the prison. Staff gave evidence that even when the system did connect, they could be waiting in a queue for up to an hour to access an appropriate interpreter. There was no plan to seek to reduce Rolandas’ obvious isolation, and seemingly no provision for expediting his induction so that he could be housed with fellow Lithuanian speakers. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to embed learning from deaths and monitor safety culture
Wider context from the report
“I heard evidence that many of the contributory factors leading to the deaths of Anthony, David and Rolandas, had been raised as issues in the investigations following previous deaths in custody at HMP Lowdham Grange. While Serco no longer manage HMP Lowdham Grange, they continue to manage prisons, and there is a risk of future deaths if the organisation is unable to create a robust culture of seeking to identify issues early, adopt learning, and continually monitor culture to ensure any action taken is embedded to reduce the risk of future deaths. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide a nurse during night state
Wider context from the report
“For months prior to the deaths, the Trust failed to fulfil its commissioned obligations to provide a nurse during night state. Prison staff have only basic first aid training and lacked the expertise of a medical professional when attempting to provide CPR to Anthony. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Unreliable and delayed access to interpretation services for foreign national prisoners
Wider context from the report
“I heard evidence that the Big Word translation service did not work on multiple occasions across multiple sites within the prison. Staff gave evidence that even when the system did connect, they could be waiting in a queue for up to an hour to access an appropriate interpreter. There was no plan to seek to reduce Rolandas’ obvious isolation, and seemingly no provision for expediting his induction so that he could be housed with fellow Lithuanian speakers. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of an effective system for gathering, retaining, reviewing and disclosing investigation material
Wider context from the report
“HMPPS have no effective system for gathering, retaining, reviewing and disclosing potentially relevant material so that the issues relevant to death can be identified and learning put in place. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to retain sufficient experienced prison and healthcare staff
Wider context from the report
“I am concerned by the failure to retain experienced prison officers and healthcare staff. The private prison operator and the Authority were focused on the number of staff, rather than the skill sets or experience of the staffing body as a whole. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of effective NPS-specific drug policy
Wider context from the report
“There is no requirement for prisons to have an NPS specific drug policy and I am concerned that generic drug reduction strategies are ineffective against this particular threat. NPS is highly dangerous and carries a risk of death. I am concerned that more young men will die in custody as a result of NPS use. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of a formal prison-to-prison transfer management system
Wider context from the report
“I heard evidence that there is no formal policy framework or system for managing the progress of prison-to-prison transfers, including a lack of expected response times or formal escalation plan if a prison fails to provide any response. ”
Open source report
17 Dec2024
Nottinghamshire
Concerns raised2
1. Failure to keep cell observation panels clear and challenge prisoners who cover them
2. Delays in entering cells when observation panels are obscured and the prisoner does not respond
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Anthony Binfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Anthony Binfield died from ligature asphyxiation inside his cell at HMP Lowdham Grange on 6 March 2023. Prison staff delayed entering the cell for 11 minutes after finding the observation panel covered and receiving no response. The principal concerns were unsafe and policy-inconsistent management of covered cell observation panels, an embedded staff practice of delaying entry, and repeated notices failing to address the issue.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to keep cell observation panels clear and challenge prisoners who cover them
Wider context from the report
“(1) Prison staff failing to manage the covering of cell observation panels in a safe way that is compliant with the policy and guidance issued by the prison over many years. I am taking the exceptional step of writing to you formally before the conclusion of the inquest as I am so concerned by the evidence called to date regarding the custom and practice of officers when discovering obscured cell observation panels at night. There is a dangerous culture of staff assuming the prisoner has obscured the observation panel for privacy purposes or as a form of protest against the regime. This neglects the obvious and very real risk that the prisoner is seeking to harm themselves, without detection. The HMPPS Safety Notice, issued in February 2018, made clear that cell observation panels are a vital tool in keeping prisoners safe and must be kept clear at all times in order to preserve life. The custom and practice of seeking to visualise the prisoner via the inundation unit hole (and other means, such as the side of the door) has developed over time and is now an embedded culture accepted by many officers as a response to this occurrence. This practice leads to delay in entering the cell, risks lives and is contrary to policy. This is not a new issue for the prison and hence my concern that the prison has failed to tackle this issue over many years. In August 2020, a prisoner died at HMP Lowdham Grange as a result of drug use. When officers conducted a welfare check they found his cell observation panel to be obscured. Contrary to policy and guidance, Prison staff delayed entering the cell while they fetched the inundation unit key to attempt to observe inside the cell. The Prison and Probation Ombudsman made a recommendation to the Prison Director that they should ensure that observation panels are kept clear, and that staff actively challenge prisoners who cover them. In response, the Prison Director issued a notice to staff in January 2021 reminding staff of the need to treat any prisoner as unresponsive if they fail to acknowledge the officer, and to call a code blue. A similar notice was issued in April 2021, reminding staff of the need to perform a dynamic risk assessment and enter the cell in a quick and safe manner when there is no response to asking the prisoner to remove the offending item. The notice was re-issued in November 2021, and after the inquest in approximately April 2023. Despite these multiple notices, a number of witnesses who remain members of staff at the prison (now under HMPPS employ) reported being unaware of the expected procedure when faced with an obscured cell observation panel until attending Anthony’s inquest in December 2024. It is clear that the issuing of staff notices has not addressed the problem of prisoner's covering their cell hatches, nor the unsafe custom and practice of staff leaving the cell and thereby delaying safe entry. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Delays in entering cells when observation panels are obscured and the prisoner does not respond
Wider context from the report
“(1) Prison staff failing to manage the covering of cell observation panels in a safe way that is compliant with the policy and guidance issued by the prison over many years. I am taking the exceptional step of writing to you formally before the conclusion of the inquest as I am so concerned by the evidence called to date regarding the custom and practice of officers when discovering obscured cell observation panels at night. There is a dangerous culture of staff assuming the prisoner has obscured the observation panel for privacy purposes or as a form of protest against the regime. This neglects the obvious and very real risk that the prisoner is seeking to harm themselves, without detection. The HMPPS Safety Notice, issued in February 2018, made clear that cell observation panels are a vital tool in keeping prisoners safe and must be kept clear at all times in order to preserve life. The custom and practice of seeking to visualise the prisoner via the inundation unit hole (and other means, such as the side of the door) has developed over time and is now an embedded culture accepted by many officers as a response to this occurrence. This practice leads to delay in entering the cell, risks lives and is contrary to policy. This is not a new issue for the prison and hence my concern that the prison has failed to tackle this issue over many years. In August 2020, a prisoner died at HMP Lowdham Grange as a result of drug use. When officers conducted a welfare check they found his cell observation panel to be obscured. Contrary to policy and guidance, Prison staff delayed entering the cell while they fetched the inundation unit key to attempt to observe inside the cell. The Prison and Probation Ombudsman made a recommendation to the Prison Director that they should ensure that observation panels are kept clear, and that staff actively challenge prisoners who cover them. In response, the Prison Director issued a notice to staff in January 2021 reminding staff of the need to treat any prisoner as unresponsive if they fail to acknowledge the officer, and to call a code blue. A similar notice was issued in April 2021, reminding staff of the need to perform a dynamic risk assessment and enter the cell in a quick and safe manner when there is no response to asking the prisoner to remove the offending item. The notice was re-issued in November 2021, and after the inquest in approximately April 2023. Despite these multiple notices, a number of witnesses who remain members of staff at the prison (now under HMPPS employ) reported being unaware of the expected procedure when faced with an obscured cell observation panel until attending Anthony’s inquest in December 2024. It is clear that the issuing of staff notices has not addressed the problem of prisoner's covering their cell hatches, nor the unsafe custom and practice of staff leaving the cell and thereby delaying safe entry. ”
Open source report
3 Aug2022
Nottinghamshire
Concerns raised2
1. Failure to retain and preserve evidence relevant to learning from deaths in custody
2. Insufficient robustness of the local system for retaining and preserving material relevant to deaths
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

NIGEL JOHN SAUNDERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Nigel John Saunders was detained at HMP Lowdham Grange and was found suspended by ligature on 17 November 2018. He was pronounced deceased in hospital on 18 November 2018 following hypoxic brain injury sustained during the suspension. The concerns included failings in his admission to the Segregation Unit, care under the ACCT Plan, and searching before entering the shower area, as well as failures to retain and preserve evidence relevant to investigations of deaths in custody.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to retain and preserve evidence relevant to learning from deaths in custody
Wider context from the report
“(1) The Prison failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to National Prison policy to retain and preserve evidence likely to assist all agencies to learn from deaths in custody. (2) The local system in place for the retention and preservation of material likely to be relevant to the circumstances of death is not as robust as it ought to be. This is not the first time serious disclosure irregularities have undermined the veracity of an Article 2 inquest involving this prison in my corner Area. I consider this to be a local issue of significant importance. If the investigations following a death are repeatedly hindered in their full and frank examination of the facts due to missed opportunities by the prison to have retained and preserved evidence, then lessons cannot be learned, and the risk of further deaths shall persist. The Chief Coroner highlights this specific area of risk at paragraph 42 of the revised Guidance Note 5. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Lowdham Grange Prison; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Insufficient robustness of the local system for retaining and preserving material relevant to deaths
Wider context from the report
“(1) The Prison failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to National Prison policy to retain and preserve evidence likely to assist all agencies to learn from deaths in custody. (2) The local system in place for the retention and preservation of material likely to be relevant to the circumstances of death is not as robust as it ought to be. This is not the first time serious disclosure irregularities have undermined the veracity of an Article 2 inquest involving this prison in my corner Area. I consider this to be a local issue of significant importance. If the investigations following a death are repeatedly hindered in their full and frank examination of the facts due to missed opportunities by the prison to have retained and preserved evidence, then lessons cannot be learned, and the risk of further deaths shall persist. The Chief Coroner highlights this specific area of risk at paragraph 42 of the revised Guidance Note 5. ”
Open source report

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Concerns raised6

Failure to retain evidence pertinent to deaths

Failure to ensure a safe and productive working relationship between prison and healthcare staff

Failure to maintain an appropriately staffed and resourced Safer Custody function

Failure to provide a safe Care and Separation Unit meeting expected policy and minimum standards of decency

Persistent failure to maintain a robust system for learning from deaths

Failure to maintain a robust system for managing the safer custody telephone line

Concerns raised14

Inadequate basic training, supervision and mentoring of prison staff

Inadequate prison and healthcare staffing levels

Failure to act with candour in post-death investigations

Use of inaccessible email channels for risk pertinent information

Failure to identify and share risk pertinent information between prison and healthcare staff

Insufficient safety scrutiny during prison contract transfer

Failure to reduce isolation of foreign national prisoners

Failure to embed learning from deaths and monitor safety culture

Failure to provide a nurse during night state

Unreliable and delayed access to interpretation services for foreign national prisoners

Lack of an effective system for gathering, retaining, reviewing and disclosing investigation material

Failure to retain sufficient experienced prison and healthcare staff

Lack of effective NPS-specific drug policy

Lack of a formal prison-to-prison transfer management system

Concerns raised2

Failure to keep cell observation panels clear and challenge prisoners who cover them

Delays in entering cells when observation panels are obscured and the prisoner does not respond

Concerns raised2

Failure to retain and preserve evidence relevant to learning from deaths in custody

Insufficient robustness of the local system for retaining and preserving material relevant to deaths