Medacs Healthcare Limited

Private and voluntary organisations · Private limited company

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First report 6 Jan 2014•Latest report 16 Apr 2015

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports: 3
Published responses: 0%
Concerns addressed: 0
Stated actions: 0

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Medacs Healthcare Limited linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

16 Apr2015
Manchester South
Concerns raised28
1. Failure of the youth diversion project to provide diversion before criminal justice processing
2. Failure to record and explain incomplete medical assessments
3. Failure to return completed Appropriate Adult forms to Social Services
1. Interagency confusion about safeguarding roles and access to information
2. Failure to initiate youth offending and mental health monitoring after case transfer
3. Failure to pass complete incident information to attending officers
4. Inconsistent safeguarding functions across Manchester Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs
5. Insufficient availability of accommodation for children under 17
6. Insufficient recording of safeguarding information by Appropriate Adults
7. Failure of youth offending teams to transfer and oversee cases after relocation
8. Failure to assess police information when selecting an Appropriate Adult
9. Lack of legally required accommodation for 17-year-olds refused bail
10. Failure to make safeguarding referrals from custody medical information
11. Failure to record safeguarding intelligence on nominal profiles
12. Failure to conduct police database checks on standard-risk DASH referrals
13. Failure to route domestic violence cases involving 17-year-old children to child protection review
14. Lack of shared understanding between police and MEDACS about requested medical assessments
15. Lack of interagency understanding for sharing safeguarding information between police and CPS
16. Failure to provide Appropriate Adults with relevant custody risk information
17. Failure to provide differentiated mental health assessments for children in custody
18. Failure to document information provided to MEDACS before medical assessments
19. Failure to check and update Prisoner Escort Records before release
20. Custody handovers dependent on officers’ and staff’s unpaid free time
21. Lack of consistent child safeguarding coverage across Manchester local authorities
22. Lack of clear officer guidance for raising safeguarding concerns
23. Unclear referral routes for non-criminal safeguarding concerns
24. Lack of a process for recording safeguarding concerns
25. Lack of a non-criminal safeguarding policy
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Kesia Lena Mary Leatherbarrow · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Kesia Lena Mary Leatherbarrow, aged 17, died on 3 December 2013 after tying a ligature around her neck. The report describes missed opportunities among multiple agencies to obtain and share information, assess risks, and provide appropriate support, including concerns about her care and information handling while in police custody.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of the youth diversion project to provide diversion before criminal justice processing
Wider context from the report
“The court heard evidence that in Tameside this signposting is only taking place to the mental health services once the young person has been processed through the Criminal Justice System and is not in fact acting as a diversion pathway. There was no evidence from those working in custody that any consideration was given to this scheme for Kesia and there appeared to be little knowledge of the scheme. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to record and explain incomplete medical assessments
Wider context from the report
“It was clear that a medical assessment could not be completed and in these circumstances this should be fully explained to the police and the record endorsed accordingly rather than simply endorsing that someone is fit to be detained/interviewed or transferred. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to return completed Appropriate Adult forms to Social Services
Wider context from the report
“Evidence from Tameside Social Services indicated that they did not receive the completed form in relation to Kesia and that it was not unusual not to receive the completed forms in any cases. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Interagency confusion about safeguarding roles and access to information
Wider context from the report
“Having heard the evidence the Court felt that there was a degree of confusion and misunderstanding between all the agencies as to their roles, what they are able and not able to do and also where to access important and effective information. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to initiate youth offending and mental health monitoring after case transfer
Wider context from the report
“This did not occur as the file had not been processed at the time of Kesia’s death but also because of the confusion between the Youth Offending Teams involved with Kesia which meant she was never picked up by Tameside. The plan that Kesia should be monitored for any interim changes in her risk did not therefore occur. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to pass complete incident information to attending officers
Wider context from the report
“The Court heard evidence as to the failure to pass on complete information to the officers who then subsequently attended on Kesia including on one occasion the fact that it had been communicated that she had a knife. The court heard evidence that the failure to pass on important information could impact on the safety of the officers and others and also lead to missed opportunities for safeguarding. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Inconsistent safeguarding functions across Manchester Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs
Wider context from the report
“This was not the system in Manchester and the Court heard evidence that the development of MASHs across Manchester is still ongoing. The Court heard evidence that in Manchester different hubs work differently with different agendas – some relate to domestic violence only and not all of them deal with safeguarding of children. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Insufficient availability of accommodation for children under 17
Wider context from the report
“The Inquest heard that across Greater Manchester it is estimated that, until recently, in only 10% of cases where the police requested such a service from a local authority a bed was available. Attempts are being made to address this issue but at present the figure remains approximately 20% and the Inquest heard evidence that this was, “not good enough”. Again the facts heard at this Inquest seem to suggest that children younger than 17 are at risk of being held in custody longer than necessary due to a lack of appropriate facilities. The court heard evidence that the police are in the undesirable position of having to decide whether to detain someone (potentially unlawfully) or release them when they feel it may be unsafe to do so. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Insufficient recording of safeguarding information by Appropriate Adults
Wider context from the report
“The quality of the information given by the appropriate adult on the completed form was insufficient in light of all the information which had been made available to her about Kesia and the behaviour she had witnessed. Important information such as the threat made by Kesia was not placed onto the form ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of youth offending teams to transfer and oversee cases after relocation
Wider context from the report
“There was a failure by Lancashire to note her move which led to a delay in her case being transferred, but in addition there was a failure in the communications with Tameside for each team to understand what was being requested and to have oversight of the situation. This led to a lack of involvement with Kesia and a proposal to breach her. It also meant that no effective work was being carried out with her and a missed opportunity to recognise her developing situation in terms of her lack of residence and drug use. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to assess police information when selecting an Appropriate Adult
Wider context from the report
“It was not her understanding of the system in place that she should be assessing the information given to her by the police to consider whether it was more suitable for the attendance of a Social Worker. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of legally required accommodation for 17-year-olds refused bail
Wider context from the report
“There remains no legal requirement for local authorities to provide accommodation for 17 year olds who will then have to remain in police custody if bail is refused. The result is that 17 year old children risk being kept in custody for longer than necessary if there is nowhere suitable for them to be bailed to. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to make safeguarding referrals from custody medical information
Wider context from the report
“Similarly the Court heard that no safeguarding referral was made about Kesia despite information about her self-harming, drug and alcohol use. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to record safeguarding intelligence on nominal profiles
Wider context from the report
“No intelligence was placed on Kesia’s nominal profile despite a number of concerning contacts with her by officers. It is a core function of the police to submit such intelligence. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to conduct police database checks on standard-risk DASH referrals
Wider context from the report
“when a Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Harassment form (DASH) is submitted to the PPI unit, where the risk level is standard then no checks on the Police National Computer or the Police National Database are carried out. The rationale for this was not clear although DC Evans indicated this may be due to the volume of work. Clearly the PNC can hold vital information about a potential offender. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to route domestic violence cases involving 17-year-old children to child protection review
Wider context from the report
“For domestic violence incidents the closing code relates to people over the age of 16 as being adults. This means that the case is not then automatically passed through to the Child Protection Team within Greater Manchester Police for a review even if one of the people involved is still a child - i.e. is 17 years of age. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of shared understanding between police and MEDACS about requested medical assessments
Wider context from the report
“It was apparent to the Court that the expectations of the police as to the precise medical assessment being carried out and the conclusions of the assessment may not always be the same as the expectations and understanding of MEDACS. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of interagency understanding for sharing safeguarding information between police and CPS
Wider context from the report
“There was a lack of understanding between GMP and the CPS as to how such important information should be shared between agencies. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide Appropriate Adults with relevant custody risk information
Wider context from the report
“She was not advised that Kesia had been assessed as intoxicated and arrival, nor that she had been seen by MEDACS, nor that she had threatened to jump off a bridge on her release. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide differentiated mental health assessments for children in custody
Wider context from the report
“The Court also heard evidence that the same medical assessment is carried out for every detained person in custody regardless of whether that is a 17 year old child with mental health difficulties or a 69 year old man with a heart condition. There is no difference in the mental health assessments for children as opposed to adults. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to document information provided to MEDACS before medical assessments
Wider context from the report
“there was no clarity as to whether this included previous risk assessments, whether this was a complete record and there was no recorded evidence to indicate what information had been passed to MEDACS by the police and who had provided the information. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to check and update Prisoner Escort Records before release
Wider context from the report
“The Prisoner Escort Record form was completed over 12 hours prior to Kesia leaving police custody. It was not checked or amended prior to her release and it failed to contain crucial information indicating that whilst in custody Kesia had made a threat to jump from a bridge. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Custody handovers dependent on officers’ and staff’s unpaid free time
Wider context from the report
“The system at present relies on officers and staff attending work early and sometimes staying late after a 12 hour shift to provide a handover. Whilst it is clear there would need to be some overlap in the times people are on duty, the Court heard evidence as to the quality of the handovers which is clearly impacted by the fact that this crucial part of the information sharing process relies entirely on the free-time of officers and staff. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of consistent child safeguarding coverage across Manchester local authorities
Wider context from the report
“This will mean that there is a lack of consistency in approach across the different local authorities in Manchester as to what will be dealt with. Worryingly some will not deal with the safeguarding of children ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of clear officer guidance for raising safeguarding concerns
Wider context from the report
“Greater Manchester Police has no stand-alone safeguarding policy for matters which are not criminal. There is no clear guidance to officers regarding what to do to raise safeguarding issues. There is no process for the recording of safeguarding concerns. There is confusion and a lack of understanding as to which agencies officers should refer to and where this should be recorded. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Unclear referral routes for non-criminal safeguarding concerns
Wider context from the report
“Greater Manchester Police has no stand-alone safeguarding policy for matters which are not criminal. There is no clear guidance to officers regarding what to do to raise safeguarding issues. There is no process for the recording of safeguarding concerns. There is confusion and a lack of understanding as to which agencies officers should refer to and where this should be recorded. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of a process for recording safeguarding concerns
Wider context from the report
“Greater Manchester Police has no stand-alone safeguarding policy for matters which are not criminal. There is no clear guidance to officers regarding what to do to raise safeguarding issues. There is no process for the recording of safeguarding concerns. There is confusion and a lack of understanding as to which agencies officers should refer to and where this should be recorded. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of a non-criminal safeguarding policy
Wider context from the report
“Greater Manchester Police has no stand-alone safeguarding policy for matters which are not criminal. There is no clear guidance to officers regarding what to do to raise safeguarding issues. There is no process for the recording of safeguarding concerns. There is confusion and a lack of understanding as to which agencies officers should refer to and where this should be recorded. ”
Open source report
15 Oct2014
Manchester (North)
Concerns raised7
1. Lack of communication between GMP and MEDACS about the existence of an escalation protocol
2. Lack of resources for mental health response
3. Failure to adhere to or use escalation and call grading protocols
1. Failure and reluctance to correspond with patients’ GPs and other healthcare professionals after consultation
2. Clinical decision-making by a non-medically qualified Practice Manager
3. Failure of clinicians to retain responsibility for patients’ safety and wellbeing in the community
4. Delays in GMP responses
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Lucasz Lewandowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Lucasz Lewandowski suffered catastrophic head injuries after jumping from the roof of his employer’s building on 16 July, and died two days later. The principal concerns included delays and communication failures in emergency and mental-health responses, failures in psychiatric information-sharing and continuity of care, and issues concerning clinical decision-making and responsibility for his safety.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of communication between GMP and MEDACS about the existence of an escalation protocol
Wider context from the report
“2. Lack of communication between GMP and MEDACS regarding the existence of their escalation protocol resulting in the delayed attendance of an FME. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of resources for mental health response
Wider context from the report
“3. The use of S.136 of the Mental Health Act due to lack of resources – albeit on logical, pragmatic grounds. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to adhere to or use escalation and call grading protocols
Wider context from the report
“1. The timeliness of GMP’s response, against a backdrop of lack of adherence to/use of the escalation and call grading protocols. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure and reluctance to correspond with patients’ GPs and other healthcare professionals after consultation
Wider context from the report
“4. The psychiatric practice’s failure and reluctance to correspond with a patient’s GPs and/or other healthcare professionals following consultation, jeopardising continuity of care. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Clinical decision-making by a non-medically qualified Practice Manager
Wider context from the report
“5. Clinical decision-making by a non-medically qualified Practice Manager. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of clinicians to retain responsibility for patients’ safety and wellbeing in the community
Wider context from the report
“6. The view of the physician - that responsibility for maintaining a patient’s safety and wellbeing within the community rests entirely with the family and/or patient rather than the clinician. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Delays in GMP responses
Wider context from the report
“1. The timeliness of GMP’s response, against a backdrop of lack of adherence to/use of the escalation and call grading protocols. ”
Open source report
6 Jan2014
Manchester South
Concerns raised13
1. Failure to complete MEDACS assessment forms and care plans accurately
2. Failure to document non-assessment and avoid misleading medical records
3. Failure to obtain and review detained persons’ relevant medical information
1. Lack of understanding of required custody observation levels and rationale
2. Failure to accurately document custody cell checks
3. Failure to complete prisoner transfer documentation accurately
4. Failure to staff the Prisoner Processing Unit overnight
5. Lack of staff knowledge of MEDACS policies and protocols
6. Failure to transfer and replicate medical observation information during GEO AMEY custody
7. Lack of specific instructions and effective positioning for CCTV cell monitoring
8. Ineffective or absent handovers between custody staff
9. Failure to accurately record custody visits and checks
10. Failure to record custody risk assessments and rationale for unchanged assessments
No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Billy Paul Thomas Salton, who had epilepsy and was intermittently non-compliant with his medication, was detained at Cheadle Police Station without initially receiving his medication. He experienced seizures in custody and was later found collapsed in a cell at Stockport Magistrates’ Court; he died after being taken to hospital. The report identified concerns about medication verification and administration, recording and handovers, observation levels and cell checks, custody delays, and the accuracy and communication of medical and escort information.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to complete MEDACS assessment forms and care plans accurately
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to document non-assessment and avoid misleading medical records
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to obtain and review detained persons’ relevant medical information
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of understanding of required custody observation levels and rationale
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to accurately document custody cell checks
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to complete prisoner transfer documentation accurately
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to staff the Prisoner Processing Unit overnight
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of staff knowledge of MEDACS policies and protocols
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to transfer and replicate medical observation information during GEO AMEY custody
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of specific instructions and effective positioning for CCTV cell monitoring
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Ineffective or absent handovers between custody staff
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to accurately record custody visits and checks
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Medacs Healthcare Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to record custody risk assessments and rationale for unchanged assessments
Wider context from the report
“1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”
Open source report

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Concerns raised28

Failure of the youth diversion project to provide diversion before criminal justice processing

Failure to record and explain incomplete medical assessments

Failure to return completed Appropriate Adult forms to Social Services

Interagency confusion about safeguarding roles and access to information

Failure to initiate youth offending and mental health monitoring after case transfer

Failure to pass complete incident information to attending officers

Inconsistent safeguarding functions across Manchester Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs

Insufficient availability of accommodation for children under 17

Insufficient recording of safeguarding information by Appropriate Adults

Failure of youth offending teams to transfer and oversee cases after relocation

Failure to assess police information when selecting an Appropriate Adult

Lack of legally required accommodation for 17-year-olds refused bail

Failure to make safeguarding referrals from custody medical information

Failure to record safeguarding intelligence on nominal profiles

Failure to conduct police database checks on standard-risk DASH referrals

Failure to route domestic violence cases involving 17-year-old children to child protection review

Lack of shared understanding between police and MEDACS about requested medical assessments

Lack of interagency understanding for sharing safeguarding information between police and CPS

Failure to provide Appropriate Adults with relevant custody risk information

Failure to provide differentiated mental health assessments for children in custody

Failure to document information provided to MEDACS before medical assessments

Failure to check and update Prisoner Escort Records before release

Custody handovers dependent on officers’ and staff’s unpaid free time

Lack of consistent child safeguarding coverage across Manchester local authorities

Lack of clear officer guidance for raising safeguarding concerns

Unclear referral routes for non-criminal safeguarding concerns

Lack of a process for recording safeguarding concerns

Lack of a non-criminal safeguarding policy

Concerns raised7

Lack of communication between GMP and MEDACS about the existence of an escalation protocol

Lack of resources for mental health response

Failure to adhere to or use escalation and call grading protocols

Failure and reluctance to correspond with patients’ GPs and other healthcare professionals after consultation

Clinical decision-making by a non-medically qualified Practice Manager

Failure of clinicians to retain responsibility for patients’ safety and wellbeing in the community

Delays in GMP responses