Military Aviation Authority

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First report 24 Aug 2023•Latest report 24 Aug 2023

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Military Aviation Authority linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Somerset

    AI-generated summary

    Jonathan Paul Bost Mann and Margaret Jean Costa · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 12 August 2021, Jonathan Paul Bost Mann and Margaret Jean Costa were involved in a plane crash after weather conditions deteriorated while Mr Mann was flying above cloud, which he was not qualified to do. Both suffered catastrophic injuries incompatible with life. The principal concerns were that the Distress and Diversion Cell did not obtain or share critical information about the pilot, aircraft and weather, and that incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications with Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the assistance provided.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Military Aviation Authority; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain critical information about the pilot’s capabilities

    Wider context from the report

    “The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Military Aviation Authority; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain accurate shared understanding and communication between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control

    Wider context from the report

    “The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Military Aviation Authority; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain critical information about the plane’s capabilities

    Wider context from the report

    “The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Military Aviation Authority; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use checklists and aide memoires for ground-based assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Military Aviation Authority; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain critical weather information about the selected diversion aerodrome

    Wider context from the report

    “The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026