22 Feb 2017 Mrs. Margaret Joyce Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report Avon
View report summary
Concerns raised 5 Failure to maintain the high-friction road surface in the vicinity of the junction View source Inadequate or unrepaired carriageway markings warning drivers of the junction risk View source Failure to set an appropriately safe speed limit on the A36 either side of Branch Road View source Inadequate road signs warning drivers of the risk from the junction View source Repeated road traffic collisions at the junction involving drivers emerging onto the A36 View source See 2 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Mrs. Margaret Joyce Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Mrs. Margaret Joyce Jones died at the scene after her car collided with a northbound articulated lorry while she was turning onto the A36 from Branch Road on 5 September 2016. The report identified repeated collisions at the junction and raised concerns about the speed limit, road signs, carriageway markings, and the condition of the high-friction surface.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to maintain the high-friction road surface in the vicinity of the junction
Wider context from the report “(3) The road signs including carriageway markings should be reviewed and improved so as to provide greater warning to drivers as to the risk from this junction.
(4) Whilst not factors in this collision appropriate repairs should be made to the high friction surface and road markings in the vicinity of the junction .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate or unrepaired carriageway markings warning drivers of the junction risk
Wider context from the report “(3) The road signs including carriageway markings should be reviewed and improved so as to provide greater warning to drivers as to the risk from this junction .
(4) Whilst not factors in this collision appropriate repairs should be made to the high friction surface and road markings in the vicinity of the junction .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to set an appropriately safe speed limit on the A36 either side of Branch Road
Wider context from the report “(2)The speed limit in the section of the A36 either side of Branch Road should be reduced so as to improve the safety of drivers both those on A36 and those emerging from Branch Road .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate road signs warning drivers of the risk from the junction
Wider context from the report “(3) The road signs including carriageway markings should be reviewed and improved so as to provide greater warning to drivers as to the risk from this junction .
(4) Whilst not factors in this collision appropriate repairs should be made to the high friction surface and road markings in the vicinity of the junction.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Repeated road traffic collisions at the junction involving drivers emerging onto the A36
Wider context from the report “(1) Notwithstanding the contribution made to this collision by the factors described above there have been a number of road traffic collisions at this junction involving drivers emerging on to the A36 .
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Progress a permanent replacement scheme for part of the high-friction surfacing through the prioritized value-management process.
Verbatim wording from the response “Our maintenance interventions are made on the basis of priority and safety. We have had our pavement specialists inspect the junction recently. The wear of the HFS is immediately opposite the junction, caused by tyre friction associated with vehicles turning off of the A36 and not in the braking zone for approaching vehicles.” Source location Response from Highways England
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete a localized temporary repair to the high-friction surfacing at the junction.
Verbatim wording from the response “Our maintenance interventions are made on the basis of priority and safety. We have had our pavement specialists inspect the junction recently. The wear of the HFS is immediately opposite the junction, caused by tyre friction associated with vehicles turning off of the A36 and not in the braking zone for approaching vehicles.” Source location Response from Highways England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Continue monitoring the locality for changes requiring appropriate safety action.
Verbatim wording from the response “The road surface, specifically the HFS, while showing signs of wear is still fit for purpose and what wear there is can be considered normal and adjacent to the junction rather than in the braking zone. It will of course be monitored and overtime be replaced during our normal cycle of renewals. On that basis I consider we have implemented appropriate repairs and management regimes.” Source location Response from Highways England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implement visibility and signing measures at the Branch Road junction, including warning signs, road markings, red surfacing, direction signs and vegetation clearance.
Verbatim wording from the response “A scheme was completed on 24th November 2015 at Branch Road, with the aim of raising the visibility of the Branch Road junction. It comprised the following elements:” Source location Response from Highways England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Existing engineering measures and management arrangements address the identified risks, and no additional measures preventing the collision have been identified.
Verbatim wording from the response “In summary, the A36 is an evolved rural route and we have in place a realistic speed limit and applied what engineering measures are possible to make the travelling public aware of the risks that they are approaching.” Source location Response from Highways England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The high-friction surfacing remains fit for purpose, with wear outside the braking zone managed through monitoring and normal renewal arrangements.
Verbatim wording from the response “Our maintenance interventions are made on the basis of priority and safety. We have had our pavement specialists inspect the junction recently. The wear of the HFS is immediately opposite the junction, caused by tyre friction associated with vehicles turning off of the A36 and not in the braking zone for approaching vehicles.” Source location Response from Highways England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Excessive speed did not contribute to the collision, so reducing the posted speed limit would be unlikely to prevent similar incidents.
Verbatim wording from the response “With reference to this incident it seems the Scania vehicle travelling on the A36, based on the assessment in your letter, was traveling at about 35 mph which is significantly below the posted limit. It does not appear excessive speed was a factor on this occasion and a reduction in the posted limit would be unlikely to have avoided or influenced the unfortunate outcome of the incident of the 5th September 2016.” Source location Response from Highways England
Open published response
25 Oct 2016 Kevin Andrew Heffernan · Prevention of Future Deaths report Hertfordshire
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Concerns raised 1 Flow of water across the carriageway during heavy rain View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Kevin Andrew Heffernan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Kevin Andrew Heffernan died after losing control of his BMW in poor weather on the M25 on 27 March 2016, colliding with other vehicles and falling from the motorway. The principal concern was a approximately 16-metre flow of water across the carriageway, which police considered may have contributed to the collision and posed a danger to road users during heavy rain; 18 collisions had been recorded at the location in the preceding five years.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Flow of water across the carriageway during heavy rain
Wider context from the report “(1) Police officers who attended the scene noticed, in addition to standing water on the carriageway, a flow of water across the westbound carriageway at or near the point where the BMW began to veer to the left . They measured the flow of water as being approximately 16 metres wide flowing towards the nearside.
(2) A police officer gave evidence that in the 5 years prior to this incident 18 collisions had been recorded at this spot, with rain or water on the carriageway mentioned in 6 cases.
(3) The evidence of the police officers was that this flow of water may well have been a contributory factor in Mr Heffernan losing control of his vehicle, and that it could be a source of danger to road users in cases of heavy rain.
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Investigated the relevant section of carriageway and identified pavement, geometry and drainage findings.
Verbatim wording from the response “Action taken or to be taken by Highways England” Source location 2016-0381-Response-by-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Cleared drainage gratings, cleaned gullies and swept the v-channel to maintain unobstructed carriageway drainage.
Verbatim wording from the response “Drainage Condition” Source location 2016-0381-Response-by-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review the carriageway design, including design considerations from the major improvement scheme.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following your report we will undertake a further review of the design of this section of carriageway. This will include analysis of the design considerations that were made as part of the major improvement scheme and this is due to be completed in the spring of 2017.” Source location 2016-0381-Response-by-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Crossfall change and gradients were within normal design parameters and were considered in highway design.
Verbatim wording from the response “Our records for this section show that the crossfall (the slope of the carriageway perpendicular to the direction of travel) of the road surface changes direction prior to the point where Mr Heffernan’s vehicle started to move out of lane. The gradient (the slope of the carriageway parallel to the direction of travel) before and after this point is within normal design parameters. It is a characteristic of highway design that crossfall change will result in an increased depth of water flowing across the carriageway, in more extreme periods of rainfall. This is not an uncommon feature in highway geometry and is taken into design consideration.” Source location 2016-0381-Response-by-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Drainage inspections identified no issues affecting operation after gullies were cleared and cleaned.
Verbatim wording from the response “On 15th March 2016 the gully gratings in this location were cleared of debris to ensure no obstruction to water flowing from the carriageway. On 19th April 2016 a full clean of the gullies on the anti-clockwise carriageway of the M25 between junctions 23 and 22 was carried out, along with sweeping of the v-channel; no issues affecting the operation of the drainage were identified at this time.” Source location 2016-0381-Response-by-Highways-England
Open published response
11 Oct 2016 Vichai Tonpradit · Prevention of Future Deaths report Hertfordshire
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Concerns raised 2 Potential confusion from a visual marking from a previous road layout View source Potential hazard from a raised tarmac section separating a slip road from a main carriageway View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Vichai Tonpradit · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Vichai Tonpradit died after falling from his motorcycle on the A1(M) and being struck by a heavy goods vehicle and a small hatchback. The report identified a raised section of tarmac as potentially hazardous and a solid white line from a previous road layout as potentially confusing.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Potential confusion from a visual marking from a previous road layout
Wider context from the report “(2) At the same location, the visual marking (solid white line) from the previous road layout is potentially confusing
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Potential hazard from a raised tarmac section separating a slip road from a main carriageway
Wider context from the report “(1) The raised section of the tarmac separating the slip road from the main carriageway on the A1(M) approaching Junction 6 northbound is potentially hazardous .
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce raised kerbing to separate the off-slip road from the main carriageway.
Verbatim wording from the response “a. Highways England (as far as we have been able to ascertain) was not a party to the inquest hearing on 11 October 2016. The ‘raised section of tarmac’ identified as a matter of concern by the Senior Coroner, is a specifically designed and installed section of raised kerbing to separate the off slip road from the main carriageway at Junction 6 of the A1(M) northbound.” Source location 2016-0380-Response-by-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Obscure the redundant solid white line with bituminous material.
Verbatim wording from the response “b. Having reviewed the road markings at the location it would appear that since the incident on 10 November 2015 the road marking referred to was covered over by applying a bituminous material to obscure the redundant solid white line and this is no longer visible.” Source location 2016-0380-Response-by-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The raised kerbing was designed to current standards and safety-audited, so it is not treated as requiring further action.
Verbatim wording from the response “a. Highways England (as far as we have been able to ascertain) was not a party to the inquest hearing on 11 October 2016. The ‘raised section of tarmac’ identified as a matter of concern by the Senior Coroner, is a specifically designed and installed section of raised kerbing to separate the off slip road from the main carriageway at Junction 6 of the A1(M) northbound.” Source location 2016-0380-Response-by-Highways-England
Open published response
13 May 2016 Harold James Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report Nottinghamshire
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Concerns raised 3 Delays in approval and commencement of remedial junction safety work View source Repeated fatal collisions at the junction involving vehicles emerging from Station Road View source 60mph speed limit on the Station Road approach to the junction for unfamiliar drivers View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
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AI-generated summary
Harold James Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Harold James Davies, aged 91, died in a road traffic collision on the evening of 8 November 2015 after his Volvo collided with a Jaguar at the junction of Station Road and the A.46 in Nottinghamshire. The principal concern was that this was the third fatality at the junction since 2010, with concerns about the absence of a date for funding or commencing proposed remedial safety work and the potential need for additional warning signs and a lower speed limit.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays in approval and commencement of remedial junction safety work
Wider context from the report “2. Highways England and their maintenance contractor A-One+ have undertaken an extensive risk assessment of the junction and there is a proposal to undertake the following remedial safety work:
(a) vehicle activated signs on both carriageways of the A.46 to alert oncoming traffic of the presence of vehicles at the junction waiting to join or cross the carriageways
(b) the installation of slim line bollards at the Station Road junction
(c) appropriate demarcation of the central reservation/turning area.
3. Evidence was given at the inquest that there is no date for the approval of funding or the commencement of the remedial safety work .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Repeated fatal collisions at the junction involving vehicles emerging from Station Road
Wider context from the report “1. Although the current road layout and existing safety provisions did not cause or contribute to the particular circumstances of this collision, I am concerned that this is the 3rd fatality at this junction since 2010 . The 2 most recent fatalities in January 2014 and November 2015 involving, vehicles emerging from Station Road into the northbound carriageway .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation 60mph speed limit on the Station Road approach to the junction for unfamiliar drivers
Wider context from the report “4. The national speed limit on Station Road on its approach to the junction with the A.46 is 60mph . The SCIO gave evidence that additional warning signs and a possible reduction in speed limit on the approach would provide additional safety for drivers who were unfamiliar with the Station Road and its approach to the junction . Nottinghamshire Police has offered to meet with Nottinghamshire County Council, the authority responsible for the maintenance of Station Road, and undertake a risk assessment.
” Open source report
21 Apr 2016 Keith John Charles Harper · Prevention of Future Deaths report Essex
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Concerns raised 3 Lack of prior warning of the pedestrian crossing for drivers exiting the roundabout View source Inadequate visibility and conspicuity of the pedestrian/cycle path and crossing for drivers View source Obscured carriageway markings exiting the roundabout View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
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AI-generated summary
Keith John Charles Harper · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Keith John Charles Harper was struck by a Renault Clio while exiting a footpath crossing the central reservation of the A132 Southmayne and died in hospital on 2 December 2015. Concerns related to limited warning and visibility of the pedestrian crossing for drivers, and obscured carriageway markings caused by resurfacing work and road debris.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of prior warning of the pedestrian crossing for drivers exiting the roundabout
Wider context from the report “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN]
(1) A driver exiting the roundabout has no prior warning of the crossing. From the driver's position the aspect view of the pedestrian/cycle path is limited and the central reservation presents itself as a grassed area. A review should be carried out of features of the pedestrian crossing – warning signs/design/position etc etc
(2) The carriageway markings exiting the roundabout have been obscured by resurfacing work and road debris. This work needs to be carried out
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate visibility and conspicuity of the pedestrian/cycle path and crossing for drivers
Wider context from the report “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN]
(1) A driver exiting the roundabout has no prior warning of the crossing. From the driver's position the aspect view of the pedestrian/cycle path is limited and the central reservation presents itself as a grassed area. A review should be carried out of features of the pedestrian crossing – warning signs/design/position etc etc
(2) The carriageway markings exiting the roundabout have been obscured by resurfacing work and road debris. This work needs to be carried out
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Obscured carriageway markings exiting the roundabout
Wider context from the report “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN]
(1) A driver exiting the roundabout has no prior warning of the crossing. From the driver's position the aspect view of the pedestrian/cycle path is limited and the central reservation presents itself as a grassed area. A review should be carried out of features of the pedestrian crossing – warning signs/design/position etc etc
(2) The carriageway markings exiting the roundabout have been obscured by resurfacing work and road debris. This work needs to be carried out
” Open source report
Concerns raised 1 Lack of warning signs for pedestrians and motorists approaching the crossing View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
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AI-generated summary
John Reginald Moreton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
John Reginald Moreton, aged 74, died after being struck by a car while crossing the A500 dual carriageway on 15 February 2015. The concern was that a public footpath led pedestrians to a dangerous crossing point without warning signs for pedestrians or motorists, and the report advocated installing warning signs.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of warning signs for pedestrians and motorists approaching the crossing
Wider context from the report “The collision occurred when the deceased attempted to cross the busy dual carriageway A500 at a point approximately one half mile from the A34 exit. This road links junction 16 of the M6 with Stoke-on-Trent and is generally in a southbound direction. The deceased had approached the edge of the dual carriageway after using a pedestrian's stile which led him directly to this point and where there is a gap in the central reservation to enable pedestrians to cross to the northbound carriageway and continue over another stile. There are no warning signs of the clear and present danger either for pedestrians or motorists on their approaches. The deceased was struck by a car and would have died instantly.
The footpath has been in situ for many years prior to the construction of the A500 in the 1970s. I am not aware of any previous fatality but the danger is obvious with a road having the national speed limit.
Warning signs of pedestrians crossing are common elsewhere in the county. I am advocating they should be erected here. Another rambler was seen to cross this busy road whilst officers were still at the scene.
” Open source report
26 Oct 2015 Neil Layne Garry · Prevention of Future Deaths report West Yorkshire Eastern
View report summary
Concerns raised 1 Lack of a pedestrian crossing at or near Ramshead Approach in Leeds View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
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AI-generated summary
Neil Layne Garry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Neil Layne Garry was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing the A6120 Ring Road in Leeds on 10 December 2014 and sustained fatal head injuries. The report raised concern that there was no pedestrian crossing at or near Ramshead Approach, despite the busy road being frequently used by pedestrians.
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How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a pedestrian crossing at or near Ramshead Approach in Leeds
Wider context from the report “(1) There is no pedestrian crossing at, or in the vicinity of, Ramshead Approach in Leeds. The Ring Road (A6120) is a busy road in that particular area and is frequently navigated by pedestrians, especially by children, in the manner adopted by Neil Garry on the 10th December 2014.
” Open source report
Concerns raised 2 Lack of appropriate signage prohibiting right turns View source Lack of a westbound slip road or deceleration lane at the crossover point View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Charles Ernest Rayner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Charles Ernest Rayner died after his motorcycle collided with a vehicle and trailer turning right on the A66 near the Otter Trust turnoff on 6 April 2015. The concerns identified were that the westbound crossover had no slip road or deceleration lane, requiring vehicles turning right to slow to a virtual standstill in the outside lane, and that there was no signage prohibiting the right turn.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of appropriate signage prohibiting right turns
Wider context from the report “2) There is no prohibition on a right turn by way of appropriate signage .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a westbound slip road or deceleration lane at the crossover point
Wider context from the report “1) The crossover point between the Otter Trust and access road to the moors, traveling West, does not have a slip road/deceleration lane for traffic travelling west such that to carry out the turn it is necessary to reduce speed to a virtual standstill in the outside lane .
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Stop up the gated moorland access to remove westbound right-turn manoeuvres from the A66.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following a review of the arrangement of the A66 in the vicinity of Vale House Farm, Highways England has determined that the most suitable approach to reduce future collision risk and improve road user safety is to stop up the gated access to the moorland, thus removing the need for future right turn manoeuvres to be made from the A66 westbound carriageway. Work is also proposed to improve an alternative access to the moorland that is located 380m west of Vale House Farm, subject to agreement with the landowner.” Source location 2015-0367-Highways-England
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Examine collision circumstances and records in the vicinity of Vale House Farm.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following receipt of the Report, a detailed examination of the circumstances of this and other collisions recorded in the vicinity of this location has taken place, and a detailed inspection and assessment of the road’s layout has been undertaken.” Source location 2015-0367-Highways-England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inspect and assess the A66 road layout at Vale House Farm.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following receipt of the Report, a detailed examination of the circumstances of this and other collisions recorded in the vicinity of this location has taken place, and a detailed inspection and assessment of the road’s layout has been undertaken.” Source location 2015-0367-Highways-England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Submit a funding bid for the proposed safety work.
Verbatim wording from the response “Regrettably at this time, no funding is available to undertake this work. A bid will be placed to secure funding, which is normally allocated on a priority basis to ensure that funds are targeted at sites that are likely to provide the greatest collision savings and safety benefit to road users.” Source location 2015-0367-Highways-England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The proposed work cannot currently be undertaken because funding is unavailable; funding must first be secured through a priority-based bid.
Verbatim wording from the response “Regrettably at this time, no funding is available to undertake this work. A bid will be placed to secure funding, which is normally allocated on a priority basis to ensure that funds are targeted at sites that are likely to provide the greatest collision savings and safety benefit to road users.” Source location 2015-0367-Highways-England
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Improvement of the alternative moorland access is contingent on reaching agreement with the landowner.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following a review of the arrangement of the A66 in the vicinity of Vale House Farm, Highways England has determined that the most suitable approach to reduce future collision risk and improve road user safety is to stop up the gated access to the moorland, thus removing the need for future right turn manoeuvres to be made from the A66 westbound carriageway. Work is also proposed to improve an alternative access to the moorland that is located 380m west of Vale House Farm, subject to agreement with the landowner.” Source location 2015-0367-Highways-England
Open published response
Concerns raised 2 Lack of signage prohibiting eastbound U turns or right turns at the central-reservation gap View source Lack of no-entry signage for eastbound vehicles at the central-reservation gap View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Kenneth (“Ken”) McCurdy and Mary (“Maida”) Brunton Cunningham McCurdy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Kenneth and Mary McCurdy died in a road traffic collision near the A66 on 1 April 2015 after their car crossed through a central reservation gap and collided with a westbound vehicle. The concerns identified were the absence of signage indicating that the gap was no entry for eastbound vehicles and the absence of signage prohibiting U-turns or right turns for eastbound vehicles.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of signage prohibiting eastbound U turns or right turns at the central-reservation gap
Wider context from the report “2. There is no signage at or leading up to the said gap in the central reservation to indicate that there is a prohibition to U turns or right turns to vehicles travelling east .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of no-entry signage for eastbound vehicles at the central-reservation gap
Wider context from the report “1. There is no signage at the gap in the central reservation for vehicles travelling west to turn right towards Hulands Quarry to indicate that it is no entry to vehicles travelling east for any form of manoeuvre .
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Investigate amendments to signing and road markings at appropriate locations to provide improved advance information.
Verbatim wording from the response “It is however recognised that Mr McCurdy was performing a U-turn manoeuvre when the collision occurred. Such manoeuvres are normally made when a driver either realises that he is driving, or he is under the misconception that he is driving, in the wrong direction. Highways England therefore proposes to work with Durham Constabulary in December to identify the route that Mr McCurdy had intended to take. Using this information, we will investigate amendments to signing and road markings at appropriate locations that will provide drivers with improved advance information. This is aimed at reducing driver confusion and hence reducing future collision risk. By 31 March 2016 we aim to deliver investigations that will recommend proposals for this length of the A66” Source location 2015-0369-Response-by-Highways-England
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation No legally approved or appropriate sign can indicate the gap restriction because it could mislead westbound drivers and create danger.
Verbatim wording from the response “• There is no currently legally approved or appropriate sign that can be installed on the A66 westbound carriageway to indicate to drivers that the gap cannot be entered by vehicles passing from the eastbound carriageway. Vehicles exiting the Hulands Quarry access have the need and right to pass through the central” Source location 2015-0369-Response-by-Highways-England
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Turning manoeuvres cannot be prohibited without suitable alternative U-turn facilities, which are absent between Bowes Interchange and Cross Lanes junction.
Verbatim wording from the response “• By prohibiting certain turning manoeuvres, Highways England has a duty to provide an alternative facility for users. In this case, drivers would be required to divert elsewhere to perform U-turn manoeuvres. Currently there are no suitable alternative U-turn facilities on the A66 between Bowes Interchange and Cross Lanes junction.” Source location 2015-0369-Response-by-Highways-England
Open published response
28 Sep 2015 John Frederick Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report Essex
View report summary
Concerns raised 1 Unsafe pedestrian crossings of the traffic island and central reservation View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
John Frederick Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
John Frederick Roberts, a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle in Springfield Road, Chelmsford, on 5 March 2015 and died in hospital the following day. The report raised concern that pedestrians regularly crossed the traffic island and central reservation despite serious risks, while the nearest crossing was not very evident, and called for consideration of a safer junction design.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unsafe pedestrian crossings of the traffic island and central reservation
Wider context from the report “A well worn path across the central reservation indicates that pedestrians regularly cross the traffic island and the central reservation, putting themselves at serious risk . Sixty metres away is the nearest crossing which is not very evident .
” Open source report
11 Jun 2015 Deborah Roberts and Marshall Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report Mid Kent and Medway
View report summary
Concerns raised 4 Failure to reduce the Sheppey Road Bridge speed limit from 70 mph View source High vehicle speeds on the Sheppey Road Bridge View source Insufficient forward visibility caused by the geometry of the Sheppey Road Bridge View source Rear-end collision hazard involving stationary vehicles on the Sheppey Road Bridge View source See 1 more concern
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Deborah Roberts and Marshall Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
On 1 July 2014, Deborah Roberts stopped her car on the Sheppey Crossing road bridge and it was struck from behind by a van; Deborah and her eight-year-old son, Marshall Roberts, died. Concerns included repeated rear-end collisions involving stationary vehicles, limited forward visibility and high vehicle speeds on the bridge, and the fact that the speed limit remained 70 mph despite a recommendation to reduce it to 50 mph.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to reduce the Sheppey Road Bridge speed limit from 70 mph
Wider context from the report “• Accident data reveals that in addition to the collision subject of this inquest which resulted in two fatalities, there have been a number of rear end collisions on the Sheppey Road Bridge associated with stationary vehicles being struck including a multiple vehicle collision in September 2013
• A review of the safety of the Sheppey Road Bridge published in February 2015 has concluded that a combination of the geometry of the bridge affecting the forward visibility available to drivers and the high speeds of vehicles travelling over the bridge which has a 70 mph limit impacts on the safety of the bridge. The review recommended a reduction in the speed limit to 50 mph to mitigate the safety concerns
• The speed limit for the bridge remains at 70 mph
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation High vehicle speeds on the Sheppey Road Bridge
Wider context from the report “• Accident data reveals that in addition to the collision subject of this inquest which resulted in two fatalities, there have been a number of rear end collisions on the Sheppey Road Bridge associated with stationary vehicles being struck including a multiple vehicle collision in September 2013
• A review of the safety of the Sheppey Road Bridge published in February 2015 has concluded that a combination of the geometry of the bridge affecting the forward visibility available to drivers and the high speeds of vehicles travelling over the bridge which has a 70 mph limit impacts on the safety of the bridge. The review recommended a reduction in the speed limit to 50 mph to mitigate the safety concerns
• The speed limit for the bridge remains at 70 mph
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient forward visibility caused by the geometry of the Sheppey Road Bridge
Wider context from the report “• Accident data reveals that in addition to the collision subject of this inquest which resulted in two fatalities, there have been a number of rear end collisions on the Sheppey Road Bridge associated with stationary vehicles being struck including a multiple vehicle collision in September 2013
• A review of the safety of the Sheppey Road Bridge published in February 2015 has concluded that a combination of the geometry of the bridge affecting the forward visibility available to drivers and the high speeds of vehicles travelling over the bridge which has a 70 mph limit impacts on the safety of the bridge. The review recommended a reduction in the speed limit to 50 mph to mitigate the safety concerns
• The speed limit for the bridge remains at 70 mph
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Rear-end collision hazard involving stationary vehicles on the Sheppey Road Bridge
Wider context from the report “• Accident data reveals that in addition to the collision subject of this inquest which resulted in two fatalities, there have been a number of rear end collisions on the Sheppey Road Bridge associated with stationary vehicles being struck including a multiple vehicle collision in September 2013
• A review of the safety of the Sheppey Road Bridge published in February 2015 has concluded that a combination of the geometry of the bridge affecting the forward visibility available to drivers and the high speeds of vehicles travelling over the bridge which has a 70 mph limit impacts on the safety of the bridge. The review recommended a reduction in the speed limit to 50 mph to mitigate the safety concerns
• The speed limit for the bridge remains at 70 mph
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implement a temporary 50-mile-per-hour speed restriction along the specified A249 approach roads and crossing in both directions.
Verbatim wording from the response “b) A temporary 50 mile per hour speed restriction from the end of the current 50 mile per hour speed restriction at the Neats Court roundabout (Thomsett Way) through to Grovehurst junction in both directions has been implemented. These points have been chosen at this stage in order to ensure that the implementation of a temporary speed limit did not create a new risk of its own and was at least no less safe than the circumstances existing at the time of the accident on 1 July 2014.” Source location Response from Highways
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete and publish a safety review of the A249 Swale Crossing, focusing particularly on the speed limit.
Verbatim wording from the response “a) Following the tragic deaths of Deborah and Marshall Roberts, a review of safety of the A249 Swale Crossing was commissioned, with a particular emphasis on the speed limit (“the ARUP review”). The ARUP review (published in February 2015) concluded that a combination of geometry of the bridge affecting the forward visibility available to drivers and the high average speeds of vehicles travelling over the bridge had an impact upon the safety of the bridge. The report offered evidence that these high average speeds were created by those driving in excess of the posted speed limit which takes the subject of reduced Stopping Sight Distance outside the scope of DMRB.” Source location Response from Highways
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Enhance incident management by enabling more flexible use of variable-message-sign messages through the regional control centre.
Verbatim wording from the response “It will additionally enhance incident management by providing greater flexibility in the use of the VMS message sets through the Highways England Traffic Officer Service Regional Control Centre, with whom Kent Police already have agreed working protocols.² Highways England awaits information about the delivery date for this work.” Source location Response from Highways
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Kent Police should actively assist Highways England and SRL in achieving compliance with the posted speed limit over the crossing.
Verbatim wording from the response “In paragraph 6 of the Regulation 28 report the coroner states that she believes that Highways England has the power to take action to prevent future deaths. Highways England accepts that it has power to take action and refers to the measures set out above. However, based upon its understanding of the information available in relation to the 1st July 2014 fatal collision, Highways England considers that it is also crucial that compliance with the posted speed limits is achieved. This view is reinforced by consideration of other collisions at the locus, as noted in the ARUP review (paragraph 5.2) in which it is noted that speed is likely to have been a factor in all the collisions reviewed.” Source location Response from Highways
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The bridge design and maintenance comply with DMRB, achieving scheme objectives and an acceptable balance between safety, cost and economic growth.
Verbatim wording from the response “a) Highways England considers that the bridge is designed and built and is being maintained in accordance with the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (“DMRB”) and that it has delivered the scheme objectives, as set out at Public Inquiry. The Post Opening Project Evaluation report dated July 2012 reiterated these as follows:” Source location Response from Highways
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The crossing's collision rate is substantially below the national average, so the available evidence does not establish an unusually high safety risk.
Verbatim wording from the response “c) Whilst every accident is undesirable and may have tragic consequences, as does the present one, when considering an appropriate response to the concerns raised, it is important to consider this accident in the context both of the volume of traffic passing through the accident locus and other data which is available. Some 30,000 vehicles pass over the crossing each day. Post-accident reports confirm that in the 5 year period up to mid-2014, there were 7 relevant personal injury collisions on the crossing, in addition to this tragic accident. There was also a multi-vehicle incident in heavy fog just off the crossing in September 2013 (which is not included in the above statistics). Highways England notes the collision rate as assessed in the February 2015 ARUP review of safety (please see below) is substantially less than the national average collision rate.¹” Source location Response from Highways
Open published response
13 May 2015 Fred Hudson · Prevention of Future Deaths report West Yorkshire Eastern
View report summary
Concerns raised 1 Lack of measures preventing public access to the disused railway bridge View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Fred Hudson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Fred Hudson died after falling approximately 25 metres from disused railway bridge AB08 in Leeds during the early hours of 28 January 2014. The bridge was accessible by several routes, had no measures to prevent access, and was next to a main road and frequently visited by members of the public, including children.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of measures preventing public access to the disused railway bridge
Wider context from the report “Railway bridge number AB08 has been disused for many years. It is accessible by a number of routes. No steps have been taken to prevent access to the said bridge. It is located next to a main road and is visited frequently by members of the public including children.
” Open source report
18 Feb 2015 Keri Victoria Holdsworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report Hartlepool
View report summary
Concerns raised 1 Serious and fatal collision hazard at the junction involving right-turning vehicles View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Keri Victoria Holdsworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Keri Victoria Holdsworth died after sustaining fatal injuries in a road traffic crash at the junction of the A19 and the road from Dalton Piercy village on 13 June 2014. The report raised concern that this was the latest in several serious incidents at the junction, including three fatal incidents within the previous five years.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Serious and fatal collision hazard at the junction involving right-turning vehicles
Wider context from the report “(1) This is the latest in several serious incidents at this junction, three of which have been fatal within the last five years . All of the fatal incidents have involved vehicles either turning right at this junction to join the northbound A19, or turning right from the northbound into the Dalton Piercy junction .
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete the Route Safety Action Plan identifying A19 junctions with poor accident records.
Verbatim wording from the response “Prior to the above accident the Highways Agency undertook a Route Safety Action Plan to identify locations on the A19 that display a poor accident record. This highlighted the junctions at Elwick, a short distance north of the Dalton Piercy junction. Study work was initiated to look at what improvements could be made to the junction including the provision of a bridge and the closure of the central reserve gaps. Following the above accident the scope of this study was extended to consider whether the provision of a bridge at Elwick could facilitate the closure of some or all of the central reserve gaps, including the Dalton Piercy junction, along the section of the A19 between the A689 and A179 junctions. Hartlepool Borough Council are a partner in this study.” Source location 2015-0060-Response-by-Highways-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Conduct and report the extended study of A19 junction improvements, including whether bridge provision could enable closure of central reserve gaps.
Verbatim wording from the response “Prior to the above accident the Highways Agency undertook a Route Safety Action Plan to identify locations on the A19 that display a poor accident record. This highlighted the junctions at Elwick, a short distance north of the Dalton Piercy junction. Study work was initiated to look at what improvements could be made to the junction including the provision of a bridge and the closure of the central reserve gaps. Following the above accident the scope of this study was extended to consider whether the provision of a bridge at Elwick could facilitate the closure of some or all of the central reserve gaps, including the Dalton Piercy junction, along the section of the A19 between the A689 and A179 junctions. Hartlepool Borough Council are a partner in this study.” Source location 2015-0060-Response-by-Highways-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Constructing any resulting scheme depends on the availability of funding.
Verbatim wording from the response “The study is due to report in August 2015. Closure of any of the gaps, including the Dalton Piercy junction will be dependent on the outcome of the study which will consider whether there are viable alternative routes for right turning traffic and whether there is a strong business case for doing so. Construction of any subsequent scheme would be subject to the availability of funds.” Source location 2015-0060-Response-by-Highways-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Closing the Dalton Piercy junction depends on study findings about alternative routes and whether a strong business case exists.
Verbatim wording from the response “The study is due to report in August 2015. Closure of any of the gaps, including the Dalton Piercy junction will be dependent on the outcome of the study which will consider whether there are viable alternative routes for right turning traffic and whether there is a strong business case for doing so. Construction of any subsequent scheme would be subject to the availability of funds.” Source location 2015-0060-Response-by-Highways-Agency
Open published response
18 Dec 2014 Mr Kevin Lawrenson · Prevention of Future Deaths report Oxfordshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 2 Inadequate visibility of signage for slow-moving vehicles View source Presence of slow-moving vehicles at the location View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Mr Kevin Lawrenson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Mr Kevin Lawrenson died after his works van collided with the rear of a slow-moving lorry on the M40 southbound near Junction 6 in Oxfordshire. The concerns related to slow-moving vehicles, signage and possible measures to reduce the likelihood of similar collisions, noting that there had been several similar accidents and three fatalities at or near the location since 2008.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate visibility of signage for slow-moving vehicles
Wider context from the report “The MATTERS OF CONCERN are in relation to slow moving vehicles at the location, signage and steps that may be possible to reduce the likelihood of a similar accident occurring in future.
It will be seen from paragraph 2.3 of ████████ report that there have been a large number of similar accidents at or near this location, including 3 fatalities since 2008. It will also be seen from paragraph 3.1.1 of ████████ report there is a photograph of the first of the 2 signs. It does not appear to be a very large sign; it is sited quite low down.
I heard oral evidence from Mr ████████ about the system of monitoring and reporting in place and that, as recommended in the 2013 Safety Monitoring Report prepared on behalf of UK Highways Limited, a further study between junction 5 to 6 has been undertaken and a report is due to be completed very shortly. It is understood that the report is likely to outline possible improvements to signage and other steps. For example, there is the potential of increasing signage and/ or making the additional signs more visible . I was told there was insufficient room in the central reservation to place a sign. I understand chevrons for lane separation is a possibility, as is an electronic sign which detects slow moving vehicles and warns other motorists. I appreciate of course that there will be considerations around the issue of funding if improvements are to be implemented.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Presence of slow-moving vehicles at the location
Wider context from the report “The MATTERS OF CONCERN are in relation to slow moving vehicles at the location , signage and steps that may be possible to reduce the likelihood of a similar accident occurring in future.
It will be seen from paragraph 2.3 of ████████ report that there have been a large number of similar accidents at or near this location, including 3 fatalities since 2008. It will also be seen from paragraph 3.1.1 of ████████ report there is a photograph of the first of the 2 signs. It does not appear to be a very large sign; it is sited quite low down.
I heard oral evidence from Mr ████████ about the system of monitoring and reporting in place and that, as recommended in the 2013 Safety Monitoring Report prepared on behalf of UK Highways Limited, a further study between junction 5 to 6 has been undertaken and a report is due to be completed very shortly. It is understood that the report is likely to outline possible improvements to signage and other steps. For example, there is the potential of increasing signage and/ or making the additional signs more visible. I was told there was insufficient room in the central reservation to place a sign. I understand chevrons for lane separation is a possibility, as is an electronic sign which detects slow moving vehicles and warns other motorists. I appreciate of course that there will be considerations around the issue of funding if improvements are to be implemented.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Instruct UK Highways M40 Limited to initiate work improving signing on the southbound approach to Stokenchurch Cutting.
Verbatim wording from the response “We have carefully considered the recommendations in this report and we have now instructed UK Highways M40 Limited to initiate work to improve signing on the southbound approach to the Stokenchurch Cutting.” Source location 2014-0577-Response-by-Highways-Agency
Open published response
24 Sep 2014 Jake Anthony JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report Cheshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 4 Damaged or disrepairing boundary fencing near the steps View source Open access from the steps to the M56 motorway View source Children’s play area in the vicinity of the motorway access and steps View source Absence of warning signs about the danger from the nearby motorway View source See 1 more concern
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Jake Anthony JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Jake Anthony JOHNSON, aged 22, died after being struck by a lorry while crossing the Manchester-bound carriageway of the M56 on 6 January 2014. The report identifies open access steps to the motorway, damaged boundary fencing, a lack of warning signs, and a nearby children’s play area as substantive concerns.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Damaged or disrepairing boundary fencing near the steps
Wider context from the report “2. Part of the boundary fencing in the vicinity of the steps is damaged or in a state of disrepair ;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Open access from the steps to the M56 motorway
Wider context from the report “1. The steps afford open access to the M56 motorway (although their original design purpose is seemingly now redundant);
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Children’s play area in the vicinity of the motorway access and steps
Wider context from the report “4. I am told that there is a children’s play area in the vicinity .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Absence of warning signs about the danger from the nearby motorway
Wider context from the report “3. There are no signs in place warning the public of danger, due to the proximity of the motorway ;
” Open source report
9 Jul 2014 Georgina Lauren Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report Manchester North
View report summary
Concerns raised 2 Lack of inspection of developing soft estate to assess vehicle restraint protection requirements View source Failure to protect or remove trees within 4.5m of the paved carriageway View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Georgina Lauren Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Georgina Lauren Taylor died following a road traffic collision on the A627(M), in which a vehicle lost control at excessive speed, struck a tree and rolled. The report raised concerns about trees and other roadside features near the carriageway, including whether they were adequately protected or should have been removed, and about the lack of requirements to reassess protection as roadside vegetation developed.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of inspection of developing soft estate to assess vehicle restraint protection requirements
Wider context from the report “2. The introduction of the interim requirements for road restraint systems in 2002 identified that all trees with a girth exceeding 500mm (or several closely spaced trees) located within a distance of 4.5m from the paved carriageway require protection. The re-issued requirements in 2004 identified that trees above 300mm in girth should be protected by a suitable vehicle restraint system.
3. Current design standard TD19/06 includes a site specific risk process where topographical features, together with adjacent sources of risk are reviewed in order to identify the most appropriate restraint facility and containment levels and that in relation to the presence of trees adjacent to the nearside verge and protection requirements, it is unclear as to when these regimented and it is likely that they are all ‘self-seeded’ with the larger specimens being over 10 years old. Whilst the vehicle restraint systems in place comply with identified requirements at the time of the construction of the route, there are no current requirements to inspect soft estate as it develops in terms of assessing protection requirements . The application of more recent design standards would have required some of the trees at this location to be protected (as well as the lighting columns) or removed within the 4.5m threshold.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to protect or remove trees within 4.5m of the paved carriageway
Wider context from the report “2. The introduction of the interim requirements for road restraint systems in 2002 identified that all trees with a girth exceeding 500mm (or several closely spaced trees) located within a distance of 4.5m from the paved carriageway require protection . The re-issued requirements in 2004 identified that trees above 300mm in girth should be protected by a suitable vehicle restraint system .
3. Current design standard TD19/06 includes a site specific risk process where topographical features, together with adjacent sources of risk are reviewed in order to identify the most appropriate restraint facility and containment levels and that in relation to the presence of trees adjacent to the nearside verge and protection requirements, it is unclear as to when these regimented and it is likely that they are all ‘self-seeded’ with the larger specimens being over 10 years old. Whilst the vehicle restraint systems in place comply with identified requirements at the time of the construction of the route, there are no current requirements to inspect soft estate as it develops in terms of assessing protection requirements. The application of more recent design standards would have required some of the trees at this location to be protected (as well as the lighting columns) or removed within the 4.5m threshold .
” Open source report
Concerns raised 9 Failure to position lookouts for smoke or fog approaching nearby highways or railway lines View source Lack of immediate communication access to emergency services during firework displays View source Failure to assess humidity and wind conditions immediately before firework displays View source Lack of firework-firer training on recognising risks arising from high humidity View source Failure to prepare a comprehensive firework-display risk assessment View source Failure of road-safety-equipment deployment criteria to provide special consideration below six personal injury collisions in three years View source Lack of fog detection devices to identify reduced visibility before an initial incident View source Insufficient use of overhead gantries displaying reduced-visibility warnings View source Failure to ensure immediate stopping of firework displays when emergencies arise View source See 6 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Names not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Seven people died when 34 vehicles collided in thick fog on the M5 motorway near Taunton on 4 November 2011; 51 others were injured. The concerns related to preventing vehicles entering areas of severely reduced visibility, detecting and warning of fog, and managing risks from firework displays that may increase fog or smoke near highways.
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× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to position lookouts for smoke or fog approaching nearby highways or railway lines
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity .
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of immediate communication access to emergency services during firework displays
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to assess humidity and wind conditions immediately before firework displays
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display ,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of firework-firer training on recognising risks arising from high humidity
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose .
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to prepare a comprehensive firework-display risk assessment
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents .
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of road-safety-equipment deployment criteria to provide special consideration below six personal injury collisions in three years
Wider context from the report ““A”
I am concerned that the Highway Agency's proposals whilst possibly preventing further vehicles entering an accident scene or a large area of reduced visibility would not prevent the initial incident and that this can only be achieved by the erection of fog detection devises and greater use of overhead gantries displaying signs warning of events that may cause reduced visibility.
AND as the criterion for deploying road safety equipment is six personal injury collisions in three years the present incident would not qualify for special consideration .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of fog detection devices to identify reduced visibility before an initial incident
Wider context from the report ““A”
I am concerned that the Highway Agency's proposals whilst possibly preventing further vehicles entering an accident scene or a large area of reduced visibility would not prevent the initial incident and that this can only be achieved by the erection of fog detection devises and greater use of overhead gantries displaying signs warning of events that may cause reduced visibility.
AND as the criterion for deploying road safety equipment is six personal injury collisions in three years the present incident would not qualify for special consideration.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient use of overhead gantries displaying reduced-visibility warnings
Wider context from the report ““A”
I am concerned that the Highway Agency's proposals whilst possibly preventing further vehicles entering an accident scene or a large area of reduced visibility would not prevent the initial incident and that this can only be achieved by the erection of fog detection devises and greater use of overhead gantries displaying signs warning of events that may cause reduced visibility .
AND as the criterion for deploying road safety equipment is six personal injury collisions in three years the present incident would not qualify for special consideration.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure immediate stopping of firework displays when emergencies arise
Wider context from the report ““B”
To consider whether or not risks arising from firework displays being held in periods of very high humidity can be greatly reduced if the City and Guild’s courses for Firers and Senior Firers (being the only persons able to conduct a firework display using class IV fireworks) had instruction in realising when such risks arose.
AND before operating any display Firers had prepared :-
(i) a risk assessment which took account of the topography of the area, nearby watercourses, prevailing wind conditions, identifying highways and all other matters relevant for the safety of the users thereof onlookers and nearby residents.
(ii) Assessed the humidity, wind direction and speed immediately before the display,
(iii) Positioned lookouts to see if any smoke or fog was approaching a highway or railway line in the immediate vicinity.
(iv) Had immediate access to a communication link to the emergency services and
(v) Be able to stop the display immediately if an emergency arises
AND to consider whether Firers and Senior Firers should be licensed by law for periods of five year
AND whether Local Licensing Authorities shall advise persons holding firework displays of the risks referred to herein.
” Open source report
28 Apr 2014 Miss Yasmin Mary Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report Avon
View report summary
Concerns raised 3 Recurring loss of vehicle control on the same section of the A46 View source Failure of the speed limit to adequately protect drivers approaching the Hartley Bends View source Inadequate road signs and carriageway markings warning drivers about the severity of approaching bends View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Miss Yasmin Mary Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Miss Yasmin Mary Richards died at the scene after her Ford Ka crossed into the opposing carriageway and collided with a Range Rover on the A46 on 2 November 2013. The inquest heard that worn and under-inflated tyres contributed to the collision, alongside the vehicle’s speed and the driver’s inexperience. Concerns were raised about repeated collisions on the same section of road and the adequacy of the speed limit, signs, carriageway markings and other measures at the bends.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Recurring loss of vehicle control on the same section of the A46
Wider context from the report “(1) Notwithstanding the contribution made to this collision by the condition of the tyres of Ford Ka this is the second Inquest I have conducted within the past 12 months into the death of a driver who lost control of their vehicle on the same section of the A46 .
(2)The speed limit in the section of the A46 known as the 'Hartley Bends' should be reviewed and reduced so as to improve the safety of drivers as they approach these bends.
(3) The road signs including carriageway markings should be reviewed and improved so as to provide greater warning to drivers as to the severity of the approaching bends.
(4) Consideration be given to the provision of ‘rumble strips’ in advance of the bends so as to further encourage the reduction in the speed of vehicles as they approach the bends.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of the speed limit to adequately protect drivers approaching the Hartley Bends
Wider context from the report “(1) Notwithstanding the contribution made to this collision by the condition of the tyres of Ford Ka this is the second Inquest I have conducted within the past 12 months into the death of a driver who lost control of their vehicle on the same section of the A46.
(2)The speed limit in the section of the A46 known as the 'Hartley Bends' should be reviewed and reduced so as to improve the safety of drivers as they approach these bends .
(3) The road signs including carriageway markings should be reviewed and improved so as to provide greater warning to drivers as to the severity of the approaching bends.
(4) Consideration be given to the provision of ‘rumble strips’ in advance of the bends so as to further encourage the reduction in the speed of vehicles as they approach the bends.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate road signs and carriageway markings warning drivers about the severity of approaching bends
Wider context from the report “(1) Notwithstanding the contribution made to this collision by the condition of the tyres of Ford Ka this is the second Inquest I have conducted within the past 12 months into the death of a driver who lost control of their vehicle on the same section of the A46.
(2)The speed limit in the section of the A46 known as the 'Hartley Bends' should be reviewed and reduced so as to improve the safety of drivers as they approach these bends.
(3) The road signs including carriageway markings should be reviewed and improved so as to provide greater warning to drivers as to the severity of the approaching bends .
(4) Consideration be given to the provision of ‘rumble strips’ in advance of the bends so as to further encourage the reduction in the speed of vehicles as they approach the bends.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Commission an independent peer review of the Hartley Bends safety work.
Verbatim wording from the response “In reviewing the 2011 report I still consider that the now implemented local measures to highlight the nature of the road are logical and proactive steps, which may positively affect speeds without the need for a revised posted limit. As regards your recommendation 2 of Section 5 we proposed the following future actions:” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete road resurfacing and most planned Hartley Bends safety-scheme works.
Verbatim wording from the response “This recommendation was accepted and, following development of a business case, this safety scheme was included in our forward programme for implementation in early 2014. The salient proposals in the Hartley Bends locality were as follows:” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Gather speed data and monitor accidents for a reasonable period to assess the implemented safety scheme.
Verbatim wording from the response “2. The gathering of speed data to ascertain the effectiveness of the now implemented safety scheme together with a reasonable period of accident monitoring to gauge impact, and if required, further intervention development. In this case one year would seem appropriate.” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide temporary advisory 30 mph signing while accelerating consideration of road-surface renewal.
Verbatim wording from the response “As previously stated, these works were programmed for early 2014 and therefore after November 2013. However, following 2 November, we took the additional precaution of providing temporary advisory 30 mph signing while we looked into accelerating future road surface renewal works, over and above the planned safety scheme.” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Install vehicle-activated signs on both approaches to Hartley Bends.
Verbatim wording from the response “• Interactive vehicle activated signs (VAS) to be installed on the north and southbound approaches to Hartley Bends. These signs visually are activated by high speed and advise drivers to slow down and of the geometric hazards ahead;” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Rumble strips are unsuitable on single-carriageway bends because they may reduce traction, create hazards for oncoming vehicles and increase noise.
Verbatim wording from the response “In section 5(3) of your report you make reference to ‘rumble strips’. I believe you are referring to yellow bar markings as used on the approaches to roundabouts. These are not considered suitable for use on single carriageway roads as they need to be laid verge to verge in order for their extremities not to cause a hazard to oncoming vehicles and if used on bends such as the A46 can reduce traction for vehicles. There are also adverse environmental effects such as increased noise.” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implemented local measures are considered sufficient to influence speeds without revising the posted speed limit, subject to continued monitoring.
Verbatim wording from the response “In reviewing the 2011 report I still consider that the now implemented local measures to highlight the nature of the road are logical and proactive steps, which may positively affect speeds without the need for a revised posted limit. As regards your recommendation 2 of Section 5 we proposed the following future actions:” Source location 2014-0193-Response-by-Highway-Agency
Open published response
26 Feb 2014 Samuel Eric Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report North Northumberland
View report summary
Concerns raised 3 Lack of a central pedestrian refuge at the crossing point View source Lack of warning signage for southbound motorists approaching the pedestrian crossing View source Inadequate lighting and visibility at the pedestrian crossing View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Samuel Eric Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Samuel Eric Shaw, aged 70, died after being struck by a southbound ambulance while crossing the A1 at Haggerston on 29 October 2013. Concerns included the absence of warning signs and a central pedestrian refuge, poor lighting, and the need for pedestrians to cross both lanes of a 60 mph road from the bus stop to Haggerston.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a central pedestrian refuge at the crossing point
Wider context from the report “At Haggerston Holiday Park, adjoining the east side of the A1 trunk road there are hundreds of caravans located and several hundreds of people come to stay and visit regularly. Access from public transport is by buses which also stop at various towns and villages along the A1 Trunk road. The road is the main strategic highway route between Scotland and England. The speed limit at Haggerston is 60 miles per hour and those travelling north on buses have to set down on the west side and cross both lanes of the A1 Trunk road traffic, through an unlit area to reach Haggerston. The visibility of pedestrians on the road for drivers travelling at up to 60 mph is restricted because of the need to use dipped headlights. There is no warning sign for motorists travelling south to alert drivers of pedestrians crossing the road. There is no central refuge for pedestrians crossing the road at the crossing point .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of warning signage for southbound motorists approaching the pedestrian crossing
Wider context from the report “At Haggerston Holiday Park, adjoining the east side of the A1 trunk road there are hundreds of caravans located and several hundreds of people come to stay and visit regularly. Access from public transport is by buses which also stop at various towns and villages along the A1 Trunk road. The road is the main strategic highway route between Scotland and England. The speed limit at Haggerston is 60 miles per hour and those travelling north on buses have to set down on the west side and cross both lanes of the A1 Trunk road traffic, through an unlit area to reach Haggerston. The visibility of pedestrians on the road for drivers travelling at up to 60 mph is restricted because of the need to use dipped headlights. There is no warning sign for motorists travelling south to alert drivers of pedestrians crossing the road . There is no central refuge for pedestrians crossing the road at the crossing point.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate lighting and visibility at the pedestrian crossing
Wider context from the report “At Haggerston Holiday Park, adjoining the east side of the A1 trunk road there are hundreds of caravans located and several hundreds of people come to stay and visit regularly. Access from public transport is by buses which also stop at various towns and villages along the A1 Trunk road. The road is the main strategic highway route between Scotland and England. The speed limit at Haggerston is 60 miles per hour and those travelling north on buses have to set down on the west side and cross both lanes of the A1 Trunk road traffic, through an unlit area to reach Haggerston . The visibility of pedestrians on the road for drivers travelling at up to 60 mph is restricted because of the need to use dipped headlights . There is no warning sign for motorists travelling south to alert drivers of pedestrians crossing the road. There is no central refuge for pedestrians crossing the road at the crossing point.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Investigate options for an improved pedestrian crossing near Haggerston by assessing crossing demand, NMU routes and potential locations against highway standards.
Verbatim wording from the response “However, I have arranged for an investigation to be undertaken to consider possible options to install an improved pedestrian crossing facility in the vicinity of Haggerston. This investigation will:” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Existing lighting and signing meet current standards, so no immediate action is required.
Verbatim wording from the response “I have concluded that the lighting and signing provision meets current standards and therefore no immediate action is required to address your concerns.” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation A central pedestrian refuge cannot be installed because the carriageway must safely accommodate turning traffic.
Verbatim wording from the response “Currently, lengths of footway are provided on both the eastern and western sides of the A1 and a dropped crossing facility for pedestrians is provided on the northern side of the minor road junction. This crossing facility has been installed as close as possible to the preferred desire line of pedestrians walking between the northbound bus-stop and access to Haggerston, to minimise their inconvenience and thus maximise usage.” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Warning signs and associated road markings have been in place on both approaches to the crossing since 2005.
Verbatim wording from the response “Your report indicates that there are no warning signs on the A1 southbound approach to Haggerston. I can, however, confirm that signs have been in place since 2005 comprising an ‘Accompanied Horses Crossing’ warning sign, an ‘Other Danger Ahead’ warning sign with ‘Pedestrians Crossing’ worded supplementary plate, on a bright yellow backing board. These signs exist on both the north and southbound approaches to the crossing location at appropriate distances from the hazard. These signs are associated with a SLOW road marking laid on a red coloured carriageway surface patch, to further highlight the hazard ahead. Please see Photograph 1 below.” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
Concerns raised 2 Failure of the road lighting system to operate during hours of darkness View source Insufficient visibility for drivers to detect carriageway debris and avoid collisions View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Mark Andrew Burgess · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Mark Andrew Burgess died after losing control of his vehicle on the M65 while under the influence of alcohol and probably using a mobile phone, colliding with the nearside vehicle restraint system and sustaining fatal injuries. The report raised concerns that the road lighting had been decommissioned and was not operating during hours of darkness, leaving debris and damaged vehicles difficult to see and contributing to further collisions in which up to eleven other people were injured.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of the road lighting system to operate during hours of darkness
Wider context from the report “I received a report from ████████ a Road Safety Engineer employed by Balfour Beatty Mott MacDonald, on behalf of the Highways Agency. That report confirmed that the current road lighting system for that section of the M65 Motorway was not operating during the hours of darkness , having been decommissioned in March 2011 , as part of a “full lighting switch-off” process .
The collision involving Mr Burgess left debris in the carriageway, including an engine block which had become detached from his vehicle. I heard evidence from four witnesses, each of whom were unable to see the debris in the unlit carriageway, such that over a period of several minutes four other vehicles then collided with debris and/or accident damaged vehicles. In addition to Mr Burgess who was killed there were up to eleven other people who received varying degrees of injuries. The evidence I received was that in the absence of any street lighting and in the absence of any ambient light, including moonlight, and once vehicles had sustained sufficient damage such that no lights were operating, drivers were unable to avoid further collisions.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient visibility for drivers to detect carriageway debris and avoid collisions
Wider context from the report “I received a report from ████████ a Road Safety Engineer employed by Balfour Beatty Mott MacDonald, on behalf of the Highways Agency. That report confirmed that the current road lighting system for that section of the M65 Motorway was not operating during the hours of darkness, having been decommissioned in March 2011, as part of a “full lighting switch-off” process.
The collision involving Mr Burgess left debris in the carriageway, including an engine block which had become detached from his vehicle. I heard evidence from four witnesses, each of whom were unable to see the debris in the unlit carriageway , such that over a period of several minutes four other vehicles then collided with debris and/or accident damaged vehicles. In addition to Mr Burgess who was killed there were up to eleven other people who received varying degrees of injuries. The evidence I received was that in the absence of any street lighting and in the absence of any ambient light, including moonlight , and once vehicles had sustained sufficient damage such that no lights were operating, drivers were unable to avoid further collisions .
” Open source report
13 Jan 2014 Mustafa Cicek · Prevention of Future Deaths report East Sussex
View report summary
Concerns raised 4 Lack of a SLOW carriageway marking on the approach to the bend View source Failure of chevron signs to have yellow backgrounds View source Collision black spot at the bend View source Potential carriageway hazard from a maturing eucalyptus sapling View source See 1 more concern
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Mustafa Cicek · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Mustafa Cicek died following a road traffic collision on the A21 when his Ford Fiesta left the carriageway on a bend and struck a fixed structure. The concerns identified included the bend being a collision black spot, inadequate chevron-sign visibility, a potentially hazardous sapling, and the need for a “SLOW” road marking.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a SLOW carriageway marking on the approach to the bend
Wider context from the report “(4) Consideration should be given to painting “SLOW” in the carriageway on the approach to the bend .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of chevron signs to have yellow backgrounds
Wider context from the report “(2) The apparatus along the carriageway, particularly two of the chevron signs, could be improved. There are three chevron signs but only one has a yellow background . If the two chevron signs without a yellow background could have a yellow background added it would further enhance their presence on this bend.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Collision black spot at the bend
Wider context from the report “(1) The bend at this particular location is a collision black spot as there have been several road traffic collisions at the location of Mr Cicek’s collision .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Potential carriageway hazard from a maturing eucalyptus sapling
Wider context from the report “(3) A Eucalyptus sapling has been planted on Highways Agency land between the front fence at ████████ and the edge of the carriageway. This will mature into a potential hazard and consideration should be given to its removal.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Increase bend chevrons to three in each direction and place them on yellow backgrounds.
Verbatim wording from the response “We are also advanced with preparations to complete:-” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop new reflective road studs on both approaches and around the bend to improve night-time safety.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following a further site inspection and assessment we have identified additional road safety improvements that we are currently considering through our design process these are:” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop an additional red triangular warning sign on the southbound approach for possible queues ahead.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following a further site inspection and assessment we have identified additional road safety improvements that we are currently considering through our design process these are:” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide additional SLOW road markings on the carriageway.
Verbatim wording from the response “We have completed:-” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Consider whether advisory maximum-speed plates are appropriate or permissible under the bend warning signs.
Verbatim wording from the response “• We will also consider whether advisory maximum speed plates are appropriate or permissible under the bend warning signs but this may be difficult if we are also to retain the plate telling drivers of the distance ahead of the bend.” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Chevrons cannot be increased beyond three in each direction because private entrances restrict available space.
Verbatim wording from the response “• Improvement to the chevrons on the bend. We are planning to increase the number of chevrons to 3 in both directions. This is the maximum we can erect at this location because of the private entrances on this corner. We are also ensuring that all the chevrons are on yellow backgrounds to help them stand out. The signs are ordered and we are awaiting returns from statutory checks we have to make to ensure the safe digging of new foundations. If all goes well we hope to complete the new chevrons in March.” Source location Response from Highways Agency
Open published response
2 Dec 2013 Karl Olaf Nilsson · Prevention of Future Deaths report West Yorkshire (Western)
View report summary
Concerns raised 3 Inconsistent driver priority at the junction View source Failure of the STOP sign and stop line to be clearly visible View source Failure of the junction layout to provide clear driver orientation View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
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AI-generated summary
Karl Olaf Nilsson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Karl Olaf Nilsson died minutes after suffering catastrophic injuries in a motorcycle collision at the junction of Victoria Road and the A657 Saltaire Road on 14 October 2012. The report raised concerns that the junction’s layout and the visibility of the STOP sign may have contributed to the fatality, and noted that this was the only junction along Victoria Road where drivers did not have right of way.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inconsistent driver priority at the junction
Wider context from the report “1. There are a number of factors which could, in my opinion have caused or contributed to this fatality. Victoria Road is an absolutely straight road which is aligned in almost a perfect north-south direction. It is a wide avenue type of road, with large trees visible on both the east and west pavements. On both sides of the road there are parking bays, and the cars are able to park fully on the road, whilst still leaving ample room for cars to pass in both directions. The layout is the same on both sections of Victoria Road – both before and after it is bisected by the A657 Saltaire Road. There is a gradient of approximately 1:7 stretching uphill from north to south. The slope of the road is only interrupted by the A657, which is perfectly level, but due to the slope of the road, it is not seen until the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. Moreover, due to the slope of the road, the STOP sign and stop line painted on the road is only really visible when the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. The overall layout of the road (i.e. it being perfectly straight with a sort of symmetrical appearance on both sides) contrives to almost create an optical illusion. The driver’s eye is drawn to the horizon in the centre – and as such, the STOP sign at the mouth of the junction is only in the driver’s peripheral vision.
2. I am concerned that the overall layout of this junction was a substantial contributing factor to this fatal accident.
3. I am concerned that the STOP sign is not clearly visible in its current
4. Furthermore, I understand from the evidence which was given to me that this is the only junction on the entire length of Victoria Road where the driver does not have right of way. It is possible that Mr Nilsson became confused as to where he was on Victoria Road.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of the STOP sign and stop line to be clearly visible
Wider context from the report “1. There are a number of factors which could, in my opinion have caused or contributed to this fatality. Victoria Road is an absolutely straight road which is aligned in almost a perfect north-south direction. It is a wide avenue type of road, with large trees visible on both the east and west pavements. On both sides of the road there are parking bays, and the cars are able to park fully on the road, whilst still leaving ample room for cars to pass in both directions. The layout is the same on both sections of Victoria Road – both before and after it is bisected by the A657 Saltaire Road. There is a gradient of approximately 1:7 stretching uphill from north to south. The slope of the road is only interrupted by the A657, which is perfectly level, but due to the slope of the road, it is not seen until the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. Moreover, due to the slope of the road, the STOP sign and stop line painted on the road is only really visible when the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. The overall layout of the road (i.e. it being perfectly straight with a sort of symmetrical appearance on both sides) contrives to almost create an optical illusion. The driver’s eye is drawn to the horizon in the centre – and as such, the STOP sign at the mouth of the junction is only in the driver’s peripheral vision.
2. I am concerned that the overall layout of this junction was a substantial contributing factor to this fatal accident.
3. I am concerned that the STOP sign is not clearly visible in its current
4. Furthermore, I understand from the evidence which was given to me that this is the only junction on the entire length of Victoria Road where the driver does not have right of way. It is possible that Mr Nilsson became confused as to where he was on Victoria Road.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to National Highways; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of the junction layout to provide clear driver orientation
Wider context from the report “1. There are a number of factors which could, in my opinion have caused or contributed to this fatality. Victoria Road is an absolutely straight road which is aligned in almost a perfect north-south direction. It is a wide avenue type of road, with large trees visible on both the east and west pavements. On both sides of the road there are parking bays, and the cars are able to park fully on the road, whilst still leaving ample room for cars to pass in both directions. The layout is the same on both sections of Victoria Road – both before and after it is bisected by the A657 Saltaire Road. There is a gradient of approximately 1:7 stretching uphill from north to south. The slope of the road is only interrupted by the A657, which is perfectly level, but due to the slope of the road, it is not seen until the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. Moreover, due to the slope of the road, the STOP sign and stop line painted on the road is only really visible when the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. The overall layout of the road (i.e. it being perfectly straight with a sort of symmetrical appearance on both sides) contrives to almost create an optical illusion. The driver’s eye is drawn to the horizon in the centre – and as such, the STOP sign at the mouth of the junction is only in the driver’s peripheral vision.
2. I am concerned that the overall layout of this junction was a substantial contributing factor to this fatal accident.
3. I am concerned that the STOP sign is not clearly visible in its current
4. Furthermore, I understand from the evidence which was given to me that this is the only junction on the entire length of Victoria Road where the driver does not have right of way. It is possible that Mr Nilsson became confused as to where he was on Victoria Road.
” Open source report
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Request correction
Addressed to Highways Agency, now represented here by National Highways.
Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations