4 Nov 2022 Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report Berkshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 5 Lack of Standard Operating Procedure instructions to contact the local DNO during electrical hazards View source Fragmented DNO emergency contact arrangements across ambulance service boundaries View source Delays to life-saving treatment due to uncertainty about whether OHPLs remain live View source Unavailability and poor accessibility of correct DNO emergency numbers to ambulance control centre operators View source Risk to bystanders and emergency services from approaching patients near live OHPLs View source See 2 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
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AI-generated summary
Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Levi Louis Alleyne, a grab lorry delivery driver, died by electrocution at a building site after raising his lorry’s crane arm beneath overhead power lines. CPR was delayed because it was unclear whether the electricity remained live, and the ambulance control operator had no procedure or readily accessible emergency contact information for the relevant electricity network operator. The report identifies risks of delayed life-saving treatment or people approaching live electrical hazards and notes that similar mitigating procedures may not be adopted across England and Wales.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of Standard Operating Procedure instructions to contact the local DNO during electrical hazards
Wider context from the report “According to the evidence heard at the inquest:
1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off . There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure .
2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known.
3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO.
4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards.
5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold:
▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live,
▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Fragmented DNO emergency contact arrangements across ambulance service boundaries
Wider context from the report “According to the evidence heard at the inquest:
1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure.
2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known.
3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact . There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries . Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand . The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO .
4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards.
5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold:
▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live,
▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays to life-saving treatment due to uncertainty about whether OHPLs remain live
Wider context from the report “According to the evidence heard at the inquest:
1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure.
2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known.
3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO.
4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live . There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards.
5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold:
▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live ,
▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unavailability and poor accessibility of correct DNO emergency numbers to ambulance control centre operators
Wider context from the report “According to the evidence heard at the inquest:
1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure.
2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes . The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known .
3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO.
4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards.
5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold:
▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live,
▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Risk to bystanders and emergency services from approaching patients near live OHPLs
Wider context from the report “According to the evidence heard at the inquest:
1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure.
2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known.
3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO.
4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards.
5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold:
▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live,
▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live .
” Open source report
18 Oct 2013 ELIZABETH AURORA KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report Manchester City
View report summary
Concerns raised 14 Unavailability of carbon monoxide detection equipment on Fire and Rescue Service frontline appliances View source Absence of a statutory Fire and Rescue Service role in carbon monoxide safety, regulation and enforcement View source Lack of suitable training in the operation of carbon monoxide detection equipment View source Lack of clear oversight of gas-supplier steps to raise awareness of danger View source Lack of clear gas-supplier criteria for identifying vulnerable and priority customers View source Failure to identify incomplete flue piping during routine inspections View source Lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the movement of carbon monoxide within buildings View source Lack of established monitoring of offers and uptake of free annual gas safety checks View source Lack of a duty to warn other occupants to install carbon monoxide alarms View source Lack of regulatory coverage for ongoing maintenance and inspection of existing solid fuel appliances View source Lack of a duty to allow recognised engineers to inspect boilers in multi-occupancy buildings View source Lack of required audit trails of fuel-supplier carbon monoxide safety steps View source Lack of HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents on independent validation of gas and other fuel safety equipment in rented property View source Lack of required specific carbon monoxide safety information from fuel suppliers View source See 11 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
ELIZABETH AURORA KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Elizabeth Aurora Kerr died after carbon monoxide from a malfunctioning basement boiler entered the residential flat where she lived, and she was found unconscious several hours after the Fire Service had attended the building. The report identified concerns about the movement and detection of carbon monoxide in buildings, the absence and use of carbon monoxide alarms and gas safety controls, and Fire and Rescue Service equipment, guidance and responses.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unavailability of carbon monoxide detection equipment on Fire and Rescue Service frontline appliances
Wider context from the report “7. The use and availability of CGI meters by Fire and Rescue Services and having suitable training in their operation as well as the use of personal protective equipment CO alarms.
GMFRS did some research in the use of such equipment by all Fire and Rescue Services. Please see the attached. It is suggested that if all Fire and Rescue Services carried such equipment on front line appliances and used them on both emergency responses and preventative work that would reduce the risk of death to Fire Fighters and the public.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Absence of a statutory Fire and Rescue Service role in carbon monoxide safety, regulation and enforcement
Wider context from the report “3. The Role of Fire and Rescue Services in Carbon Monoxide Safety:
The Fire and Rescue Services currently have no statutory role in Carbon Monoxide safety, regulation and enforcement. This could be reviewed and considered by the Department for Communities and Local Government. It is appreciated that this is far from straight forward and wider issues would need to be taken into account. For example Fire and Rescue Services have no statutory role in other gases or substances which can cause death. This may require a more detailed analysis and assessment of issues and complications which may then come to light. In the absence of a statutory role, and possibly through the Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch” initiative, Fire and Rescue Services could be encouraged to voluntarily engage in local and national Carbon Monoxide campaigns. Such campaigns may benefit from closer working at a local level with relevant CO charities and at a national level between the Gas Safety Trust, the Gas Safe Charity and the Chief Fire Officers Association.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of suitable training in the operation of carbon monoxide detection equipment
Wider context from the report “7. The use and availability of CGI meters by Fire and Rescue Services and having suitable training in their operation as well as the use of personal protective equipment CO alarms.
GMFRS did some research in the use of such equipment by all Fire and Rescue Services. Please see the attached. It is suggested that if all Fire and Rescue Services carried such equipment on front line appliances and used them on both emergency responses and preventative work that would reduce the risk of death to Fire Fighters and the public.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of clear oversight of gas-supplier steps to raise awareness of danger
Wider context from the report “4. Piped Gas Suppliers:
It is understood that there are specific conditions of a licence to supply gas as summarised below. It is not clear how gas suppliers define and determine who is a ”vulnerable and priority” customer and how it is established that they have been offered a free annual gas safety check, and have taken advantage (or not) of such an offer ? Nor who actually checks what steps a gas supplier takes in practice to raise the awareness of danger and who judges the reasonability of the steps?
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of clear gas-supplier criteria for identifying vulnerable and priority customers
Wider context from the report “4. Piped Gas Suppliers:
It is understood that there are specific conditions of a licence to supply gas as summarised below. It is not clear how gas suppliers define and determine who is a ”vulnerable and priority” customer and how it is established that they have been offered a free annual gas safety check, and have taken advantage (or not) of such an offer ? Nor who actually checks what steps a gas supplier takes in practice to raise the awareness of danger and who judges the reasonability of the steps?
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to identify incomplete flue piping during routine inspections
Wider context from the report “8. The Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch Initiative”
This is a voluntary initiative to be encouraged and supported. It offers an independent safety validation service for landlords and letting agents.
http://www.bluewatch.co.uk/. The investigation established that incomplete flue piping had not been identified on routine inspection visits despite the regulatory regime created by The Gas Safety (Installation and Use ) Regulations 1988. At present there is no duty imposed on the owner of a boiler or a gas supplier ( who makes a profit from the supply ) that in the case of a multi occupancy building to allow the other occupants , through recognised engineers , to inspect the boiler and be warned to install CO alarms.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the movement of carbon monoxide within buildings
Wider context from the report “2. Guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building:
There appears to be a lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building from its original source and how it can penetrate and move within it. The HSE could provide more information on its web site and provide specific guidance or warnings. There is no HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents as to what independent validation has taken place of the gas and other fuel safety equipment provided in rented property may be appropriate. Such information could also be disseminated to and within all Fire and Rescue Services.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of established monitoring of offers and uptake of free annual gas safety checks
Wider context from the report “4. Piped Gas Suppliers:
It is understood that there are specific conditions of a licence to supply gas as summarised below. It is not clear how gas suppliers define and determine who is a ”vulnerable and priority” customer and how it is established that they have been offered a free annual gas safety check, and have taken advantage (or not) of such an offer ? Nor who actually checks what steps a gas supplier takes in practice to raise the awareness of danger and who judges the reasonability of the steps?
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a duty to warn other occupants to install carbon monoxide alarms
Wider context from the report “8. The Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch Initiative”
This is a voluntary initiative to be encouraged and supported. It offers an independent safety validation service for landlords and letting agents.
http://www.bluewatch.co.uk/. The investigation established that incomplete flue piping had not been identified on routine inspection visits despite the regulatory regime created by The Gas Safety (Installation and Use ) Regulations 1988. At present there is no duty imposed on the owner of a boiler or a gas supplier ( who makes a profit from the supply ) that in the case of a multi occupancy building to allow the other occupants , through recognised engineers , to inspect the boiler and be warned to install CO alarms.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of regulatory coverage for ongoing maintenance and inspection of existing solid fuel appliances
Wider context from the report “6. The installation , use , maintenance and correct positioning of fixed hard wired or battery operated CO alarms.
From October 1st 2010 Building Regulations Approved Document J “Combustion appliances and fuel storage systems” sets out a number of legal requirements in England and Wales. For the first time carbon monoxide (CO) alarms were made mandatory “where a new or replacement fixed solid fuel appliance is installed in a dwelling, a CO alarm should be provided in the room where the appliance is located.” However Building Regulations only concern the processes used during the ‘building’ or ‘installation’ phases, of a solid fuel appliance and do not have any power to talk about on-going maintenance processes or the inspection of existing appliances.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a duty to allow recognised engineers to inspect boilers in multi-occupancy buildings
Wider context from the report “8. The Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch Initiative”
This is a voluntary initiative to be encouraged and supported. It offers an independent safety validation service for landlords and letting agents.
http://www.bluewatch.co.uk/. The investigation established that incomplete flue piping had not been identified on routine inspection visits despite the regulatory regime created by The Gas Safety (Installation and Use ) Regulations 1988. At present there is no duty imposed on the owner of a boiler or a gas supplier ( who makes a profit from the supply ) that in the case of a multi occupancy building to allow the other occupants , through recognised engineers , to inspect the boiler and be warned to install CO alarms.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of required audit trails of fuel-supplier carbon monoxide safety steps
Wider context from the report “5. Enforcement and Information:
There is no requirement that in the case of a carbon monoxide death, a clear audit trail is available of the steps taken by the relevant fuel supplier to ensure the specific customer in question was aware of the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning and the benefits of fitting an audible alarm. At the moment there is no specific information that fuel suppliers are required to give.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents on independent validation of gas and other fuel safety equipment in rented property
Wider context from the report “2. Guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building:
There appears to be a lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building from its original source and how it can penetrate and move within it. The HSE could provide more information on its web site and provide specific guidance or warnings. There is no HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents as to what independent validation has taken place of the gas and other fuel safety equipment provided in rented property may be appropriate. Such information could also be disseminated to and within all Fire and Rescue Services.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of required specific carbon monoxide safety information from fuel suppliers
Wider context from the report “5. Enforcement and Information:
There is no requirement that in the case of a carbon monoxide death, a clear audit trail is available of the steps taken by the relevant fuel supplier to ensure the specific customer in question was aware of the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning and the benefits of fitting an audible alarm. At the moment there is no specific information that fuel suppliers are required to give.
” Open source report
Concerns raised 6 Failure of customer services to provide assistance to consumers in difficulty View source Failure to recognise vulnerable consumers View source Failure to provide required customer protection to vulnerable consumers View source Lack of permanent, industry-wide consumer protection View source Failure to empower personnel to halt disconnection View source Failure to report consumer-protection failings and relevant deaths to oversight bodies View source See 3 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Michael Joseph Hirrell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Michael Joseph Hirrell died from carbon monoxide poisoning between 18 and 25 January 2013 after using a borrowed generator at his home following disconnection of the electricity supply. The principal concerns were that his vulnerability was not recognised or protected during the disconnection, staff did not feel empowered to halt it, and wider consumer-protection arrangements may not prevent similar deaths.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of customer services to provide assistance to consumers in difficulty
Wider context from the report “2. Although all 3 personnel present on the morning (Warrant Officer, locksmith and meter engineer) had concerns regarding Mr Hirrell, no one felt empowered to halt the disconnection and, despite efforts by the Warrant Officer, customer services at npower were unable to assist with his predicament .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to recognise vulnerable consumers
Wider context from the report “1. Mr Hirrell’s presence was recognised by npower representatives before the power supply was disconnected, and he was noted to look unwell, be in receipt of welfare benefits, have no credit on his mobile telephone and to have no gas supply (and therefore no source of heat or light to his home). Notwithstanding this, he was not recognised to be a “vulnerable person” .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide required customer protection to vulnerable consumers
Wider context from the report “3. Mr Hirrell was not afforded customer protection under the license agreement, or under the Energy UK Safety Net as a vulnerable person , which he clearly and unequivocally was.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of permanent, industry-wide consumer protection
Wider context from the report “5. Steps taken by npower since Mr Hirrell’s death was brought to their attention are (while welcome) not permanent, nor industry wide , and therefore future deaths may occur if matters are not resolved to introduce a more robust form of consumer protection .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to empower personnel to halt disconnection
Wider context from the report “2. Although all 3 personnel present on the morning (Warrant Officer, locksmith and meter engineer) had concerns regarding Mr Hirrell, no one felt empowered to halt the disconnection and, despite efforts by the Warrant Officer, customer services at npower were unable to assist with his predicament.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to report consumer-protection failings and relevant deaths to oversight bodies
Wider context from the report “4. Ofgem were unaware of this death until advised of the circumstances by this office ; no contact has been made directly with Energy UK but npower were unable to offer any reassurances at inquest hearing that the circumstances of this tragic death were reported back either in routine audit feedback, or as a special case , given the failings of the system for consumer protection.
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Ask domestic and non-domestic suppliers to report fatalities known to result from disconnection.
Verbatim wording from the response “In the light of this case, we will ask domestic and non-domestic suppliers to report to Ofgem as soon as it becomes known to them that there has been a fatality as a consequence of a disconnection.” Source location Response from OFGEM
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Request that npower share its revised disconnection processes with Energy UK for consideration in the Safety Net review.
Verbatim wording from the response “Npower review of its practices” Source location Response from OFGEM
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Issue guidance to non-domestic suppliers on good practice for debt management and disconnection, including shared occupancy and vulnerable customers.
Verbatim wording from the response “Open letter: Non-domestic debt and disconnection – suppliers’ approaches and good practice expected” Source location Response from OFGEM
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Work with Energy UK as its review of shared-premises Safety Net provisions progresses.
Verbatim wording from the response “We met with Energy UK on 14 November to ask that they review the provisions of Safety Net covering the disconnection of domestic customers where they take a supply from a shared non-domestic premise. We have written to Energy UK to highlight our expectation that these provisions must be clear to ensure that suppliers would not proceed with a disconnection of a vulnerable domestic customer in this situation. I have enclosed a copy of this letter. Energy UK has acknowledged the relevant clause in the Safety Net is not fit for the purpose and is also not reflective of suppliers’ current practices.” Source location Response from OFGEM
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Discuss with suppliers their treatment of domestic customers in shared-occupancy situations.
Verbatim wording from the response “We intend to discuss with suppliers their approach to treating domestic customers in shared occupancy situations as part of our next regular meetings with them.” Source location Response from OFGEM
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Send a joint follow-up letter with Consumer Futures to non-domestic suppliers on shared occupancy and disconnection expectations.
Verbatim wording from the response “Joint letter to suppliers with Consumer Futures” Source location Response from OFGEM
Open published response
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations