Ofgem

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First report 1 Oct 2013•Latest report 4 Nov 2022

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
3

Naming this recipient

Published responses
33%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
6

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
8

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Ofgem linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Levi Louis Alleyne, a grab lorry delivery driver, died by electrocution at a building site after raising his lorry’s crane arm beneath overhead power lines. CPR was delayed because it was unclear whether the electricity remained live, and the ambulance control operator had no procedure or readily accessible emergency contact information for the relevant electricity network operator. The report identifies risks of delayed life-saving treatment or people approaching live electrical hazards and notes that similar mitigating procedures may not be adopted across England and Wales.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of Standard Operating Procedure instructions to contact the local DNO during electrical hazards

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fragmented DNO emergency contact arrangements across ambulance service boundaries

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays to life-saving treatment due to uncertainty about whether OHPLs remain live

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability and poor accessibility of correct DNO emergency numbers to ambulance control centre operators

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk to bystanders and emergency services from approaching patients near live OHPLs

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”
    Open source report

  2. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    ELIZABETH AURORA KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Aurora Kerr died after carbon monoxide from a malfunctioning basement boiler entered the residential flat where she lived, and she was found unconscious several hours after the Fire Service had attended the building. The report identified concerns about the movement and detection of carbon monoxide in buildings, the absence and use of carbon monoxide alarms and gas safety controls, and Fire and Rescue Service equipment, guidance and responses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of carbon monoxide detection equipment on Fire and Rescue Service frontline appliances

    Wider context from the report

    “7. The use and availability of CGI meters by Fire and Rescue Services and having suitable training in their operation as well as the use of personal protective equipment CO alarms. GMFRS did some research in the use of such equipment by all Fire and Rescue Services. Please see the attached. It is suggested that if all Fire and Rescue Services carried such equipment on front line appliances and used them on both emergency responses and preventative work that would reduce the risk of death to Fire Fighters and the public. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a statutory Fire and Rescue Service role in carbon monoxide safety, regulation and enforcement

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Role of Fire and Rescue Services in Carbon Monoxide Safety: The Fire and Rescue Services currently have no statutory role in Carbon Monoxide safety, regulation and enforcement. This could be reviewed and considered by the Department for Communities and Local Government. It is appreciated that this is far from straight forward and wider issues would need to be taken into account. For example Fire and Rescue Services have no statutory role in other gases or substances which can cause death. This may require a more detailed analysis and assessment of issues and complications which may then come to light. In the absence of a statutory role, and possibly through the Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch” initiative, Fire and Rescue Services could be encouraged to voluntarily engage in local and national Carbon Monoxide campaigns. Such campaigns may benefit from closer working at a local level with relevant CO charities and at a national level between the Gas Safety Trust, the Gas Safe Charity and the Chief Fire Officers Association. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of suitable training in the operation of carbon monoxide detection equipment

    Wider context from the report

    “7. The use and availability of CGI meters by Fire and Rescue Services and having suitable training in their operation as well as the use of personal protective equipment CO alarms. GMFRS did some research in the use of such equipment by all Fire and Rescue Services. Please see the attached. It is suggested that if all Fire and Rescue Services carried such equipment on front line appliances and used them on both emergency responses and preventative work that would reduce the risk of death to Fire Fighters and the public. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear oversight of gas-supplier steps to raise awareness of danger

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Piped Gas Suppliers: It is understood that there are specific conditions of a licence to supply gas as summarised below. It is not clear how gas suppliers define and determine who is a ”vulnerable and priority” customer and how it is established that they have been offered a free annual gas safety check, and have taken advantage (or not) of such an offer ? Nor who actually checks what steps a gas supplier takes in practice to raise the awareness of danger and who judges the reasonability of the steps? ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear gas-supplier criteria for identifying vulnerable and priority customers

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Piped Gas Suppliers: It is understood that there are specific conditions of a licence to supply gas as summarised below. It is not clear how gas suppliers define and determine who is a ”vulnerable and priority” customer and how it is established that they have been offered a free annual gas safety check, and have taken advantage (or not) of such an offer ? Nor who actually checks what steps a gas supplier takes in practice to raise the awareness of danger and who judges the reasonability of the steps? ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify incomplete flue piping during routine inspections

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch Initiative” This is a voluntary initiative to be encouraged and supported. It offers an independent safety validation service for landlords and letting agents. http://www.bluewatch.co.uk/. The investigation established that incomplete flue piping had not been identified on routine inspection visits despite the regulatory regime created by The Gas Safety (Installation and Use ) Regulations 1988. At present there is no duty imposed on the owner of a boiler or a gas supplier ( who makes a profit from the supply ) that in the case of a multi occupancy building to allow the other occupants , through recognised engineers , to inspect the boiler and be warned to install CO alarms. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the movement of carbon monoxide within buildings

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building: There appears to be a lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building from its original source and how it can penetrate and move within it. The HSE could provide more information on its web site and provide specific guidance or warnings. There is no HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents as to what independent validation has taken place of the gas and other fuel safety equipment provided in rented property may be appropriate. Such information could also be disseminated to and within all Fire and Rescue Services. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of established monitoring of offers and uptake of free annual gas safety checks

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Piped Gas Suppliers: It is understood that there are specific conditions of a licence to supply gas as summarised below. It is not clear how gas suppliers define and determine who is a ”vulnerable and priority” customer and how it is established that they have been offered a free annual gas safety check, and have taken advantage (or not) of such an offer ? Nor who actually checks what steps a gas supplier takes in practice to raise the awareness of danger and who judges the reasonability of the steps? ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a duty to warn other occupants to install carbon monoxide alarms

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch Initiative” This is a voluntary initiative to be encouraged and supported. It offers an independent safety validation service for landlords and letting agents. http://www.bluewatch.co.uk/. The investigation established that incomplete flue piping had not been identified on routine inspection visits despite the regulatory regime created by The Gas Safety (Installation and Use ) Regulations 1988. At present there is no duty imposed on the owner of a boiler or a gas supplier ( who makes a profit from the supply ) that in the case of a multi occupancy building to allow the other occupants , through recognised engineers , to inspect the boiler and be warned to install CO alarms. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of regulatory coverage for ongoing maintenance and inspection of existing solid fuel appliances

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The installation , use , maintenance and correct positioning of fixed hard wired or battery operated CO alarms. From October 1st 2010 Building Regulations Approved Document J “Combustion appliances and fuel storage systems” sets out a number of legal requirements in England and Wales. For the first time carbon monoxide (CO) alarms were made mandatory “where a new or replacement fixed solid fuel appliance is installed in a dwelling, a CO alarm should be provided in the room where the appliance is located.” However Building Regulations only concern the processes used during the ‘building’ or ‘installation’ phases, of a solid fuel appliance and do not have any power to talk about on-going maintenance processes or the inspection of existing appliances. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a duty to allow recognised engineers to inspect boilers in multi-occupancy buildings

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The Chief Fire Officers Association “Blue Watch Initiative” This is a voluntary initiative to be encouraged and supported. It offers an independent safety validation service for landlords and letting agents. http://www.bluewatch.co.uk/. The investigation established that incomplete flue piping had not been identified on routine inspection visits despite the regulatory regime created by The Gas Safety (Installation and Use ) Regulations 1988. At present there is no duty imposed on the owner of a boiler or a gas supplier ( who makes a profit from the supply ) that in the case of a multi occupancy building to allow the other occupants , through recognised engineers , to inspect the boiler and be warned to install CO alarms. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of required audit trails of fuel-supplier carbon monoxide safety steps

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Enforcement and Information: There is no requirement that in the case of a carbon monoxide death, a clear audit trail is available of the steps taken by the relevant fuel supplier to ensure the specific customer in question was aware of the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning and the benefits of fitting an audible alarm. At the moment there is no specific information that fuel suppliers are required to give. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents on independent validation of gas and other fuel safety equipment in rented property

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building: There appears to be a lack of understanding and detailed guidance on the potential movement of CO within a building from its original source and how it can penetrate and move within it. The HSE could provide more information on its web site and provide specific guidance or warnings. There is no HSE guidance to landlords and letting agents as to what independent validation has taken place of the gas and other fuel safety equipment provided in rented property may be appropriate. Such information could also be disseminated to and within all Fire and Rescue Services. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of required specific carbon monoxide safety information from fuel suppliers

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Enforcement and Information: There is no requirement that in the case of a carbon monoxide death, a clear audit trail is available of the steps taken by the relevant fuel supplier to ensure the specific customer in question was aware of the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning and the benefits of fitting an audible alarm. At the moment there is no specific information that fuel suppliers are required to give. ”
    Open source report

  3. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Joseph Hirrell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Joseph Hirrell died from carbon monoxide poisoning between 18 and 25 January 2013 after using a borrowed generator at his home following disconnection of the electricity supply. The principal concerns were that his vulnerability was not recognised or protected during the disconnection, staff did not feel empowered to halt it, and wider consumer-protection arrangements may not prevent similar deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of customer services to provide assistance to consumers in difficulty

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Although all 3 personnel present on the morning (Warrant Officer, locksmith and meter engineer) had concerns regarding Mr Hirrell, no one felt empowered to halt the disconnection and, despite efforts by the Warrant Officer, customer services at npower were unable to assist with his predicament. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise vulnerable consumers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mr Hirrell’s presence was recognised by npower representatives before the power supply was disconnected, and he was noted to look unwell, be in receipt of welfare benefits, have no credit on his mobile telephone and to have no gas supply (and therefore no source of heat or light to his home). Notwithstanding this, he was not recognised to be a “vulnerable person”. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide required customer protection to vulnerable consumers

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Mr Hirrell was not afforded customer protection under the license agreement, or under the Energy UK Safety Net as a vulnerable person, which he clearly and unequivocally was. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of permanent, industry-wide consumer protection

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Steps taken by npower since Mr Hirrell’s death was brought to their attention are (while welcome) not permanent, nor industry wide, and therefore future deaths may occur if matters are not resolved to introduce a more robust form of consumer protection. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to empower personnel to halt disconnection

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Although all 3 personnel present on the morning (Warrant Officer, locksmith and meter engineer) had concerns regarding Mr Hirrell, no one felt empowered to halt the disconnection and, despite efforts by the Warrant Officer, customer services at npower were unable to assist with his predicament. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Ofgem; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report consumer-protection failings and relevant deaths to oversight bodies

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Ofgem were unaware of this death until advised of the circumstances by this office; no contact has been made directly with Energy UK but npower were unable to offer any reassurances at inquest hearing that the circumstances of this tragic death were reported back either in routine audit feedback, or as a special case, given the failings of the system for consumer protection. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ask domestic and non-domestic suppliers to report fatalities known to result from disconnection.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the light of this case, we will ask domestic and non-domestic suppliers to report to Ofgem as soon as it becomes known to them that there has been a fatality as a consequence of a disconnection.”

    Source location

    Response from OFGEM
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Request that npower share its revised disconnection processes with Energy UK for consideration in the Safety Net review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Npower review of its practices”

    Source location

    Response from OFGEM
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue guidance to non-domestic suppliers on good practice for debt management and disconnection, including shared occupancy and vulnerable customers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Open letter: Non-domestic debt and disconnection – suppliers’ approaches and good practice expected”

    Source location

    Response from OFGEM
    Page 5 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with Energy UK as its review of shared-premises Safety Net provisions progresses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We met with Energy UK on 14 November to ask that they review the provisions of Safety Net covering the disconnection of domestic customers where they take a supply from a shared non-domestic premise. We have written to Energy UK to highlight our expectation that these provisions must be clear to ensure that suppliers would not proceed with a disconnection of a vulnerable domestic customer in this situation. I have enclosed a copy of this letter. Energy UK has acknowledged the relevant clause in the Safety Net is not fit for the purpose and is also not reflective of suppliers’ current practices.”

    Source location

    Response from OFGEM
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with suppliers their treatment of domestic customers in shared-occupancy situations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We intend to discuss with suppliers their approach to treating domestic customers in shared occupancy situations as part of our next regular meetings with them.”

    Source location

    Response from OFGEM
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send a joint follow-up letter with Consumer Futures to non-domestic suppliers on shared occupancy and disconnection expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Joint letter to suppliers with Consumer Futures”

    Source location

    Response from OFGEM
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026