Recipient

Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust

First report 20 Aug 2013•Latest report 21 Jun 2019

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Health and care · NHS trust. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports
22

Naming this recipient

Published responses
27%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
20

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
53

Described in responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

27%published responses found
53stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Deborah Anne Hopkinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Deborah Anne Hopkinson was treated for Cushing’s disease caused by a pituitary adenoma and later developed pneumocystis pneumonia. Her condition deteriorated during intensive care, and she died at Fairfield General Hospital on 26 September 2018 after a cardiac arrest. Concerns included equipment failures, delays in specialist advice and delays in recognising and treating complications associated with Cushing’s disease.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the computer system to support timely specialist involvement

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquiry heard that there were numerous occasions when equipment failure occurred and this is likely to have had some impact on the treatment which the deceased received i. When the deceased was re-admitted to hospital on 12 September 2018 there was delay of some 6 days in involving the endocrine consultant at Fairfield Hospital and the reason given during the inquiry was that the computer system was down. ii. The inquiry heard the importance about controlling the cortisol levels yet there was evidence to the effect that the analyser for running the cortisol sample was down multiple times during the deceased’s admission. iii. There was a significant deterioration in the deceased’s condition in the evening of 25 September 2018 but a CT abdomen could not be performed because the CT scanner at Fairfield Hospital was not working. iv. When the deceased’s was discussed at an MDT meeting on 13 September 2018 the MRI scan could not be viewed on the PACS system. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of specialist knowledge to recognise the association between Cushing’s disease and PJP

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was delay in obtaining advice from a specialist centre such as Salford Royal Hospital or the Christie Hospital despite a lack of expertise at Fairfield General Hospital as evidenced by the following: i. ████████ Consultant Endocrinologist at Salford Royal Hospital explained to the deceased’s husband ████████ and her sister ████████ that she was not a specialist in Cushing’s disease when discussing the deceased’s case on 17 September 2018. ii. In the Investigation Report the Trust accepted that there had been a delay in treatment for probable PJP because the medical team did not recognise the association between Cushing’s disease and PJP due to lack of specialist knowledge. On 21 August 2018 an MRI pituitary revealed a pituitary adenoma which was the most likely cause of the deceased’s Cushing disease yet it was not until 28 August 2018 that ████████ Consultant Endocrinologist at Salford Royal Hospital was contacted. Prior to the deceased’s re-admission to hospital on 12 September 2018 she contracted pneumocystis pneumonia, a recognised complication of Cushing’s disease. There was delay in obtaining advice from a specialist centre despite a significant deterioration in her condition and when there was involvement from a Consultant Endocrinologist at the Christie Hospital this was only achieved because of the intervention of the deceased’s sister. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of the CT scanner for abdominal imaging

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquiry heard that there were numerous occasions when equipment failure occurred and this is likely to have had some impact on the treatment which the deceased received i. When the deceased was re-admitted to hospital on 12 September 2018 there was delay of some 6 days in involving the endocrine consultant at Fairfield Hospital and the reason given during the inquiry was that the computer system was down. ii. The inquiry heard the importance about controlling the cortisol levels yet there was evidence to the effect that the analyser for running the cortisol sample was down multiple times during the deceased’s admission. iii. There was a significant deterioration in the deceased’s condition in the evening of 25 September 2018 but a CT abdomen could not be performed because the CT scanner at Fairfield Hospital was not working. iv. When the deceased’s was discussed at an MDT meeting on 13 September 2018 the MRI scan could not be viewed on the PACS system. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the PACS system to provide access to MRI scans

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquiry heard that there were numerous occasions when equipment failure occurred and this is likely to have had some impact on the treatment which the deceased received i. When the deceased was re-admitted to hospital on 12 September 2018 there was delay of some 6 days in involving the endocrine consultant at Fairfield Hospital and the reason given during the inquiry was that the computer system was down. ii. The inquiry heard the importance about controlling the cortisol levels yet there was evidence to the effect that the analyser for running the cortisol sample was down multiple times during the deceased’s admission. iii. There was a significant deterioration in the deceased’s condition in the evening of 25 September 2018 but a CT abdomen could not be performed because the CT scanner at Fairfield Hospital was not working. iv. When the deceased’s was discussed at an MDT meeting on 13 September 2018 the MRI scan could not be viewed on the PACS system. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in obtaining specialist-centre advice despite lack of local expertise

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was delay in obtaining advice from a specialist centre such as Salford Royal Hospital or the Christie Hospital despite a lack of expertise at Fairfield General Hospital as evidenced by the following: i. ████████ Consultant Endocrinologist at Salford Royal Hospital explained to the deceased’s husband ████████ and her sister ████████ that she was not a specialist in Cushing’s disease when discussing the deceased’s case on 17 September 2018. ii. In the Investigation Report the Trust accepted that there had been a delay in treatment for probable PJP because the medical team did not recognise the association between Cushing’s disease and PJP due to lack of specialist knowledge. On 21 August 2018 an MRI pituitary revealed a pituitary adenoma which was the most likely cause of the deceased’s Cushing disease yet it was not until 28 August 2018 that ████████ Consultant Endocrinologist at Salford Royal Hospital was contacted. Prior to the deceased’s re-admission to hospital on 12 September 2018 she contracted pneumocystis pneumonia, a recognised complication of Cushing’s disease. There was delay in obtaining advice from a specialist centre despite a significant deterioration in her condition and when there was involvement from a Consultant Endocrinologist at the Christie Hospital this was only achieved because of the intervention of the deceased’s sister. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of the cortisol sample analyser

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquiry heard that there were numerous occasions when equipment failure occurred and this is likely to have had some impact on the treatment which the deceased received i. When the deceased was re-admitted to hospital on 12 September 2018 there was delay of some 6 days in involving the endocrine consultant at Fairfield Hospital and the reason given during the inquiry was that the computer system was down. ii. The inquiry heard the importance about controlling the cortisol levels yet there was evidence to the effect that the analyser for running the cortisol sample was down multiple times during the deceased’s admission. iii. There was a significant deterioration in the deceased’s condition in the evening of 25 September 2018 but a CT abdomen could not be performed because the CT scanner at Fairfield Hospital was not working. iv. When the deceased’s was discussed at an MDT meeting on 13 September 2018 the MRI scan could not be viewed on the PACS system. ”
    Open source report
  2. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ann Corfield was admitted to hospital with a urinary tract infection, low sodium levels and deteriorating mental health, later developing severe psychotic depression, poor oral intake and dehydration. She suffered a cardiac arrest and died after transfer between hospitals. Concerns included inadequate handover about anticoagulation, failure to administer prescribed prophylactic anticoagulation, poor completion of fluid balance charts, and the lack of suitably qualified staff to administer intravenous fluids at Park House.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in prescribing prophylactic anticoagulation for patients at high risk of VTE

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence that although Mrs Corfield was at high risk of developing a VTE, following her admission to Park House on 28th June, prophylactic anticoagulation was not prescribed for her until 30th June when a prescription for clexane (enoxaparin) was issued. Further, although clexane was prescribed, it was never administered to Mrs Corfield. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff training to administer intravenous fluids in the psychiatric unit

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Further, I also heard evidence that the staff at Park House were not trained to administer intravenous fluids. This meant that Mrs Corfield had to be transferred to a North Manchester Hospital for intravenous fluids when she was in urgent need of specialist psychiatric care and treatment. I formed the view that ████████ was left extremely frustrated that he was unable to treat Mrs Corfield with intravenous fluids whilst she was a patient at Park House. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide written handovers containing medication information during patient transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence at the Inquest staff at Park House were not aware that Mrs Corfield was receiving an anticoagulant in the form of enoxaparin whilst she was a patient at Royal Oldham Hospital to reduce the risk of her developing a VTE or that she had refused this medication whilst a patient ROH. I received written evidence from ████████ that the Pennine Acute Trust has in place an Adult Transfer Policy and a Form should be generated which includes details with regards the patient’s medication and most recent observations. However, the evidence I heard from ████████, Consultant Psychiatrist at Park House, was that this unit still does not receive a written handover. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed prophylactic anticoagulation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence that although Mrs Corfield was at high risk of developing a VTE, following her admission to Park House on 28th June, prophylactic anticoagulation was not prescribed for her until 30th June when a prescription for clexane (enoxaparin) was issued. Further, although clexane was prescribed, it was never administered to Mrs Corfield. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete fluid balance charts accurately and consistently

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Dehydration clearly played a part in Mrs Corfield’s death. I heard evidence at Inquest that Fluid Balance Charts were poorly completed indeed some of them were not completed at all or contained errors with simple arithmetic. At the Inquest, I heard conflicting evidence about the usefulness of fluid balance charts. Witnesses who were employed by Pennine Acute Trust tended to place more reliance on the results of blood tests. However, ████████ emphasised to me the importance of FBC charts in a patient like Mrs Corfield who had a history of chronic kidney disease because blood tests were an ‘insensitive measure’ of hydration. I received helpful written evidence from ████████ who is the Divisional Director of Nursing for Medicine at Royal Oldham Hospital, dated 31st January 2019, which, at paragraph 17, shows there are still ongoing problems with the way fluid balance charts are completed some two and a half years after Mrs Corfield’s death. ”
    Open source report
  3. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Graham Tailby · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Graham Tailby, a patient detained under the Mental Health Act and receiving care on Juniper Ward, was found unresponsive in his room on 22 December 2015 and died despite resuscitation efforts. The inquest found bronconeumonia and combined sertraline and fentanyl toxicity, but it was unclear how the toxicity occurred or developed. A concern was raised that intraosseous drills were not available on crash trolleys, potentially limiting emergency intervention options.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of intraosseous drills on crash trolleys

    Wider context from the report

    “His evidence was that he whilst struggling to gain intravenous access to administer relevant drugs to Mr Tailby he had considered the possible use and assistance of a piece of equipment known as an intraosseous drill. The equipment however wasn’t present on the crash trolley which had been brought to Mr Tailby’s room. In the event he was in fact able to secure intravenous access and proceed accordingly. He also acknowledged that whilst the use of an intraosseous drill was an option with which he was familiar, that might not be the case for others and in any event is not a core requirement of expertise of those involved in emergency responses such as that which took place. The point that I raise is that the provision of the intraosseous drill on crash trolleys may provide another route of intervention for those familiar and trained in its use in other circumstances in the future, and having that option may prevent deaths in the context of emergency crash responses to wards for which the Trust has responsibility. ”
    Open source report
  4. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Marjorie GARTSIDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marjorie Gartside, aged 100, fractured her hip in an unwitnessed fall at a residential home and underwent surgery. She was discharged from hospital on two occasions, with concerns about inaccurate information regarding her mobility, unsafe discharge processes, lack of care handover and unclear palliative-care arrangements, and anticipatory medication not being sent with her. She died at the Home on 19 October 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide accurate mobility information during hospital-to-home communication

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That the information provided by the Royal Oldham Hospital to the Home on 10 October 2018 was inaccurate in suggesting that Mrs Gartside was able to mobilise. Had that information been relied upon by the Home it would have resulted in Mrs Gartside not having suitable or appropriate equipment in place for her return. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to send prescribed anticipatory medication with the person at discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “4. That the prescribed anticipatory medication was not sent with Mrs Gartside when she was discharged on 17 October 2018. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about palliative-care status at discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There appears to have been no handover of care and a lack of clarity as to whether Mrs Gartside was for palliative care when she was discharged from the Royal Oldham Hospital on 12 October 2018. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over care

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There appears to have been no handover of care and a lack of clarity as to whether Mrs Gartside was for palliative care when she was discharged from the Royal Oldham Hospital on 12 October 2018. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discharge processes lacking robustness

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That Mrs Gartside’s discharge from the Royal Oldham Hospital on 12 October 2018 appears to have been unsafe and raises a concern about the robustness of discharge processes. ”
    Open source report
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    John Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Lea was admitted to hospital for management of heart failure and was later found collapsed on the ward after the bay-tagging nurse temporarily left without arranging monitoring. Resuscitation was unsuccessful and his death was confirmed on 12 June 2017; the report considered a sudden cardiac-related event more likely than not. Concerns included incomplete risk assessments, poor communication, gaps in documentation, failure to escalate a change in oxygen saturations, incorrectly calculated NEWS scores, and failures to follow relevant policies and protocols.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to update and complete critical risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “1. In this case, critical risk assessments had not been updated and/or completed (falls, cot sides etc.) There were missed opportunities to re-assess. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient progress in the ward's NAAS rating

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Insufficient progress with regard to the NAAS rating for the ward in question (initial assessment a year ago ‘red’, more recent assessment ‘high amber’). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate when an on-call doctor does not attend after a marked change in oxygen saturations

    Wider context from the report

    “4. No escalation when the on call doctor failed to attend following a marked change in the deceased’s oxygen saturations. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Gaps in clinical documentation and record keeping

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Gaps within the documentation/record keeping/missing entries by both doctors and nurses (including fluid balance charts for a patient in heart failure and subject to fluid restriction, risk assessments, care planning, rounding tool and medical attendance upon the deceased). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorrect calculation of NEWS scores

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Incorrectly calculated NEWS scores. The NEWS was designed to address mistakes brought about by the previous early waring score tool (EWS), yet mistakes with regard to score calculations continue. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor communication within the nursing team about bay tagging

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Poor communication between the nursing team, with particular reference to ‘bay tagging’. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adhere to patient observation policy and protocol

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Failure to adhere to Trust policy/protocol – prevention of falls, patient observation. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adhere to falls prevention policy and protocol

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Failure to adhere to Trust policy/protocol – prevention of falls, patient observation. ”
    Open source report
  6. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Robert Allan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 16 July 2017, Paul Robert Allan walked onto the track at Oxford Circus tube station and was struck by a westbound train. Concerns included his discharge from the Rochdale Community Mental Health Team without transfer to the corresponding team in Stoke, and a failure to consult or work with drug and alcohol advisory services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consult or work with drug and alcohol advisory services

    Wider context from the report

    “2) The Rochdale community Mental Health Team failed to consult or work with the Drug and Alcohol advisory services in relation to Paul Robert Allan as it is required to do. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer people between community mental health teams when they move

    Wider context from the report

    “1) The Rochdale Community Mental Health Team discharged Paul Robert Allan from their care instead of transferring him to the Community Mental Health Team in Stoke where Paul Robert Allan was moving to. ”
    Open source report
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Barbara Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barbara Johnson was detained under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act and admitted to the Moorside Unit on 19 April 2017. She suffered a heart attack on 30 April 2017 and was pronounced deceased after resuscitation efforts. The principal concerns included gaps in physical observations and clinical review, deficiencies in handover and emergency-response equipment, and junior doctors’ failure to consider ECG machine printout abnormalities during interpretation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider ECG machine printouts in clinical interpretation and judgment

    Wider context from the report

    “It is understood that Pennine Acute NHS Trust employed the junior doctors on the Moorside Unit at Tameside General Hospital. During the course of the inquest we heard evidence from ████████ regarding ECGs that he carried out on Barbara Johnson on the 19th April 2017 at the time of her admission to the Moorside Unit. A number of the doctors understandably did not recall carrying out the ECGs but formed the view from the records that the patient was moving at the time that the ECGs were performed. Thus, he explained, had an impact on the ECG although he was not able to explain the precise impact. At the top of 2 of the ECGs there was a printout from the machine which stated (inter alia) “T Wave abnormality”, “Possible anterolateral ischemia” and “abnormal ECG”. ████████ evidence was that regard would not be had to the printout summary at the top of the ECG and that the doctor would interpret the ECG himself. Whilst it was accepted that the printout is no substitute for a doctor’s interpretation, it did give cause for concern that junior doctors employed by the Trust were routinely ignoring the printout. It was of concern that the printout was not being considered and/or was not informing clinical interpretation and judgment. ”
    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Hall died after a series of hospital admissions and attendances, with the medical cause described as acute left ventricular failure and B Cell lymphoma on a background of ischaemic heart disease. A principal concern was that an Emergency Department discharge letter stated that blood tests were normal, although her full blood count was abnormal, and that discharge letters did not routinely include complete blood results, limiting opportunities for GPs to identify trends.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately transcribe significant individual results into discharge letters

    Wider context from the report

    “Following Mrs Hall’s attendance at the Royal Oldham Emergency Department, a letter was written to her GP which included the text ‘Bloods and ECG all normal’. The evidence before the court was that contrary to this statement, Mrs Hall’s full blood count was, in fact, abnormal, with a slightly low haemoglobin at 96 grams / litre. ████████ Consultant in Emergency Medicine, explained in his evidence that in contrast to other systems which operate across the Trust whereby complete sets of results are automatically incorporated into discharge letters, the Emergency Department system is currently predicated on junior doctors accurately transcribing significant individual results. In addition to increasing the chances for errors of the sort that occurred in this case, it is a matter of concern that the absence of a complete set of blood results in discharge letters reduces the potential for GPs to compare results with others on their own systems, reducing the opportunity for trend analysis. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include a complete set of blood results in discharge letters

    Wider context from the report

    “Following Mrs Hall’s attendance at the Royal Oldham Emergency Department, a letter was written to her GP which included the text ‘Bloods and ECG all normal’. The evidence before the court was that contrary to this statement, Mrs Hall’s full blood count was, in fact, abnormal, with a slightly low haemoglobin at 96 grams / litre. ████████ Consultant in Emergency Medicine, explained in his evidence that in contrast to other systems which operate across the Trust whereby complete sets of results are automatically incorporated into discharge letters, the Emergency Department system is currently predicated on junior doctors accurately transcribing significant individual results. In addition to increasing the chances for errors of the sort that occurred in this case, it is a matter of concern that the absence of a complete set of blood results in discharge letters reduces the potential for GPs to compare results with others on their own systems, reducing the opportunity for trend analysis. ”
    Open source report
  9. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Pauline Hayston · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Pauline Hayston, who had reduced mobility, frailty and recent falls, sustained an unwitnessed fall while attempting to mobilise as an inpatient and later died following a fractured neck of femur and resulting immobility. The concerns identified related to the reliability and fitness for purpose of the Rambledguard falls mats, the suitability of the wireless system when several mats were in use, and the absence of technical instructions for nursing staff about operational problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide nursing staff with instructions on the operational integrity of essential falls-risk equipment

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence raises the following concerns: 1. The reliability of the Rambledguard fall mats and its fitness for purpose. 2. The suitability of a wireless “WiFi” activated where several fall mats are in place in proximity to each other. 3. Insertion of instructions to nursing staff where the operational integrity of an essential equipment to alleviate falls risks has been identified. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unsuitability of wireless WiFi activation when several fall mats are in proximity

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence raises the following concerns: 1. The reliability of the Rambledguard fall mats and its fitness for purpose. 2. The suitability of a wireless “WiFi” activated where several fall mats are in place in proximity to each other. 3. Insertion of instructions to nursing staff where the operational integrity of an essential equipment to alleviate falls risks has been identified. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unreliability of Rambledguard fall mats for their intended purpose

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence raises the following concerns: 1. The reliability of the Rambledguard fall mats and its fitness for purpose. 2. The suitability of a wireless “WiFi” activated where several fall mats are in place in proximity to each other. 3. Insertion of instructions to nursing staff where the operational integrity of an essential equipment to alleviate falls risks has been identified. ”
    Open source report
  10. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Patricia Norfolk · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patricia Norfolk was admitted to Royal Oldham Hospital after discovery of a fractured neck of femur, following earlier unwitnessed falls and an attendance at the hospital where no X-ray investigation was undertaken. She developed an infection following surgery, deteriorated despite medical intervention, and died from bronchopneumonia after discharge to Braeside Care Home. The principal concern was that patients were not receiving a daily senior clinician review, including during the interim period before recruitment and appointment of appropriate staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of daily senior clinician reviews for patients

    Wider context from the report

    “That patients, such as the deceased, were not being receiving a daily senior clinician review. I have been appraised of the developments that the Trust is aspiring to in relation to senior daily reviews and decision making and recognise the steps the Trust is taking to recruit appropriate staff to undertake such reviews. However, I remain concerned regarding what happens to patients in the interim period pending recruitment and appointment. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare a medical staffing paper to improve seven-day standards for daily senior clinical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst not considered as contributory to Patricia Norfolk’s death, the necessity for daily senior clinical review did form part of the recommended actions to be taken by the Trust following its Root Cause Analysis (RCA). As outlined in the directive of Professor Makin (dated 15 March 2017), a paper on medical staffing in general and acute medicine within the Trust was prepared with a view to improving seven day standards for daily senior clinical review. This directive was provided to you under cover of a letter dated 15 March 2017.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit four substantive consultant posts to increase capacity for seven-day clinical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ultimately improved medical staffing will achieve seven day clinical review albeit the numbers required currently will be lessened with improvement in patient flow. Recruitment into posts is on-going and a Diabetologist, a Chest Consultant and a Geriatrician will start this year, with further interviews planned. £10 million of funding for new consultant posts has been agreed by our Salford Group colleagues.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a full learning cycle on the deteriorating-patient change package.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The deteriorating patient collaborative will ensure that seven day clinical review will be available to those patients medically requiring of it. Mirroring the approach adopted by our Salford Group colleagues during their successful improvement collaborative in 2008, a full cycle of learning as regard to the methodology of the change package will be completed in November 2017 following which a cohort of Innovation Wards will be selected to represent a range of divisions and specialities across the organisation. These Innovation Wards will become the early adopters of the change package and will inform as to its spread and sustainability which will in turn inform the Trust-wide roll out of the successful interventions.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Select Innovation Wards to adopt the deteriorating-patient change package.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The deteriorating patient collaborative will ensure that seven day clinical review will be available to those patients medically requiring of it. Mirroring the approach adopted by our Salford Group colleagues during their successful improvement collaborative in 2008, a full cycle of learning as regard to the methodology of the change package will be completed in November 2017 following which a cohort of Innovation Wards will be selected to represent a range of divisions and specialities across the organisation. These Innovation Wards will become the early adopters of the change package and will inform as to its spread and sustainability which will in turn inform the Trust-wide roll out of the successful interventions.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement improved medical staffing to support seven-day clinical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having considered the content of the letter and its enclosures, including the directive of Professor Makin, you subsequently highlighted that no corresponding timescale was attached to the stated aspiration of the Trust to deliver daily senior clinical decision making and sought further information. This information was provided within an email dated 26 May which provided you with a timescale for the implementation of improved daily senior clinical decision making, namely following the completion of the recruitment process of two new substantive consultant posts, estimated at that time to be September 2017. The precursor to these posts was Trust Board agreement to the paper prepared by Professor Makin and provision of funding for the two new substantive posts.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust considered the actions within its power to improve daily senior clinical review already taken and communicated, requiring no additional response work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The use of your PFD Report has not had any meaningful practical effect on the improvement of public safety given the actions within the Trust’s power to take have already been taken and communicated to you in advance of you issuing your PFD Report. Furthermore, the PFD Report’s practical effect is questionable given the date for the Trust’s response loosely coincides with the date originally envisaged for the implementation of improved medical staffing.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust could not realistically provide daily senior clinical review to all patients because medical staffing constraints were outside its control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledges that the action as per the RCA report for ‘all patients to receive a daily senior clinician review’ was, with hindsight, more aspirational than realistically achievable due to circumstances outside its control, as detailed above. This has been fed back to those responsible for the action plan, for reflection when considering future actions.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further action on daily senior clinical review without recruitment should be addressed to the Secretary of State for Health as a national issue.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the Trust has taken steps to address this within its locality, as previously indicated, this is a national issue and consequently any steps to address your concern as to daily senior clinical review in the absence of recruitment such as that undertaken by the Trust would more appropriately addressed to The Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP, Secretary of State for Health.”

    Source location

    2017-0438
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 July 2017

    Open published response
  11. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Kathleen Cooper · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Kathleen Cooper, aged 73, underwent elective sigmoid colectomy and later deteriorated, suffering an intra-operative cardiac arrest during emergency surgery on 11 July 2016. The report identified medical and nursing neglect, including communication and record-keeping failures, inadequate supervision, inaccurate observations and early warning scores, delayed tests and treatment, and failures to escalate deterioration. Concerns also related to out-of-hours and weekend care and the patient-safety impact of split-site hospital arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in arranging urgent tests and treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of clinical judgement caused by over-reliance on early warning tools

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor ward-level leadership and supervision of nurses

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Difficulties in providing safe and effective care across split hospital sites

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the inquest, a medical practitioner raised concerns regarding the difficulties faced by clinicians in providing safe and effective care when an acute NHS Trust has a number of hospitals/departments on different sites i.e. the difficulties faced as a result of split-site commitments as a result of NHS reconfiguration. I echo this concern. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by doctors and nurses to escalate patient deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make timely progress in addressing previously recognised care failings

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Impact of split-site commitments and reconfiguration on patient safety and clinical care

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Split site commitment/reconfiguration and the impact this potentially has upon patient safety and clinical care (please see 1 above). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor communication between clinicians and nurses

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate on-call consultant supervision of junior colleagues

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate and incomplete fluid balance charts

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor medical and nursing record keeping

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to repeat indicated tests and act on the results

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unsafe standard of hospital care out of hours and at weekends

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The standard of care provided to hospital patients out of hours/weekend and the risk/s posed to patient safety as a result. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record accurate baseline observations and vital parameters

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorrect calculation of early warning scores

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The RCA and the inquest process identified a significant number of errors, omissions and missed opportunities to treat the deceased – all of which, on the balance of probabilities, could and would have improved the deceased’s chances of survival, despite her pre-existing co-morbidities. Most of the failings identified in this case have been recognised in previous RCA’s conducted by the Trust over the last 6-12 months. Despite evidence as to ‘lesson learned’ action plans set etc. flowing therefrom, there appears to be little (if any) timely progress being made in terms of improving/driving up care standards and preventing future deaths. My concerns relate to the following in particular: - Poor communication by/between clinicians and nurses - Poor record keeping – medical and nursing - Poor leadership/supervision of nurses - Ward/Matron level - Inadequate supervision by on-call consultants of junior colleagues - Incorrectly calculated early warning scores - Baseline observations not recorded/inaccurately record/missing vital parameters (impacting upon the calculation of early warning scores) - outwith Trust guidance/deviation from the same not clinically justified - Inaccurate fluid balance charts (persistent basic arithmetical errors/lack of recording) - The absence of clinical judgement as a result of the over-reliance placed upon tools such as the early warning scores - Failure to repeat tests such as bloods and to act upon the results accordingly - Failure to escalate (by doctors and nurses) when signs of deterioration/change in the patient’s clinical condition become apparent - Delays in arranging urgent/additional tests and treatment (in this case radiological CT scanning, bloods and IV antibiotics) ”
    Open source report
  12. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Dildar Shariff · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dildar Shariff died at Fairfield General Hospital on 10 May 2016 after a cardiac arrest, following a fall, head pain and vomiting. An intracerebral haemorrhage was confirmed, and the report states that his haemodialysis placed him at increased risk of haemorrhage. The principal concern was that this risk was not widely recognised or referred to in the relevant NICE guidelines, potentially creating a risk to other patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to incorporate the significance of head injury in patients undergoing haemodialysis or with significant uraemia due to renal failure into relevant NICE guidelines

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was given that patients who are undergoing haemodialysis or with significant uraemia due to renal failure, such as Mr Shariff, are at increased risk of a haemorrhage and that this is not commonly known within the medical profession or referred to in the relevant NICE guidelines. This lack of awareness could create a risk that other deaths will continue to exist or occur in the future and whilst I am satisfied that the Trust have taken this matter very seriously, in that they have implemented appropriate measures to reduce the risk of this occurring in the future, I am concerned with the National procedures as I am mindful that it may take some time for the significance of a head injury within patients with undergoing haemodialysis or with significant uraemia due to renal failure to be incorporated into the NICE guidelines. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of awareness within the medical profession of haemorrhage risk after head injury in patients undergoing haemodialysis or with significant uraemia due to renal failure

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was given that patients who are undergoing haemodialysis or with significant uraemia due to renal failure, such as Mr Shariff, are at increased risk of a haemorrhage and that this is not commonly known within the medical profession or referred to in the relevant NICE guidelines. This lack of awareness could create a risk that other deaths will continue to exist or occur in the future and whilst I am satisfied that the Trust have taken this matter very seriously, in that they have implemented appropriate measures to reduce the risk of this occurring in the future, I am concerned with the National procedures as I am mindful that it may take some time for the significance of a head injury within patients with undergoing haemodialysis or with significant uraemia due to renal failure to be incorporated into the NICE guidelines. ”
    Open source report
  13. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    baby Dominic Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Baby Dominic Smith was born on 2 June 2015 after a prolonged labour and died at approximately 18 hours of life following a collapse. The report describes pneumonia as the cause of death and identifies concerns including failure to recognise possible rupture of membranes and infection risk, inadequate maternal and neonatal observations, failure to escalate deterioration, delayed antibiotic treatment, and communication and record-keeping problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on early warning scores

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out maternal observations after delivery despite a temperature spike

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise signs and symptoms of neonatal deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate clinical communication and handover

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified and part-time midwives

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of midwives to escalate to or consult with relevant specialist clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out speculum examination to establish rupture of membranes

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document rationale for clinical discretion

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out neonatal observations after material change in condition

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely offer intrapartum prophylactic antibiotics to women with current or previous positive GBS tests

    Wider context from the report

    “Department of Health, NIHCE and the Royal Colleges: 1. I previously completed a PFD 13 month ago in relation to a neonatal GBS death. At that time I raised the following concerns: - That antenatal screening for GBS was not being routinely offered by the NHS to all pregnant women during the final weeks of pregnancy, - That prophylaxis intrapartum antibiotics were not routinely offered to all women who test positive for GBS (or have done so in the past) & - That given the seriousness of the illness, in the absence of a national screening and prophylactic treatment programme, babies were potentially being put at risk of harm/death. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death the evidence suggested that no further action has been taken in this regard, despite the responses received in relation to the last PFD action. I therefore raise the issues again as a concern. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of staff to follow clinical protocols and guidance

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely offer antenatal GBS screening to pregnant women during the final weeks of pregnancy

    Wider context from the report

    “Department of Health, NIHCE and the Royal Colleges: 1. I previously completed a PFD 13 month ago in relation to a neonatal GBS death. At that time I raised the following concerns: - That antenatal screening for GBS was not being routinely offered by the NHS to all pregnant women during the final weeks of pregnancy, - That prophylaxis intrapartum antibiotics were not routinely offered to all women who test positive for GBS (or have done so in the past) & - That given the seriousness of the illness, in the absence of a national screening and prophylactic treatment programme, babies were potentially being put at risk of harm/death. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death the evidence suggested that no further action has been taken in this regard, despite the responses received in relation to the last PFD action. I therefore raise the issues again as a concern. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Miscalculation of early warning scores

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate clinical record keeping

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”
    Open source report
  14. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Milly ZEMMEL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Milly ZEMMEL, who was blind and aged 89, was admitted to hospital after becoming unwell and later suffered falls, including an unwitnessed fall on 1 March 2015 while experiencing acute confusion. She fractured her left femur, was not considered fit for surgery, and died on 3 March 2015. The principal concerns were failures in falls-risk assessment, escalation and handover after an earlier fall, appropriate supervision and observations, and the adequacy of the hospital’s internal investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to initiate appropriate one-to-one supervision and observations

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was a gross failure to initiate appropriate one to one supervision and observations for the deceased from the early hours of the morning on 1 March 2015. In addition there was a failure to ensure that important clinical information about the deceased’s condition was handed over to the next shift. Nor did the next shift nurse in charge ensure that the deceased’s records were checked to find out what the up to date information on the situation was. Consequently the deceased, who was suffering an acute confusional state, and who was blind was left unsupervised for several hours leading her to have a fall and suffer a serious injury which caused or contributed to her death. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate internal investigation of failures in basic medical care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Trust’s own internal investigative procedures were demonstrably inadequate because the internal hospital investigation did not fully and properly identify the gross failure to provide the deceased with the basic medical care which her condition obviously required on the morning of 1 March 2015. The full particulars only became apparent when evidence was heard at the inquest and the records were checked. The gravity of the failings in care had not been properly identified. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over important clinical information to the next shift

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was a gross failure to initiate appropriate one to one supervision and observations for the deceased from the early hours of the morning on 1 March 2015. In addition there was a failure to ensure that important clinical information about the deceased’s condition was handed over to the next shift. Nor did the next shift nurse in charge ensure that the deceased’s records were checked to find out what the up to date information on the situation was. Consequently the deceased, who was suffering an acute confusional state, and who was blind was left unsupervised for several hours leading her to have a fall and suffer a serious injury which caused or contributed to her death. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess and correctly apply the falls risk policy

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There have been failures to assess and correctly apply the then existing falls risk policy. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate required clinical review after a fall

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was a failure to escalate the requirement for a clinical review following her fall on 21 February 2015 and nor was this identified at handovers on several occasions. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check patient records for up-to-date information at shift change

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was a gross failure to initiate appropriate one to one supervision and observations for the deceased from the early hours of the morning on 1 March 2015. In addition there was a failure to ensure that important clinical information about the deceased’s condition was handed over to the next shift. Nor did the next shift nurse in charge ensure that the deceased’s records were checked to find out what the up to date information on the situation was. Consequently the deceased, who was suffering an acute confusional state, and who was blind was left unsupervised for several hours leading her to have a fall and suffer a serious injury which caused or contributed to her death. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch and disseminate the Clinical Communication and Handover Policy with structured escalation and handover documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust launched a policy for Clinical Communication and Handover in September 2015 which includes handover documentation templates with more robust information for recording safety concerns such as a patient who may be at risk of falls information and a standard framework for escalating concerns about a patient. The policy also includes the standard required for doctor to doctor handovers including for patients who have been referred and who need to be assessed. The policy has been disseminated across the clinical teams in the Trust and the senior nursing team undertake quarterly audits to assess the quality and level of compliance. This policy is within Appendix 3 - Clinical Communication and Handover Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the Enhanced Patient Observation Policy to guide safe supervision and observation of adult in-patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Enhanced Patient Observation Policy was also introduced in February 2016 to ensure patient safety and to help provide the appropriate level of supervision and observation for adult in-patients. This policy provides advice and support to staff on the different requirements and needs of patients who require observation. This can be found in Appendix 6 - Enhanced Patient Observation Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct quarterly audits of compliance with the Clinical Communication and Handover Policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust launched a policy for Clinical Communication and Handover in September 2015 which includes handover documentation templates with more robust information for recording safety concerns such as a patient who may be at risk of falls information and a standard framework for escalating concerns about a patient. The policy also includes the standard required for doctor to doctor handovers including for patients who have been referred and who need to be assessed. The policy has been disseminated across the clinical teams in the Trust and the senior nursing team undertake quarterly audits to assess the quality and level of compliance. This policy is within Appendix 3 - Clinical Communication and Handover Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop an investigation toolkit covering investigation processes and report preparation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• To accompany the RCA training programme the Clinical Governance team have also developed an investigation toolkit that covers all aspects of investigations and advice on preparing and writing investigation reports.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require nursing staff to escalate urgent medical reviews through the specified clinical escalation route and use the SBAR communication tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Failure to act and escalate the lack of medical review will be included in the Lessons Learned Bulletin within the Medical Division and disseminated to all wards and departments across the division. The learning for nursing staff is to escalate to the medical team and in the first instance to the registrar and then consultant or on call Consultant, with assistance if required from within the senior nursing site team or on call/ bleep holder out of hours to ensure that any request for urgent review occurs. Staff will be required to use the communication handover SBAR tool (situation, background, assessment and recommendation) to support any communication. This is contained within the Clinical Communication and Handover Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train 103 staff, including senior clinicians and managers, in root cause analysis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A two day programme of root cause analysis training was commissioned by an external company specialising in root cause analysis (RCA) training and 103 staff, including senior clinicians and managers, were trained during 2015/16. In addition the Trust delivered training on Duty of Candour (being open) to ensure that patients and families receive support and feedback when a serious incident investigation is commenced. An internal programme of investigation training will continue throughout 2016/17 to ensure that the quality and breadth of Trust investigations continues to improve.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include learning about failures to obtain and escalate medical review in the Medical Division Lessons Learned Bulletin and disseminate it across wards and departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Dissemination of Lessons Learned”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce Safety Huddles at the start of ward and departmental shifts to discuss incidents, safety issues and enhanced observation needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has piloted and now introduced a ‘Safety Huddle’ at the commencement of each ward and departmental shift which includes the discussion and handover of any recent incidents, as well as safety issues relating to patients. This includes a prompt for discussion of any patients who will require additional observation or enhanced supervision as part of their care. This allows nursing staff to report on any unexpected and significant events involving patients and helps them to proactively plan and agree how to resolve them. The policy is within Appendix 2 - Safety Huddle document.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and launch the Incident Reporting and Investigation Policy and require independent investigation teams for serious incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It was recognised early in 2015 that the Trust need to make improvements in how investigations were conducted within the organisation. An external review of serious incident investigations was commissioned by the former Chief Executive and following this review the Trust instigated a number of actions:”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the Fallsafe Policy with assessment, care-planning and care-bundle tools, supported by staff training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The new Fallsafe Policy for the prevention and management of in-patient falls was introduced in April 2016; this includes newly launched tools for assessment, care planning and a care bundle. As part of the launch, training was included using the Fallsafe resources produced by the Royal College of Physicians and is available to all staff.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue the internal investigation training programme throughout 2016/17.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A two day programme of root cause analysis training was commissioned by an external company specialising in root cause analysis (RCA) training and 103 staff, including senior clinicians and managers, were trained during 2015/16. In addition the Trust delivered training on Duty of Candour (being open) to ensure that patients and families receive support and feedback when a serious incident investigation is commenced. An internal programme of investigation training will continue throughout 2016/17 to ensure that the quality and breadth of Trust investigations continues to improve.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Employ two falls specialist practitioners to enhance staff education and training and develop falls-management systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has now employed two Specialist Practitioners for falls to further enhance and develop the systems and processes for the education and training of staff. Part of their work will be to develop the processes for patient risk assessment and for auditing the implementation and effectiveness of the policy in clinical areas. The Fallsafe Policy is in Appendix 4 and the Fallsafe staff information booklet is within at Appendix 5.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop patient risk-assessment processes and audit Fallsafe Policy implementation and effectiveness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has now employed two Specialist Practitioners for falls to further enhance and develop the systems and processes for the education and training of staff. Part of their work will be to develop the processes for patient risk assessment and for auditing the implementation and effectiveness of the policy in clinical areas. The Fallsafe Policy is in Appendix 4 and the Fallsafe staff information booklet is within at Appendix 5.”

    Source location

    2016-0139-Response-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 April 2016

    Open published response
  15. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Joyce Hartford · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joyce Hartford, described as a frail woman with pre-existing co-morbidities, suffered a fall causing a fracture that required surgery. Her health deteriorated and she died at home on 23 January 2015; the medical cause of death included pneumonia, an operated right neck of femur osteoporotic fracture, and caecal carcinoma. The inquest identified incomplete or inaccurate nursing tools, assessments, records, associated documentation, and the nursing discharge summary, with concerns that record-keeping standards had not materially improved.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of nurse record-keeping audits to produce material improvement in standards

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the inquest hearing it became apparent that the nursing tools (in particular, the ‘Purpose T’), assessments, records, associated documentation and nursing discharge summary were incomplete and/or inaccurate. Whilst I was told that the Trust, to its credit, had been conducting audits since the Summer of 2014 in order to improve nurse record keeping, Mrs Hartford died in January 2015 and the evidence at inquest did not disclose any material improvement in overall standards. As this was not the first case over which I had presided that involved concerns arising from record keeping that fell below expectation (over and above the aforementioned) I considered that I was under an obligation to bring this to your attention. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incomplete or inaccurate nursing records and associated documentation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the inquest hearing it became apparent that the nursing tools (in particular, the ‘Purpose T’), assessments, records, associated documentation and nursing discharge summary were incomplete and/or inaccurate. Whilst I was told that the Trust, to its credit, had been conducting audits since the Summer of 2014 in order to improve nurse record keeping, Mrs Hartford died in January 2015 and the evidence at inquest did not disclose any material improvement in overall standards. As this was not the first case over which I had presided that involved concerns arising from record keeping that fell below expectation (over and above the aforementioned) I considered that I was under an obligation to bring this to your attention. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue developing and governing nursing documentation through the Nursing Documentation Group and Nursing and Midwifery Board, including wider professional documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Over the last 12 months we have also reviewed the process of developing, reviewing and ratifying nursing documents to implement a more rigorous governance process through our Nursing Documentation Group and the Nursing and Midwifery Board. This project is ongoing. The Nursing Documentation Group has widened its remit to cover Allied Health Professionals and Maternity documentation. The main objective is to align documentation control and development processes across specialties.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use Nursing Metrics across the Trust to audit nursing-documentation quality in case notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Over the past 18 months Nursing Metrics have been introduced, part of which involves audit of the quality of nursing documentation in the case notes.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit registered nurses to Ward T7 and provide induction competency observations covering documentation and related clinical tasks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Since January 2015 Ward T7 has recruited into a number of vacant registered nurse posts; as part of the induction for these new staff we have developed an induction booklet which includes the requirement for a senior member of the nursing team to observe the staff member undertaking various tasks to confirm that these are being performed competently – this includes completion of documentation such as District Nurse referrals, SKIN bundles (for tissue viability) and Rounding Tools (involves nursing staff using predetermined questions to ask patients on a regular basis about care needs and includes checks on the patient environment.)”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the EVOLVE electronic case-note system, beginning with a pilot of nursing assessments, care plans, referrals and specified risk documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Trust has also commenced the implementation of the ‘EVOLVE’ system which will introduce electronic records across the Trust. This will be piloted later this year and is projected to start on 17th November and run for 4 weeks with a Trust wide rollout projected to take 4 months starting in January 2016. The Project brief is to replace all clinical documentation with electronic forms hosted within the Evolve electronic case-note system. This will help mandate the completion of key patient assessments. The first phase of forms to be piloted on two wards at NMGH will focus on nursing assessment documents, associated care plans and referrals and will include nutritional assessments, falls and bed rails risk assessments, dementia screening and the pressure ulcer care plan.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Secure Trust Development Agency support and carry out a Trust-wide documentation standardisation project.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• With the support of the Chief Nurse, we have now secured support of a team from the Trust Development Agency to help improve record keeping and a Trust wide documentation standardisation project is underway.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement scenario training on completing the Purpose T tool for early pressure-ulcer detection and management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• For early detection and management of pressure ulcers the use of scenario training on the completion of the Purpose T tool is now in place. The introduction of an air flow mattress store on the unit now ensures that patients who have suffered a fractured neck of femur are admitted to the Unit from A&E directly onto a ‘pre-socio’ mattress.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Ward T7 documentation against Trust standards and conduct monthly nursing-metrics audits of record keeping.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We are undertaking a review of current documentation to ensure it meets all Trust standards and therefore supports improvements in care delivery. On a monthly basis the ward is audited using the nursing metrics which includes the quality of record keeping.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct weekly Ward T7 documentation audits with immediate feedback on risk assessments, care plans and reassessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There are also weekly audits of documentation undertaken by the Clinical Matron/Unit Manager and the Band 6 Sisters and feedback is given to the relevant member of staff at the time of the audit. These include accurate and timely completion of risk assessments, use of appropriate care plans and timely reassessments.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce Ward Accreditation to monitor ward-team nursing-care quality, including record keeping and patient assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Trust is also introducing Ward Accreditation, a new project which will help us to monitor safe practice by measuring the quality of nursing care delivered by ward teams. As part of this project we will be checking and monitoring the quality of record keeping including patient assessments.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run Nursing Care Indicators audits and respond to reduced results through corrective action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Since February 2015, the Unit has achieved 90% and above in the Nursing Care Indicators Audit except for May when the results reduced to 84% and this reduction was responded to immediately recognising that this was related to a trial of incorporating nursing documentation within the medical records. This was addressed and results improved to 92% in June, 95% in July and 93% in August.”

    Source location

    2015-0279-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hositals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2015

    Open published response
  16. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Toni Piel · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Toni Piel suffered a head injury in a fall at home on 10 December 2014 and was treated at hospital before being discharged. He was found dead at home on 23 December 2014, with the inquest concluding that he died from a head injury caused by a fall, although it was not established whether this was linked to the earlier injury. Concerns included that his home circumstances and the absence of anyone able to observe him were apparently not considered at discharge, and that risk factors were not documented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess home circumstances and available observation when discharging patients following head injury

    Wider context from the report

    “i) At the time the deceased was discharged home following the head injury on 10 December 2014 the deceased’s home circumstances were apparently not taken into account. Had such an assessment been made it would have been noted that there was no-one able to observe the deceased at home. The NICE clinical guideline 175 issued January 2014 recommends that this should be taken into account. ii) No assessment of the risk factors in discharging the deceased was documented in the deceased’s records. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document discharge risk-factor assessments in clinical records

    Wider context from the report

    “i) At the time the deceased was discharged home following the head injury on 10 December 2014 the deceased’s home circumstances were apparently not taken into account. Had such an assessment been made it would have been noted that there was no-one able to observe the deceased at home. The NICE clinical guideline 175 issued January 2014 recommends that this should be taken into account. ii) No assessment of the risk factors in discharging the deceased was documented in the deceased’s records. ”
    Open source report
  17. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Beaty · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Beaty was born by emergency caesarean section after an abandoned instrumental delivery on 11 April 2014. At 26 hours of age, he suffered a catastrophic head injury, hypovolaemic shock and hypoxic brain ischaemia, and died. The report raised concerns that guidance on instrumental delivery was ambiguous and potentially open to misinterpretation, including unclear terminology and misleading guidance about traction.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Difficulty for Trusts to change guidance without external guidance improvement

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Instrumental Delivery – the Court heard how local/national protocols and training programmes are routinely based on guidance issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians and NICE. The guidance in use at the time of Thomas’ birth was found to be ambiguous, misleading and potentially open to misinterpretation. A key example was: ‘…When to abandon the procedure: • No evidence of progressive descent with each pull • No evidence of imminent birth following 3 pulls of a correctly placed instrument by an experienced operator…’ The first point by implication must mean that where there is no descent with the first pull, then the procedure ought to be abandoned, yet the second point suggests abandonment after a 3rd traction. 2. Terminology - The RCOG Guidance did not provide operational definitions for words such as ‘imminent’ (vis a vis birth) or ‘crowning’. This was particularly important in Thomas’ case, as it had a bearing on the decision making processes applied during the course of the forceps delivery. 3. Traction - The term ‘gentle’ (traction) forming the ‘G’ of the algorithm within the Trust’s protocol was misleading and not in line with the RCOG Guidance. The clinical evidence suggested that in most (if not all) cases mild to moderate traction is routinely applied by clinicians in order to ensure safe and successful instrumental delivery. Whilst it was accepted that this was often subjective, the term ‘gentle’ was clinically out with. 4. Development of Trust Guidance – it is difficult for Trusts to change their guidance until and unless there is a change/material improvement in the Guidance issued by the RCOG. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of misleading and clinically inappropriate ‘gentle’ traction terminology

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Instrumental Delivery – the Court heard how local/national protocols and training programmes are routinely based on guidance issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians and NICE. The guidance in use at the time of Thomas’ birth was found to be ambiguous, misleading and potentially open to misinterpretation. A key example was: ‘…When to abandon the procedure: • No evidence of progressive descent with each pull • No evidence of imminent birth following 3 pulls of a correctly placed instrument by an experienced operator…’ The first point by implication must mean that where there is no descent with the first pull, then the procedure ought to be abandoned, yet the second point suggests abandonment after a 3rd traction. 2. Terminology - The RCOG Guidance did not provide operational definitions for words such as ‘imminent’ (vis a vis birth) or ‘crowning’. This was particularly important in Thomas’ case, as it had a bearing on the decision making processes applied during the course of the forceps delivery. 3. Traction - The term ‘gentle’ (traction) forming the ‘G’ of the algorithm within the Trust’s protocol was misleading and not in line with the RCOG Guidance. The clinical evidence suggested that in most (if not all) cases mild to moderate traction is routinely applied by clinicians in order to ensure safe and successful instrumental delivery. Whilst it was accepted that this was often subjective, the term ‘gentle’ was clinically out with. 4. Development of Trust Guidance – it is difficult for Trusts to change their guidance until and unless there is a change/material improvement in the Guidance issued by the RCOG. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of operational definitions for instrumental-delivery terminology

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Instrumental Delivery – the Court heard how local/national protocols and training programmes are routinely based on guidance issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians and NICE. The guidance in use at the time of Thomas’ birth was found to be ambiguous, misleading and potentially open to misinterpretation. A key example was: ‘…When to abandon the procedure: • No evidence of progressive descent with each pull • No evidence of imminent birth following 3 pulls of a correctly placed instrument by an experienced operator…’ The first point by implication must mean that where there is no descent with the first pull, then the procedure ought to be abandoned, yet the second point suggests abandonment after a 3rd traction. 2. Terminology - The RCOG Guidance did not provide operational definitions for words such as ‘imminent’ (vis a vis birth) or ‘crowning’. This was particularly important in Thomas’ case, as it had a bearing on the decision making processes applied during the course of the forceps delivery. 3. Traction - The term ‘gentle’ (traction) forming the ‘G’ of the algorithm within the Trust’s protocol was misleading and not in line with the RCOG Guidance. The clinical evidence suggested that in most (if not all) cases mild to moderate traction is routinely applied by clinicians in order to ensure safe and successful instrumental delivery. Whilst it was accepted that this was often subjective, the term ‘gentle’ was clinically out with. 4. Development of Trust Guidance – it is difficult for Trusts to change their guidance until and unless there is a change/material improvement in the Guidance issued by the RCOG. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambiguity in guidance on when to abandon instrumental delivery

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Instrumental Delivery – the Court heard how local/national protocols and training programmes are routinely based on guidance issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians and NICE. The guidance in use at the time of Thomas’ birth was found to be ambiguous, misleading and potentially open to misinterpretation. A key example was: ‘…When to abandon the procedure: • No evidence of progressive descent with each pull • No evidence of imminent birth following 3 pulls of a correctly placed instrument by an experienced operator…’ The first point by implication must mean that where there is no descent with the first pull, then the procedure ought to be abandoned, yet the second point suggests abandonment after a 3rd traction. 2. Terminology - The RCOG Guidance did not provide operational definitions for words such as ‘imminent’ (vis a vis birth) or ‘crowning’. This was particularly important in Thomas’ case, as it had a bearing on the decision making processes applied during the course of the forceps delivery. 3. Traction - The term ‘gentle’ (traction) forming the ‘G’ of the algorithm within the Trust’s protocol was misleading and not in line with the RCOG Guidance. The clinical evidence suggested that in most (if not all) cases mild to moderate traction is routinely applied by clinicians in order to ensure safe and successful instrumental delivery. Whilst it was accepted that this was often subjective, the term ‘gentle’ was clinically out with. 4. Development of Trust Guidance – it is difficult for Trusts to change their guidance until and unless there is a change/material improvement in the Guidance issued by the RCOG. ”
    Open source report
  18. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr James Mc Manus · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr James Mc Manus was admitted with acute lower limb ischaemia requiring thrombolysis and subsequently developed bleeding and hypovolaemic shock. He died on 3 November 2013 following recognised but rare complications of medical intervention; concerns included failures to follow protocols for managing thrombolytic-associated bleeding and massive blood loss.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff knowledge, application and implementation of guidelines for managing bleeding associated with thrombolytic therapy

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned about the lack of knowledge, application and implementation of key protocols by Trust staff – in particular, guidelines for the management of bleeding associated with thrombolytic therapy and the management of massive blood loss. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff knowledge, application and implementation of protocols for managing massive blood loss

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned about the lack of knowledge, application and implementation of key protocols by Trust staff – in particular, guidelines for the management of bleeding associated with thrombolytic therapy and the management of massive blood loss. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory training on thrombolysis policies and associated bleeding risks to medical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Development of a training presentation incorporating the policies and guidelines regarding Thrombolysis and management of associated bleeding risks. This presentation will take place on 22nd May 2015, during the Clinical Governance Audit session, attendance is mandatory for all levels of medical staff. ████████, Vascular Surgeon and ████████ Clinical Lead for Anaesthetics will lead on this presentation. Prior to the audit day the Directorate Manager for Vascular Surgery will ensure that all levels of Vascular medical staff receive copies of the policies to be discussed.”

    Source location

    2015-0097-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver thrombolysis and bleeding-risk training to Critical Care staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• New Thrombolysis Policy drafted November 2014 prior to inquest (please see attached in appendix 1). The new Thrombolysis policy was circulated and is now available on the Trust Intranet. All Critical Care staff have had a series of Training sessions in the care of the thrombolysed patient which was provided by the Vascular and Radiology Consultants. The session dates were held on the following dates, 14th and 27th October 2014 and on 10th and 24th November 2014.”

    Source location

    2015-0097-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate and maintain the new thrombolysis policy on the Trust intranet.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• New Thrombolysis Policy drafted November 2014 prior to inquest (please see attached in appendix 1). The new Thrombolysis policy was circulated and is now available on the Trust Intranet. All Critical Care staff have had a series of Training sessions in the care of the thrombolysed patient which was provided by the Vascular and Radiology Consultants. The session dates were held on the following dates, 14th and 27th October 2014 and on 10th and 24th November 2014.”

    Source location

    2015-0097-Response-by-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 March 2015

    Open published response
  19. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    infant Rahat Qayyum (otherwise known as Mohammed Rahat Yousaf) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Infant Rahat Qayyum was delivered in very poor condition on 5 July 2013 after abnormalities on CTG traces were not fully recognised, and died on 19 July 2013 from hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy due to or as a consequence of perinatal asphyxia. The concerns identified included the absence of national guidelines for interpreting antenatal CTG tracings and issues concerning the dissemination, application and applicability of the Trust’s Interpreting Policy, particularly in relation to informed consent.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disseminate the Trust’s Interpreting Policy to staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The dissemination, application and applicability of the Trust’s Interpreting Policy, by its staff, in force at the material time (with particular regard to the obtaining of informed consent). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of national guidelines for interpreting and classifying antenatal CTG tracings

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Whilst Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust has now established its own local guidelines based upon recent research conducted in Bristol, there are no national guidelines on how to interpret and/or classify antenatal (as opposed to intra-partum) CTG tracings. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Trust’s Interpreting Policy to provide applicable guidance on obtaining informed consent

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The dissemination, application and applicability of the Trust’s Interpreting Policy, by its staff, in force at the material time (with particular regard to the obtaining of informed consent). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by staff to apply the Trust’s Interpreting Policy

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The dissemination, application and applicability of the Trust’s Interpreting Policy, by its staff, in force at the material time (with particular regard to the obtaining of informed consent). ”
    Open source report
  20. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Barry James LEWIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry James Lewis suffered an anaphylactic reaction of unknown origin and developed severe airway swelling and difficulty speaking. Despite emergency treatment, attempts to secure his airway were difficult, he suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest, and he died after 50 minutes of resuscitation. The substantive concerns related to the availability and suitability of emergency airway instruments, theatre access, night staffing, and out-of-hours ENT cover across multiple sites.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistency of instrumental content within packs

    Wider context from the report

    “2) The consistency of instrumental content within the packs and familiarity with the same. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate night staffing levels of ODTs

    Wider context from the report

    “5) Night staffing levels – in particular, the adequacy/sufficiency of ODTs. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequacy or unavailability of emergency airway surgical sets containing instruments of different sizes

    Wider context from the report

    “1) The adequacy/availability of emergency airway surgical sets, containing instruments of different sizes, within the ER department. The ‘one size fits all’ approach raises patient safety issues. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited out-of-hours accessibility of theatres to obtain additional instrumentation

    Wider context from the report

    “4) The accessibility of theatres in order to obtain additional instrumentation when needed, out of hours. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequacy or unavailability of additional individually packed surgical instrumentation as back-up to standard sets

    Wider context from the report

    “3) The adequacy and availability of additional, individually packed surgical instrumentation within the ER, as ‘back-up’ to the standard sets (e.g. larger retractors, scalpels etc.) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of familiarity with the instrumental content of packs

    Wider context from the report

    “2) The consistency of instrumental content within the packs and familiarity with the same. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate out-of-hours medical cover for ENT service provision

    Wider context from the report

    “6) Staffing levels/adequacy/sufficiency of medical cover, with particular reference to ENT service provision out of hours and geographic/split site commitments. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate medical cover for geographic or split-site commitments

    Wider context from the report

    “6) Staffing levels/adequacy/sufficiency of medical cover, with particular reference to ENT service provision out of hours and geographic/split site commitments. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review night nurse practitioners’ role to involve them in direct care and management of critically ill patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) The role of the night nurse practitioners has been reviewed to ensure that they would be involved in the direct care & management of such critically ill patients to ensure that others are released to do what they in turn are needed to do e.g. ODP’s.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement flexible team working to support ODPs and enable other staff to perform their required duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) The role of the night nurse practitioners has been reviewed to ensure that they would be involved in the direct care & management of such critically ill patients to ensure that others are released to do what they in turn are needed to do e.g. ODP’s.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and standardize emergency airway packs across A&E departments, including large instruments and ENT clinician input.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1) The emergency airways packs have been up dated in all the A&E departments at the trust to ensure that they have ‘large’ instruments for the overweight patients.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increasing ODP staffing at Fairfield is considered neither clinically nor financially practical.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) The availability of ODP’s for Fairfield is appropriate for the volume of surgical activity it receives. As per 4) it is important that other members of the team work flexibly to support them. This has been implemented. To increase ODP levels is neither practical clinically or financially.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A&E departments cannot stock theatres’ full specialist equipment range, so specialist equipment must sometimes be obtained from elsewhere.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) As before ‘large’ scalpels & retractors are available. It does however need to be noted that A&E departments will never be in a position to stock the same range of equipment as theatres in addition to the wide variety of other equipment they have for day to day use. As such arrangements will not remove the need on occasions for more specialist equipment which cannot be stocked to be obtained from other areas.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Out-of-hours staffing and ENT cover are considered appropriate for the site and trust’s activity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6) Out of hours staffing, like that for ODP’s, is appropriate for the site & the trust. With particular reference to ENT cover it would again neither be clinically or financially practical to have more than one person on call at middle grade level for the trust for the level of activity in that specialty. Where there is a clinical need the consultant would be contacted & asked to come in. As you are aware the trend in medicine is for there to be fewer specialist sites which cover a wider catchment population. Other specialties where this has happened would include cardiothoracic surgery, vascular surgery, ophthalmology, urology & neurosurgery.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    More than one trust-wide middle-grade ENT clinician on call is considered neither clinically nor financially practical.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6) Out of hours staffing, like that for ODP’s, is appropriate for the site & the trust. With particular reference to ENT cover it would again neither be clinically or financially practical to have more than one person on call at middle grade level for the trust for the level of activity in that specialty. Where there is a clinical need the consultant would be contacted & asked to come in. As you are aware the trend in medicine is for there to be fewer specialist sites which cover a wider catchment population. Other specialties where this has happened would include cardiothoracic surgery, vascular surgery, ophthalmology, urology & neurosurgery.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ODP availability at Fairfield is considered appropriate for its surgical activity, with flexible teamwork supporting available staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) The availability of ODP’s for Fairfield is appropriate for the volume of surgical activity it receives. As per 4) it is important that other members of the team work flexibly to support them. This has been implemented. To increase ODP levels is neither practical clinically or financially.”

    Source location

    2013-0314-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response
  21. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Jack William PARTINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Partington was born by planned caesarean section on 25 November 2011 and developed breathing difficulties requiring neonatal ventilation. After developing a pneumothorax, he was treated with intubation and ventilation but deteriorated and died on 26 November 2011. Concerns included gaps in neonatal handover and care planning, treatment decisions made without multidisciplinary consultation, lack of routine use of exhaled carbon dioxide detectors, absence of national guidance on paralysing agents and neonatal ventilation, and inadequate monitoring of ventilatory pressure after intubation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of national standardised guidance on the management of ventilation in neonates

    Wider context from the report

    “4) There are no national standardised policies, protocols or guidance on the management and administration of paralysing agents to neonates in need of intubation and/or the management of ventilation in neonates. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely check medical records for new neonatal admissions

    Wider context from the report

    “1) That there was no 1:1 neonatal nurse/cotside ‘handover’ at shift change, no individualised neonatal nursing care plan in use and no routine checks of medical records for new neonatal admissions. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely use disposable exhaled carbon dioxide detectors on the NNU

    Wider context from the report

    “3) That disposable exhaled carbon dioxide detectors (ET CO2) were not routinely used on the NNU (as an adjunct) and that they are not currently/routinely used in many NNUs throughout the country. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of the ventilatory pressure dial following intubation

    Wider context from the report

    “5) No single individual within the neonatal (resuscitation) team was allocated to oversee and monitor the ventilatory pressure dial following intubation. The dial in question was situated on the side of the incubator/cot, out of the direct line of sight of the clinician controlling the airway/ventilatory process. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of national standardised guidance on the management and administration of paralysing agents to neonates needing intubation

    Wider context from the report

    “4) There are no national standardised policies, protocols or guidance on the management and administration of paralysing agents to neonates in need of intubation and/or the management of ventilation in neonates. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make treatment decisions collaboratively and using all available information

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Nursing staff, rather than the multi-disciplinary team plus parents, took treatment/change of treatment decisions in isolation and without consulting all available information (such as medical records etc.) ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of individualised neonatal nursing care plans

    Wider context from the report

    “1) That there was no 1:1 neonatal nurse/cotside ‘handover’ at shift change, no individualised neonatal nursing care plan in use and no routine checks of medical records for new neonatal admissions. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide 1:1 neonatal nurse/cotside handover at shift change

    Wider context from the report

    “1) That there was no 1:1 neonatal nurse/cotside ‘handover’ at shift change, no individualised neonatal nursing care plan in use and no routine checks of medical records for new neonatal admissions. ”
    Open source report
  22. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Derek BRIERLEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Brierley’s urethral catheter became blocked and attempts to recatheterise him were unsuccessful, including an abandoned suprapubic catheter insertion, after which he became acutely unwell with features of peritonitis. Concerns included the likely high insertion site, the absence of Trust guidelines on competence and training for the procedure, and difficulties locating a suprapubic catheter beforehand.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Difficulties in locating suprapubic catheters before procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “3)Difficulties were encountered in locating a suprapubic catheter prior to the procedure ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Suprapubic catheter insertion at an excessively high site

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Although the consultant performing the suprapubic procedure had done so successfully on nine previous occasions the last such occasion was twelve months earlier. The family overheard instructions for the procedure being read out to the consultant whilst it was being carried out. More likely than not the site of the insertion was too high. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of Trust guidelines for competence and training in suprapubic procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “2) There are no Trust Guidelines as to the standard of competence or training of those carrying out the procedure ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure current competence for suprapubic procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Although the consultant performing the suprapubic procedure had done so successfully on nine previous occasions the last such occasion was twelve months earlier. The family overheard instructions for the procedure being read out to the consultant whilst it was being carried out. More likely than not the site of the insertion was too high. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement urology training and competency sign-off for clinicians inserting suprapubic catheters outside urology.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) The urology team have initiated a training program for those who may need to insert such catheters outside of the urology division. Individuals will need to be signed off for this, (a process we already use for chest drains).”

    Source location

    2013-0244-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Label, regularly check and appropriately store suprapubic catheter procedure trays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8) Procedure trays are clearly labelled, regularly checked & appropriately stored. Difficulty finding the kit in this case was due to individual lack of familiarity as it is not a procedure frequently performed in a very busy A&E.”

    Source location

    2013-0244-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Procedure trays are clearly labelled, regularly checked and appropriately stored, so no change to tray arrangements is identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8) Procedure trays are clearly labelled, regularly checked & appropriately stored. Difficulty finding the kit in this case was due to individual lack of familiarity as it is not a procedure frequently performed in a very busy A&E.”

    Source location

    2013-0244-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The difficulty locating the procedure kit resulted from individual unfamiliarity, not inadequate tray labelling, checking or storage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8) Procedure trays are clearly labelled, regularly checked & appropriately stored. Difficulty finding the kit in this case was due to individual lack of familiarity as it is not a procedure frequently performed in a very busy A&E.”

    Source location

    2013-0244-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 December 2013

    Open published response
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Published response patterns

Compared with other recipients in reports included in PFD Monitor

Describes published response evidence, not performance.

Published responses found

27%
27%All other recipients 58%
0%100%

How actions were described at the time

This respondent
60%15%21%4%
All other recipients
47%25%27%<1%<1%
  • Completed
  • In progress
  • Planned
  • Unclear
  • Partially completed

Statuses reflect what recipients said at the time. PFD Monitor does not verify whether actions happened.

Types of action described in responses

Percentages use all actions described by each group. An action may have more than one type, so percentages do not total 100%.

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026