Red Bay Boats Limited

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First report 15 Nov 2024•Latest report 15 Nov 2024

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
100%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
7

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
11

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Red Bay Boats Limited linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Emily Jane LEWIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emily Jane Lewis, aged 15, died at Southampton General Hospital on 22 August 2020 after the high-speed RIB on which she was a passenger collided with a buoy, projecting her into a handhold and causing fatal injuries. The principal concerns included the workload and situational awareness of a lone skipper, inadequate forward visibility and passenger protection, shortcomings in seating and handrail design, insufficient risk assessment and safety management, and confusing or inconsistent regulation of high-speed RIB experience rides.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code to high-speed passenger craft

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of proper protection for passengers and crew from impact and vibration hazards

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Non-uniform risk management for high-speed rides

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confusing and inconsistent requirements and guidance for small-craft operators

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient crewing for lookout and skipper workload control

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in revising codes of practice for high-speed craft

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Loss of situational awareness during RIB operations

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate seating and collision-impact mitigation in RIBs

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate forward visibility from passenger-carrying RIBs

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of AIS capability for monitoring RIB operations

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Red Bay Boats Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Excessive piloting workload during high-speed RIB operations

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requisite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningfully (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “... passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to: a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensive framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess each model’s field of vision in accordance with ISO 11591.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “g. Field of Vision Compliance:”

    Source location

    Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
    Page 8 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test Red Bay vessel seating and handholds for collision loads and applicable safety standards to inform safer designs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c. Seating and Handhold Testing:”

    Source location

    Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an external naval-architect audit of all Red Bay-built vessels, including technical documentation, calculations and stability tests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. External Naval Architect Audit:”

    Source location

    Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission new seating designs informed by testing results and retest them for safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i. A testing company has been commissioned to assess the designs of the seating and handholds on Red Bay vessels. The loads on the pod seats will be tested to determine their endurance in the event of a collision. Test results are expected by the end of February 2025. These results will help set load factor and stress conditions on future vessels, influencing the design of new seating, which will be commissioned by the end of May 2025 and re-tested thereafter.”

    Source location

    Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Decline commissions for thrill-seeking passenger RIBs and thrill-seeking market vessels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “e. Commissioning of Passenger RIBs:”

    Source location

    Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Passenger RIB commissions will not be accepted until the Marine and Coastguard Agency updates its regulations for this area.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “e. Commissioning of Passenger RIBs:”

    Source location

    Response from Red Bay Boats Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 November 2024

    Open published response
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026