Recipient

Teesside University

First report 21 Feb 2019•Latest report 21 Feb 2019

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Other public bodies · University. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

0%published responses found
0stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Teesside University linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terrence Smith died in hospital on 13 November 2013 after developing amphetamine-induced Excited Delirium/Acute Behavioural Disturbance, being subjected to prolonged restraint, and stopping breathing while being transported to hospital. The principal concerns included failures to recognise the condition as a medical emergency, inadequate assessment and training, excessive restraint, delayed conveyance to hospital, and deficiencies in relevant emergency response, clinical, police and custody policies and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of call-handling provision for identifying unrecognised ED/ABD presentations

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that, whilst waiting for version 17 of NHS Pathways, SECAMB has provided its call handlers with guidance (by way of a “Hot Topic”) that a call from the Police or a Health Care Professional stating that a patient is suffering ED/ABD should be given a category 2 response. I was also told, however, that SECAMB’s call handlers have no discretion when using NHS Pathways which must be followed precisely. I have three concerns about the current situation. First, there appears to be a contradiction between the call handlers being told they have no discretion when using NHS Pathways and their being given additional guidance for certain calls. This contradiction could cause confusion. Secondly, the guidance given in the “Hot Topic” is concerned only with calls from the Police or an HCP in which ED/ABD is identified. Currently, therefore, there is no provision for identifying the condition in calls from the Police or an HCP which do not expressly mention ED/ABD or in calls from the public (meaning the call from Terry’s family would still not be recognised as a call relating to ED/ABD, even today). Thirdly, the “Hot Topic” does not guide the call handlers to ask whether the patient is under restraint. If a patient suffering ED/ABD is under restraint this could add to his risk of sudden death and this information could affect the proper categorisation of the response to the call. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistency between police conveyance policy and officer training

    Wider context from the report

    “The Joint Surrey Police, Sussex Police, Kent Police and South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust Conveyance Policy is currently being re-drafted but I have concerns about the current and draft proposed versions I was shown. Both versions indicate that a patient suffering ED/ABD (or other life threatening conditions) should not be conveyed to hospital by police vehicle under any circumstances or unless a series of 11 conditions are satisfied. Some of the 11 conditions could take some time to satisfy and some are dependent on the presence of SECAMB at the scene (which could be subject to delay). I have two concerns : (a) I am concerned that the policy could prevent a patient who is suffering a medical emergency being conveyed to hospital as soon as possible, and by police vehicle if necessary, and could result in a fatal delay in the provision of life-saving treatment. (b) I am concerned that the content of this policy is inconsistent with the training I was told is given to police officers, namely that they may convey a patient to hospital by police vehicle if the use of an ambulance is not an available or practical option, and as long as the conveyance is approved by a senior officer. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conveyance policy restricting timely transport of medical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “The Joint Surrey Police, Sussex Police, Kent Police and South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust Conveyance Policy is currently being re-drafted but I have concerns about the current and draft proposed versions I was shown. Both versions indicate that a patient suffering ED/ABD (or other life threatening conditions) should not be conveyed to hospital by police vehicle under any circumstances or unless a series of 11 conditions are satisfied. Some of the 11 conditions could take some time to satisfy and some are dependent on the presence of SECAMB at the scene (which could be subject to delay). I am concerned that the policy could prevent a patient who is suffering a medical emergency being conveyed to hospital as soon as possible, and by police vehicle if necessary, and could result in a fatal delay in the provision of life-saving treatment. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of national guidance for out-of-hospital rapid tranquilisation

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that although the London Ambulance Service has provided out of hospital rapid tranquilisation of patients (such as may well be needed by a patient suffering ED/ABD) for some years, SECAMB will not do so until a national protocol or guidance has been issued by JRCALC. In those circumstances, whilst I understand that work on the production of such guidance is being undertaken, I am nevertheless concerned that none is yet in place. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of timely escalation of serious ED/ABD safety matters to senior management

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told by the Chief Executive Officer of SECAMB that he was not aware of Terry’s death and SECAMB’s involvement in it, nor of the issues arising at the Inquest, until very shortly before being required to give oral evidence at the Regulation 28 hearing. Given the length of the Inquest and the seriousness of the issues arising in relation to SECAMB (including their failure to recognise that Terry was suffering ED/ABD and to ensure he was treated as a medical emergency and taken to an Accident and Emergency Department), I am concerned that there is no system in place to ensure that such matters are drawn to the attention of the most senior management in a timely manner so as to ensure there is strategic planning for the prevention of other deaths. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient coverage of ED/ABD training for front-line response staff

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that in 2016/17 SECAMB sought to address the absence of training of its clinical staff by providing some “key skills” training in relation to the condition of ED/ABD and its management, but that it was only in 2018 that it introduced a specific training package on the condition. I have two concerns about this training package. First, its content is potentially confusing in that (a) it refers to the condition of ED/ABD as “controversial” (when it is not) and (b) it links ED/ABD to patients detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act (which a patient suffering ED/ABD will not necessarily be). Secondly, to date the training has been given to only about 150 out of about 650 front-line response staff (and out of a much higher number of all employees who should be trained). I was told that there are plans to create an e-learning package to aid faster delivery, but this has not yet been created. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contradictory ambulance call-handling instructions

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that, whilst waiting for version 17 of NHS Pathways, SECAMB has provided its call handlers with guidance (by way of a “Hot Topic”) that a call from the Police or a Health Care Professional stating that a patient is suffering ED/ABD should be given a category 2 response. I was also told, however, that SECAMB’s call handlers have no discretion when using NHS Pathways which must be followed precisely. I have three concerns about the current situation. First, there appears to be a contradiction between the call handlers being told they have no discretion when using NHS Pathways and their being given additional guidance for certain calls. This contradiction could cause confusion. Secondly, the guidance given in the “Hot Topic” is concerned only with calls from the Police or an HCP in which ED/ABD is identified. Currently, therefore, there is no provision for identifying the condition in calls from the Police or an HCP which do not expressly mention ED/ABD or in calls from the public (meaning the call from Terry’s family would still not be recognised as a call relating to ED/ABD, even today). Thirdly, the “Hot Topic” does not guide the call handlers to ask whether the patient is under restraint. If a patient suffering ED/ABD is under restraint this could add to his risk of sudden death and this information could affect the proper categorisation of the response to the call. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Training that conflates ED/ABD death risk with positional asphyxia

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned about the following within the training materials : (a) Under the heading “What causes Death in Excited Delirium ?” there follows a series of six slides dealing with positional asphyxia when a patient has been “hogtied”. A later slide, headed “Hypoxia The last nail in the coffin?”, suggests that hypoxia is an element in what causes death from ED/ABD. In fact, the evidence provided to me at the Inquest established that ED/ABD and positional asphyxia are two entirely separate and quite different conditions. Death from ED/ABD can result even though there is no asphyxiation or hypoxia. Whilst many patients suffering ED/ABD in a custodial setting may well be under restraint (although they will not necessarily be), it is of real importance that FMEs (and all involved) understand that there is a risk of sudden death from ED/ABD whatever the patient’s position, whether or not there is restraint, and whether or not there is hypoxia. The evidence I heard showed that it is vital that it is understood that the risk of death from ED/ABD comes from the condition itself, which can be exacerbated by restraint and resistance against the restraint, no matter what the sufferer’s position. On the basis of the current training material, students may be misled in to thinking that a patient is not at risk of death as long as the position in which he is being restrained is not causing him asphyxiation (which was the thinking of the officers restraining Terry), and that they will fail to understand that there is a risk of death from ED/ABD whatever the sufferer’s position under restraint and even if he is not being restrained at all. (b) The material suggests that FMEs should encourage the use of minimal force and minimal restraint and the use of de-escalation techniques, but it makes no reference to encouraging the containment rather than restraint of the patient. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conveyance policy restricting timely transport of medical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “The Joint Surrey Police, Sussex Police, Kent Police and South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust Conveyance Policy is currently being re-drafted but I have concerns about the current and draft proposed versions I was shown. Both versions indicate that a patient suffering ED/ABD (or other life threatening conditions) should not be conveyed to hospital by police vehicle under any circumstances or unless a series of 11 conditions are satisfied. Some of the 11 conditions could take some time to satisfy and some are dependent on the presence of SECAMB at the scene (which could be subject to delay). I have two concerns : (a) I am concerned that the policy could prevent a patient who is suffering a medical emergency being conveyed to hospital as soon as possible, and by police vehicle if necessary, and could result in a fatal delay in the provision of life-saving treatment. (b) I am concerned that the content of this policy is inconsistent with the training I was told is given to police officers, namely that they may convey a patient to hospital by police vehicle if the use of an ambulance is not an available or practical option, and as long as the conveyance is approved by a senior officer. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the police Mental Health Guide to separately address ED/ABD

    Wider context from the report

    “Surrey Police’s Mental Health Guide addresses ED/ABD only in bullet point form alongside reference to Positional Asphyxia. The conditions are separate and different and the absence of a separate sheet addressing ED/ABD alone could mislead those reading the Guide in to thinking that the conditions are necessarily connected. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police training that mischaracterises ED/ABD as controversial

    Wider context from the report

    “It is clear that Surrey Police now ensure that all officers and staff receive training in relation to ED/ABD and its management, including the fact that it is a medical emergency. I was provided with a copy of the current training material and told that it was, to a very large extent, reflective the material provided by The College of Policing’s National Curriculum, Module 5. I have two concerns : (a) I am concerned that the material includes reference to ED/ABD being “controversial” when this is not the case. A number of the officers who restrained Terry stated in evidence that they believed the condition was “controversial”. The inclusion of this reference continues the risk that trainees are misled into doubting the existence of ED/ABD and this may result in their failing to recognise or accept a presentation of ED/ABD. (b) I am concerned that, within the training material, the guidance in relation to ED/ABD is closely linked to the guidance in relation to positional asphyxia. The evidence provided to me at the Inquest established that ED/ABD and positional asphyxia are two entirely separate and quite different conditions. Death from ED/ABD can result even though there is no asphyxia. Whilst many of those suffering ED/ABD may be under restraint (although they will not necessarily be) it is of real importance that police officers and staff understand that there is a risk of sudden death from ED/ABD whatever the sufferer’s position and whether or not he is under restraint. It is vital that it is understood that the risk of death from ED/ABD comes from the condition itself, which can be exacerbated by restraint and resistance against the restraint. On the basis of the current training material, there is a risk that students may be misled in to thinking that there is no risk of death as long as there is no positional asphyxiation (which was the thinking of the officers restraining Terry). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omission of patient containment guidance from ED/ABD training

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned about the following within the training materials : (a) Under the heading “What causes Death in Excited Delirium ?” there follows a series of six slides dealing with positional asphyxia when a patient has been “hogtied”. A later slide, headed “Hypoxia The last nail in the coffin?”, suggests that hypoxia is an element in what causes death from ED/ABD. In fact, the evidence provided to me at the Inquest established that ED/ABD and positional asphyxia are two entirely separate and quite different conditions. Death from ED/ABD can result even though there is no asphyxiation or hypoxia. Whilst many patients suffering ED/ABD in a custodial setting may well be under restraint (although they will not necessarily be), it is of real importance that FMEs (and all involved) understand that there is a risk of sudden death from ED/ABD whatever the patient’s position, whether or not there is restraint, and whether or not there is hypoxia. The evidence I heard showed that it is vital that it is understood that the risk of death from ED/ABD comes from the condition itself, which can be exacerbated by restraint and resistance against the restraint, no matter what the sufferer’s position. On the basis of the current training material, students may be misled in to thinking that a patient is not at risk of death as long as the position in which he is being restrained is not causing him asphyxiation (which was the thinking of the officers restraining Terry), and that they will fail to understand that there is a risk of death from ED/ABD whatever the sufferer’s position under restraint and even if he is not being restrained at all. (b) The material suggests that FMEs should encourage the use of minimal force and minimal restraint and the use of de-escalation techniques, but it makes no reference to encouraging the containment rather than restraint of the patient. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance call-triage tools to support recognition and appropriate response to ED/ABD

    Wider context from the report

    “The version of NHS Pathways currently in use is version 16 which does not enable operators to recognise potential ED / ABD and respond accordingly. I was told that it is intended that version 17 will do so but this is not yet in use. My concern is that, unless and until it is in use, there will continue to be a failure by call handlers to recognise ED/ABD and respond appropriately. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate monitoring and capture of ED/ABD incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that SECAMB is not currently monitoring accurately the incidence of cases of ED/ABD in the regions it covers. A witness told me that she believed there were very few incidents (under ten a year) and that they were all apparent from the data gathered. On the basis of the evidence heard at the Inquest it seems unlikely that there are very few incidents given that SECAMB cover three large counties with a total population of over 4 million people and given the much higher incidence in other areas. Further, there were at least two incidents of ED/ABD (from 2018 and 2019) referred to in evidence which had not been captured at all by SECAMB’s data gathering. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confusing clinical-staff ED/ABD training content

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that in 2016/17 SECAMB sought to address the absence of training of its clinical staff by providing some “key skills” training in relation to the condition of ED/ABD and its management, but that it was only in 2018 that it introduced a specific training package on the condition. I have two concerns about this training package. First, its content is potentially confusing in that (a) it refers to the condition of ED/ABD as “controversial” (when it is not) and (b) it links ED/ABD to patients detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act (which a patient suffering ED/ABD will not necessarily be). Secondly, to date the training has been given to only about 150 out of about 650 front-line response staff (and out of a much higher number of all employees who should be trained). I was told that there are plans to create an e-learning package to aid faster delivery, but this has not yet been created. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police training that conflates ED/ABD with positional asphyxia

    Wider context from the report

    “It is clear that Surrey Police now ensure that all officers and staff receive training in relation to ED/ABD and its management, including the fact that it is a medical emergency. I was provided with a copy of the current training material and told that it was, to a very large extent, reflective the material provided by The College of Policing’s National Curriculum, Module 5. I have two concerns : (a) I am concerned that the material includes reference to ED/ABD being “controversial” when this is not the case. A number of the officers who restrained Terry stated in evidence that they believed the condition was “controversial”. The inclusion of this reference continues the risk that trainees are misled into doubting the existence of ED/ABD and this may result in their failing to recognise or accept a presentation of ED/ABD. (b) I am concerned that, within the training material, the guidance in relation to ED/ABD is closely linked to the guidance in relation to positional asphyxia. The evidence provided to me at the Inquest established that ED/ABD and positional asphyxia are two entirely separate and quite different conditions. Death from ED/ABD can result even though there is no asphyxia. Whilst many of those suffering ED/ABD may be under restraint (although they will not necessarily be) it is of real importance that police officers and staff understand that there is a risk of sudden death from ED/ABD whatever the sufferer’s position and whether or not he is under restraint. It is vital that it is understood that the risk of death from ED/ABD comes from the condition itself, which can be exacerbated by restraint and resistance against the restraint. On the basis of the current training material, there is a risk that students may be misled in to thinking that there is no risk of death as long as there is no positional asphyxiation (which was the thinking of the officers restraining Terry). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Teesside University; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of call-handling guidance to capture patient restraint status

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told that, whilst waiting for version 17 of NHS Pathways, SECAMB has provided its call handlers with guidance (by way of a “Hot Topic”) that a call from the Police or a Health Care Professional stating that a patient is suffering ED/ABD should be given a category 2 response. I was also told, however, that SECAMB’s call handlers have no discretion when using NHS Pathways which must be followed precisely. I have three concerns about the current situation. First, there appears to be a contradiction between the call handlers being told they have no discretion when using NHS Pathways and their being given additional guidance for certain calls. This contradiction could cause confusion. Secondly, the guidance given in the “Hot Topic” is concerned only with calls from the Police or an HCP in which ED/ABD is identified. Currently, therefore, there is no provision for identifying the condition in calls from the Police or an HCP which do not expressly mention ED/ABD or in calls from the public (meaning the call from Terry’s family would still not be recognised as a call relating to ED/ABD, even today). Thirdly, the “Hot Topic” does not guide the call handlers to ask whether the patient is under restraint. If a patient suffering ED/ABD is under restraint this could add to his risk of sudden death and this information could affect the proper categorisation of the response to the call. ”
    Open source report
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Published response patterns

Compared with other recipients in reports included in PFD Monitor

Describes published response evidence, not performance.

Published responses found

0%
0%All other recipients 58%
0%100%

How actions were described at the time

This respondent
All other recipients
47%25%27%<1%<1%
  • Completed
  • In progress
  • Planned
  • Unclear
  • Partially completed

Statuses reflect what recipients said at the time. PFD Monitor does not verify whether actions happened.

Types of action described in responses

Percentages use all actions described by each group. An action may have more than one type, so percentages do not total 100%.

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026