PFD report

Richard Edward Anthony Jaeger-Fozard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 30 May 2014•Buckinghamshire

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

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Concerns
0

Raised in this report

Recipients
1

Named on the report

Responses found
1

Of 1 recipient

Stated actions
3

Described in responses

Recipients and published responses

Source document

Full report text

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Concerns and recipient responses

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No concerns are currently included for this report.

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.3

  1. 1

    Issue a mandatory Safety Notice requiring Z135/70 owners to remove machines from service and verify secondary boom angle sensor calibration before return to service.

    Stated by Terex Aerial Work Platforms, Terex Global GmbHStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 30 May 2014.
  2. 2

    Implement updated Z135/70 controller software that detects mis-calibration, faults the machine into a stable safe position, and prevents further boom extension.

    Stated by Terex Aerial Work Platforms, Terex Global GmbHStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 30 May 2014.
  3. 3

    Make the updated software available to all Z135/70 owners and issue a Service Advisory recommending installation in specified circumstances.

    Stated by Terex Aerial Work Platforms, Terex Global GmbHStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 30 May 2014.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.3

  1. 1

    The accident resulted from mis-calibration, and the proposed switch would not prevent mis-calibration or the resulting instability.

    Stated by Terex Aerial Work Platforms, Terex Global GmbHDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.
  2. 2

    The proposed switch is unreliable, fails required safety-control standards, and introduces additional calibration complexity.

    Stated by Terex Aerial Work Platforms, Terex Global GmbHDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.
  3. 3

    Updated control software and calibration measures adequately address mis-calibration and prevent machine instability, so further design modifications are unnecessary.

    Stated by Terex Aerial Work Platforms, Terex Global GmbHExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Issue a mandatory Safety Notice requiring Z135/70 owners to remove machines from service and verify secondary boom angle sensor calibration before return to service.

Verbatim wording from the response

“On 29th July 2013, Genie issued a mandatory Safety Notice that requires all Z135/70 owners to remove their machines from service and to confirm that the secondary boom angle sensor on all machines is calibrated correctly before returning the machines to service in accordance with the procedure set out in the Safety Notice. A copy of the Safety Notice is attached hereto. In addition, through research and development efforts, Genie has updated the controller software that, in the event of a mis-calibration, prevents machine instability. The following four updates to the control system software are discussed below. These changes update the calibration and operation of the secondary boom angle sensor.”

Source location

2014-0246-Response-by-Genie
Page 1 · response
Published 30 May 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement updated Z135/70 controller software that detects mis-calibration, faults the machine into a stable safe position, and prevents further boom extension.

Verbatim wording from the response

“On 29th July 2013, Genie issued a mandatory Safety Notice that requires all Z135/70 owners to remove their machines from service and to confirm that the secondary boom angle sensor on all machines is calibrated correctly before returning the machines to service in accordance with the procedure set out in the Safety Notice. A copy of the Safety Notice is attached hereto. In addition, through research and development efforts, Genie has updated the controller software that, in the event of a mis-calibration, prevents machine instability. The following four updates to the control system software are discussed below. These changes update the calibration and operation of the secondary boom angle sensor.”

Source location

2014-0246-Response-by-Genie
Page 1 · response
Published 30 May 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Make the updated software available to all Z135/70 owners and issue a Service Advisory recommending installation in specified circumstances.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Genie requires operators to conduct a pre-operation function test from the ground controls before entering the platform. Any errors in calibration or machine faults will be detected during this inspection. However, in the event of a fault during operation from the platform, certain machine functions will remain active, allowing the operator to lower the platform safely. Genie began installing the updated software on the Z-135/70 manufacturing line on 1st April 2014. As of 14th July 2014, Genie has made this updated software available to all Z135/70 owners. On the 14th July 2014, Genie issued a Service Advisory to all Z135/70 owners. This advisory advises owners to install the software in a number of situations including when the secondary boom angle sensor needs to be calibrated for any reason. A copy of the Service Advisory is attached hereto.”

Source location

2014-0246-Response-by-Genie
Page 2 · response
Published 30 May 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The accident resulted from mis-calibration, and the proposed switch would not prevent mis-calibration or the resulting instability.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The following is a response to the Regulation 28 Report issued on 30th May 2014. Following the accident on 5th June 2013 at the Kimberly Depot in the United Kingdom, Genie Industries, Inc. conducted a full investigation of the accident. In addition, Genie has thoroughly reviewed and confirmed the design, testing and manufacturing procedures for the Z135/70. Based on the information and data available, Genie believes that the machine became unstable because it was mis-calibrated. These conclusions are consistent with the findings made by ████████”

Source location

2014-0246-Response-by-Genie
Page 1 · response
Published 30 May 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

The proposed switch is unreliable, fails required safety-control standards, and introduces additional calibration complexity.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The proposed switch also adds to complexity and requires an additional, separate calibration procedure. The switch would have to be calibrated after the angle sensors are calibrated.”

Source location

2014-0246-Response-by-Genie
Page 2 · response
Published 30 May 2014

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Updated control software and calibration measures adequately address mis-calibration and prevent machine instability, so further design modifications are unnecessary.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The updated software no longer tolerates an incorrect secondary boom angle calibration. If the machine is mis-calibrated, the software faults the machine out in a stable and safe position as designed. The fault interrupts machine movement automatically and prevents further boom extension eliminating the potential for machine instability.”

Source location

2014-0246-Response-by-Genie
Page 2 · response
Published 30 May 2014

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026