PFD report

Sean DUIGNAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

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Issued 16 Jan 2023•Bedfordshire and Luton

Report record

Published report and response evidence

This page connects the concerns raised in this report with statements found in recipients’ published responses. A link shows a clear evidence connection; it does not assign responsibility.

View original report
Concerns
5

Raised in this report

Recipients
2

Named on the report

Responses found
2

Of 2 recipients

Stated actions
17

Described in responses

Source document

Full report text

This is the full text from the original published report.

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Concerns and recipient responses

Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

Report evidence summary

Concerns raised5

  1. Repeated failure of the armoury access-control system
  2. Lack of effective ongoing monitoring of the armoury access-control system
  3. Failure to communicate armoury access-system failures effectively
Responses linked to these concerns

Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

Actions described in response An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.9

  1. Action

    Monitor Bedfordshire Police’s armoury processes through the 2023–25 police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy inspection programme.

    Stated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue ServicesStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  2. Action

    Ensure a national circular is issued to all forces by 31 March 2023, sharing lessons learned and requesting an auditable review of force armoury access procedures.

    Stated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue ServicesStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  3. Action

    Complete the fieldwork phase of a national thematic inspection of armed policing, including munitions and weapons storage and issue.

    Stated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue ServicesStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 January 2023.

Respondent positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when it does not describe a specific action.2

  1. Position

    Armoury access failures do not create a risk to the public or officers because secure key access remains available.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceDisputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Repeated failure of the armoury access-control system

Wider context from the report

“There was a serious failure by senior management to effectively and safely manage the South Base Armoury. All the base officers who gave evidence before me told me the armoury system, which they referred to as Chronicle, repeatedly and randomly failed. These multiple failures were, according to ████████ not communicated effectively to her. She agreed that she did not herself make any further detailed enquiry instead relying on her Operational Inspector to manage the issue and/or to feed back as appropriate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Lack of effective ongoing monitoring of the armoury access-control system

Wider context from the report

“The computerised system controlling the access to the armoury at South Base included a number of different parts including the server, the software, the Chronicle system itself, the card readers etc. The system as a whole repeatedly failed. There was no effective ongoing monitoring of the system. CI Rowley Smith agreed that the system did not work properly and the monitoring system did not work properly. As part of a fail safe to ensure that officers who needed weapons could obtain them if the computerised system failed, an armoury override key was kept in a locked box, secured by a PIN, in the equipment room. All officers giving evidence before me agreed that the PIN number was common knowledge. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to communicate armoury access-system failures effectively

Wider context from the report

“There was a serious failure by senior management to effectively and safely manage the South Base Armoury. All the base officers who gave evidence before me told me the armoury system, which they referred to as Chronicle, repeatedly and randomly failed. These multiple failures were, according to ████████ not communicated effectively to her. She agreed that she did not herself make any further detailed enquiry instead relying on her Operational Inspector to manage the issue and/or to feed back as appropriate. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to restrict single-person armoury access

Wider context from the report

“Sean, discovering his access to the override key was blocked asked one of the officers to second him into the armoury. By chance, it was ████████ who agreed and went with Sean to the armoury. She had been given single access by error following a Chronicle systems failure some time previously. Sean applied his armoury card to the reader and entered his PIN. It failed ████████ reasonably thought it was because Chronicle had failed again and used her card and PIN. Because she was allowed – incorrectly – single access, the door opened and she let Sean in where he retrieved a handgun and ammunition. Had ████████ any other officer at base known that Sean’s access had been restricted she would not, I am certain, have allowed him entry. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this individual concern was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. Response links show a clear evidence connection; they do not assign responsibility.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Failure to keep the armoury override-key PIN confidential

Wider context from the report

“The computerised system controlling the access to the armoury at South Base included a number of different parts including the server, the software, the Chronicle system itself, the card readers etc. The system as a whole repeatedly failed. There was no effective ongoing monitoring of the system. CI Rowley Smith agreed that the system did not work properly and the monitoring system did not work properly. As part of a fail safe to ensure that officers who needed weapons could obtain them if the computerised system failed, an armoury override key was kept in a locked box, secured by a PIN, in the equipment room. All officers giving evidence before me agreed that the PIN number was common knowledge. ”

Is this part of a recurring concern?

No recurring-concern membership is currently published.

Open source report

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Monitor Bedfordshire Police’s armoury processes through the 2023–25 police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy inspection programme.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Further to the inspection work, I intend to take the following action:”

Source location

Response from HMICFRS
Page 2 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Ensure a national circular is issued to all forces by 31 March 2023, sharing lessons learned and requesting an auditable review of force armoury access procedures.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Further to the inspection work, I intend to take the following action:”

Source location

Response from HMICFRS
Page 2 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete the fieldwork phase of a national thematic inspection of armed policing, including munitions and weapons storage and issue.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Coincidentally, under the leadership of my colleague, His Majesty’s Inspector ████████, HMICFRS has very recently completed the fieldwork phase of a national thematic inspection of armed policing. The terms of reference for that inspection include elements of munitions and weapons storage and issue. We did not specifically test armoury access. The inspection visited nine forces; Bedfordshire wasn’t one of these.”

Source location

Response from HMICFRS
Page 2 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Work with ICT and JML to improve southern-base armoury hardware reliability and monitoring, tracking residual issues to resolution.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Whilst we do continue to have ICT challenges where officers are on occasion refused access to the armoury, we now have robust measures in place that ensure these are recorded, effectively managed, and follow an escalation process through to resolution. The backup armoury key safe code is only known to the Bedfordshire control room inspector and the Operations Superintendent, so whilst failures are frustrating for officers there is no risk to the public or workforce.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Control emergency armoury access through restricted code knowledge, two-officer confirmation, direct requests, and immediate code changes after use.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The access issue as detailed focused on single access as addressed in point 1 above. Access can also be granted via the emergency access function should either the door access fail or due to an overall power failure.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 3 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Restrict single armoury access to authorised roles, communicate the restrictions, record them in procedures, and review access levels monthly.

Verbatim wording from the response

“A review of armoury access was commissioned by the Operations Superintendent on 3 June 2021 which found that two officers within the unit had incorrect access, and this was rectified immediately. The IOPC report of 28 June 2021 also highlighted this (see appendix 1).”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 1 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Record Chronicle access outages and operate an escalation process involving ICT and JML to monitor and resolve system failures.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Following the death of Sgt Duignan, the access code for the emergency access at the southern base was reviewed and amended so that only the Force Incident Manager, stationed at Bedfordshire Police Headquarters, and the Superintendent of Specialist Operations were aware of the code. Any requirement for use would necessitate a request directly to the Force Incident Manager and confirmation of the presence of a second officer. Following use of the code, it would be changed immediately by the Superintendent or the Chief Superintendent in their absence. Since the introduction of the armoury access outage recording process on 11 November 2022 there have been 15 access issues identified.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 3 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement a USB-related system fix to prevent associated armoury-access outages.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We have also introduced a specific escalation process should any difficulties be found in our use of Chronicle. This increases our ability to monitor the effective functioning of the systems and processes, including the escalation to ICT and JML. These have been reviewed, introduced and are now well-embedded across the unit to ensure that any impasses are easily identified and strictly monitored. As access failures referred to above identify, there are still problems with the computer hardware, specifically in relation to USB ports, these are being addressed by ICT and JML. A USB fix was implemented on the 24 February 2023, since that date there has been no related outages. Access failures do not result in any risk to the public or officers. Access to the armoury can be carried out via keys through the secure and managed process outlined above.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 4 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Increase CCTV coverage across BCH armouries, monitor site connectivity, and improve officers', supervisors' and ICT staff's Chronicle knowledge.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This escalation process was part of the work completed in conjunction with JML and BCH ICT following the inquest. This included:”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 4 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Armoury access failures do not create a risk to the public or officers because secure key access remains available.

Verbatim wording from the response

“We have also introduced a specific escalation process should any difficulties be found in our use of Chronicle. This increases our ability to monitor the effective functioning of the systems and processes, including the escalation to ICT and JML. These have been reviewed, introduced and are now well-embedded across the unit to ensure that any impasses are easily identified and strictly monitored. As access failures referred to above identify, there are still problems with the computer hardware, specifically in relation to USB ports, these are being addressed by ICT and JML. A USB fix was implemented on the 24 February 2023, since that date there has been no related outages. Access failures do not result in any risk to the public or officers. Access to the armoury can be carried out via keys through the secure and managed process outlined above.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 4 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Recorded access failures, escalation procedures and restricted backup key access are considered sufficient to manage armoury access problems.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Whilst we do continue to have ICT challenges where officers are on occasion refused access to the armoury, we now have robust measures in place that ensure these are recorded, effectively managed, and follow an escalation process through to resolution. The backup armoury key safe code is only known to the Bedfordshire control room inspector and the Operations Superintendent, so whilst failures are frustrating for officers there is no risk to the public or workforce.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Other statements in published responses

These actions and other statements could not be clearly connected to one concern in this report.

Recipient-stated actions An action is something a recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to a concern raised.8

  1. 1

    Publish the national armed policing inspection report, including findings and recommendations on force armouries.

    Stated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue ServicesStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  2. 2

    Monitor Bedfordshire Police’s armoury processes through the 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme.

    Stated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue ServicesStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  3. 3

    Email all armoury-access officers when an individual's access is removed, and brief officers and commanders on the decision.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  4. 4

    Operate daily and monthly management meetings to review staffing, safety, operational and armoury-access issues and escalate unresolved matters.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  5. 5

    Maintain armoury security through documented procedures, risk assessments, and scheduled health-and-safety and senior-responsible-person inspections.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  6. 6

    Implement the remaining three changes arising from the College of Policing's northern-base feedback.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceStated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  7. 7

    Install CCTV at the new south-base premises when the premises contract and build are completed.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceStated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 January 2023.
  8. 8

    Complete a comprehensive review of armed-policing risk assessments with the tri-force Health and Safety department.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceStated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 January 2023.

Recipient positions A position is what a recipient says about a concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

  1. 1

    Existing procedures, policies and processes at the Luton firearms base are considered sufficient to keep officers safe.

    Stated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue ServicesExisting arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.
  2. 2

    CCTV installation is currently prevented because the south base is shared with users outside policing, pending new premises.

    Stated by Bedfordshire PoliceUnable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Publish the national armed policing inspection report, including findings and recommendations on force armouries.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Coincidentally, under the leadership of my colleague, His Majesty’s Inspector ████████, HMICFRS has very recently completed the fieldwork phase of a national thematic inspection of armed policing. The terms of reference for that inspection include elements of munitions and weapons storage and issue. We did not specifically test armoury access. The inspection visited nine forces; Bedfordshire wasn’t one of these.”

Source location

Response from HMICFRS
Page 2 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Monitor Bedfordshire Police’s armoury processes through the 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme.

Verbatim wording from the response

“I am writing to provide you with an update on my letter dated 31 January 2023. In this letter to you, I said I would instruct my team to monitor Bedfordshire Police’s armoury processes. This was as part of the HMICFRS police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy (PEEL) inspection programme 2023–25.”

Source location

Response from HMICFRS
Page 1 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Email all armoury-access officers when an individual's access is removed, and brief officers and commanders on the decision.

Verbatim wording from the response

“This was rectified following Sgt Duignan’s death. On 28 June 2021 we introduced a standard email which is sent to all officers with armoury access, advising of individuals who have had their armoury access removed. The most recent example of a teamwide authority email was sent by the base inspector on 9 January 2023 (see Appendix 3). Since the introduction of this process the armed policing management team have sent 15 such emails. Whilst this is a balance of privacy against safety, safety must be the overriding factor. This was a recommendation of the original College of Policing report (see Appendix 2).”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 2 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Operate daily and monthly management meetings to review staffing, safety, operational and armoury-access issues and escalate unresolved matters.

Verbatim wording from the response

“Following the death of Sgt Duignan and the subsequent coronial process, communication between managers and armed officers has been brought into sharp focus. Significant steps have been taken to enhance the security provision regarding armoury access, the communication to officers and the governance that supports this updated operating model.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 2 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Maintain armoury security through documented procedures, risk assessments, and scheduled health-and-safety and senior-responsible-person inspections.

Verbatim wording from the response

“The safety of the public and our people is paramount which is why the security surrounding armoury access at the base is of a high standard. All our security enhancement actions following the death of Sgt Duignan are captured within the Armed Policing Unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and have been communicated to all officers in the unit.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 4 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Implement the remaining three changes arising from the College of Policing's northern-base feedback.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As detailed in the letter from HMICFRS dated 31 January 2023, armouries within Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire will be specifically included within their next set of inspections over the next two years.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Install CCTV at the new south-base premises when the premises contract and build are completed.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As detailed in the letter from HMICFRS dated 31 January 2023, armouries within Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire will be specifically included within their next set of inspections over the next two years.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Complete a comprehensive review of armed-policing risk assessments with the tri-force Health and Safety department.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In conjunction with the tri force Health and Safety department, we have also carried out a comprehensive and in-depth review of all those armed policing-related risk assessments.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 4 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

Existing procedures, policies and processes at the Luton firearms base are considered sufficient to keep officers safe.

Verbatim wording from the response

“In conclusion, I am satisfied that the firearms base at Luton airport is managed correctly. It has the correct procedures, policies and processes in place to keep officers safe while on the site. I am pleased to report positively on the force’s efforts to improve. They take all reasonable steps to continually improve the safety and well-being of their officers.”

Source location

Response from HMICFRS
Page 3 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response

Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation

CCTV installation is currently prevented because the south base is shared with users outside policing, pending new premises.

Verbatim wording from the response

“As detailed in the letter from HMICFRS dated 31 January 2023, armouries within Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire will be specifically included within their next set of inspections over the next two years.”

Source location

Response from Bedfordshire Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 January 2023

Open published response
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Information checked against the published report and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Official responses located
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Data last updated 7 September 2026