Investigation and inquest
On 4 May 2020 an investigation into the death of Fraser William Moore, aged 25, was opened. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 15 December 2022. The conclusion of the inquest, heard before a jury was the "inappropriate handcuffing, his unnecessary arrest, inadequate supervision of his arrest and the failing to prevent his escape." He escaped firstly onto the station concourse and then onto the railway lines at London Bridge Station.
The medical cause of death was 1a. Electrocution, 1b. Contact with live rail.
Circumstances of the death
On 25 March 2020 Mr Moore had been arrested, handcuffed and was present in a carriage. He managed to exit one of the carriage doors, which was unattended and fled onto the platform. After running for a short period of time firstly up and then down the platform by moving down one side of the concourse to the other, he was running towards the country end at London Bridge Hospital. He proceeded to jump onto the track whilst still within the platform area before continuing out of the platform area towards the country. He was followed by a BTP officer. The rails were still live. The calling for the lines to be isolated occurring about the same time that maters were picked up by the signalman. Sadly, he made contact with the live rail before power could be severed. Subsequently, after the power switched off and assistance to move to his location, some distance from the platforms, he was pronounced dead at the scene.
Coroner’s concerns
The CCTV coverage/ footage ends at the end of the station concourse on both the city and country ends. Station footage does not get sent to Route Control. On a risk-based review, the chances of incidents happening in a busy cosmopolitan station must, by footfall and surrounding populations alone, increase the risk of an event. An event that should then be looked at. In order to look at an event, I accept that current CCTV is in place within the station confines but for these stations, I do not consider that I have received sufficient evidence to persuade me that the footages should not be available immediately to the Route Control Rooms or that the coverage should not extend up or down line beyond the end of the platforms.