Recurring concern

Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a formal organisational safety-incident or serious-incident management framework, including incident identification, grading, coordination, investigation, monitoring and control.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing corrective actions after incident learning has already been established.
  • Excludes generic organisational learning, governance or incident-reporting deficiencies where no serious-incident management process is identified.
  • Excludes the underlying clinical or operational hazard and failures in ordinary care that are not part of serious-incident management.
  • Excludes investigations concerning deaths, complaints, crime or regulatory matters where the reported concern is not the management of a serious or untoward incident.
  • Excludes operational emergency-response, rescue and event-planning protocols that are not part of a formal organisational safety-incident management framework.
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
129

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
182

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care16
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
NHS England10
Care Quality Commission9
Barts Health NHS Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
East London NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
General Medical Council2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan was found deceased on 27 March 2019 while a voluntary psychiatric patient at St Charles Hospital, after leaving the hospital unescorted and failing to return. The principal concerns were failures to update his self-harm risk assessment, formulate a care and treatment plan, document unescorted leave, and promptly notify police when he did not return. The report also raised concerns that the hospital’s serious incident investigation did not identify or investigate these issues adequately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident Investigations to investigate missing records and interview relevant witnesses

    Wider context from the report

    “2) My second concern is the poor contemporaneous documentation of the grant of unescorted leave from the hospital and the time taken to alert the police when Daniel failed to return on 26/3/19 by 21:00 pm. A ward nurse eventually contacted the police after midnight. i) I am concerned that an earlier call to the police may have prevented the death, because Daniel was recorded on General Security Zone (GSZ) cameras at 22:21 leaving Vauxhall bridge, and returning, on foot at 23:48. An earlier call might have enabled police to intervene before he was able to commence the actions which ended his life. ii) The ward manager claimed in evidence that he had instructed others to call the police when Daniel failed to return at 21:00. However, this was not documented anywhere in the medical records and a leave book with handwritten entries went missing after the death. The missing leave book was not investigated by the SII. iii) A nurse who called the police, sometime before 00:30 according to the medical records, at 01:10 according to police records, was not interviewed by the SII. I found these investigative deficits troubling because the learning of lessons in patient care depends, in part, on an early SII by the hospital concerned so that risks to patient safety can be identified to enable recommendations and improvements long before an inquest conclusion. The delay in reporting the failure to return to the Ward was a factor that contributed to the dangerous situation already created by rescinding s.2. I am nonetheless concerned that, in general, psychiatric patients being tested on voluntary leave are a vulnerable group and as such failures to return should be reported with expedition not only because they may be a danger to themselves, but also due to a risk of being preyed upon by others. ”

    Source location

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident Investigations to investigate care and treatment plan deficiencies and make recommendations

    Wider context from the report

    “1) On completion of the inquest, I found the decision to rescind detention under s.2 on 25/3/19 was undermined in two essential respects: a) A failure to update a suicide self-harm risk assessment. b) A failure to formulate a Care and Treatment plan identifying core treatment needs. A Serious Incident Investigation (SII), commissioned by CNWL, completed on 9/9/2019, investigated the Risk Assessment and made recommendations which I heard from a CNWL witness had subsequently been implemented and I am satisfied that his risk to life has been satisfactorily reduced. However, I remain concerned that the Care and Treatment plan aspect was not identified by the SII and as such no recommendations were identified and followed up. The psychiatrist who rescinded s.2, on 25/3/2019, was unable to participate in the inquest through illness. As a result, I instructed an independent expert psychiatrist who gave evidence that there had been no treatment plan addressing Daniel’s core treatment needs. The core treatment needs were that Daniel required antipsychotic medication to control his delusional beliefs and psychological intervention to address his substance misuse which exacerbated his delusional beliefs. The expert also identified from statements and medical records that Daniel lacked insight into his mental health conditions and thereby lacked capacity. The treatment Daniel required was twofold. Assertive treatment of the delusional disorder with antipsychotics, whilst detained under s.2, to achieve stability, coupled with psychological therapy to address the illicit drug use. I heard evidence that antipsychotics could not commence until the results of liver function tests were available, but this did not persuade the expert, that recession of s.2 was correct. The psychiatrist who rescinded s.2 on 25/3/19 was interviewed by the SII but the care and treatment plan aspect was not explored by that investigation. My concern is that failures in the formulation of a Care and Treatment Plan made a significant contribution to the death and this failing was not exposed until the inquest when it could have been identified much earlier by the SII in September 2019. The fact that a Care and Treatment plan was not formulated gives me concern that the mistake could be repeated in future and my concern is compounded by the SII failing to investigate and make recommendations arising from this issue. ”

    Source location

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Accredit the serious incident review process through SIRAN, revising policies, templates and review arrangements to meet best practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the beginning of 2020, the Trust sought to incorporate best practice in its management of serious incidents, which would result in improvement and effectiveness of the process and evidenced through Accreditation. Following several months of readiness activity including auditing and self-evaluation, workshops with Divisional representatives, implementation of agreed actions, revision of templates and redrafting of our policy, we succeeded through SIRAN. At the time of the changes, the Trust also introduced a forum to support reviewers/investigators of serious incidents to enhance understanding of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) process.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide RCA methodology training to staff and establish a forum supporting serious-incident reviewers and investigators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the beginning of 2020, the Trust sought to incorporate best practice in its management of serious incidents, which would result in improvement and effectiveness of the process and evidenced through Accreditation. Following several months of readiness activity including auditing and self-evaluation, workshops with Divisional representatives, implementation of agreed actions, revision of templates and redrafting of our policy, we succeeded through SIRAN. At the time of the changes, the Trust also introduced a forum to support reviewers/investigators of serious incidents to enhance understanding of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) process.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a dedicated serious incident review post in the incident division.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the specific issue of skills and competency to undertake reviews/investigations, 88 members of staff have been trained in RCA methodology in the last 2 years (since 2020). This methodology equips reviewers with the skill to probe and draw out care and service delivery problems and guides them to elicit lessons. In addition, the Division in which the incident occurred now has a dedicated serious incident review post, offering additional skills and support in this process.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce Advanced Clinical Practitioners to support care planning, risk management and identification of Care and Treatment Plan deficiencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, St Charles Mental Health Unit has recruited and trained Advanced Clinical Practitioners (ACPs). One of the roles of the ACP is to support the MDT and in particular the nursing team with specific interventions, care planning and risk management. This includes reviewing the Care and Treatment Plan and highlighting any deficiencies.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework through a fortnightly working group and human-factors education incorporating learning from this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In August 2022, NHS England launched the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), which NHS organisations are expected to implement over the next year. This new framework phases out the RCA methodology, introducing human factors and system-based approaches instead. As rolling out of human factors training had already commenced in the Trust prior to publication of the new framework, the Trust is ahead in its preparations in this regard. A working group is in place and meeting fortnightly to drive implementation of the new process. Education is a significant part of this work and training procured will take learning from this case into account.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response
  2. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Francis Heffron, a 50-year-old wheelchair user, was found confused in his flat and later suffered a cardiac arrest while alone in an A&E cubicle. There was a delay in initiating CPR, including delays in making a crash call and ascertaining his DNAR status; he was resuscitated but sustained a hypoxic brain injury and died in hospital. The concerns included bank and agency nursing staff’s familiarity with emergency procedures, training and induction, and the adequacy and independence of the Trust’s investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain timely and adequate evidence during serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess workload and staffing levels in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure serious incident investigations are conducted by suitably trained and experienced investigators

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure serious incident investigations are conducted independently

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the Emergency Department senior nursing team with a memory-capture tool to promote prompt, consistent incident recording and formalise evidence gathering.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to your observations regarding the chronology of events it is noted that the incident summary in the investigation report does contain an outline chronology of events. It is acknowledged that it would have been helpful if this had contained more detail in regard to the time of the doctor’s attendance and if the report had been supported by notes of discussion with relevant staff. The Trust’s Investigation Procedure includes a range of tools and templates to assist staff when conducting investigations and whilst use of these is actively encouraged, it is not mandated. In response to the specific concerns raised about the investigation of this incident, the Trust has provided the ED senior nursing team with a memory capture tool to promote prompt and consistent recording of staff involvement in incidents and to formalise the evidence gathering stage of the investigation.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train staff conducting Patient Safety Incident Response Framework reviews, with ongoing support and updating sessions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will be aware from previous discussions that the Trust has been a pilot site for the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) which will replace the current Serious Incident Framework. It represents a significant shift in the way the NHS responds to patient safety incidents. The PSIRF promotes a range of system-based approaches for learning from patient safety incidents and national tools and guides have been produced to support this.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver bespoke Patient Safety Incident Response Framework documentation sessions for Urgent Care senior staff with the Risk Management team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a pilot site the Trust has had the opportunity to trial the new approaches and better understand the training requirements that will need to be delivered. All Trust staff charged with undertaking reviews under the new framework will receive training in how to conduct and record them. Support and advice, and regular updating sessions, will also be provided. The Urgent Care CSU has planned some bespoke sessions for their senior staff with the Trust’s Risk Management team to complete training in relation to the new investigation documentation. This will help ensure that learning from incidents is maximised and documentation is completed to a high standard.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that CPR was delayed for 15 minutes, stating that it began within 30 to 60 seconds of the patient being found.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(1) The Trust acknowledges that there was a delay in CPR being commenced after the patient had been found in an unresponsive condition and there were discrepancies in the evidence for the inquest about timings. However, the senior sister stands by the account that she gave in court i.e., that she had been contacted at 01.15am, after the doctor had been approached, and that she attended immediately after the call to her, by which time CPR was being undertaken. In her statement for the inquest, she explained that her discussions with the relevant team members afterwards indicated that CPR had been started within 30 to 60 seconds of the patient being found. The Trust understands that it was Dr Binbay’s recollection that she had been contacted at 01.30am however this was not supported by other staff members.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A fully independent investigation was not required because the incident was locally investigated under procedures reserving complete independence for serious incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(7) The investigation into the care provided to this patient was not a Serious Incident (level 3) within the terms of NHSE’s Serious Incident Framework. Within the Trust there is a grading process to decide which incidents will be fully investigated. There are three main considerations when making this decision:”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jade Michelle Hart died on 9 July 2018 after giving birth, following a uterine inversion caused by inappropriate management of the third stage of labour. She suffered massive uterine haemorrhage and multiple cardiac arrests, with delayed recognition and management of the bleeding, and the inquest concluded that her death was contributed to by neglect. The report raised concerns about the Trust’s serious incident investigation and insufficient support for newly appointed obstetric consultants.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain timely written accounts and interviews from key staff in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include and properly weight family evidence in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly consider commissioned expert evidence in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a memory-capture document in DATIX alongside immediate interviews and written statements, and reinforce its use across teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Furthermore, the Trust recognises how vital it is to document factual accounts of events at the earliest opportunity and that this should be done without delay. When an incident occurs within the organisation, this is immediately scoped which includes requesting a recollection of the event from all staff involved in the incident. To support this process, a memory capture document (please see attached) was developed and is accessible on the Trust’s Incident Reporting System (DATIX) for ease of access and is utilised in addition to undertaking initial interviews and obtaining factual accounts in the form of written statements.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Involve families directly in investigations and include their recollections and concerns, with supporting evidence, in reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• we now involve families more directly and incorporate comments from families within investigation reports. A family’s recollection of events along with the clinicians’ recollection of events are both included to enable the author to draw reasonable conclusions based on the available evidence. Recollections may differ and reports will display these differences, balance any supportive evidence, and draw conclusions over the most likely description of events. There is expected to be evidence included to support the rationale for the conclusion.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reference commissioned expert opinions in investigation reports and record reasons when an opinion is not reconciled with the evidence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above, where an expert opinion is sought for the purposes of a Serious Investigation, it will now always be referenced within the report. Where the authors of the investigation report determine that the expert opinion provided cannot be reconciled with the evidence obtained through interviews and within statements, then the rationale for that determination will be included within the report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HSIB could not support the requested investigation because its northern branch had not yet been established and operations were limited to southern England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can assure you that incidents of this kind are no longer investigated by the Trust and are now escalated to the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) to carry out the investigation. As stated in the evidence provided in the inquest by ████████, Executive Medical Director, the Trust did approach HSIB shortly after the incident to request their involvement. However, they were unable to support us at that time, as their northern branch had not been established and they were only operating in the South of England.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The external expert opinion was not relied upon because it conflicted with subsequently gathered evidence and was considered less informed than staff accounts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust took the decision to seek an early external opinion for this case to ensure the investigation was both robust and comprehensive. We initially approached the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to ask them to conduct a review. They declined to do so, but were able to suggest the names of people who could assist and review the case, including ████████. We therefore approached ████████ who was provided with copies of the clinical records. We are mindful that clinical opinions can vary significantly, however the conclusion of ████████ report was at odds with the emerging evidence that we were subsequently gathering through the interviews and statements of”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response
  4. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Graham Edgar White · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Graham Edgar White was treated for a ureteric stone in November 2019 with an antegrade ureteric stent intended for temporary use. The stent remained in place for 20 months despite deterioration observed on multiple occasions, and was removed after he developed a urinary tract infection and right perinephric abscess. He developed sepsis and died in hospital on 18 August 2021. Concerns included the absence of a stent registry for monitoring and recall, uncertainty about other patients at risk, and delayed identification of the death as a serious incident.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and escalate deaths through governance procedures as serious incidents for investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Trust did not successfully identify and escalate this death through its governance procedures as a serious incident for investigation until the issue was raised by the Coroner. ”

    Source location

    Mr Graham Edgar White · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review governance procedures for detecting potential incidents and emphasise internal incident reporting within clinical divisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the Coroner’s concern around the Trust’s delay in identifying this as a serious incident for investigation, whilst a serious incident report was completed, which has resulted in key actions and recommendations described above, that process should have commenced at an earlier stage and in accordance with the BHRUT’s own governance procedures. BHRUT has reviewed its governance procedures for the detection of potential incidents and via the Quality and Safety Team, the need to internally report incidents has been emphasised within the Divisions. In addition, BHRUT has introduced incident reporting of all new inquests to formalise divisional review, with the aim of capturing any incidents that may not have been incident reported prior to the opening of an inquest.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce incident reporting for all new inquests to formalise divisional review and identify previously unreported incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the Coroner’s concern around the Trust’s delay in identifying this as a serious incident for investigation, whilst a serious incident report was completed, which has resulted in key actions and recommendations described above, that process should have commenced at an earlier stage and in accordance with the BHRUT’s own governance procedures. BHRUT has reviewed its governance procedures for the detection of potential incidents and via the Quality and Safety Team, the need to internally report incidents has been emphasised within the Divisions. In addition, BHRUT has introduced incident reporting of all new inquests to formalise divisional review, with the aim of capturing any incidents that may not have been incident reported prior to the opening of an inquest.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delayed stent removal should largely be addressed through individual NHS trust clinical governance systems, led by trust medical directors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Importantly, we feel that clarity is needed with regard to “ownership” of the delayed stent removal issue, in particular as to which parts of the NHS should be taking a lead going forward. As an example of this, we feel that a large part of the issue is fundamentally one that should sit within individual trust clinical governance systems and yet there are no recommendations for action by trust medical directors in the HSIB report.”

    Source location

    Response from BAUS HSIB
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response
  5. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Bernard Hendley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Bernard Hendley, who had lymphoma and recent lung infection and pulmonary embolism, developed a severe rash most likely caused by Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and died in hospital on 23 January 2022 after maximal treatment. The report identified concerns about delays in medical assessment and treatment, failure to escalate significant blood-test results, lack of specialist dermatology input and prognostic scoring, and the robustness of systems for monitoring and supporting severely ill patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of mortality and harm review to identify the need for a Serious Incident Review

    Wider context from the report

    “7) I was shown a “Mortality and Harm Review Tool” completed in May which concluded that “care was good and decisions sound”, and that there was no need for a Serious Incident Review. I stated in court that I completely rejected this. I did however note and am pleased that ████████ is producing an educational programme and Standard operating procedure for SJS/TENS. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Bernard Hendley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Shona Christine Michaela Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shona Christine Michaela Campbell, a detained psychiatric patient with a history of self-harm and repeated ligature incidents, was found in cardiac arrest after using a ligature on 12 January 2019 and died in hospital on 14 February 2019. The principal concerns included incomplete and inaccurate clinical and observation records, inadequate communication, patients’ access to ligatures, insufficiently developed risk-management plans, training and staffing deficiencies, and shortcomings in the serious incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigations to obtain relevant information and make additional enquiries

    Wider context from the report

    “10. The opportunities missed by the Safety Matters Ltd Serious Incident Investigation report process to obtain other relevant information and/or make additional enquiries which could affect the overall findings and recommendations for learning, improving practice and procedures as well as patient safety. This will also help improve other investigations that the authors of the report may do in the future. ”

    Source location

    Shona Christine Michaela Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Holmes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Holmes, who had advanced metastatic prostate cancer and congestive cardiac failure, was admitted to hospital with several acute problems and fell while attempting to get out of bed. He sustained a left hip fracture requiring surgery and died after developing vomiting and signs of a chest infection. Concerns included errors in the Trust’s Root Cause Analysis, inadequate formal examination of issues including patient call-bells and delays in obtaining specialist advice, and the grading of the fall’s harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to revisit patient safety incident harm grading

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Notwithstanding the fact that the document had passed through the Trust’s quality assurance process, it is a matter of concern that the Root Cause Analysis investigation into the circumstances of Mr Holmes’s fall contained a number of basic and obvious errors. Prompt, rigorous and effective investigations of clinical incidents are essential to deriving learning and improving patient safety, thereby reducing the risk of future deaths; 2. The formal learning derived from the Trust’s investigation (in the form of an Action Plan to the Root Cause Analysis) does not appear to take into account the breadth of issues raised by the case and which were apparent to the Trust from complaints correspondence and statements obtained from staff in advance of the inquest. As such, the Trust does not appear to have taken the opportunity to formally examine and critically analyse key issues such as: • the adequacy of existing processes designed to ensure patient call-bells are working at all times; and • why a delay has occurred in obtaining advice from a specialist hospital in the present case and whether the processes by which such advice is obtained are fit for purpose. 3. Connected with the above, the Trust does not appear to have revisited the grading of “moderate” harm originally assigned to Mr Holmes’s fall on the Acute Medical Unit notwithstanding his death being reported to the Coroner on the basis there was reason to suspect it contributed to his death. The court heard evidence to the effect that this grading informs the nature and extent of investigation which arises from a patient safety incident (thus impacting upon the learning which can be derived from such an incident). ”

    Source location

    Derek Holmes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement strengthened inquest triage with seven-day clinical review, investigation review, communication and delay monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To provide an additional safety net in this process, the Trust has also taken steps to amend and improve the triage system for newly listed inquests. In the context of the recent letter HM Senior Coroner received from Mr Richard Jolly of Weightmans LLP, in relation to the provision of our inhouse legal team, processes have been reinvigorated to ensure triage, review and instruction sent out to clinicians within seven days of the initial inquest request.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a full-time clinical staff member to support the strengthened inquest triage and review process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the new process, a clinical review of the case and a review of any previous investigations is also performed at the outset where we are able, in order to identify any linked actions. This process would allow for the revisiting of levels of harm for individual incidents to ensure that this is appropriate, with advice from the specialist teams. There is also the addition of a full time clinical member of staff to support this process moving forward, and a more rigorous review system to capture potential delays. The Trust has started to implement this process ensuring communication is maintained with HM Coroner throughout.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 September 2022

    Open published response
  8. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Donald Gore · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Donald Gore acquired a Mycobacterium Chimaera infection during open-heart surgery in November 2016 and died after a prolonged delay in diagnosis. The report describes failures to communicate and recognise the infection risk, delays in testing, and treatment for misdiagnosed sarcoidosis. It also raises concerns that the investigation into the incident was inadequate and was not disclosed to the Coroner’s office.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate investigation of incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence demonstrated that the General Practitioner to whom Mr Gore first presented with symptoms on 3.11.17 did not read the alert regarding the risk of Mycobacterium Chimaera infection contained in his GP records, entered in March 2017 further to a letter sent to the practice by the cardiac surgery department. The investigation in response to this is summarised in a document headed “Proforma for completion at SEA/adverse incident meeting” dated 14.1.19. My concerns are - 1. The investigation in response to this incident summarised in that document – a) Does not conform to the usual detail and format of such investigations (eg a Root Cause Analysis), and b) Appeared inadequate; (In addition the investigation and document, or even their existence, were not disclosed to the Coroner’s office despite three GP statements/reports from your practice being requested and provided in the preparation for the Inquest, only being revealed in the course of oral evidence from the GP during the course of the Inquest). ”

    Source location

    Donald Gore · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a second significant event analysis using the revised investigation system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Additionally, the surgery has completed a second SEA process on the 18th July 2022 regarding this incident. This is attached and has identified the following:”

    Source location

    Response from Air Balloon Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appoint an independent external GP and appraiser to scrutinise incident records, investigation processes and significant event analyses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The surgery is fully committed to openness and promoting a learning and improving culture. We have carefully considered the benefits of external scrutiny to help us see beyond any “organisational blind spots” and have appointed an experienced objective external GP and GP Appraiser, who has never worked for the surgery and has knowledge of local systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Air Balloon Surgery
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a root cause analysis with detailed risk assessment to identify safety actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Undertaken a Root Cause Analysis – attached. This has included a detailed risk assessment showing how rare this infection is and has helped to identify actions for the surgery.”

    Source location

    Response from Air Balloon Surgery
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and use a new significant event analysis policy and documentation process for future investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Produced a new SEA policy and documentation process. CQC have been given a copy. We feel our new policy and documentation is robust and will result in a better investigation, including risk assessing, analysis, outcome, and written record.”

    Source location

    Response from Air Balloon Surgery
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the new significant event analysis system at the practice board meeting after its further use in August.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. The surgery has used this new system for the repeat SEA conducted on this case on the 18th July 2022. Attached. We will continue to use it for a further SEA meeting planned in August, where other SEA issues are being discussed. The practice board will then review at its meeting in August to assess if it is fit for purpose.”

    Source location

    Response from Air Balloon Surgery
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Significant event analysis broadly met CQC requirements; root cause analysis is not specifically required and is not generally used in general practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. We have reviewed what our regulatory body- CQC- required in terms of investigation and managing incidents. This indicated that the main approach is SEA. GP mythbuster 3: Significant event analysis (SEA) – Care Quality Commission (cqc.org.uk) There is no specific mention of Root Cause Analysis on the website and this is not a technique which is generally used in general practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Air Balloon Surgery
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Jack HURN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Hurn, aged 26, died after developing vaccine-induced immune thrombocytopenia and thrombosis with cerebral venous sinus thrombosis following an AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccination. Concerns included the absence or non-use of guidance and pathways for timely specialist management of VITT, aspects of his care at Alexandra Hospital, and the apparent inadequacy of the investigation into his care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigations to identify relevant guidance and explain departures from it

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Level Two Comprehensive Investigation of the Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust ("WAH") concluded the root cause of Jack's death was: "There was no official national guidance and no approved Trust guidance on managing VITT in place at the time this patient was admitted to AGH, therefore staff are unlikely to have been aware of the time-critical need to transfer the patient to a specialist centre (QEHB)." The following care and service delivery problems were identified: “There was no written Trust or national guidance on managing VITT at the time the patient was admitted, therefore staff are unlikely to have been aware of the time-critical need to transfer the patient to a specialist centre (QEHB).” The following Contributory factors were identified: - The Neurosurgical team at QEHB were contacted for advice; had the Trust VITT guidance been in place at the time, it would have stipulated not to contact the Neurosurgical team, but instead to contact Haematology and Neurology at QEHB. - The Neurosurgical team at QEHB advised to continue medical management locally (at WAHT). - Had the Trust VITT guidance been in place at the time, the WAHT Haematologist would have been prompted to contact their counterpart Haematologist at QEHB which may have accelerated the process of transfer; this did not happen until the day after the patient’s admission. 2. Within the course of the evidence at the inquest it was identified that, whilst there was no NICE Guidance or a local policy at WAH, there was a number of publications on the management of VITT and patients presenting with complications post Astra Zeneca Vaccination: i. Guidance from the Expert Haematology Panel (EHP) on Covid-19 Vaccine-induced Immune Thrombocytopenia and Thrombosis (VITT) 28th May 2021 ii. Joint guidance from the Royal College of Emergency medicine, the Society for Acute Medicine and the Royal College of Physicians ‘Management of patients presenting to the Emergency Department/ Acute Medicine with symptoms 5-42 days post Astra Zeneca vaccine’ 24th May 2021 iii. 'Management of Cerebral Venous Sinus Thrombosis following COVID-19 vaccination. A neurosurgical guide.' from the British Society of Neurological Surgeons 19th April 2021 3. Evidence also identified that the University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust had also put in place a Regional VITT Pathway that was communicated to Haematologists and Neurologists across the region in March 2021. Prior to Jack's admission to the Alexandra Hospital on the 8ᵗʰ June 2021 4 patients had been transferred from the WAH to the QEH under the pathway including 1 patient from the Alexandra Hospital. 4. The WAH investigation did not identify the above guidance or Pathway and did not provide any explanation of why they were not followed in Jack's case. 5. Concerns were raised in the management of Jack's care whilst at the Alexandra Hospital, in particular the emergency department decision to refer to the medical and not neurology team, the level of observations whilst on ward 11 and the fact that family were reporting a concern that Jack was deteriorating during the afternoon of the 9ᵗʰ June 2021. The WAH investigation report does not record that these matters (or any other aspect of clinical care) were investigated, the conclusions reached or the basis for those conclusions. 6. This raises a concern that the investigation was not sufficient and as such has not served its purpose of safeguarding patients. 7. No adequate explanation was given in evidence to explain why the investigation was incomplete. 8. If WAH serious incident investigations are not sufficient the lessons arising will not be identified and necessary action will not be taken putting lives at risk. ”

    Source location

    Jack HURN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require investigators to use comprehensive literature and independent evidence reviews and address families’ concerns in investigation reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are ensuring investigators undertake more comprehensive literature and independent evidence reviews when indicated, rather than relying on internal expertise, and ensure that the concerns of patient’s family are sought and addressed in our reports. As part of our reflection we have recognised the need and actioned raising awareness of the Trust’s Library Services who can support literature searches for existing clinical guidelines and publications, to our investigators.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Worcestershire Acute Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise investigators’ awareness of Library Services support for searches of clinical guidelines and publications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are ensuring investigators undertake more comprehensive literature and independent evidence reviews when indicated, rather than relying on internal expertise, and ensure that the concerns of patient’s family are sought and addressed in our reports. As part of our reflection we have recognised the need and actioned raising awareness of the Trust’s Library Services who can support literature searches for existing clinical guidelines and publications, to our investigators.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Worcestershire Acute Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a gap analysis of national patient-safety investigation standards against current practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You may also be aware that NHS England is due to publish their Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), which describes how providers should respond to patient safety incidents and how and when a patient safety investigation should be conducted. Included as part of the framework are the National Standards for Patient Safety Investigation, published in 2020, designed to support improvement in the quality of patient safety investigation in NHS-funded care and specifies the basic requirements of reviews. The Trust completed a gap analysis of these standards against current practice, which is being used to inform the development of a revised investigation processes and report template as well as guidance for investigators. The Framework supports the National Patient Safety Strategy, to improve understanding of safety by drawing insights from patient safety incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Worcestershire Acute Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop revised investigation processes, report templates and investigator guidance informed by the standards gap analysis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You may also be aware that NHS England is due to publish their Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), which describes how providers should respond to patient safety incidents and how and when a patient safety investigation should be conducted. Included as part of the framework are the National Standards for Patient Safety Investigation, published in 2020, designed to support improvement in the quality of patient safety investigation in NHS-funded care and specifies the basic requirements of reviews. The Trust completed a gap analysis of these standards against current practice, which is being used to inform the development of a revised investigation processes and report template as well as guidance for investigators. The Framework supports the National Patient Safety Strategy, to improve understanding of safety by drawing insights from patient safety incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Worcestershire Acute Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response
  10. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Elizabeth Margaret Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Margaret Mills was admitted to hospital with abdominal pain on 25 March 2021, underwent surgery for a perforated pyloric ulcer, and later developed pneumonia requiring increasing oxygen therapy. She died after removing an oxygen mask while unattended in a side ward, when nasal cannulae were replaced but were no longer connected to an oxygen supply. Concerns included poor medical record-keeping about the do-not-attempt-CPR process, reliance on her husband to keep the mask in place, and the Trust’s failure to investigate unexpected events through a Serious Incident Investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate unexpected care-impacting events through Serious Incident Investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Unexpected events that impacted upon Mrs Mills’ care were not investigated by the Trust in the form of a Serious Incident Investigation. ”

    Source location

    Elizabeth Margaret Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident did not require a Serious Incident investigation because reviews concluded it was not a Serious Incident matter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The incident was reported on 26 March 2021 and it was flagged as a potential SI matter by the Quality and Safety ‘Q&S’ Team. A review was undertaken by the ED Matron and by the Surgical Division. This was held with multidisciplinary key stakeholders from including pharmacists, matrons, registrars, clinical leads, consultants and consultant surgeons from Gastroenterology, Breast and General Surgery, Adult Day Unit and Theatres. The reviews established that the correct morphine doses were given to EM at appropriate times and the matter was not an SI matter. The Q&S team removed the potential SI flag. Separately, EM’s husband pursued a complaint regarding her care and management which was not upheld and the husband declined a meeting with the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026