Recurring concern

Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a formal organisational safety-incident or serious-incident management framework, including incident identification, grading, coordination, investigation, monitoring and control.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing corrective actions after incident learning has already been established.
  • Excludes generic organisational learning, governance or incident-reporting deficiencies where no serious-incident management process is identified.
  • Excludes the underlying clinical or operational hazard and failures in ordinary care that are not part of serious-incident management.
  • Excludes investigations concerning deaths, complaints, crime or regulatory matters where the reported concern is not the management of a serious or untoward incident.
  • Excludes operational emergency-response, rescue and event-planning protocols that are not part of a formal organisational safety-incident management framework.
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
129

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
182

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care16
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
NHS England10
Care Quality Commission9
Barts Health NHS Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
East London NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
General Medical Council2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Juliet Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Juliet Saunders, a 25-year-old woman with Cornelia De Lange Syndrome and a profound learning disability, attended hospital on 7 March 2020 with abdominal pain and vomiting and died at home the following day. The report identified concerns including misinterpretation of abdominal x-rays, failure to diagnose intestinal obstruction, inadequate escalation and supervision, departures from transfer and discharge procedures, lack of safety-netting advice, and insufficient support for patients with learning disabilities at weekends.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serious Incident Investigation process failing to identify significant care failings and produce a good-quality report

    Wider context from the report

    “8. Ineffective identification of significant failings in care delivered through the Trust’s own Serious Incident Investigation process, leading to a finalised report of poor quality. ”

    Source location

    Juliet Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and complete an external review of serious-incident reports, policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Trust commissioned an external maternity review in March 2021, into Serious Incidents (SIs) from the period of January 2019 to December 2020. The review involved a structured review of SI reports as well as a review of SI related policies and procedures at the Trust. This was in conjunction with a series of semi structured interviews with staff at all levels of the Trust as well as site visits during which more informal conversations with staff and patients took place. The final report has now been received by the Trust. This will enable the Trust to undertake a review of existing systems and processes, and the opportunity to plan positive actions as well as planning for the transition to the new national policy framework, particularly the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), set to be rolled out nationally from spring next year.”

    Source location

    2021-0157-Response-from-Queens-Hospital_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serious Incident governance arrangements remain paused because COVID-19 released clinical staff and the Trust awaits national guidance, although reports are being progressed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the Covid pandemic governance arrangements, including SI reports were placed on hold, to allow for clinical staff to be released to support ward areas. The pause is still in place (the declaration of SIs or Never Event continues) however the Trust is taking proactive steps to ensure reports are still being progressed in line with reporting requirements, which the Trust is awaiting guidance from NHSEI and the CCG.”

    Source location

    2021-0157-Response-from-Queens-Hospital_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response
  2. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Margaret Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Margaret Clarke, a 23-year-old university student with significant mental health difficulties, was found deceased in her university accommodation on 21 November 2019 after sending an email indicating that she intended to end her life. The concerns included inadequate follow-up after she became extremely distressed, insufficiently robust systems for managing and safeguarding students at high risk of self-harm, and failure to implement relevant national guidance or provide adequate oversight and learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete a serious incident report on CWB working practices

    Wider context from the report

    “7. There was no serious incident report completed by US as to the working practices of the CWB and no reflection has taken place and no steps have been taken to put into place by CWB to provide more robust systems to confirm the safety of students such as Sarah. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Margaret Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make internal reviews following future student suicides standard procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “f) Internal reviews after any future suicides will now be standard procedure”

    Source location

    Response from University of Surrey
    Page 10 · response
    Published 1 December 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The University was not required to produce a serious incident report because it is not a regulated healthcare service provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. There was no serious incident report completed by US as to the working practices of the CWB and no reflection has taken place and no steps have been taken to put into place by CWB to provide more robust systems to confirm the safety of students such as Sarah.”

    Source location

    Response from University of Surrey
    Page 7 · response
    Published 1 December 2022

    Open published response
  3. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Gillian McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gillian McKinlay, aged 68, was admitted to Royal Blackburn Hospital on 23 April 2018 with a provisional diagnosis of small bowel obstruction. A nasogastric tube requested by clinicians was not sited before her death four hours later, and the Coroner considered this contributed to the death. Concerns included unclear responsibility for patients in the Accident and Emergency Department, failure to undertake or escalate a clinically indicated review, and inadequacies in the Trust's investigation and subsequent measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the serious incident investigation to identify why NG tube placement failures were not escalated or referred back to requesting teams

    Wider context from the report

    “1. For patients remaining for a considerable period of time in the Accident and Emergency Department there is no clear indication or understanding as to who is responsible for the overall patient's clinical care. 2. EWS scores indicated that a clinical review was mandated for which there is no evidence in the medical records that any such review took place by A & E medical staff or that the matter was referred to any of the on call clinical teams. 3. When the NG tube was unable to be sited and no obvious clinical review in response to the EWS scores had occurred, there is no evidence of escalation by the nursing staff either through the nursing hierarchy or the medical hierarchy. 4. The Trust's Serious Incident Review to identify the root causes of the incident raises the following concerns concerning the adequacy of the Trust's investigation and measures taken: a. NG tube not sited - the Trust's response does not address why there was a failure of escalation or referral back to the requesting teams and the updated action plan that "training on insertion should shorten time taken to decompress" is inadequate; b. that the EWS score mandated review by the acute care team (whoever that may be for these purposes-see first point), there is no evidence in the medical records apart from a blood gas that any such review took place or that any treatment occurred; c. the investigating consultant had informal conversations during the investigation with a middle grade doctor who had performed the arterial blood gas but was unable to state who this was, why no medical records were created and why no action was taken; d. the report states that there was a "correct escalation of the EWS at every stage" for which no evidence has been provided and appears to be factually incorrect; e. medical records created by the surgical registrar were in accurate as they were completed by a junior doctor and not checked; f. that no audit has taken place to ascertain whether the Trust's measures have had the appropriate effect. ”

    Source location

    Gillian McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    BETTY ANNIE TADMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Betty Annie Tadman died after an unwitnessed fall at home caused a pelvic fracture with extensive local haemorrhage. She was treated for suspected urosepsis and deep vein thrombosis, but no imaging was conducted despite signs of possible injury, and the pelvic fracture and internal bleeding were not diagnosed. Concerns were also raised that the Trust did not investigate the death or review it through its morbidity and mortality processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct a serious incident investigation after a death

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The Trust did not conduct a serious incident investigation following Mrs Tadman’s death when the post-mortem cause of death established a pelvic fracture with severe haemorrhage. Evidence heard at the inquest confirmed that this case was not discussed at the trust morbidity and mortality review or any other forum giving rise to concerns that lessons had not been learned. ”

    Source location

    BETTY ANNIE TADMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Evadney Dawkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evadney Dawkins, aged 77, fell at home and was admitted to hospital on 22 July 2018. Renal monitoring planned after assessment was not undertaken for four days, when she was found to have a Grade 3 acute kidney injury; she later suffered a cardiac arrest and was pronounced deceased on 23 August 2018. Concerns also included that the Trust’s governance systems did not identify the case as a Serious Incident requiring investigation for two years.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of governance systems to assess cases as Serious Incidents requiring investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On 22nd July 2018, Mrs Dawkins was assessed to require renal monitoring, incorporating; a) Regular blood tests b) A renal ultrasound c) Fluid intake/output monitoring The 3 actions were not undertaken for 4 days, after which, it was discovered that the patient had deteriorated and had sustained a Grade 3 acute kidney injury. 2. The Trust’s governance systems did not assess to a case as a Serious Incident requiring investigation for 2 years. ”

    Source location

    Evadney Dawkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review unexpected deaths through a multidisciplinary Serious Incident Review meeting, declaring and investigating incidents where appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We recognise that there was a failure to assess and grade Mrs Dawkins’s death correctly as a Serious Incident at the time it happened. We now have an established and robust system in place where unexpected deaths are taken to a Serious Incident Review meeting where they are considered by a multidisciplinary team. Where there is doubt, the hospital errs on the side of declaring the incident as a Serious Incident and investigating as such, de-escalating as appropriate.”

    Source location

    2020-0292-Response-from-Royal-London-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appoint three Medical Examiners to review every death on the site.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally we have appointed three Medical Examiners who review every death on the site. These roles are overseen by the Deputy Medical Director which is an additional new post, part of the remit of which is to give greater assurance around patient safety governance. In this way, deaths that do not meet the criteria for a Serious Incident are robustly reviewed. We believe that had these actions been in place at the time of the incident, it is highly likely that it would have been declared as a Serious Incident.”

    Source location

    2020-0292-Response-from-Royal-London-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a Deputy Medical Director post overseeing Medical Examiners and strengthening patient safety governance assurance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally we have appointed three Medical Examiners who review every death on the site. These roles are overseen by the Deputy Medical Director which is an additional new post, part of the remit of which is to give greater assurance around patient safety governance. In this way, deaths that do not meet the criteria for a Serious Incident are robustly reviewed. We believe that had these actions been in place at the time of the incident, it is highly likely that it would have been declared as a Serious Incident.”

    Source location

    2020-0292-Response-from-Royal-London-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Trust systems, including multidisciplinary death reviews and medical examiner scrutiny, are considered sufficient to prevent recurrence of missed Serious Incident identification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand the Trust has acknowledged the failure to identify Mrs Dawkins death as a Serious Incident but that it considers that it now has systems in place that mean this is unlikely to happen again. For example, the Trust advises that a multi-disciplinary team now considers unexpected deaths to determine whether investigation under the Serious Incident Review process is appropriate. Additionally, the Trust has appointed three Medical Examiners who review every death within the Trust’s services. As you will know, medical examiners have been introduced to the NHS nationally to provide a new level of independent scrutiny of deaths. Furthermore, the Trust has created a new post of Deputy Medical Director with a remit to provide greater assurance on patient safety governance.”

    Source location

    2020-0292-Response-from-Dept.-of-Health-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2021

    Open published response
  6. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Eddie Coffey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eddie Coffey was born at Lister Hospital in a poor state, with a low heart rate and symptoms of hypoxia, and required resuscitation before transfer to neonatal intensive care. He died at Luton & Dunstable Hospital from perinatal asphyxia. Inquest evidence identified gross failures in monitoring and managing the foetal heart rate during labour, and raised concerns about whether the same situation could recur and whether other maternity units were following incorrect guidelines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigation to determine directly responsible factors

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Serious Incident Report prepared on behalf of East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust concluded that the Investigation was unable to determine the factors that were directly responsible for the death of baby Eddie Coffey. This conclusion was directly contradicted by evidence at the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Eddie Coffey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain future independent clinical opinions under formal terms of reference.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When obtaining an independent third-party or independent clinical opinion in the future the trust will ensure this is done on a more formal basis with clear terms of reference.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Lister-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a standard operating procedure for LMNS oversight of serious incident investigations and action plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the Directors of Midwifery and the LMNS Programme Lead have agreed a standard operating procedure for LMNS oversight of SI investigations and action plans going forward.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Lister-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Bring the coroner’s report to the attention of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, my officials have brought your report to the attention of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB). HSIB is a key part of our commitment to improve patient safety and the culture of learning in the NHS. The HSIB conduct independent maternity investigations that meet the Each Baby Counts criteria and a defined criteria for maternal deaths so that the NHS learns quickly from what went wrong and uses this to prevent future tragedies. Where HSIB identifies systemic risks, it can consider making national recommendations for system change.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Dept.-for-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS providers and local health partners are responsible for implementing the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework and supporting standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHSEI is currently working with early adopters to pilot the new Framework. The learning from this pilot will be used to inform the final version of the Framework. Until this is finalized, NHS providers and their local health partners should review the introductory framework and Patient Safety Incident Investigation standards⁴ and begin to consider what they will need to do to support their implementation.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Dept.-for-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response
  7. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Rory Attwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rory Attwood died at home on 9 October 2018 after an acute cardiac event attributed by the pathologist to excessive MDMA consumption. The report raised concerns that he had fallen between gaps in health and social care services and that his GP was not involved in the internal investigation after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to involve primary care contacts in internal or serious incident reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “After his death the charity MIND wrote to me and expressed concerns that Rory had fallen between gaps in services. This was addressed in the internal investigation undertaken by ABUHB, however it is surprising that his GP was not involved in this review and Dr ████████ told me that GPs are rarely asked to participate in these investigations. In order that lessons can be learned and opportunities identified for better partnership working around patients, it would seem appropriate that the patient’s primary care contact (especially when being supervised in the community) be involved in internal / serious incident reviews. ”

    Source location

    Rory Attwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review practices governing GP involvement in Serious Incident Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further to your report, I am pleased to inform you that the Aneurin Bevan University Health Board has reviewed its practices with regard to GP involvement in Serious Incident Reviews.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a process and pro forma to share pertinent information and invite GPs routinely to Serious Incident Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Furthermore, the Mental Health and Learning Disabilities Division has devised a process and pro forma to aid the timely sharing of pertinent information, and to ensure that GPs are routinely invited to participate in reviews of Serious Incidents. Copies of both documents are enclosed for your information. Whilst I must highlight that only a small number of GP Surgeries within the Gwent area are managed by the Health Board and the vast majority are managed independently, it is hoped that this process will enable the Health Board to engage with both managed and non-managed GP surgeries when conducting Serious Incident Reviews.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the pro forma to notify GPs of relevant unexpected deaths, request salient information, and invite review participation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The MH & LD Division will use a pro forma to notify the GP of an unexpected death of a patient in the Division. This will be sent by email from the Division’s Quality and Patient Safety (QPS) department to the GP Practice.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with the Primary Care and Community Division after the trial period to review the GP notification process and take forward suggested amendments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is suggested that this process is tried for 6 months; following which, the MH & LD Division will liaise with the Primary Care and Community Division to review the process and take forward any suggested amendments.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response
  8. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Geoffrey Peter Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Geoffrey Peter Banks, aged 64, took 44 co-codamol tablets after pulling open a locked medicine cupboard at his assisted accommodation on 1 January 2020. He was admitted to hospital and died on 8 January 2020 from an acute heart attack; the overdose contributed to his death, although it was not possible to determine whether it was accidental or deliberate. Concerns were raised about the lack of safe medication storage for residents needing supervision and about the apparent investigation being perfunctory and conducted by an untrained staff member.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of untrained staff to conduct incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The deceased resided at Oak Priory and was the tenant of a privately rented flat in a scheme from a housing provider. He was on a care package provided by Comfort Call under a contract from Stoke on Trent Council. He received visit four times per day principally to administer medication. The medicine was kept in a locked kitchen cupboard in his flat. He had been identified as not being able to manage his own medication. The tenant was easily able to pull open the cupboard door and the barrel of the lock fell out. He overdosed on medication. There appears to be no system of safe storage in place where a resident has been identified as being in need of supervision with medication. (2)The apparent investigation into the incident was perfunctory and carried out by an untrained member of staff. ”

    Source location

    Geoffrey Peter Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Council assessments and reviews were undertaken by trained, qualified social workers, not untrained staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have conducted a review into our records and we are clear that, in relation to any assessment and review undertaken by the Stoke-on-Trent City Council these were all undertaken by a trained and qualified social worker. The notes on the case file and the assessment and support plan for GB was completed by a qualified social worker and while no specific risk assessment in relation to medication had been undertaken a range of assessments were in place and had been done by a suitably qualified member of staff. Any internal review of a death that raised any concerns would be undertaken or overseen by the Principal Social Worker or Assistant Director (Adult Social Care).”

    Source location

    2020-0256-Response-from-Adult-Social-Care-Health-Integration-and-Wellbeing-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2020

    Open published response
  9. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    June Patricia Margaret PARLOUR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    June Parlour was an inpatient with disseminated terminal cancer when she received morphine doses exceeding national and hospital guidelines. Her condition deteriorated, and she later died of opiate toxicity; the overdose significantly hastened her death. Concerns included staff awareness of morphine guidance, inaccurate hospital guidance and incident reporting, education and auditing for doctors, unclear prescribing instructions, and communication and escalation failures between staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorrect quotation of hospital IV morphine dose guidelines in Serious Incident reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was concerning that even the hospital’s own Serious Incident report had incorrectly quoted the hospital’s guidelines as to the safe dose of IV morphine and that neither the investigatory team or any of the clinical staff who subsequently read that report had picked up on this. ”

    Source location

    June Patricia Margaret PARLOUR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish trained investigating officers and a team-based process for patient safety incident investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has been selected as one of the early adopters for the new NHS Patient Safety Incident Response Framework, which commenced on the 2 November 2020. In establishing the new framework ESNEFT has put in place a number of highly trained investigating officers to lead the patient safety incident investigations, utilising relevant clinical experts within the process. Through a team approach to investigations, greater scrutiny of the information and evidence provided will be undertaken and will support a timely response to incidents and the identification of improvements required. The framework aims to ensure investigations are undertaken in a timely manner and with a greater involvement of patients, families and carers.”

    Source location

    2020-0186-Response-from-East-Suffolk-and-North-Essex_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 November 2020

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Sylvia Scully · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sylvia Scully became unwell with sudden abdominal pain and vomiting and attended Tameside General Hospital on 9 February 2020. A radiologist initially reported another patient’s scan in error, and the correct diagnosis of hollow viscus perforation was made after her condition had deteriorated so severely that she could not withstand emergency surgery; she died in hospital on 10 February 2020. Concerns included variations in radiologists’ access to systems and equipment for out-of-hours reporting, the absence of a formal investigation into her care, and the lack of a Rapid Assessment and Treatment Model for walk-in emergency patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of routine clinical governance processes to initiate formal Serious Untoward Incident investigations or similar investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Notwithstanding the circumstances of Mrs Scully’s death, the Trust’s routine clinical governance processes have not resulted in a formal Serious Untoward Incident investigation or similar taking place in respect of the care and treatment provided to her. This is a matter of concern given the great importance to patient safety of robust and effective investigations being undertaken in a timely fashion; ”

    Source location

    Sylvia Scully · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have senior clinicians undertake Case Review and Lessons Learned reviews for relevant patient-safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is appreciated that this level of scrutiny is not always apparent and evident for the purpose of the Inquest therefore, the Trust’s Integrated Governance Team have considered how they can evidence different responses to patient safety incidents, including Multi-Disciplinary Team reviews, complaints investigations and expert opinions, which occur outside of a formal SUI process. A new ‘Case Review and Lessons Learned’ document has been produced which will be provided as part of the coronial disclosure process. Senior Clinicians with the expertise in the area of concern will undertake such case reviews. The findings and lessons learned document will be presented in a ‘Case Review and Lessons Learned’ report which the Trust intend on disclosing as part of the coronial process for the benefit of the family and Court if a serious incident investigation is not required.”

    Source location

    2020-0156-Response-from-NHS-Tameside-and-Glossop-Integrated-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing incident investigation processes and review were considered sufficient, so a formal serious untoward incident investigation was not undertaken.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to address your concerns, I would first like to take the opportunity to explain the Trust’s incident investigation process, which was effective at the time of Mrs Scully’s attendance. I hope by explaining this and various other types of investigations the Trust undertake, it will provide you with reassurance that whilst a Serious Untoward Incident was not undertaken in Mrs Scully’s case, her treatment and care was reviewed by the Trust.”

    Source location

    2020-0156-Response-from-NHS-Tameside-and-Glossop-Integrated-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 October 2020

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026