Recurring concern

Failure to prevent duplicate or discontinued medication prescriptions

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First reported 27 Oct 2014•Latest report 14 Oct 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to check prescription status before issuing a subsequent prescription, prevent repeat prescribing of discontinued medication, or reconcile hospital and primary-care prescriptions to prevent duplicate medication supply.

Not included

  • Excludes clinically inappropriate medication choice, dose or indication where duplication or continuation after cancellation or discontinuation is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes ordinary medication administration, dispensing, supply, monitoring or adherence failures after prescription duplication or discontinuation has not occurred.
  • Excludes medication-quantity controls and overdose-risk prescribing safeguards where the issue is excessive quantity rather than duplicate or discontinued prescriptions.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping, communication or electronic-system deficiencies unless they directly allow a duplicate or discontinued medication prescription to be issued.
Reports
10

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
11

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
23

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England3
Royal Pharmaceutical Society2
Belmarsh Prison1
Clare House Surgery1
Egton Medical Information Systems Limited1
Eltham Palace Surgery1
General Medical Council1
Greater Manchester1
Isle of Wight NHS Trust1
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust1
Medical Centre1
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency1
NHS Hampshire and Isle of Wight Integrated Care Board1
Nursing and Midwifery Council1
Oracle Corporation UK Limited1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes was admitted to hospital after a fall and received paracetamol in excess of the recommended dose because paracetamol was prescribed alongside co-codamol. The overdose was not recognised until she had developed fulminant acute liver failure, and timely treatment was not provided. The principal concerns included preventing duplicate paracetamol prescriptions and administration, recognising and managing therapeutic excess, accurately assessing confusion, recording over-the-counter medicines, mitigating confirmation bias, and providing guidance for virtual patient reviews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol-containing drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “1. In respect of preventing concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs and otherwise preventing prescribing errors resulting in therapeutic excess of paracetamol (NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA, LGT) (1) NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA I consider that the risk of concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs is of wider national concern. The Cerner prescribing system offers a duplicate checking functionality that is not a standard feature. It is hard stop and can be overridden and was not adopted by the LGT when the system was introduced. All the healthcare professionals were aware that co-codamol contained paracetamol and should not be prescribed with paracetamol. However, the 2 prescribing doctors failed to recognise that Mrs Hughes was already prescribed a paracetamol containing drug. 2 nurses failed to recognise they were administering 2 paracetamol containing drugs. A pharmacist failed to identify the concurrent prescriptions during reconciliation. (2) LGT LGT’s response to the incident was swift and commendable. A hard stop was introduced to the electronic prescribing system which eliminated concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs. Further refinements of the system significantly reduced therapeutic excesses of paracetamol based on weight, which had been identified as an issue when investigating Mrs Hughes’ death. However, it is my understanding that consideration is being given to changing the electronic record and prescribing system. My concern is that during any move to a new system, the safety nets introduced by the Trust will be diluted or lost. ”

    Source location

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and maintain the ePRASE toolkit, including therapeutic duplication scenarios in its finalised 2025 release.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England commissioned the ‘ePrescribing Risk and Safety Evaluation’ (ePRASE) toolkit, which is an online self-assessment tool that NHS secondary care providers are able to register to use with annual releases. It is intended to test how effectively e-prescribing systems respond to high-risk prescribing scenarios. The 2025 release is now finalised and therapeutic duplication as a theme is included. This incident will be considered as part of the review of the scenarios for the next release in 2026 as a priority area.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review therapeutic-duplication scenarios as a priority for the 2026 ePRASE release.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England commissioned the ‘ePrescribing Risk and Safety Evaluation’ (ePRASE) toolkit, which is an online self-assessment tool that NHS secondary care providers are able to register to use with annual releases. It is intended to test how effectively e-prescribing systems respond to high-risk prescribing scenarios. The 2025 release is now finalised and therapeutic duplication as a theme is included. This incident will be considered as part of the review of the scenarios for the next release in 2026 as a priority area.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with NHS England about preventing prescribing systems from dispensing two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have liaised with NHSE with regard to the ability of the prescribing system to dispense two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol and we understand they will incorporate learning from this incident into the commissioning of the ePRaSE tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Medicines & Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a detailed review of Millennium’s duplicate-prescription and paracetamol overdose alert functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Oracle Health was saddened to learn of, and deeply regrets, the various medical omissions at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (“QE Hospital”) and extends its condolences to the family of the Deceased and others bereaved. Oracle Health assures the Deceased’s family that the contents of the Report are taken extremely seriously. While there is no suggestion that Oracle Health’s Millennium software deployed at the QE Hospital was in any way at fault or contributed to the Deceased’s death, Oracle Health conducted a detailed review of that software in response to the Report and concludes as follows (key findings are highlighted in bold throughout):”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue augmenting the content and functionality of Millennium alert notifications, including overdose-related alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.5. Oracle Health does not consider that any further code development of alert notifications is required, but it continues to augment the content and function of all alert notifications and Millennium in general. Oracle Health will continue to work closely with its Trust clients to inform and educate them on the available functionality.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with Trust clients to inform and educate them about available alert functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.5. Oracle Health does not consider that any further code development of alert notifications is required, but it continues to augment the content and function of all alert notifications and Millennium in general. Oracle Health will continue to work closely with its Trust clients to inform and educate them on the available functionality.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss safeguards against paracetamol dosing incidents with Trust clients through quarterly meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.4. Oracle Health has no record of LGT raising any relevant service or test issues as part of the deployment testing process or subsequent to the systems going live. Approaches to safeguard against paracetamol dosing incidents were discussed with a number of Trust clients, including LGT, at a regular quarterly meeting in June 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the UK Administration Alert Notification and explain its triggers, operation and implementation options to Trusts through a Special Interest Group meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “13. Oracle Health holds Special Interest Group (“SIG”) meetings approximately every quarter, which enable Oracle to share enhancements, upgrades, and best practices with regard to Millennium functionality. They also enable clients to come together and present on any issues encountered within particular fields. At a SIG meeting in September 2022, Oracle Health introduced the Administration Alert Notification in the UK, including details about its form, how the alert is triggered, and how Trusts could seek to implement it. Trust clients in attendance also provided feedback on how the alert notification might be refined in the future. At a SIG meeting in June 2024, LGT raised in general terms paracetamol dosing incidents as a topic for discussion among other Trust clients, including whether any additional alert notifications may have been implemented by those Trusts internally.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present updates to the Administration Alert Notification, including patient-weight-based maximum-dose calculations, to Trust clients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the same meeting, Oracle Health presented updates to the Administration Alert Notification, including functionality that would take into account the patient’s weight in calculating the maximum dose before triggering the alert notification.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing and monitoring Trust-client awareness of duplicate-prescription and paracetamol overdose alert functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “15. Oracle Health considers that the Millennium prescribing system features are appropriate and functioning as designed in respect of the risk of duplicate paracetamol doses, including the Prescription Duplicate Alert Notification and the Administration Alert Notifications. Oracle Health will continue to review and monitor awareness of this functionality among its Trust clients.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue discussing potential software or configuration enhancements with clients, including their appropriateness and workflow impact.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. As noted above, Oracle Health continuously engages in ongoing dialogue with its clients regarding software code and configuration enhancements to its Millennium solutions. Such enhancements can arise at the global, or national, level in response to the knowledge and experience gained by Oracle Health from working with its extensive client base. They can also arise in response to specific issues at the level of local deployments. In each case, Oracle Health will discuss with its client the appropriateness of taking a potential upgrade and its impact on existing workflows and the user interface. Ultimately, the decision on whether to take a particular code or configuration enhancement remains with the client and can involve clinical and commercial considerations.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain electronic prescribing alerts preventing duplicate or excessive paracetamol prescribing and administration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are several safety elements incorporated into the Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust (LGT) electronic prescribing and medicines administration (EPMA) system, iCare. This includes a ‘hard stop’ on prescribing concomitant paracetamol containing products and a number of ‘soft stops’ as listed below:”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek assurance that Epic will implement iCare paracetamol safety features when introduced across the three Trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May 2027, the Trust will be joining Epic, an electronic records and prescribing system shared by our neighbouring Trusts, Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (GSTT) and King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (KCH).”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHSE is responsible for incorporating incident learning into commissioning the ePRaSE prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have liaised with NHSE with regard to the ability of the prescribing system to dispense two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol and we understand they will incorporate learning from this incident into the commissioning of the ePRaSE tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Medicines & Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Building electronic prescribing alerts requires national oversight to coordinate work with secondary-care system suppliers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We believe that steps could be taken to try and build alerts and warnings for the unacceptable duplication of medicines in these electronic prescribing systems to make them safer. This would require national oversight to coordinate work with secondary care system suppliers.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Pharmaceutical Society
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No evidence has been identified that the software contains a defect or deficiency relevant to duplicate paracetamol prescribing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.1. Oracle Health was invited to comment on one specific issue in the Report, out of a number of identified issues, which issue related to concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol and duplicate checking functionality. Further to its review, Oracle Health has not identified any evidence of any defect or deficiency in its software.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing prescribing and administration alert functionality is considered appropriate and functioning as designed, so further alert-notification code development is unnecessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.5. Oracle Health does not consider that any further code development of alert notifications is required, but it continues to augment the content and function of all alert notifications and Millennium in general. Oracle Health will continue to work closely with its Trust clients to inform and educate them on the available functionality.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The client decides whether to adopt particular code or configuration enhancements, taking account of clinical and commercial considerations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. As noted above, Oracle Health continuously engages in ongoing dialogue with its clients regarding software code and configuration enhancements to its Millennium solutions. Such enhancements can arise at the global, or national, level in response to the knowledge and experience gained by Oracle Health from working with its extensive client base. They can also arise in response to specific issues at the level of local deployments. In each case, Oracle Health will discuss with its client the appropriateness of taking a potential upgrade and its impact on existing workflows and the user interface. Ultimately, the decision on whether to take a particular code or configuration enhancement remains with the client and can involve clinical and commercial considerations.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  2. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver James Billings · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver James Billings, aged 22, was found deceased at home on 6 December 2023 after consuming possibly as many as 266 prescribed 75mg tablets. The report describes concerns that a second prescription was issued without confirming the status of the first, that rapid dispatch limited opportunities to identify or correct the error, and that Oliver was expected to remedy the problem when Pharmacy2U could not be contacted.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Submission of subsequent prescriptions despite knowledge that the first prescription was cancelled or to be cancelled

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That a subsequent prescription was submitted in the knowledge that the first was cancelled or to be cancelled but that steps do not appear to have been taken or be able to be taken to ascertain the status of that prescription before the subsequent prescription was issued. ”

    Source location

    Oliver James Billings · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure or inability to ascertain prescription status before issuing a subsequent prescription

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That a subsequent prescription was submitted in the knowledge that the first was cancelled or to be cancelled but that steps do not appear to have been taken or be able to be taken to ascertain the status of that prescription before the subsequent prescription was issued. ”

    Source location

    Oliver James Billings · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish and make available the Repeat Prescribing Toolkit with guidance on reviewing and safely managing high-risk repeat medicines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “High risk medicines and vulnerable patients The recently published Royal College of General Practitioners and RPS Repeat Prescribing Toolkit¹, advises GPs to think carefully about their arrangements for repeat prescribing of medicines. Patients should be offered regular and careful review of their medicines and the decision to prescribe high-risk medicines should always be considered on an individual basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Pharmaceutical Society
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require prescription cancellation to be treated as a last resort.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That said, we are committed to taking the steps we can, to prevent any future tragedies and we believe we have taken all measures that are within our control. We have taken the following action to safeguard against any future duplication of prescriptions:”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require prescription staff to email Pharmacy2U about prescription cancellations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Asked all prescriptions staff to email Pharmacy2U to communicate cancellations. This is under their direction as their phonelines are not well manned and/or in high demand – They state in their message that they prefer email. A call can take more than an hour to be answered, and it is not sustainable for us to use our limited resource calling them, given their poor answering capacity.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor rejected electronic cancellation notifications daily and act on them when required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Reviewed processes related to rejected prescription cancellation notifications within our clinical system. This is an alert that will tell us within our clinical system if there has been a cancellation request that has been rejected due to already being downloaded by the pharmacy. To ensure that these are monitored, and acted upon when required, a member of the prescriptions team is assigned to review this each day.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Eliminate non-auditable messaging systems for clinical information in prescription management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improved Communication Protocols: We have eliminated the use of non-auditable messaging systems (e.g., screen messages) for clinical information to ensure transparency and accountability in prescription management as we believe that this method was used for communication between Prescription Clerk B and the GP who issued the second prescription.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Without direct contact from the prescriber, the pharmacy could not reasonably establish that an already downloaded prescription was intended to be cancelled.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the absence of direct contact, as described above, regrettably I consider that there are no reasonable steps which we could have taken to have established that the prescriber had attempted a cancellation of the prescription on the spine after we had downloaded it.”

    Source location

    Response from Pharmacy2U
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reminding prescribers about cancellation guidance may be a matter for the professional leadership body for GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. I consider that there may be a need for all prescribers to be reminded of the applicable guidance highlighted above and the importance of making direct contact with a pharmacy if they wish to cancel an electronic NHS prescription that has already been issued and downloaded by a pharmacy, and to follow the instructions in their clinical system when it alerts them that the electronic cancellation was ineffective. This may be a matter for the professional leadership body for GPs.”

    Source location

    Response from Pharmacy2U
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The initial advice to contact Pharmacy2U was considered correct, and no error had occurred at that interaction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal review identified that initially the action taken was correct in that when Prescription Clerk A was asked by Mr Billings to change where the prescription was being sent, she informed him that he would need to contact Pharmacy2u to ask them to release the prescription so that his preferred pharmacy could dispense the prescription instead. This is in line with our policy and ensures that there is not a duplication of prescription. The process to change a pharmacy once the prescription has been sent involves contacting pharmacies directly and at present there is not a direct route for practices to easily do this. Where this change is at patient request, rather than as a result of an error, we put the onus back on the patient to arrange this.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing policy of asking patients to arrange pharmacy changes directly was considered sufficient where the request is patient-initiated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal review identified that initially the action taken was correct in that when Prescription Clerk A was asked by Mr Billings to change where the prescription was being sent, she informed him that he would need to contact Pharmacy2u to ask them to release the prescription so that his preferred pharmacy could dispense the prescription instead. This is in line with our policy and ensures that there is not a duplication of prescription. The process to change a pharmacy once the prescription has been sent involves contacting pharmacies directly and at present there is not a direct route for practices to easily do this. Where this change is at patient request, rather than as a result of an error, we put the onus back on the patient to arrange this.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The practice cannot easily cancel prescriptions after pharmacy download because cancellation routes and pharmacy communications are not sufficiently accessible.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal review identified that initially the action taken was correct in that when Prescription Clerk A was asked by Mr Billings to change where the prescription was being sent, she informed him that he would need to contact Pharmacy2u to ask them to release the prescription so that his preferred pharmacy could dispense the prescription instead. This is in line with our policy and ensures that there is not a duplication of prescription. The process to change a pharmacy once the prescription has been sent involves contacting pharmacies directly and at present there is not a direct route for practices to easily do this. Where this change is at patient request, rather than as a result of an error, we put the onus back on the patient to arrange this.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response
  3. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Lilian Margaret BOARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lilian Margaret BOARD, aged 91, died at Lincoln County Hospital on 1 February 2023 after intentionally ingesting tablets the previous day; a note of intent was left. The principal concern was that both her GP and the hospital had prescribed the same medication, raising a question about checks to prevent duplicate prescriptions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent duplicate medication prescriptions between hospital and GP

    Wider context from the report

    “The deceased was prescribed ████████ by her GP. Following discharge from hospital on 18th January 2023 LCH also prescribed ████████. The deceased therefore had two prescriptions of the same medication that she used to end her life. Are there any checks in place to avoid duplicity of prescriptions between hospital and GP ? ”

    Source location

    Lilian Margaret BOARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust’s 14-day discharge-supply policy and associated arrangements remain appropriate despite accepted overlapping prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to point out that the policy of the Trust (Policy for Medicines Management Supply of Medicines), in agreement with Lincolnshire Primary Care colleagues including the Primary Care Networks, the Local Medical Committee and the Integrated Care Board, is that we supply patients with 14 days supply of medication as a default at the point of discharge, This is not unusual, as almost all acute provider Trusts within NHS England have similar policies to dispense medication supplies upon discharge, with these supply arrangements ranging anywhere between 7-28 days depending on policies of the specific NHS Trusts.”

    Source location

    Response from United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response
  4. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew William Thomas Power · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew William Thomas Power, a 33-year-old man living in supported accommodation, died at a house in Redhill after taking illicit and prescribed drugs over the previous 36 hours; the medical cause of death was recorded as mixed drug toxicity. The concerns identified related to the EMIS prescribing system, including cancelled prescriptions remaining pending, prescriptions being grouped in a way that obscured prescribing history, and difficulty determining what had been prescribed and issued.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ended repeat prescriptions to be removed from pending medication-management queues

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The GP practice uses EMIS for patient records and prescribing. From the evidence it appears that when one doctor ends a repeat prescription on EMIS, it remains in the 'pending' Medication Management box of the doctor to whom it was originally sent. Creating the risk, as in this case, that as a pending prescription it is actioned and issued instead of cancelled. ”

    Source location

    Matthew William Thomas Power · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain cancellation warnings, workflow task visibility, and restart-or-reject controls for ended repeat prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When a clinician ends a prescription (including, any repeat prescription) in the Medication module of the System (End Course), this action ends that prescription if there are no outstanding associated Workflow tasks (as discussed in further detail below).”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing EMIS Web functionality is sufficient to mitigate the identified medication-management risks, so no software developments are required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Based upon the information provided in the Report and our subsequent review, we do not believe there are any software developments that are required in order to mitigate risks relating to this case beyond the”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 July 2023

    Open published response
  5. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Paris Alan George Lapper · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paris Alan George Lapper, aged 19, was found deceased in his room at the Wolsey Hotel on 13 August 2020 and was declared deceased at 1125hrs. The post-mortem recorded respiratory depression due to opiate and benzodiazepine toxicity. The report raised concerns that he obtained duplicate prescriptions from multiple providers because providers lacked a central record or mechanism to check prescriptions issued elsewhere, creating a risk of medication misuse and fatal outcomes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of providers to check existing prescriptions across providers before issuing new prescriptions

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Lapper was a young man who was struggling with mental health issues. He had become dependent on prescribed medication. He had made concerted efforts to obtain prescribed medication, in the lead up to his death, from a number of sources. He was able to obtain medication from the local Community Mental Health Team, his GP and A&E at the local hospital whilst also obtaining prescriptions from a Private Psychiatrist. During the evidence heard at the Inquest it was clear that individuals can very easily manipulate the current prescription system. As there is no central record of what prescriptions have been issued it appears very easy for individuals to play the system and thereby obtain excess medication. This can lead to the risk of an individual abusing the medication that can bring about a fatal outcome. Whilst the GP was made aware of some of the prescriptions that had been issued there is no mechanism in place for any provider to check what the individual has already been prescribed by with other providers before the new prescription is issued. It appears that the NHS and private providers act in isolation. ”

    Source location

    Paris Alan George Lapper · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Define common medicines-information standards and support their adoption across health and care organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Secondly, sharing medicines information requires the adoption of common information standards and work is also underway to define the necessary standards with subsequent plans in place to support adoption across health and care organisations, and these standards will be underpinned by the mandate to adopt them. The first early adopters of this programme are due to have these standards in place by the end of this financial year and the work is due to be completed by the end of 2024. This should enable a consolidated view of an individual’s medicines from numerous sources. In the shorter term, the shared record programme aims to deliver a minimum of view access by the end of this year for information that is digitally available now.”

    Source location

    2021-0148-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver minimum shared-record view access to currently digitally available medicines information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Secondly, sharing medicines information requires the adoption of common information standards and work is also underway to define the necessary standards with subsequent plans in place to support adoption across health and care organisations, and these standards will be underpinned by the mandate to adopt them. The first early adopters of this programme are due to have these standards in place by the end of this financial year and the work is due to be completed by the end of 2024. This should enable a consolidated view of an individual’s medicines from numerous sources. In the shorter term, the shared record programme aims to deliver a minimum of view access by the end of this year for information that is digitally available now.”

    Source location

    2021-0148-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing GMC prescribing guidance sets information and safety responsibilities for NHS and private prescribers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Guidance issued by the General Medical Council (GMC) sets out good prescribing practice (Good practice in prescribing and managing medicines and devices), including specific references to prescriber responsibilities and ensuring prescribers have all the relevant information, including adequate knowledge of the patient’s health, before prescribing. This guidance also applies to prescribers in the private sector. There is also reference to specific considerations such as whether or not the prescriber has sufficient information to prescribe safely and has access to the patient’s medical records.”

    Source location

    2021-0148-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response
  6. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Brady · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Brady, a 75-year-old woman, was admitted to hospital on 4 August 2020 after being found unresponsive at home following a presumed medication overdose. She deteriorated into multi-organ failure and died in hospital on 8 August 2020. The concerns included prescriptions exceeding the GP’s seven-day limit despite her history of overdose and erratic medication compliance, possible stockpiling of medication, and uncertainty about whether an additional hospital prescription had been fulfilled.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to limit prescription quantities and avoid duplicate prescribing for patients at high risk of medication overdose

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Due to the above, Mrs Brady’s GP was only issuing 7 day prescriptions due to her high risk of overdose in order to limit medication availability. This included ████████ ████████ amongst others. (3) Mrs Brady had already been issued with a prescription by her GP on 14/7/20 for her regular prescription medication; (4) The inquest heard evidence that following a hospital admission in early July 2020, Mrs Brady was medically fit for discharge on 15/7/20 and a prescription was issued by the Sandwell & West Birmingham Hospital Trust for 14 days of ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ ████████ (4) It was unclear from the evidence whether the prescription had actually been fulfilled by the hospital. I am concerned that Mrs Brady was issued with a prescription in excess of 7 days and for medication that had already been prescribed to her by her GP only the previous day and against a background of overdose and erratic compliance with her medications; (5) The levels of ████████ found as a result of qualitative testing appeared to be well in in excess of her prescriptions and there was evidence that Mrs Brady may have been stockpiling medication. It is possible that the additional prescription, if supplied may have formed part of the medication taken by way of overdose. (6) I heard at inquest that another similar prescription issued on 28/7/20 following a further admission had NOT been fulfilled. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Brady · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that Mrs Brady was oversupplied with medication, stating supplies were limited or not dispensed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will see from the attached list that, apart from the Aspirin, dispensed on 29 July 2020, medications were supplied for 7 days, 5 days or were not dispensed at all, instead giving back her own medications. The Aspirin was a new medication so was supplied to the level agreed with the CCG and in total only provided 2.1g, where the maximum daily dose for pain control is 4g.”

    Source location

    2021-0224-Response-from-Sandwell-General-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2021

    Open published response
  7. Isle of Wight

    AI-generated summary

    Cuthbert Anthony Stanley Hingert · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cuthbert Anthony Stanley Hingert was admitted to hospital with shortness of breath and possible acute coronary syndrome, during which duplicate doses of antiplatelet and anticoagulant medications were given. He later became confused, fell and sustained a subdural haematoma, skull fracture and subarachnoid haemorrhage, dying in hospital on 5 March 2017. Concerns included failures to check the medicines database, inappropriate or potentially inappropriate prescribing, delayed documentation, inadequate staff training and failure to report a medication incident according to protocol.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check the medicines database before prescribing duplicate medication doses

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The evidence revealed that the Medical Registrar did not check the JAC medicines database to see that Mr Hingert had already been administered a stat dose of antiplatelets and anticoagulant medication before prescribing second dose of these medications. ”

    Source location

    Cuthbert Anthony Stanley Hingert · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Fred Whittaker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Fred Whittaker, who had schizophrenia and was known to abuse drugs and alcohol, attended hospital with chest pains and drowsiness after taking codeine, alcohol and methadone, but self-discharged and went home. He was found dead in his flat the following morning; the inquest concluded that he died from developing bronchopneumonia and combined codeine, methadone and alcohol toxicity. A principal concern was that Clonazepam was restarted in error after his psychiatrist had requested that it be stopped, reflecting inadequate recording and procedures for discontinued prescriptions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of standard directions for managing requests to restart a discontinued medication

    Wider context from the report

    “An important issue in the Inquest was the continued prescription of Clonazepam by the Heaton Moor Medical Centre despite the written request on 17th August 2015, from Mr Whittaker’s treating psychiatrist, ████████ that this medication be stopped. The evidence given to me by ████████ a partner at the Heaton Moor Medical Centre, suggests that although the prescription was stopped it was started again in error. ████████ advised that, a) On receipt of ████████ request the drug was moved from the Repeat Prescription list to the Past Prescription list, without any reference in the records of the reason as to why the Clonazepam was being stopped. b) On or about the 19th August 2015 the pharmacy which administered Mr Whittaker’s medication requested a repeat prescription. c) It was likely that upon receiving that request Clonazepam was simply moved back on to the repeat prescription by one of the doctors at the Practice on being advised by an administrator of the Pharmacy’s request. This is clearly an unacceptable error. I accept that, on this occasion, this error played no part in Mr Whittaker’s demise but it is not difficult to imagine a completely different set of circumstances where such an error would give rise to a risk of death. ████████ evidence was that there were no standard directions as to how to manage this as a situation and that other practices may adopt the same simple policy of transferring the drug from one list to another. 1. That Heaton Moor Medical Centre does not have a mechanism whereby the reasons or requests or decisions that a patient is no longer to be prescribed a particular drug are recorded in the clinical records. 2. That this poor practice may not be limited to Heaton Moor Medical Centre and is replicated in many GP practices in the Northwest and indeed, nationally. ”

    Source location

    Fred Whittaker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Legal responsibility for prescribing lies with the doctor who signs the prescription.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the guidance published by the Department of Health, Responsibility for prescribing between hospitals and GPs EL (91) 127, 1991 (enclosed) makes it clear that the legal responsibility for prescribing lies with the doctor who signs the prescription. The issue of any prescription and the subsequent doctor’s signature is to assure the dispensing pharmacist that the doctor considers the medication to be appropriate and necessary to treat that patient, giving due regard to dose,”

    Source location

    2016-0249-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2016

    Open published response
  9. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laurence Boyens died in prison on 15 November 2012 from Methadone, Tramadol and Diazepam intoxication. The jury identified concerns about the combination and interaction of prescribed drugs, failures to monitor intoxication symptoms and blood pressure, and failures to suspend or withhold Methadone and Tramadol when signs of toxicity were present.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to cancel discontinued medication prescriptions in the computerised record

    Wider context from the report

    “4. ████████ ████████ was represented at the inquest and the following evidence gave rise to concerns: • He prescribed Citalopram, Tramadol, Methadone, Diazepam and Sodium Valproate on 10th to a new patient without seeing him, although probably in possession of old medical records from previous stay in prison, but not those from his GP related to the period before detention in prison. • When he saw the patient on 13th he failed to consider the interactions between Citalopram and Tramadol and between Citalopram and Methadone, both of which the prison expert ████████ said were contraindicated, nor the summative effects of combining Methadone, Tramadol and Diazepam. • He said that he was not aware whether withdrawal can cause low BP and thought the BP was measured to see if the patient was withdrawing. • He said that he did not know whether he should stop Methadone if the BP was low. • Mr Boyens was seen by the doctor on 13th, the day after another witness found him drowsy with “pinned eyes” and a few hours before another witness found him unsteady and drowsy. He made no record of the state of the pupils, but did record him as unusually drowsy. • At that examination, according to his 2013 statement he considered the patient was drowsy due to lack of sleep; in a 2015 statement he considered use of illicit drugs and was aware of the possibility of Methadone toxicity. But he failed to stop these drugs from continuing to be administered. • At this assessment on 13th he recorded an intention to stop the Citalopram on the request of the patient, but did not take the simple steps to cancel the prescription on the computerised record and if he told a nurse about this instruction it was not recalled or noted by them, and continued to be administered. • He gave evidence that he would not administer Naloxone to a patient unless the patient was blue and unconscious and known to have taken opiates and did not know any disadvantages of doing so. ████████ gave evidence that this was not correct and that Naloxone properly administered had the potential to save lives. ”

    Source location

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Philip Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip Allen, who had vascular dementia, was transferred from The Oaks Care Centre to QEH in September 2012 following a deterioration in his condition and died there. The concern was that Quetiapine continued to be prescribed as a repeat prescription after specialist advice to discontinue it, because the surgery’s system did not prevent this; the inquest evidence was that the further prescriptions did not contribute to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the repeat-prescribing system to prevent prescriptions of discontinued medication

    Wider context from the report

    “████████ as Mr Allen’s GP, sought specialist advice from ████████. Not only was this advice not followed but the Quetiapine, which ████████ had stopped, continued to be prescribed as a repeat prescription on several occasions. The evidence at the inquest was that the further prescriptions of Quetiapine did not contribute to the death. However, I am concerned that the system at Eltham Palace Surgery did not prevent the repeat prescription. ████████ was unable to say if changes have been made since this incident. ”

    Source location

    Philip Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out quarterly medication reviews through the CCG Prescribing Advisor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a practice we have made several changes to our policy in dealing with the care of clients at the Oaks Nursing Home:-”

    Source location

    2014-0466-Response-by-Eltham-Palace-Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 October 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out twice-yearly medication reviews using the practice computer records and electronic prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a practice we have made several changes to our policy in dealing with the care of clients at the Oaks Nursing Home:-”

    Source location

    2014-0466-Response-by-Eltham-Palace-Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 October 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026