Recurring concern

Inadequate live-rail electrocution warnings at railway stations

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 19 Nov 2019•Latest report 18 May 2021

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of warning signs or equivalent public-facing warning arrangements specifically intended to communicate live-rail presence and electrocution risk at railway stations, including their wording, prominence, legibility, placement and visibility from entrances, platforms and areas where people may access the tracks.

Not included

  • Excludes general railway platform-edge markings, tactile paving and safe-area demarcation where live-rail electrocution warning is not the deficient control.
  • Excludes generic railway trespass, track-access, signalling or station-safety concerns without a material live-rail electrocution-warning deficiency.
  • Excludes warnings for non-railway electrical hazards and product or workplace electrical-safety signage.
  • Excludes failures limited to public awareness or behaviour where the railway-station warning arrangement itself is not deficient.
Reports
3

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
5

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2019–2021

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
4

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

First MTR South Western Trains Limited1
London & South Eastern Railway Limited1
Network Rail1
Office of Rail and Road1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Callum Rhys EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Callum Rhys EVANS, aged 17, died after falling onto the live rail at Hinton Admiral Railway Station while intoxicated with alcohol. The report identified insufficient signage communicating the presence of the live rail and the risk to life, particularly from the station entrance and central part of the platform.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of effective live-rail warning signage at the railway station

    Wider context from the report

    “A friend in the company of the deceased at the railway station indicated a lack of knowledge of the presence of a live electric (third) rail at the railway station and stated that if it had been known that there was a live rail they would not have gone onto the railway tracks. The deceased and his friends had gone onto the railway tracks by dropping down from the central part of the platform. The railway station has an absence of signage stating the presence and risk to life of a live rail on the railway tracks which can be seen by those entering the railway station or whilst on the central part of the platform. The only sign referring to the live rail is at the far sloped end of the platform, some distance from the station entrance and central part of the platform, which states “Do not touch live rail”. There is signage stating “No trespassing” but nothing effectively communicating the presence of a live rail or the risk to life from that live rail. ”

    Source location

    Callum Rhys EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trial under-platform warning signage at ten Wessex locations, including Hinton Admiral.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That said we do understand that awareness of our risks needs to be continually refreshed and needs to be a combination of hard mitigations, key messages and signage so we are now planning to trial under platform warning signage. This will be at 10 locations across the Wessex region with Hinton Admiral being one of the trial locations, and will feature warning signs underneath the platform which will be visible to passengers standing on the opposite platform.”

    Source location

    2021-0159-Response-from-Network-Rail_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing signs at Hinton Admiral warn of electrocution, contrary to the concern that the station lacked signage warning of live-rail risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have stated that “the railway station has an absence of signage stating the presence, and risk to life, of a live rail on the railway tracks which can be seen by those entering the railway station or whilst on the central part of the platform”.”

    Source location

    2021-0159-Response-from-Network-Rail_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Network Rail considers compliant platform-end signs and consistent industry-standard signage sufficient, so additional wording about risk to life is not required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Signage on the railway is set out in the industry standards. These state that we have a “do not trespass” sign at all locations. We also have signs at the ends of the platform, which were in place at Hinton Admiral, to prohibit unauthorised access and warn of the dangers, including of electrocution. The signs displayed at the station warn of the danger of electrocution and comply with the Railway Group Standard GI/RT 7033. To avoid confusion at different locations, there is safety benefit in consistent and clear signs that meet British Standard ISO 3864 – 1.2011: ‘Graphical symbols’ and the Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996. Network Rail’s own company standard NR/L2/ELP/21131 applies the industry and national standards and follows appropriate risk assessments. The signs provided by Network Rail at Hinton Admiral remain compliant with those standards.”

    Source location

    2021-0159-Response-from-Network-Rail_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    South Western Railway is responsible for signs at Hinton Admiral and for applying the relevant standards under its franchise agreement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The railway industry involves many companies who collaborate to operate safely. Network Rail owns and operates the rail infrastructure i.e. the track, signalling, bridges, level crossings etc. Other companies operate the trains and most stations. The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) coordinates standards that apply across the industry.”

    Source location

    2021-0159-Response-from-Network-Rail_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response
  2. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    WILLIAM STEVEN ISRAEL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Israel, aged 23, died after entering Canterbury East Railway Station while intoxicated, stepping onto the track and landing on the live rail at approximately 03:45 hours. Concerns included insufficient and inadequately prominent electrocution warnings, the absence of signage at the palisade gates, unimplemented recommendations for under-platform warning signs, and insufficient assessment of risks associated with public access to the station when unstaffed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient and outdated live-rail electrocution warning signage

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There is insufficient signage warning of the risk of electrocution to the public from the live rail and none present at the palisade gates. The evidence at the inquest established that there has been recent national guidance indicating changes to warning signs at railway stations. Signage has not been updated at this station following this death in accordance with that guidance. ”

    Source location

    WILLIAM STEVEN ISRAEL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make live-rail death warnings sufficiently prominent

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence heard from an experienced South Eastern Railway witness was that a national survey has found that there is a widespread assumption by members of the public that: a. Power to the rail tracks is switched off at night b. Power to the rail tracks is only switched on when trains are due This supports that the risk of electrocution from train tracks is not well understood by the public. The risk of electrocution is from the live rail in such cases and the signage at Canterbury East Station relating to this is at each end of the platform. This signs in this vicinity contain the word ‘Caution’; the font used warning of the risk of death was not highlighted and significantly smaller than the rest of the sign. ”

    Source location

    WILLIAM STEVEN ISRAEL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of visible under-platform warning signage

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The British Transport Police Designing Out of Crime Unit (BTP DOCU) investigated this incident and has made a recommendation to consider the placement of strategic under-platform warning signage that would be visible where a member of the public jumping or stepping down onto the tracks. This recommendation has not been implemented. ”

    Source location

    WILLIAM STEVEN ISRAEL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace three warning signs at Canterbury East station entrances with the new design.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(a) Replacing the three warning signs provided at the main entrance and palisade gates at platforms 1 and 2 at Canterbury East station with a new design.”

    Source location

    2020-0271-Further-response-from-Southeastern_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage with the wider rail industry to establish a project reviewing and replacing station warning signs with more informative alternatives.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5 In addition to this we have also engaged with the wider rail industry with a view to establishing a project to review and replace existing station warning signs with more informative alternatives that highlight the “Danger of Death” message.”

    Source location

    2020-0271-Further-response-from-Southeastern_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace three Canterbury East entrance warning signs with the revised design, using “Warning” and greater prominence for electrocution risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11 Action (a): we will replace the three additional signs at Canterbury East station with a new design based on that shown at Annex A.”

    Source location

    2020-0271-Response-from-Southeastern-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The claim that Canterbury East lacked effective live-rail warning signage is disputed because four warning signs were already present before the accident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “27 We do not agree with the comment regarding risk assessment in paragraph 8. We have set out at paragraph 9 above the details of the four signs which were in place prior to the accident which warned of the danger of the live rail. Following the accident, we installed additional signage at all station entrances to highlight this risk and, as set out in paragraphs 10 and 13 above, we have redesigned this signage to take into account your comments and the findings of the University of Birmingham research (see Annex A). In addition, the risk assessments applicable to Canterbury East will be reviewed as part of our routine review processes following an incident and will be updated if appropriate.”

    Source location

    2020-0271-Response-from-Southeastern-Redacted
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Under-platform signage is Network Rail’s responsibility because the relevant platform faces are its assets.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “16 The provision of under-platform signage is a matter for Network Rail as the platform faces concerned are their asset. Southeastern has made representations to Network Rail for such signage to be installed but this has been refused due to concerns that under-platform signs are difficult to maintain, and there is a risk they may obscure developing structural defects in the platform itself. In view of this, Southeastern are unable to take any further action in relation to under-platform signage at Canterbury East or elsewhere.”

    Source location

    2020-0271-Response-from-Southeastern-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further under-platform signage cannot be undertaken because Network Rail refused it over maintenance and structural-defect risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “16 The provision of under-platform signage is a matter for Network Rail as the platform faces concerned are their asset. Southeastern has made representations to Network Rail for such signage to be installed but this has been refused due to concerns that under-platform signs are difficult to maintain, and there is a risk they may obscure developing structural defects in the platform itself. In view of this, Southeastern are unable to take any further action in relation to under-platform signage at Canterbury East or elsewhere.”

    Source location

    2020-0271-Response-from-Southeastern-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 January 2021

    Open published response
  3. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    James Joseph Fennell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Joseph Fennell left a train at Wokingham Station and climbed onto the tracks to cross to the other side. He slipped and made contact with the third rail, resulting in his instant death from electrocution. The principal concern was that warning signs about the risk of electrocution were small, distant, and not visible from the main areas where commuters waited, raising a potential risk at stations nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of visible warnings about live-rail electrocution risk in platform waiting areas

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Signage was reviewed at Wokingham Station following the incident by a Designing Out Crime Unit, and I have the report of ████████ in this respect. No recommendations were made with regard to signage at this station. We heard in evidence that there are small signs at either end of the platform at Wokingham Station, indicating that the lines should not be crossed because of the danger of electrocution. Neither of these signs would be visible from the main area where commuters stand to wait for trains. They are small and some distance away. (3) There is a yellow painted line indicating the safe area away from the platform edge, as well as a white line on the platform edge. There is no tactile paving or crosshatch marking between these two lines. (4) There is no warning of the risk of the live rail visible to commuters on the platform at this station. This is likely to be a situation which is replicated in many stations nationally. (5) It was suggested in evidence that most people are aware of the risks of crossing train tracks in this way. I accepted the evidence of James' mother that he was not aware of this and I am aware of other cases in recent national press in which that was found to be the case. If indeed it is felt that the public is well aware of this risk, then there seems to be little point in having signs at the ends of the platform to warn the public of this. It seems incongruous that the public should need to be warned in an area where there is unlikely to be any member of the public present, but no warning in the areas where most of the members of the public stand to wait for trains. (6) If the purpose of the signs at the ends of the platform is to warn the public of the risk beyond the platforms areas (where the “third rail” is on the nearside of the track), then it seems to me that this risk is a much smaller one, given the much higher footfall in the platform areas – where there are no signs, and no indication whatsoever of this exceptionally high risk. (7) I cannot conceive of many (if any) scenarios in which electrical power of this magnitude would be open and accessible without significant signage and warnings. (8) Whilst James did initially step over the rail, as seen on CCTV, I do not accept that is evidence that James knew of the risk of electrocution. It is human nature to step over a rail when walking, particularly given that the third rail is somewhat elevated. (9) I accept that excessive signage can carry its own risks. It is however surprising that there is no signage visible to members of the public, warning them of this risk, except in areas where they are unlikely to stand. Whilst members of the public may be aware that crossing a train line is dangerous, this may be because of a perception of the risk of oncoming trains, rather than the risk of electrocution. (10)Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that James was intoxicated at the time of these events, this is not the first case of this nature. I consider that there is a risk of future deaths and that other members of the public are likely to be unaware of the significant risk involved in crossing tracks in this way, save in relation to the risk of oncoming trains. (11) I believe this is an issue which is likely to be relevant to stations nationally, and not just to Wokingham Station. ”

    Source location

    James Joseph Fennell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026