Recurring concern

Failure of case monitoring to identify cases requiring follow-up

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First reported 27 Dec 2013•Latest report 4 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of case monitoring, allocation tracking or referral follow-up where the control does not identify that a case has not been seen, assessed or progressed.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to the quality of clinical documentation when they do not concern identifying cases requiring follow-up.
  • Excludes delays or missed actions where no monitoring, tracking or follow-up identification failure is described.
  • Excludes generic staffing, communication or technology deficiencies not explicitly tied to monitoring or follow-up of cases.
Reports
33

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
36

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
49

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
Care Quality Commission5
NHS England3
Egton Medical Information Systems Limited2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
Asthma + Lung UK1
Avenue House Nursing and Care Home1
Bexley Medical Group1
Bow School1
Brighton and Hove City Council1
Bristol NHS Foundation Trust1
British Society Of Gastroenterology1
Bromley by Bow Health Centre1
Chelsea and Westminster Hospital1
City Health Care Partnership CIC1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Coventry

    AI-generated summary

    Roman Louie BARR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Roman Louie Barr suffered an asthma attack on 14 December 2023 and died after information indicating the need for an urgent ambulance response was not obtained, no ambulance was available for several hours, and his family transported him to hospital. The principal concerns included limited awareness and monitoring of excessive salbutamol use, ambulance handover delays affecting emergency availability, risks when families transport critically unwell patients, and unclear NHS Pathways triage wording.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a consistent follow-up process for salbutamol overuse patterns

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Identification and follow-up of reliever overuse Evidence showed that excessive or repeated requests for salbutamol inhalers may not be reliably identified within existing systems, and there may be no consistent process for follow-up when such patterns occur, meaning deteriorating asthma may go unrecognised. ”

    Source location

    Roman Louie BARR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Jamie Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jamie Harding attended Basildon Hospital on 3 June 2022 in crisis, with worsening psychotic symptoms, suicidal ideation and several days without sleep. He was discharged home rather than admitted as an inpatient and took his own life within hours after falling from a window. The substantive concerns included failures in assessment, follow-up, medication review, multidisciplinary working, risk assessment, record keeping and communication, alongside weaknesses in systems supporting the First Response Team and access to the Dual Diagnosis pathway.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the FRT caseload system to ensure efficient follow-up of referrals and queries

    Wider context from the report

    “(a) The accepted absence of effective formal, compulsory training for clinicians regarding the Dual Diagnosis (DD) pathway and what it does and does not provide, how to access it and the potential benefits of it. The evidence confirmed that practitioners outside of the DD workers/pathway were unaware how they could contact them, including directly. (b) In addition to weak record keeping and poor communication with patients and their families, the evidence revealed the lack of a robust and reliable system to ensure that the FRT deals with its caseload efficiently and effectively and that particularity when it flags and then follows up referrals to and queries from other services/clinicians contributing, in turn and on the facts of this case, to the significant failure to hold an MDT. The FRT did not follow up (as it was accepted it should have) the referral (via a self-referral) to Open Road or the referrals for a medication review. Had there been such follow up, EPUT evidence confirmed that there would likely have been a discussion of Jamie’s case at a full MDT with the likely allocation of a Care Coordinator, the likely involvement of the Dual Diagnosis pathway and the likely use of the RAG rating system to ensure on-going risk assessment. In my opinion these features give rise to a clear risk of future deaths and must be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Jamie Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the MaST caseload-management tool with electronic risk, disengagement and RAG indicators supporting MDT prioritisation, and monitor its use through regular audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has implemented the Management and Supervision Tool (MaST) caseload management tool, which is improving how our care coordinators (and their supervisors) electronically manage their caseloads.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 November 2024

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Maria Patricia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maria Patricia Kelly, who lived alone and was in poor health, was found deceased at home by police on 15 May 2024 after concerns were raised by neighbours and a housing officer. The report identifies prolonged lack of contact with primary care and mental health services, numerous failed encounters, and no welfare check until the neighbours’ concerns were raised; the inquest determined natural causes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up repeated failed clinical encounters

    Wider context from the report

    “Ms Kelly’s medical records show that she suffered from a large number of medical conditions including steatosis of the liver, hydronephrosis, left anterior fascicular block, chronic kidney disease, iron deficiency anaemia, gastro-oesophageal reflux, hyperlipidaemia, simple schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, recurrent depressive disorder and anorexia nervosa (possibly in remission). She had been also diagnosed with Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma in the past. She was prescribed repeat medications of Atorvastatin and Lansoprazole for her physical health problems, and Flupentixol (as directed by her consultant) and Mirtazapine for her mental health. A prescription appears to have been last issued by her GP on 1 August 2024. From 23 August 2023 until the practice was notified of her death, her GP summary showed 31 failed encounters for mental health reviews, as well as failed encounters for blood tests and bowel screening. Her last medical (mental health) review with South Camden Rehabilitation of Recovery Team (SCRRT) was on 7 March 2023. Ms Kelly’s care coordinator went on leave in September 2021. Ms Kelly was placed onto the waiting list for allocation of a new care coordinator on 29 December 2023 after a review of the team’s patient list found that there had been no contact with her since 11 August 2023. It was recorded that were “many attempts” (not quantified) to contact her. After a review on 29 December 2023 there were then 12 unsuccessful home visits and 6 failed telephone attempts. Despite this, no welfare check was undertaken, nor any request for a welfare made to her housing officer or police, until neighbours raised concerns on 14 May 2024. ”

    Source location

    Maria Patricia Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the DNA policy to formalise escalation after two consecutive missed appointments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. DNA (Did Not Attend) Policy The DNA policy is currently under review to formalise new working processes in the management of DNA. The policy outlines clear steps for escalating cases after two consecutive missed appointments, ensuring disengaged service users are followed up promptly. The revised policy will be implemented through staff training to ensure consistent implementation. The impact of this policy will be monitored through a Quality Improvement (QI) project.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised DNA policy through staff training and monitor its impact through a quality-improvement project.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. DNA (Did Not Attend) Policy The DNA policy is currently under review to formalise new working processes in the management of DNA. The policy outlines clear steps for escalating cases after two consecutive missed appointments, ensuring disengaged service users are followed up promptly. The revised policy will be implemented through staff training to ensure consistent implementation. The impact of this policy will be monitored through a Quality Improvement (QI) project.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Organise additional London Care Record training to improve information sharing and notification of GPs when concerns or disengagement arise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8. Communication with GPs and LCR (London Care Record) Improving communication with GPs is a priority to ensure coordinated care for service users. We are organising additional training on the use of the London Care Record (LCR) to enhance information sharing between our teams and primary care providers. This will ensure that GPs are promptly notified if concerns arise or if service users disengage from care. The integration of our teams into the new Integrated Community Teams will strengthen collaboration with GPs and other community services, enabling a more coordinated, collaborative and effective approach to care.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2024

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Allan Robin Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Allan Robin Hamilton emailed his GP practice on 14 November 2023 about breathing difficulties, but the email was not responded to until 17 November. He was found unresponsive at home on 19 November and died from lobar pneumonia. The principal concerns were the absence of systems for tracking and triaging email queries and the lack of clear, robust audit and follow-up processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to track and regularly check electronic patient contacts

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that the GP practice in question is owned by SSP Health. The company owns a number of GP practices and that operate on a similar model. Like many GP practices the surgery in question had moved to a system where contact was encouraged electronically. The surgery had no system for tracking email queries such as the one sent by Mr Hamilton and there was no clear system for triage of emails such as the one he sent. The inquest heard evidence that an electronic system of patient referrals is only effective if there is a clear and robust process for checking regularly for patient contacts, a clear audit trial and effective triage by medically qualified members of the team. In Mr Hamilton’s case effective scrutiny of his query and follow up contact from his GP on 14/11 and medical advice would probably have meant he would not have died when he did. The inquest heard evidence that there was a risk of a similar situation arising if GP practices do not have clear and robust triage and audit processes in place. ”

    Source location

    Allan Robin Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement monthly compliance audits of email response times and maintain email auditing as a standing SSP Health process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the steps already mentioned, a monthly compliance audit has been implemented as a preventative measure. This audit reviews email response times to ensure the process remains efficient, with the automated patient response system fully operational.”

    Source location

    Response from SSP - The Pike Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish or update standard operating procedures for managing practice emails.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Response to family members (Appendix A) - Timeline of events (Appendix B) - Action Log (Appendix C) - Update of Automated Email response across all SSP practices (Outlook item attached) - Audits of the Email response times over a six-month period, showing compliance of response times (Appendix E) - Governance Meeting Minutes (Appendix F) - SOPs (Appendix G) - The response to be added to all SSP practice websites. - Educational communications via social media practice accounts - Audit to highlight the automated email and audit of email responses to be a standing process across SSP Health - HR discussions with staff - Staff competency and updated by the practice manager. - Meetings with senior management to discuss.”

    Source location

    Response from SSP - The Pike Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing email controls and established electronic triage systems are considered appropriate for managing non-urgent communications and urgent-care routing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the context of it being widely recognised that emails are not for medical use, The Pike Practice, along with all SSP practices, has a structured system for managing emails. Each email is read, reviewed, and directed to the appropriate staff member. While this process was in place and adhered to at the time of the incident, the email in question was not read within the usual 48-hour window, resulting in a delay of 24 hours beyond our usual internal standard timeframe.”

    Source location

    Response from SSP - The Pike Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Individual practices are responsible for establishing reliable systems and managing email correspondence according to their local requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “General practices are independent businesses who are contracted by NHS commissioners to perform medical services, and as a result it is the responsibility of the individual practice (provider) to have reliable systems in place to manage interactions with patients. If a”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 August 2024

    Open published response
  5. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Linda Heath · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Heath was discharged from hospital with a sacral sore, but the discharge information did not include a required district nursing referral and no referral was made. Her condition worsened, she was admitted to hospital, and she died on 31 March 2022 from sepsis caused by an infected sacral sore. The substantive concerns included inadequate discharge information, failure to arrange district nursing care, insufficient follow-up after discharge, and over-reliance on private domiciliary carers without sufficient enquiry into their remit.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of GP follow-up triggers for recently discharged patients with worsening conditions and missed routine appointments

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) No trigger appears to exist whereby GPs conduct follow up enquiries or visits to patients who have recently been discharged from hospital and who are complaining of a condition which may worsen and failing to attend routine appointments due to a worsening of their condition. ”

    Source location

    Linda Heath · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the review findings with CQC’s Primary and Community Care operations team for consideration in its regulatory response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A national professional advisor and senior specialist for Primary and Community Care at CQC have reviewed the coroner’s letter, evidence bundle, the clinical records and practice response to the integrated care board who would cover the oversight of this GP practice. The findings will be shared with the operations team for Primary and Community Care to consider alongside other information held by CQC. This will inform our regulatory response.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about points 2 and 3 relate to primary care rather than the Trust’s responsive responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Matters of concern at paragraph 5 of the Report are noted, and the Trust responds as it did at the Inquest in relation to points 1 and 4. Points 2 and 3 relate to primary care.”

    Source location

    Response from HUTH
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providers involved in Linda’s care should address the specific care concerns, provide further information, and identify related learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises some concerns that would be more appropriately answered by the providers involved in Linda’s care, who I note you have also addressed your Report to. My response to your focuses on those areas that fall within the remit of NHS England’s national policy and programmes, although my regional colleagues have engaged with the Humber and North Yorkshire Health and Care Partnership on the concerns raised, as this is system in which the providers involved in Linda’s care operate.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oversight of the GP practice is assigned to the integrated care board, while findings inform CQC’s regulatory response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A national professional advisor and senior specialist for Primary and Community Care at CQC have reviewed the coroner’s letter, evidence bundle, the clinical records and practice response to the integrated care board who would cover the oversight of this GP practice. The findings will be shared with the operations team for Primary and Community Care to consider alongside other information held by CQC. This will inform our regulatory response.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  6. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Gerald Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gerald Goodwin, who had Alzheimer’s dementia and had consumed a significant amount of alcohol, was struck by a train while walking along a railway track on 10 November 2022; his death was confirmed at 00:17 on 11 November 2022. The principal concerns were that safeguarding and care-assessment referrals were rejected, closed, or not actioned, with multiple teams and systems failing to communicate effectively and potentially exposing other vulnerable adults to risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Case allocation and deallocation without action or explanatory recording

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Thereafter Mr Goodwin's case was allocated and de-allocated to a social worker within the space of one day, without anything being done. It is said that there is no note or explanation for this. I am concerned that, once again, the ability of a case to be allocated and deallocated within a short period and without anything having been done may enable a case to 'fall through the cracks'. Indeed, the referral for the care assessment was not ultimately actioned until 25th November 2022, 2 weeks after Mr Goodwin died. ”

    Source location

    Gerald Goodwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require recorded explanations for case deallocation and provide management oversight of all case closures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following completion of the witness statement a process was put in place and a directive was shared with Adult Social Care staff on 10th October 2023. This instructs staff that if a case is picked up to be allocated and is subsequently de-allocated this must be recorded as a case note on the electronic case recording system with a clear explanation of why the case is being closed, thus ensuring a clear audit trail is in place. We have also implemented a system where there is management oversight of all case closures to provide increased governance in this area.”

    Source location

    Response from Adult Social Services
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular case-file audits of chronology and completed actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regular case file audits are already in place which do look at the case chronology to ensure that appropriate actions have been taken.”

    Source location

    Response from Adult Social Services
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Kai TAKAGI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kai Takagi attended Chelsea and Westminster Hospital on 11 June 2021 with severe stomach pain and left before an abnormal blood result, suggestive of acute pancreatitis, was received. The hospital planned to contact him but did not do so, and he was found dead at home on 14 June 2021; the stated medical cause of death was acute peritonitis from a perforated gastric ulcer. Concerns included inadequate tracking and follow-up of patients who leave with outstanding abnormal test results, reliance on oral handover, and incomplete implementation of a clinician-led review system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to track outstanding diagnostic results for patients leaving the Accident and Emergency Department

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Patients that leave the hospital Accident and Emergency Department with outstanding blood results or other diagnostic tests are not followed up and “tracked” in the same way that in-patients are, thus giving rise to the risk that they are missed and urgent follow-up care is not actioned or offered. ”

    Source location

    Kai TAKAGI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish national standards for communicating diagnostic test results after hospital discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In your Report you raised the concern that patients that leave Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments with outstanding diagnostic test results are not followed up and tracked. Both NHS England and the Royal Colleges have published national guidance and standards for following up on test results following discharge from hospital, please see below:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 December 2023

    Open published response
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Sylvia Pollitt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sylvia Pollitt, an elderly resident, raised a concern about her boiler, but the subcontractor could not contact her and the situation was not escalated. She was found at home on 1 December 2022 and the post-mortem found that she had died from complications of hypothermia. The inquest identified that welfare checks were not carried out and that the Housing Association lacked systems to monitor non-escalation and referral outcomes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to capture and monitor referral outcomes

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that under the SLA between the Housing Association and Liberty if there is non-contact following a referral then this should be escalated back to the Housing Association so that they can carry out welfare checks and assess the position further. Carrying out of welfare checks for vulnerable adults ensures that they are safe and well. That did not happen in Mrs Pollitt’s case. The evidence before the inquest was that the Housing Association had: 1. No audit system which enabled it to know if this issue of non-escalation by Liberty was a one off or a frequent issue. They had only become aware of the non-contact in this instance following Sylvia Pollitt’s death. 2. No system where they captured/monitored the outcome of each referral to their subcontractor e.g. non-contact; successful attendance. ”

    Source location

    Sylvia Pollitt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Align property services and building compliance policies and processes, including gas safety and contractor management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To provide some context, we would like to highlight that Mrs Pollitt’s death occurred during a transition phase for L&Q and the previous Trafford Housing Trust (“THT”), this was as the two entities were integrating, a process which completed on 31st March 2023. The processes in place at the time were those of THT. This is not intended to avoid any ownership of the incident on our part, it is to provide the context. We have since aligned the L&Q property services and building compliance policies and processes, which includes the gas safety and contractor management processes. This shall, as we will hopefully demonstrate, now provide greater control and will prevent future deaths from these incidents occurring.”

    Source location

    Response from L&Q
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all gas repairs closed outside the agreed service level without reference back, tracing records and identifying closure reasons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As soon as we were aware of the incident and the inquest, we immediately reviewed every other gas repair request which had been closed by Liberty outside of the agreed SLA and without reference back to L&Q.”

    Source location

    Response from L&Q
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record relevant calls centrally and track every repair through the internal housing management system to maintain an auditable trail.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the inquest and prior to your formal recommendations contained within this Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths report, we had immediately put in place additional processes and checks. This included aligning the process of the former THT with that of L&Q where all calls of this nature are recorded by and within the central call centre prior to being passed to contractors, ensuring that a comprehensive record of all repairs is tracked and managed through our internal housing management system. The previous THT process was to transfer the resident call directly to the contractor, in this incident Liberty.”

    Source location

    Response from L&Q
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold weekly contractor meetings, reconcile work-in-progress reports with internal records, and review every repair to prevent unauthorised abortion without escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That notwithstanding, we have subsequently instituted weekly meetings with Liberty to review every single job raised to trace all those in progress, overdue, completed and requested to be aborted. A full Work In Progress (WIP) report is produced by Liberty which is reconciled against the list held by L&Q and is reviewed by the Gas Compliance Manager weekly to ensure every single repair is accounted for. No jobs are permitted or are possible to be aborted directly by Liberty without reference back to L&Q and the report records all reasons for no access and dates of escalation back to L&Q.”

    Source location

    Response from L&Q
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatically follow up incomplete or requested-aborted repairs and escalate unsuccessful resident contact for an in-person welfare check.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All cases of incomplete and requested aborted jobs are automatically followed up by the L&Q gas team to make contact with the resident and if this is unsuccessful, they are immediately passed to the housing management team to make an in-person welfare check.”

    Source location

    Response from L&Q
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response
  9. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Hugo Carlos · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hugo Carlos died in November 2021 after developing obstructive jaundice caused by a liver lesion and undergoing procedures including biliary drain insertion and hepatic artery embolization. The principal concern was that the EMIS system did not reliably alert general practitioners when follow-up investigations were due, placing responsibility on patients and creating a continuing risk that patients could be lost to necessary follow-up.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the practice follow-up system to ensure investigations are completed at the correct time

    Wider context from the report

    “A partner in the Deceased’s general practice gave evidence to the Inquest that the practice uses the EMIS system, and that, unlike SystemOne, the system does not have a scheduled task feature which would allow the GP to create an alert on a patient’s record to flag up when a task is due at a future date – eg an alert to book a follow up scan in one year. I have been informed that EMIS does allow a future entry into a patient’s record (a diary date), but this must be for a specific clinical code and the only way to see that there is a due diary date entry is to access the patient’s record and view the summary page or diary section. Unless the GP has reason to inspect the patient’s clinical record and examine the summary or diary pages there is no way of being alerted that a new task needs to be completed for that patient. Further, it is not possible to add a pop-up linked diary date entry for a specific task (such as a scan) outside the EMIS determined list. This creates a situation where the responsibility for ensuring that follow up investigations are undertaken at the correct time is placed onto the patient, and the patient will have to contact the GP to request follow-up. In this case the Deceased was diligent in contacting his GP surgery to request repeat scans, but I consider that unless some action is taken there is a continuing risk of patients not contacting the GP to make a request for follow-up and therefore becoming lost to necessary follow-up. ”

    Source location

    Hugo Carlos · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Demet AKCICEK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Demet Akcicek was found dead in bed beside her sleeping seven-year-old son on the morning of 27 May 2022. The inquest determined that she died after taking an excess of prescribed and online-obtained medication, and that she did not intend to take her life. Concerns included a failure by a mental health service worker to arrange follow-up after a welfare call, and an insufficiently clear record of that call.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify patients requiring service review for multidisciplinary discussion and follow-up

    Wider context from the report

    “When the duty worker from Islington complex depression, anxiety and trauma (CDAT) service rang Ms Akcicek for a welfare check on 25 November 2021, Ms Akcicek reported feeling “quite bad” and that she wanted to cry. She explained that she had difficulty performing everyday activities such as cooking and taking her child to school. She said that two nights earlier, her son reported that she had woken chanting, “I don’t want to die, I don’t want to die”. The duty worker (a registered mental health nurse) formed the view that Ms Akcicek needed to be seen by the service, but failed to put her name on the board, and so she was not discussed at the multi disciplinary team meeting and no follow up was arranged. In addition, the duty worker accepted in court that her note of the conversation was insufficient. I found the note difficult to understand and the duty worker was not able fully to explain its meaning. The duty worker told me that she will not make such mistakes again. However, I did not hear evidence of what steps, if any, Camden & Islington Trust has taken to avoid such a situation arising in future. ”

    Source location

    Demet AKCICEK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the updated CDAT operational policy and daily duty tracker, with same-day logging and senior daily cross-checks for follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly I would like to offer sincere apologies to Ms Akcicek’s family on behalf of both the CDAT team and the Trust for this error which led to her not being followed up by the team. In order to address this and prevent it happening again, the team manager and service manager have updated the CDAT Operational Policy and have implemented a daily duty sheet/tracker. All matters dealt with on duty are logged immediately on this sheet which are then cross checked at 4.30pm daily by the senior on duty to handover and ensure appropriate follow up for all issues logged. A copy of the amended Operational policy incorporating this new process is enclosed with this response.”

    Source location

    Response from Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and monitor the new duty-tracking process through scheduled review, audit and governance processes to ensure effective embedding.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This new process has been discussed at the team business meeting and was officially started on 24th October. It will be reviewed in 6 weeks’ time and monitored going forward through audit and governance processes, to ensure that it is embedded in the team’s usual business practice and is working effectively. It will be included in the induction of new staff who join the team.”

    Source location

    Response from Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include the new duty-tracking process in induction for new CDAT staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This new process has been discussed at the team business meeting and was officially started on 24th October. It will be reviewed in 6 weeks’ time and monitored going forward through audit and governance processes, to ensure that it is embedded in the team’s usual business practice and is working effectively. It will be included in the induction of new staff who join the team.”

    Source location

    Response from Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026