Recurring concern

Inadequate railway platform-edge safety markings

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First reported 30 Aug 2018•Latest report 19 Nov 2019

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated railway platform-edge markings, including absent, poorly positioned, unclear or inadequate cross-hatched, tactile, yellow-line or comparable markings intended to identify the safe area and warn or guide passengers near platform edges.

Not included

  • Excludes general railway trespass, gates, fencing, track-access or live-rail warning deficiencies where platform-edge markings are not the unsafe control.
  • Excludes generic signage or public-warning deficiencies unless they specifically concern markings at the platform edge.
  • Excludes ordinary road markings and pedestrian-crossing markings outside railway platforms.
  • Excludes failures limited to passenger behaviour or supervision where no platform-edge marking deficiency is identified.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
2

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2018–2019

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
0

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

First MTR South Western Trains Limited1
Office of Rail and Road1
West Midlands Trains Limited1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    James Joseph Fennell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Joseph Fennell left a train at Wokingham Station and climbed onto the tracks to cross to the other side. He slipped and made contact with the third rail, resulting in his instant death from electrocution. The principal concern was that warning signs about the risk of electrocution were small, distant, and not visible from the main areas where commuters waited, raising a potential risk at stations nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of tactile paving or crosshatch marking between platform safe-area and edge lines

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Signage was reviewed at Wokingham Station following the incident by a Designing Out Crime Unit, and I have the report of ████████ in this respect. No recommendations were made with regard to signage at this station. We heard in evidence that there are small signs at either end of the platform at Wokingham Station, indicating that the lines should not be crossed because of the danger of electrocution. Neither of these signs would be visible from the main area where commuters stand to wait for trains. They are small and some distance away. (3) There is a yellow painted line indicating the safe area away from the platform edge, as well as a white line on the platform edge. There is no tactile paving or crosshatch marking between these two lines. (4) There is no warning of the risk of the live rail visible to commuters on the platform at this station. This is likely to be a situation which is replicated in many stations nationally. (5) It was suggested in evidence that most people are aware of the risks of crossing train tracks in this way. I accepted the evidence of James' mother that he was not aware of this and I am aware of other cases in recent national press in which that was found to be the case. If indeed it is felt that the public is well aware of this risk, then there seems to be little point in having signs at the ends of the platform to warn the public of this. It seems incongruous that the public should need to be warned in an area where there is unlikely to be any member of the public present, but no warning in the areas where most of the members of the public stand to wait for trains. (6) If the purpose of the signs at the ends of the platform is to warn the public of the risk beyond the platforms areas (where the “third rail” is on the nearside of the track), then it seems to me that this risk is a much smaller one, given the much higher footfall in the platform areas – where there are no signs, and no indication whatsoever of this exceptionally high risk. (7) I cannot conceive of many (if any) scenarios in which electrical power of this magnitude would be open and accessible without significant signage and warnings. (8) Whilst James did initially step over the rail, as seen on CCTV, I do not accept that is evidence that James knew of the risk of electrocution. It is human nature to step over a rail when walking, particularly given that the third rail is somewhat elevated. (9) I accept that excessive signage can carry its own risks. It is however surprising that there is no signage visible to members of the public, warning them of this risk, except in areas where they are unlikely to stand. Whilst members of the public may be aware that crossing a train line is dangerous, this may be because of a perception of the risk of oncoming trains, rather than the risk of electrocution. (10)Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that James was intoxicated at the time of these events, this is not the first case of this nature. I consider that there is a risk of future deaths and that other members of the public are likely to be unaware of the significant risk involved in crossing tracks in this way, save in relation to the risk of oncoming trains. (11) I believe this is an issue which is likely to be relevant to stations nationally, and not just to Wokingham Station. ”

    Source location

    James Joseph Fennell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  2. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel James O'Mahony · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 18 December 2017, Daniel James O’Mahony was struck and killed by a train at Hemel Hempstead Railway Station after jumping from the platform onto the track. The concerns identified included inadequate signage, anti-trespass measures, platform markings, gaps between platforms, and the absence of gates to prevent unauthorised access.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of cross-hatched yellow paint on fast line platforms 1 and 2

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Cross hatching yellow paint is not present on the fast line platforms 1 and 2. To clearly demark the area. ”

    Source location

    Daniel James O'Mahony · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cross-hatching is not required because existing fencing, gates and platform barriers adequately manage fast-line access during normal operations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail advise that there is no requirement for cross hatching in any Network Rail standard. It has been used in isolation where there is a passenger train interface issue or risk identified such as overcrowding around stairs and where fast trains pass through narrow platforms. This is not an issue at Hemel Hempstead on these 2 platforms as Platform 1 where fast trains pass through is fenced and gated off to the public when trains are running normally as per the timetable. These gates allow access as and when Platform 1 is needed for stopping trains such as during engineering works, in perturbation such as a track blockage, or an infrastructure failure on the slow railway lines.”

    Source location

    2018-0258-Response-by-West-Midlands-Railway
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 September 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026