Recurring concern

Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionable

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First reported 12 Sep 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of electronic patient-record systems or their dedicated workflows that prevent relevant information from being reliably accessed, displayed, preserved, shared, handed over or acted upon across clinical care.

Not included

  • Excludes failures concerning paper-only records or information sharing with no explicit electronic patient-record connection.
  • Excludes generic failures of clinical attention, staffing, training or communication unless the report directly ties them to the electronic patient-record system or its dedicated workflow.
  • Excludes concerns about the clinical decision itself where the electronic patient-record system did not contribute to the information-access or action failure.
  • Excludes unrelated information systems that are not electronic patient-record systems or directly integrated clinical-record workflows.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
75

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
102

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care19
NHS England19
Care Quality Commission5
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust3
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership2
Ministry of Justice2
NHS Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board2
Appello Careline Limited1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Association Of British Neurologists1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Birmingham Women'S and Children'S NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Thomas Burt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Thomas Burt died at home on 15 May 2025 after a spontaneous rupture of an arterio-venous malformation at the back of his right ankle caused severe bleeding. The report raises concerns about communication between the careline service and ambulance services, including failure to pass on key information, delays in escalating the emergency, inadequate recording of information, and the loss of opportunities to provide basic first-aid advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record clinically relevant information in EMA notes

    Wider context from the report

    “4) Likewise I heard from the SECAMB CSN that she had carried out an audit of the EMA notes added to their system when speaking to the first careline operator. She did so from a clinical perspective and she discovered missing information that was given but not recorded at all namely: that there had already been 20 minutes of bleeding at the time of the first call (approx. 22:43); Mr Burt was not responding normally/groaning; and Mrs Burt was bedbound therefore could not assist Mr Burt. None of this information was therefore available to the CSN who carried out the clinical review. In addition I heard that the end to end review carried out by SECAMB and focused on the dispatch difficulties that existed on 14 May 2025. I appreciate that the dispatch and clinical review systems were different at that time and have now been changed but I remain concerned that the quality of note taking has not been properly checked and action taken to rectify then make improvements with any individual concerned as well as capturing learning points for others. Here vital information was missing and was needed to ensure an effective clinical review could take place and thereby ensure that the category of call response is accurate. I was told this call had been audited and was found to be 95% compliant. This also calls into question the quality of the call auditing system ”

    Source location

    Derek Thomas Burt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contribute to NHS Pathways discussions and share learning about documentation standards and audit weighting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has also reviewed the audit findings associated with this case. During that review it was identified that documentation quality forms a relatively small component of the current NHS Pathways audit framework. SECAMB has discussed this concern with NHS Pathways, recognising the Coroner's observations regarding the significance of missing or inaccurate information within call records. As the national audit framework is owned and maintained by NHS Pathways, any review of the weighting applied to documentation standards sits within their remit. SECAMB will continue to contribute to discussions and share learning where opportunities for improvement are identified.”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review local assurance processes to identify, escalate and address significant omissions in emergency call records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The learning arising from this case has also informed local discussions regarding the assessment of documentation quality within assurance and audit processes, with a view to ensuring that significant omissions within call records are identified, escalated and addressed through appropriate learning and improvement activity.”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review training, guidance and development enhancements to improve Emergency Medical Advisors’ documentation of emergency calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst these longer-term technological developments continue to be explored, the Trust has taken immediate action by raising the learning identified through this inquest with the Training Department. A review is underway to determine what enhancements can be made to training, guidance and development processes to further support Emergency Medical Advisors in accurately documenting information obtained during emergency calls. This will be in place by the close of the financial year.”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen CPD and learning programmes for QSF-certified organisations, covering records, operator competence, training, decision-support tools, escalation, and information-sharing with emergency services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Opportunities exist to strengthen guidance and operational procedures in these areas to help reduce the risk of similar issues occurring in the future and these will be addressed through future TEC Quality CPD e-learning programme and through strengthened QSF criteria for all certified TEC Monitoring Auditees to ensure the quality of TEC call monitoring and response.”

    Source location

    Response from Telecare Services Association
    Page 8 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Note-taking and clinical triage concerns are the responsibility of the relevant ambulance service, so no further action is proposed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concerns 4 and 5 Appello Careline Limited understands that these concerns relate to the ambulance service’s internal processes, including note taking and clinical triage decision-making.”

    Source location

    Response from Appello Careline Operations Director
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The specific case concerns should be addressed by Appello and SECAMB, rather than by the national ambulance membership organisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With respect to the matters of concern in relation to the care of Derek Burt, AACE is not in a position to respond; the specific details relate to and should subsequently be addressed by both Appello and SECAMB.”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Internal ambulance processes concerning note-taking, auditing, clinical advice and escalation fall outside the respondent’s ability to influence or comment on them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “TEC Quality response to points 4 and 5:”

    Source location

    Response from Telecare Services Association
    Page 7 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about Apello Careline’s emergency-call guidance, information handling and artificial intelligence trials are outside NHS England’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concerns 2,3, and 6 relate to the Apello Careline company, and as such are not within NHS England’s remit to comment on. As your Report has also been addressed to the Apello Careline company they will be best placed to respond to these concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apello Careline is best placed to respond to concerns about its emergency-call guidance, information handling and artificial intelligence trials.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concerns 2,3, and 6 relate to the Apello Careline company, and as such are not within NHS England’s remit to comment on. As your Report has also been addressed to the Apello Careline company they will be best placed to respond to these concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Katharine Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katharine Emma Corrigan, a patient detained under the Mental Health Act, died by suicide after failing to return from unescorted leave on 22 July 2023. The report identifies concerns about failures in the management and recording of Section 17 leave, inadequate risk assessments and care planning, staffing and oversight, and failures concerning access to recognised treatment for a pre-existing hormonal imbalance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Electronic Section 17 Leave recording failing to preserve leave timings, conditions and return visibility

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Section 17 Leave forms and the process of recording of the required components for timings and conditions of such leave had been changed by the Trust in May 2023 from a paper system to electronic recording. The new system: a. omitted previously detailed information on the timings and conditions of the leave that included required scrutiny by a qualified mental health nurse. b. Staff then recorded some information on the Bed State document and evidence was this was not the purpose of this document and led to lack of visibility of any patient who had not returned at the specified time. This was not questioned or queried by senior staff. c. Senior management staff gave evidence that they were unaware of the lack of visibility of the conditions for Section 17 leave under the new electronic system of recording and had not been consulted when the changes were being made. This was still the system in place. ”

    Source location

    Katharine Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    John Malcolm FISHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Malcolm Fisher was admitted to hospital on 22 April 2025 with persistent focal seizures that developed into status epilepticus, and he died on 4 May 2025 after the seizures could not be controlled. The report raises concerns about inaccurate or incomplete medication information during transfers between community services and the omission of sodium valproate from the care agency’s medication record, resulting in six days without that medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer all prescribed medication into the electronic MAR and cross-check it at agency handover

    Wider context from the report

    “5) Coastal Healthcare indicated that a mistake was made when documenting the medications in that although the UCR handwritten forms included sodium valproate oral solution, this was not added at all into the Coastal Homecare electronic MAR chart. As a result, Coastal Homecare accepted that between 16 April to 21 April (6 days) Mr Fisher did not receive any sodium valproate oral solution. This was one of three liquid antiepileptic drugs Mr Fisher should have received to help control possible seizures. This mistake was not spotted at all and there is no system in place to cross check what has previously been given when there is a handover between different care agencies nor was there any liaison with the community pharmacy who regularly dispensed Mr Fisher's medication. ”

    Source location

    John Malcolm FISHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a formal review of the MAR chart SOP for UCR and Home First services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action taken and planned:”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the MAR chart SOP with guidance on discontinued medicines remaining in patients’ homes and mandatory GP second checks for discrepancies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The SOP is being updated to include explicit guidance on the management of recently discontinued medications that remain physically present in the home, including a mandatory second check with the GP where discrepancies arise.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and implement UCR referral documentation to require receiving agencies to reconcile medicines with prescribers and pharmacies and clarify that UCR MAR charts are for SCFT staff only.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• UCR referral documentation is being revised to clearly reinforce current agreements that receiving care agencies must undertake their own medicines reconciliation directly with the prescriber and community pharmacy.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen referral-pathway expectations that medicines reconciliation is confirmed when care responsibility transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• SCFT has strengthened expectations within referral pathways that medicines reconciliation must be confirmed at transitions of care, particularly where responsibility for medicines administration is transferring.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a themed review of UCR medication incidents involving MAR charts and report findings through Trust governance structures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A themed review of medication incidents involving MAR charts within UCR is underway to inform ongoing quality improvement, training, and assurance.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Photograph all medicines present at assessment and onboarding for every new care package.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following changes have now been implemented:”

    Source location

    Response from Coastal Homecare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to cross-check medicines against prescribing records, administration records, and referral documentation during handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following changes have now been implemented:”

    Source location

    Response from Coastal Homecare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Receiving care agencies are responsible for medicines reconciliation with prescribers and pharmacies; SCFT MAR charts are not definitive records for external providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• UCR referral documentation is being revised to clearly reinforce current agreements that receiving care agencies must undertake their own medicines reconciliation directly with the prescriber and community pharmacy.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  4. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Roger Knight SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Roger Knight SMITH, who had cerebral amyloid angiopathy and a history of strokes, was readmitted to West Suffolk Hospital in August 2023 and received tinzaparin for venous thromboembolism prophylaxis. He later suffered a cerebral haemorrhage and died on 12 September 2023; the inquest narrative attributed his death to the effects of a stroke brought about by tinzaparin administration. The principal concerns were failures in the electronic records system to flag relevant anticoagulation advice, inadequate communication with the patient and his family, and insufficient timely specialist stroke-team input.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the patient records management system to accurately highlight important information for patient care and treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that the West Suffolk Hospital patient records management system is ineffective in accurately highlighting important information which should inform patient care and treatment. ”

    Source location

    Roger Knight SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the patient records management system to accurately highlight important information for patient care and treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “Important information relating to advice concerning the prescription of anti-coagulation therapy (low weight molecular heparin - LWMH) for venous thromboembolism (VTE) prophylaxis and which was contained in Mr. Smith’s medical records, was not flagged for clinician attention as part of the electronic records management system in use at West Suffolk Hospital. This meant that when Mr. Smith was readmitted on the 25th August 2023, this information did not form part of the reviewing consultants considerations and would not be thought to precribe tinzaparin (LWMH) to Mr. Smith for VTE prophylaxis. He subsequently received 8 doses of tinzaparin which contributed to him suffering a catastrophic stroke that led to his death. ”

    Source location

    Roger Knight SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider adding an explicit CAA bleeding-risk prompt to the VTE assessment tool through the Thrombosis Committee and embed any agreed change in Trust guidelines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• WSFT will take forward a clinically-led change to strengthen the visibility of risk factors within the existing VTE assessment processes.”

    Source location

    2026-0069 - Response from West Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop the safer handovers quality-improvement project to improve highlighting of essential information during nurse-to-nurse transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There is also a Quality Improvement Project (QIP) on ‘safer handovers’ currently underway. Although this project is looking to improve the reported safety and effectiveness of nurse-to-nurse transfers between adult inpatient wards, part of this involves looking at how essential information is highlighted. It is hoped this project will improve the quality of records which is accessible to all healthcare teams and drive-up standards.”

    Source location

    2026-0069 - Response from West Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An automated CAA anticoagulation alert cannot be implemented because eCare lacks the necessary functionality and reliable evidence base.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This concern has been reviewed by the Digital and Medicine teams to explore if it is possible to create a digital solution for this issue and to consider the process of adding alerts to the electronic patient record system, known locally as eCare. Unfortunately, based on current system capabilities, it is not possible to create an automated digital alert within eCare to warn prescribers against anticoagulating patients with cerebral amyloid angiopathy (CAA).”

    Source location

    2026-0069 - Response from West Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  5. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Valerie Jane Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Valerie Jane Gibson died on 29 October 2023 at Monkwearmouth Hospital after being admitted under the Mental Health Act with psychotic symptoms and assessed as being at risk of self-harm and harm to others. The principal concerns were uncertainty and inconsistency in the checking of possessions, dispensing and administration of medication, supervision of nurses, and use of the Omnicell and electronic medication record systems, resulting in unclear records of what medication had been dispensed or administered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent use of the Omnicell cabinet and electronic medication record

    Wider context from the report

    “There was no consistency in the evidence from the nursing staff as to the correct use of the Omnicell medication cabinet and the electronic medication record (ePMA). This resulted in different approaches being taken leading to differences between medication recorded as being dispensed from the Omnicell cabinet and that being recorded as administered to the patient on the electronic medication record (ePMA). Between 27th and 29th October 2023 Valerie’s Omnicell record showed that liquid medication had been dispensed for her. She was not prescribed this medication. Her electronic medication record (ePMA) showed that tablet medication was administered to her which was her prescribed medication. ”

    Source location

    Valerie Jane Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the actual administering nurse on the electronic medication record

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence highlighted a lack of understanding with regard to supervision requirements for preceptee nurses resulting in medication being administered without supervision and being recorded on a patient’s electronic medication record (ePMA) as being administered by a different registered nurse. ”

    Source location

    Valerie Jane Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Configure ARMS alerts so ward pharmacy teams can deliver face-to-face Omnicell training during newly employed nursing staff’s induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- An alert on the Trusts Access Request Management System (ARMS) has been established to alert ward-based pharmacy teams whenever a new member of Trust nursing staff commences employment so that face to face Omnicell training can be delivered during their induction period.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and deliver face-to-face Omnicell training for ward pharmacy teams, with training offered to bed-based nursing teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Ward based pharmacy teams have received updated face to face Omnicell training, this updated training has also been offered to nursing teams across bed based services.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update Omnicell guides and training checklists, publish them on the intranet, and circulate them through the Trust bulletin.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Omnicell guides and training checklists have been updated and are available to all staff on the Trust intranet and have been circulated via the Trust bulletin.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise nursing medicines competency assessment requirements covering EPMA, Omnicell, formulations, liquid disposal, supervision scenarios and medicines-administration sequencing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Nursing staff medicines competencies have been reviewed and updated to include use of EPMA and Omnicell.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Medicines Optimisation Policy and medicines-management e-learning package for Omnicell competencies and EPMA use, and circulate the policy updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- The Trust Medicines Optimisation Policy and medicines management e-learning package have also received updates related to Omnicell task competencies and use of EPMA, policy updates have been circulated to staff via the Trust policy bulletin.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a Task and Finish group developing further safer-medicines-administration actions, including mandatory Omnicell assessment, competency support and possible medicines-management roles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- In addition to the above, a Task and Finish group has been established to develop further actions and initiatives related to safer practice in medicines administration. The group met initially on 22/1/2026 and are scoping:”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Integration of Omnicell and EPMA is currently not viable because evidence is limited, costs are significant, and integration may introduce patient safety risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Potential integration of the two systems (a ‘closed loop system’) has been considered in conjunction with NHS England and Omnicell. At the present time integration of Omnicell and EPMA is not a viable option. There is limited published evidence from the acute sector of successful integration and no examples of integration within a Mental Health Trust. The process of integration would involve significant financial investment as well as the introduction of patient allocated barcodes / wristbands, which may bring unintended patient safety risks and would require careful consideration and consultation with stakeholders.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  6. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Hannah Louise Booth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hannah Louise Booth, who had been diagnosed with post-natal depression after giving birth in July 2024, drowned in the Goyt River on 6 January 2025 after sending a message evidencing her intention to take her own life. The report identified concerns about information sharing between services, including different record systems, incomplete records, and relevant information about Hannah being recorded only in her baby’s records. Increasing contact about her baby’s development was not shared with perinatal mental health services or recognised as potentially indicating that Hannah was struggling.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a single electronic patient record accessible to all services

    Wider context from the report

    “This inquest has exposed important issues with information sharing between services and also within services. Those issues are: • Difficulties encountered because different IT systems were being used for record keeping in different services. Essentially a lack of a single patient record. • A lack of a shared understanding of what is relevant information and needs to be made available to other services. • Relevant notes being made in records of baby and not repeated in notes of the mum. Further detail: 1. Sett Valley, the health visitors and perinatal mental health services all had information about Hannah that was potentially relevant to her mental health, but none had the whole picture. It was evident that had those within the perinatal mental health services known about Hannah’s increasing frequency of contact with services about her baby’s development, it would have prompted further contact by them with Hannah and prompted a review of risk and support offered. They did not know and there was no further contact. 2. There was no single electronic patient record accessible to all services. Whilst the perinatal mental health and health visitors used SystmOne, Sett Valley did not. The health visitor had not informed Sett Valley about the contact Hannah had had with them on 27th December so that the GP seeing Hannah on 31st did not know that Hannah was beginning to make increased contact with services about her concerns and did not share any information about that consultation with other services. 3. There was increasing contact with health visitors that was not escalated to or shared with perinatal mental health. The significance of the increased contact, to Hannah’s mental health, did not appear to have been understood. The concerns raised at each contact around her baby’s development were dealt with at face value with exploration and examination of her baby’s development and reassurances given to Hannah regarding the particular concerns raised. The evidence revealed that it was not the individual concerns raised that were relevant to Hannah’s mental health but the fact that she was making more frequent contact which suggested she was struggling. There are no policies, guidance or any shared understanding between services of what might be relevant information to be shared and when. 4. Within both Sett Valley and health visitor records there was potentially important information relevant to Hannah’s mental health recorded only within her baby’s records. At any future appointments concerning Hannah the relevant medical history available on her record would have been incomplete. It also meant that whilst the perinatal mental health services had access to the health visitor notes in relation to Hannah (because they both used SystmOne), even had they had cause to look at Hannah’s notes they would still not have had all relevant information. There are no policies or guidance regarding when information potentially relevant to both mother and baby should be placed in both records or cross referenced. This appears to be particularly important in the perinatal period. ”

    Source location

    Hannah Louise Booth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share identified non-SystmOne GP practices with Perinatal CMHT clinicians and administrators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SystmOne ‘alert’ Following the conclusion of the Inquest, the Perinatal CMHT has undertaken an audit of GP’s within its catchment area who do not use the same electronic patient record, SystmOne and have shared this information with all clinicians and administrators internally for awareness. To ensure continuing knowledge internally of GP’s who do not use SystmOne, the Trust is in the process of adding an ‘alert’ onto patients’ medical records as a reminder / notification. The Trust has taken this specific action wider than the Perinatal CMHT to include the High Peak CMHT / CRHT as that is the geographical area that the Trust covers where GP’s do not have SystmOne; in other areas GP’s do have SystmOne.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add alerts to patient records identifying GP practices that do not use SystmOne.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SystmOne ‘alert’ Following the conclusion of the Inquest, the Perinatal CMHT has undertaken an audit of GP’s within its catchment area who do not use the same electronic patient record, SystmOne and have shared this information with all clinicians and administrators internally for awareness. To ensure continuing knowledge internally of GP’s who do not use SystmOne, the Trust is in the process of adding an ‘alert’ onto patients’ medical records as a reminder / notification. The Trust has taken this specific action wider than the Perinatal CMHT to include the High Peak CMHT / CRHT as that is the geographical area that the Trust covers where GP’s do not have SystmOne; in other areas GP’s do have SystmOne.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft an information leaflet explaining different electronic records, their impact, and risk mitigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Information leaflet to GP’s on referral The Perinatal CMHT has drafted an information leaflet for GPs setting out that this Trust and the GP practice use different electronic patient record systems, highlighting the impact of this and detailing risk mitigation. This leaflet will be sent to GPs on receipt of a referral from them if they do not have the same electronic patient record. An additional page has been added to the e-referral document for professionals regarding the sharing of contextual information around the patient. A patient will also be informed that their GP is not on the same electronic patient record so that they too are aware that information sharing is not automatic at the time of their appointment.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send the electronic-record information leaflet to GPs when referring patients from practices using different systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Information leaflet to GP’s on referral The Perinatal CMHT has drafted an information leaflet for GPs setting out that this Trust and the GP practice use different electronic patient record systems, highlighting the impact of this and detailing risk mitigation. This leaflet will be sent to GPs on receipt of a referral from them if they do not have the same electronic patient record. An additional page has been added to the e-referral document for professionals regarding the sharing of contextual information around the patient. A patient will also be informed that their GP is not on the same electronic patient record so that they too are aware that information sharing is not automatic at the time of their appointment.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add contextual-information-sharing guidance to the electronic referral document for professionals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Information leaflet to GP’s on referral The Perinatal CMHT has drafted an information leaflet for GPs setting out that this Trust and the GP practice use different electronic patient record systems, highlighting the impact of this and detailing risk mitigation. This leaflet will be sent to GPs on receipt of a referral from them if they do not have the same electronic patient record. An additional page has been added to the e-referral document for professionals regarding the sharing of contextual information around the patient. A patient will also be informed that their GP is not on the same electronic patient record so that they too are aware that information sharing is not automatic at the time of their appointment.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide team training on using EMIS interoperability to view SystemOne within two months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the Significant Event Meeting the Practice discussed the fact that we have the ability to view SystemOne but this ability is quite limited as only the patient’s most recent entries can be viewed. Staff would need to have a reason to access this information as it is not feasible to check this for every patient. We as a practice refer patients to a number of other services which use different IT systems such as Mental Health Services, Hospitals and Community services. It was agreed that we will provide training for the team on using the interoperability function in EMIS to view SystemOne and this training will be given within 2 months of this Response.”

    Source location

    Response from Sett Valley Medical centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide £20 million investment to connect care records across England by March 2026.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England recognises the challenge of separate systems being used by different health and social care organisations. New initiatives and systems are being designed to integrate records. NHS England has invested £20 million to connect care records across England by March 2026. This will facilitate the safe and secure exchange of electronic health data across different systems, devices and applications. It is also expected that this will improve the information available to health and social care staff.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop the Single Patient Record to provide unified access to patient information across care settings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Work is also progressing to develop a Single Patient Record (SPR). The SPR aims to provide a clear, unified view of a patient’s health and care history, regardless of where”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the Summary Care Record Programme to support wider access to relevant patient information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is aware of the challenges in sharing medical records between providers and the variability between areas using different technologies. We are also aware that use of the SCR is variable across different care settings.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Configuration and interoperability of clinical record systems across NHS providers and GP practices fall outside the Trust’s direct control and remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledges that variations in clinical IT systems across NHS organisations can present challenges to the timely sharing of patient information. However, the configuration, interoperability and alignment of clinical record systems across NHS providers and GP practices are determined at a national and system level and sit outside the direct control and remit of the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Community Health Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Resolving the absence of a unified patient record requires system-wide and national action overseen by NHS England, rather than action by an individual Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust notes that the absence of a single, unified patient record across all NHS and GP settings is a longstanding national issue, overseen by NHS England. Any substantive resolution to this issue would require system-wide and national action, rather than action by an individual NHS Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Community Health Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing universal health visiting, professional communication, GP liaison and record-access arrangements address local information-sharing needs despite the absence of a single record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Notwithstanding these system-level constraints, the Trust has robust arrangements in place to ensure that children and young people receive universal health visiting services, and GP practices are aware of and able to engage with those services.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Community Health Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changing from EMIS to SystmOne would significantly increase risk across integrated primary-care and community services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Practice provides primary care medical services via a Personal Medical Services (PMS) contract commissioned by NHSE England (“NHSE”) and the Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board (ICB). It is part of a Primary Care Network (“PCN”) comprising 8 practices serving approximately 60,000 patients across North Derbyshire, all of which use the EMIS software system. EMIS and SystmOne are the most commonly used electronic GP medical record software systems in the UK. EMIS is used by over 50% of GP practices in the UK and by all 8 practices in our PCN. Whilst most practices in Derbyshire use SystemOne, all Practices in the High Peak area use EMIS. It is vital for effective and safe working across the Practices and for our patients to have access to the shared PCN services including the home visiting service, pharmacy team, social prescribers and others.”

    Source location

    Response from Sett Valley Medical centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Interoperability specifications and related information-technology due diligence are outside the Practice’s authority and control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The development of the ability for electronic GP medical record systems such as SystemOne and EMIS to communicate with each other and allow sharing of clinical information, is not within the control of any individual GP practice, including ours. This is a matter that falls under the responsibility of the service commissioners at Derbyshire-wide level, specifically the NHS Derby & Derbyshire Integrated Care Board (ICB), which is responsible for commissioning services, including general practice, in the area. Individual practices, including ours, have no authority to determine the specifications of such services, nor are they involved in the due diligence processes related to the Information Management and Technology (IM&T) aspects of these systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Sett Valley Medical centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Developing interoperability between EMIS and SystmOne is the responsibility of the NHS Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board as service commissioner.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The development of the ability for electronic GP medical record systems such as SystemOne and EMIS to communicate with each other and allow sharing of clinical information, is not within the control of any individual GP practice, including ours. This is a matter that falls under the responsibility of the service commissioners at Derbyshire-wide level, specifically the NHS Derby & Derbyshire Integrated Care Board (ICB), which is responsible for commissioning services, including general practice, in the area. Individual practices, including ours, have no authority to determine the specifications of such services, nor are they involved in the due diligence processes related to the Information Management and Technology (IM&T) aspects of these systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Sett Valley Medical centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England does not mandate IT infrastructure, so it cannot require a single electronic patient record across providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Historically, different care settings have adopted different clinical systems to maintain a clinical record; some areas have adopted the same electronic patient record (such as SystmOne), whereas other areas have adopted shared care records which can provide access to records from different care settings. The GP record is available via GP Connect, the Summary Care Record and the Medical Interoperability Gateway (MIG), but the availability and content does vary across England. NHS England does not mandate IT infrastructure.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Kwabena Amoateng · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kwabena Amoateng, a 17-year-old boy with congenital central hypoventilation syndrome, became ill on 16 September 2024 and died in hospital on 23 September 2024 after developing severe respiratory complications. A Paediatric Respiratory Action Plan for his condition was mislabelled and misfiled, so it was unavailable to emergency healthcare professionals assessing him. The report identified the absence of a coordinated process for producing and storing such documents in online clinical records as a substantive concern.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a coordinated process for producing and storing critical respiratory action plans in online clinical records

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest found that a critically important document had been produced by his specialist respiratory doctors to assist emergency healthcare professionals in understanding his rare and potentially dangerous condition - CCHS. The document, A Paediatric Respiratory Action Plan (‘PRAP’) set out the necessary steps to be considered should Kwabena fall ill. 2. During Kwabena’s final illness, those assessing him from 16ᵗʰ-21ˢᵗ September 2024 were unaware of this vital document as it had been mislabelled and misfiled within the online records available to them. 3. Had the PRAP been more prominently filed it is likely that those assessing Kwabena would have escalated his treatment to admission to hospital far earlier, which may have resulted in Kwabena’s life being saved. 4. An investigation into why the PRAP was not visible to emergency services in this case has highlighted that there is no coordinated process to ensure a consistent approach in producing and storing such documents in online clinical records. ”

    Source location

    Kwabena Amoateng · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Myles Edward Scriven · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Myles Edward Scriven died at Huddersfield Royal Infirmary on 16 April 2023. The report states that lack of adjustments for his Autism and Learning Disabilities contributed to incorrect decisions about his care and medication. The principal concern was that existing training, policies and support arrangements were not effectively applied or audited to ensure safe care and medication decisions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on relevant electronic patient record entries across clinical colleagues

    Wider context from the report

    “(brief summary of matters of concern) The rider of Neglect attaches to the actions of the Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (‘the Trust’). It relates to the lack of adjustments, that were identified as being required to treat Myles safely in the context of his Learning Disabilities (‘LD’) and Autism notably during his admission 20-25 October 2022. It is true that evidence from Trust witnesses has been sufficient to demonstrate that the Trust is aware of the issues arising in this case at least in terms of training and professional input. It has an ongoing programme of training in relation to Learning Disabilities and Autism in clinical care and they have people in post enhancing Learning Disability provision. The crux of the remaining concern is in relation to auditing the impact of all of this in terms of auditing the outcome of this work. To be fair, Trust evidence was that there is now auditing of mental capacity assessments and there is dedicated nursing leadership walkaround of all wards auditing LD and autism policies being applied. However, there is this remaining evidential reality: much of what is now in place was already in place in 2022 – not least key personnel who gave evidence at the Inquest, but also VIP passports, training and all the underlying regulatory underpinning. But in Myles’s case it simply had no impact whatsoever. One witness’s own ‘spot-on’ entries in the EPR on 21 October were just not acted upon by colleagues and had zero effect when he went on leave thereafter. Clinicians were applying Mental Capacity Act principle 1 but not 2. ‘Culturally’ speaking, that one obtaining in secondary care after the witness went on leave seems to have been stuck in another era. So, the question is - how it is proposed to ensure full compliance with best practice and by when? ”

    Source location

    Myles Edward Scriven · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a Quality Assurance Group reporting to the Board subcommittee to oversee care standards and record-keeping compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Chief Nurse will be chairing a new Quality Assurance Group from September 25 that will report directly into a sub committee of the board. This group will be responsible for oversight of compliance against expected standards of care for all patients including effective record keeping. Findings from the revised audit program will be fed into this group for action.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further develop the learning-disability dashboard to support patient identification, care prioritisation, audit compliance and oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support clinical oversight of patients with learning disabilities we are further developing the learning disability dashboard within KP+ (Qlik Sense) digital system. This is a data analytics/reporting tool which has the LD flag built into reporting fields which allows the Trust to identify patients with a learning disability so that clinical teams can use this data to allow prioritisation of care needs and oversight of care delivery.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the learning-disability care plan and support implementation with training on completion expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have already identified through our enhanced audit program that changes are needed to the current learning disability care plan. ████████ is working with our Chief Nursing Information Officer and stakeholders across Bradford and Airedale, who share our clinical record system, to revise the content and approach to completion of this care plan. This will be supported through a training program that clearly describes expectations for completion. Once the care plan is live in our electronic patient record the results will be added to our quality assurance dashboard for oversight and action.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 July 2025

    Open published response
  9. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    John James JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John James Johnson died on 22 November 2023 after pneumonia developed in the context of squamous cell carcinoma of the right lung. The cancer had been identified on a chest X-ray, but the finding was not followed up, and later treatment options to cure the cancer were unavailable. The substantive concerns included the use of multiple hospital IT systems and the risk that significant findings and information could be overlooked or returned to a department no longer involved in the patient’s care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fragmented clinical information systems requiring users to switch between systems

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of my investigation I heard evidence of the Hospital Trust operating a variety of IT systems to document a patient's stay in hospital. There was not one system which contained all the information generated during a patient’s stay in hospital including, but not limited to, test results. It required clinical users to switch between systems to gather all the necessary information and raised the potential risk of significant findings being overlooked. It also slows down clinical decision making and makes it more difficult to follow a patient's overall care. (2) In Mr Johnson's case, the X Ray report was returned to a department not then involved in his care. The use of multiple systems can create a risk around safe transfers of care for discharge or handover. (3) I was told this issue is not confined to one individual Trust and the use of multiple systems is widespread across the National Health Service. Their use is well known to the national NHS responsible bodies. (4) The Trust in question, has undertaken significant work to make the multiple systems it uses as safe and effective as possible so far as they are able to within their effective control. (5) Given my concerns are not confined to the operations of one NHS Trust, this appears to be a risk that may be present nationally. ”

    Source location

    John James JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of multiple clinical systems to support safe transfers of care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of my investigation I heard evidence of the Hospital Trust operating a variety of IT systems to document a patient's stay in hospital. There was not one system which contained all the information generated during a patient’s stay in hospital including, but not limited to, test results. It required clinical users to switch between systems to gather all the necessary information and raised the potential risk of significant findings being overlooked. It also slows down clinical decision making and makes it more difficult to follow a patient's overall care. (2) In Mr Johnson's case, the X Ray report was returned to a department not then involved in his care. The use of multiple systems can create a risk around safe transfers of care for discharge or handover. (3) I was told this issue is not confined to one individual Trust and the use of multiple systems is widespread across the National Health Service. Their use is well known to the national NHS responsible bodies. (4) The Trust in question, has undertaken significant work to make the multiple systems it uses as safe and effective as possible so far as they are able to within their effective control. (5) Given my concerns are not confined to the operations of one NHS Trust, this appears to be a risk that may be present nationally. ”

    Source location

    John James JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish the Single Patient Record to unify patient data and provide clinicians with accessible patient information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I agree that ensuring health and care professionals have access to a single source of digital information about the patients they are treating and caring for is vitally important to delivering the best care possible. The Department of Health and Social Care, and NHS England have programmes of work underway which should assist in preventing future deaths connected to this issue.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Each provider organisation is responsible for sharing information across different digital systems through its established local digital governance processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where multiple digital systems, including EPR systems and RIS system are in use across a provider organisation, policies and procedures should be in place to outline expectations, advice, clinical record management, and handover of abnormal results to relevant individuals. Responsibility and accountability for the sharing of information held within electronic records, including across different systems, rests with each organisation through its established digital governance processes.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Iris Joan CARTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Iris Joan CARTER had a fall at home on 1 October 2024 and sustained a left distal femur fracture, which was surgically stabilised. After rehabilitation treatment, including treatment for a Grade 4 pressure sore on her left heel, she developed pneumonia and died in hospital on 8 November 2024. The principal concern was that the pressure sore may not have been properly inspected or that inspections were not adequately recorded during her admission at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adequately record heel-skin inspections in electronic inpatient notes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I heard evidence during the inquest that Iris was at heightened risk of developing pressure sores given her co-morbidities and reduced mobility post her operation and that a Grade 4 pressure sore is the most serious type of pressure sore where bone is exposed and can therefore be at risk of infection. 3. However, apart from one entry on 13th October 2024 in the QEH electronic in patient noting records when it was recorded that Iris was complaining of pain on palpation of her left heel and a pillow was placed under her heel, there is no reference in the noting to it having been observed at any point that Iris had developed a pressure sore to her left heel during her admission at the QEH. 4. This leads to a concern that either the skin to her left heel was not being properly inspected or if it was that such inspections were not adequately noted in the electronic in-patient noting. ”

    Source location

    Iris Joan CARTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the nurse in charge on each shift to check that care assessments, including skin inspection charts, are fully completed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While reviewing the incident in November 2024, the omissions in producing appropriate and accurate levels of documentation outlining all areas of Mrs Carter’s skin were highlighted. In response to these findings, the senior sister and her team highlighted the omission in care to the wider nursing team, whilst reiterating the associated risk and the pressure ulcer prevention strategy within the Trust. The actions taken at the time were to update the pressure ulcer prevention ward information board, and to provide feedback on Mrs Carter’s case at the daily safety huddle on the ward. Another change in practice is that the nurse in charge of each shift will carry out a safety check, ensuring all care assessments, specifically the patient skin inspection charts, are fully completed. The senior sister has also been completing spot checks since December 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS BIRMINGHAM NHS FOUNDATION TRUST
    Page 4 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct ward spot checks of care documentation to verify completion of required assessments and skin inspection charts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While reviewing the incident in November 2024, the omissions in producing appropriate and accurate levels of documentation outlining all areas of Mrs Carter’s skin were highlighted. In response to these findings, the senior sister and her team highlighted the omission in care to the wider nursing team, whilst reiterating the associated risk and the pressure ulcer prevention strategy within the Trust. The actions taken at the time were to update the pressure ulcer prevention ward information board, and to provide feedback on Mrs Carter’s case at the daily safety huddle on the ward. Another change in practice is that the nurse in charge of each shift will carry out a safety check, ensuring all care assessments, specifically the patient skin inspection charts, are fully completed. The senior sister has also been completing spot checks since December 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS BIRMINGHAM NHS FOUNDATION TRUST
    Page 4 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reviews found no pressure damage before 15 October, when a blister was identified, documented, escalated and assessed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our review of the documentation outlined in the medical noting documents there was no pressure damage noted on 09.10.24 at 14:18 by the Ortho geriatrician team, who noted review of the lower limb and noted oedema present to Mrs Carter’s leg.”

    Source location

    Response from UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS BIRMINGHAM NHS FOUNDATION TRUST
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026