Recurring concern

Failure to reliably prevent patient escape from wards

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First reported 21 Aug 2013•Latest report 6 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated ward-security controls intended to prevent or detect patient escape, including perimeter and door security, environmental checks for escape routes, access-control arrangements and reassessment of security measures after an escape or attempted escape.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to patient observation frequency, quality or staffing where no ward-security or escape-prevention deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, documentation or risk-assessment deficiencies unless they are directly tied to ward escape-prevention controls.
  • Excludes visitor sign-in and general ward access-control deficiencies unless they materially concern preventing patients from escaping.
  • Excludes unrelated environmental hazards, roof access or fire-escape protection where patient escape from the ward is not the shared safety condition.
Reports
8

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
11

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
Priory Group2
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust2
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
Hywel Dda University LHB1
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Wife of the deceased1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mansoor Zaman, a 27-year-old man with a history of suicidality, substance misuse and EUPD, absconded from a mental health ward on 8 December 2024 after displaying suicidal intent and erratic and aggressive behaviour. His body was recovered on 29 December 2024. The substantive concerns included failures to use available mental health authorisations, reassess risk and observation levels, adequately document care, and promptly report him missing to police; the inquest jury identified some of these failures as factors that probably or possibly contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Repeated escape from the ward in identical circumstances

    Wider context from the report

    “4. His second escape from the ward in identical circumstances to the first. The failure of Trust staff to re-assess the frequency and quality of observations that Mr Zaman should be subject to during the afternoon of 8th December 2024. ”

    Source location

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory refresher training on structured risk assessment, dynamic risk documentation and appropriate observation levels, with monthly compliance audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. To improve staff risk assessment and observation practice the Ward staff will undertake mandatory refresher training on completing structured risk assessments and documenting dynamic changes in risk. This includes practical guidance on when observations should be increased and when zonal observations should be used. It will also highlight clear expectations for recording changes in presentation in real time. This will take place within the next two months.”

    Source location

    2026-0072 - Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    James John Jude Booth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Booth, who had longstanding mental ill-health and was detained at The Priory, Altrincham, absconded on 7 October 2020 and was found dead on 14 October 2020; the medical cause of death was hanging. The principal concerns were inadequate security of the ward garden, including the fence, inadequate risk assessments, and failures to communicate and document repeated incidents and emerging risk between shifts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of national guidance on perimeter fencing and security for outside areas of mental health locked wards

    Wider context from the report

    “Matter One The inquest heard that the Priory had identified that the garden fence was a risk, in particular the section over the door, in about December 2019. There had been a number of escapes both over the fence and through it, in the months leading up to James’ escape. The number of escapes indicates that garden area was not safe. There was a plan to replace it but there were other priorities. More striking was that there is no national guidance for perimeter fencing and security for the outside areas of mental health ‘locked wards’; unlike that in existence for mental health ‘secure units’. In particular, the height of the fence. While it is accepted that national guidance ought not be necessary to carry out appropriate risk assessments and ensure secure/safe spaces it is clear that such guidance is necessary to ensure the correct level of security for vulnerable patients, whilst benefitting from the therapeutic setting of an outdoor space. ”

    Source location

    James John Jude Booth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with stakeholders to expand evidence on physical barriers and explore approaches to reduce absconding risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Turning to perimeter fence/wall height and its role in patient safety, I understand that the Department received a Prevention of Future Death report last year from another coroner, who raised similar concerns. In response to this, officials worked with a range of stakeholders, including NCISH, to explore expanding the evidence base around the role those physical barriers play in patient safety and from this explore approaches to reducing the risk of such absconding. NCISH has updated its patient suicide questionnaire to include information about whether a patient who has died by suicide was able to leave the ward by scaling a physical barrier – a perimeter fence is provided as an example.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current guidance does not prescribe acute-ward fence heights; appropriate security measures are determined by the service location and layout.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to guidance, acute mental health wards, such as Priory Altrincham, are the least restrictive of inpatient mental health settings. They accommodate voluntary patients as well as people detained under section of the Mental Health Act, and therefore current guidance in Health Building Note 03-01: Adult acute mental health units¹ (HBN 03-01), whilst mute on the specifics of fence height, states that:”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response
  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Alexander CASEBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Caseby was detained under the Mental Health Act after being found on railway lines and in a school playground, and was transferred to the Priory Hospital in Birmingham. He absconded from the hospital courtyard on 7 September 2020 after being left unattended, and was fatally injured after stepping in front of a train on 8 September 2020. The principal concerns included inadequate recording and communication of absconding risks, failure to update risk assessments, lack of a courtyard observation policy and risk assessment, and inadequate courtyard safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unsafe courtyard perimeter fence for preventing absconding and ligature risk

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Courtyard Fence: A patient absconded over the courtyard fence during the inquest which indicates the courtyard area is not safe. I have serious concerns that an urgent review of the courtyard is required. In addition, I heard evidence from Dr ████████ that the fence was a ligature risk. Staff gave evidence that the courtyard in its current format with steps and a gradient on the grass bank was unsafe especially if a patient needed to be restrained. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Alexander CASEBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Excavate, level and landscape the Beech ward courtyard, install anti-climb roller bars, and ensure the fence is at least 3.2 metres high.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ongoing Works: Excavations of the Beech ward courtyard, to include levelling off and landscaping, began shortly after the conclusion of the Inquest. These works were finished on 10 June 2022 and will eliminate the areas where there is banking adjacent to the fence: i.e. the courtyard mesh fence will be”

    Source location

    Response from Priory Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a programme to increase acute-unit courtyard and garden fence heights to at least 3.2 metres and fit anti-climb roller bars where required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although your concerns were addressed to the Department of Health, I can confirm that following an internal review, we have concluded that the appropriate height for courtyard and garden fencing at our acute units is not less than 3.2 metres and we are currently implementing a programme of works to increase fence heights where required. This is expected to be carried out over the next 12 months. We also consider it appropriate for anti-climb roller bars to be fitted at the top of each fence.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory Group
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response
  4. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Lee William Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee William Davies, a detained patient, absconded from a mental health ward on 17 June 2019 and was found unconscious the following day after an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest. He died in hospital on 18 June 2019 after treatment was withdrawn; the inquest recorded a brain injury caused by illicit drug use. Concerns included the reduction of his observation levels despite his risk of absconding to obtain drugs, and ward-garden planting and monitoring arrangements that could allow drugs or other items to be concealed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent patients from climbing over the Laurel Ward garden perimeter fence

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of the inquest I heard evidence that it was likely that Mr Davies had absconded on 17/6/19 by scaling a perimeter fence in the garden of Laurel Ward. The Jury was told that patients had unrestricted access to the garden except when the doors were locked overnight between 10.30 pm – 7.30 am; (2) The inquest heard that on 5/6/19 Mr Davies attempted to climb over the fence with a chair; (3) Mr Davies had absconded from Laurel Ward on 2 occasions since he was detained under s3 MHA on 24/5/19 and on 15/6/19 and used drugs. On the latter occasion he was reported by a peer to have climbed over the fence. (4) On 16/6/19 Mr Davies attempted to abscond again by trying to climb over the fence and was stopped by staff. He was observed to be arranging items to help him climb over the fence namely a bin and a chair. (5) The deceased was admitted to the Centre with a known substance abuse problem; (6) The jury was told by the Responsible Clinician that the deceased was also at risk of obtaining drugs from within the ward itself as the ward was not secure; (7) I also received evidence during the investigation that when Mr Davies’s personal belongings were collected following his death, these included a crushed metal can likely to have been used for narcotic use; (8) The inquest heard evidence that the fence of Laurel Ward garden was approximately 3100 mm in height having been increased in 2015. (9) The inquest was provided with two photographs of the fence taken on the morning of the third day of inquest being 8/10/20 that showed a wooden panelled fence with a metal mesh/wire upper level behind a paved pathway with a shrubbery filled with green foliage and plants; (10) The photographs showed that some of the shrubbery plants were almost as high as the wooden part of the fence and very dense to the extent the fence could not be seen behind them and nor could the ground beneath due to ground level foliage; (11) I heard evidence at the conclusion of the inquest in the absence of the Jury that the shrubbery was not considered to be dense enough by the head of security to conceal any items and that after an incidents of absconding a anti climb review was undertaken; (12) My concern is that it is not sufficient to carry out a search of the area after a patient has absconded. The current planting arrangements based on the most recent photographs, do appear to provide ample ground coverage for ANY item to be concealed including drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, items that could be used as weapons and items in connection with absconding. (13) There was no evidence that the garden was searched on a regular basis, patients were not observed in the garden unless their level of observation included eyesight observations, and there was no CCTV covering the garden area. (14) My view is that circumstances of the current planting arrangements in the shrubbery present a risk of deaths which will continue to exist. This also extends to a risk of injury to staff on Laurel Ward and other patients. ”

    Source location

    Lee William Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete and document the Laurel Ward garden safety review, including identified environmental risks and remedial actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since receiving this action, a review of the garden on Laurel Ward was carried out on the 2nd November 2020 by ████████ (Clinical Matron for Adult Inpatient Services), ████████ (Head of Health, Safety and Security) and ████████ (Health, Safety and Security Manager).”

    Source location

    2020-0261-Response-from-Midlands-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Move the perimeter-adjacent bench to a safer location within the garden.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The first point for action was a bench which currently sits close to the perimeter. Whilst this is bolted down, it could be used as a base to attempt to scale the fence and therefore, this will be moved away from the fence to a more suitable location within the garden.”

    Source location

    2020-0261-Response-from-Midlands-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the fence structure and assess replacement or anti-climb retrofit options using quotes and evidence from an existing installation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The third point relates to the fence itself. We are in the process of reviewing the fence structure itself and have obtained quotes in the meantime to establish options. One option is to install a full replacement fence and the other option is to retrofit an addition to the existing fence of a 'bull-nose' anti-climb dome along the perimeter. This piece of work will require time to implement as we would want to see a site where this has been previously done and evidence that there are benefits and improvements relating to reducing abscond incidents. If this were the case, we would look to replicate this upgrade across our other two acute wards on the Redwoods site for consistency.”

    Source location

    2020-0261-Response-from-Midlands-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing garden foliage is considered sufficient because it balances concealment risk and reduces access to the fence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following our review on the 2nd November, we are satisfied that the garden is maintained in such a way that it is therapeutic to service users and balances the risk of being able to conceal objects as any objects hidden by service user’s would have to be brought through the ward first. This review found that the presence of the foliage impedes service user’s access to the fence thus reducing the ability to scale it.”

    Source location

    2020-0261-Response-from-Midlands-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 December 2020

    Open published response
  5. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Roy CAMPBELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Roy Campbell, who had cardiac problems and dementia, was detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to a hospital ward in July 2018. He left through an insecure gate after staff on another ward mistakenly treated him as a visitor; after being returned to the ward, he suffered cardiac arrest and died in hospital. Concerns included the risk of detained patients absconding because of inadequate visitor identification and environmental checks that were not properly carried out, embedded in Trust policy, or subject to mandatory staff training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly carry out environmental checks for ward escape routes

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) During the inquest I also heard evidence that environmental checks, introduced by Athelon ward to try to identify and remedy any means by which a determined patient could try to leave the secure confines of the ward, were not being carried out properly at the time of these events, and are still not enshrined in Trust policy, thereby ensuing staff receive mandatory training on it. I was concerned to be told that, only after evidence in this inquest was heard on Monday 2 March 2020, the current form being used to record such checks was revised and staff on both Athelon and Holt wards were instructed to start using it. I was surprised that these revisions were made at such a late stage, when the information given in evidence which led to those revisions must have been available to the Trust some time ago. I am also informed that it would take at least a further 2 months for the proper completion of this form to be enshrined into Trust policy. (4) I am concerned that, unless and until these environmental checks become the subject both of Trust policy and of mandatory training for all ward staff, there remains a risk that the means by which a vulnerable patient might try to leave the confines of a ward may not be identified in time. If that patient were to be elderly and/or physically compromised, as Mr. Campbell was, this will lead to an increased risk of death in any such patient. ”

    Source location

    Roy CAMPBELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to enshrine environmental checks in Trust policy and mandatory ward-staff training

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) During the inquest I also heard evidence that environmental checks, introduced by Athelon ward to try to identify and remedy any means by which a determined patient could try to leave the secure confines of the ward, were not being carried out properly at the time of these events, and are still not enshrined in Trust policy, thereby ensuing staff receive mandatory training on it. I was concerned to be told that, only after evidence in this inquest was heard on Monday 2 March 2020, the current form being used to record such checks was revised and staff on both Athelon and Holt wards were instructed to start using it. I was surprised that these revisions were made at such a late stage, when the information given in evidence which led to those revisions must have been available to the Trust some time ago. I am also informed that it would take at least a further 2 months for the proper completion of this form to be enshrined into Trust policy. (4) I am concerned that, unless and until these environmental checks become the subject both of Trust policy and of mandatory training for all ward staff, there remains a risk that the means by which a vulnerable patient might try to leave the confines of a ward may not be identified in time. If that patient were to be elderly and/or physically compromised, as Mr. Campbell was, this will lead to an increased risk of death in any such patient. ”

    Source location

    Roy CAMPBELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement ward-specific environmental checklists and procedures as Trust policy, including shift-start and shift-end nurse-in-charge checks and joint handover checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The form which had been introduced in October 2019 was further amended by the Ward Manager, who was present at Court on Monday 2nd March 2020, and approved by a senior manager within the trust, that same day. By the morning of Tuesday 3rd March 2020, the new amended form had been sent to Athelon Ward, and New Haven ward (a specialist dementia care unit) and staff had been instructed to use the new form with immediate effect.”

    Source location

    2020-0059-Response-from-Worcestershire-Health-and-Care-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train ward staff on the ward-specific environmental checklists and policy through new-starter induction and existing-staff supervision sessions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to training, the Trust have very specific general mandatory training which is covered across all services. It would not be appropriate to include the training on the environmental forms as part of the trusts mandatory training. Nor would it be possible to add it to the general list of mandatory training due to the differing nature of the forms.”

    Source location

    2020-0059-Response-from-Worcestershire-Health-and-Care-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A single environmental checklist cannot safely be used across all wards because each ward has different environmental factors and risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This form and procedure has now been enshrined into policy, and a copy of the updated policy is enclosed herewith for your consideration. You will note that there are several different environmental checklists in the appendix to the policy. As each ward under the control of the trust has different environmental factors and risks, it is not possible, or safe, to have one single form for all wards. Therefore, as it is now trust policy to use the forms, different forms have been introduced for each ward, which are relevant for the potential risks on that particular ward.”

    Source location

    2020-0059-Response-from-Worcestershire-Health-and-Care-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Environmental-checklist training cannot be added to general mandatory training because ward forms differ; it will instead be covered through induction and supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to training, the Trust have very specific general mandatory training which is covered across all services. It would not be appropriate to include the training on the environmental forms as part of the trusts mandatory training. Nor would it be possible to add it to the general list of mandatory training due to the differing nature of the forms.”

    Source location

    2020-0059-Response-from-Worcestershire-Health-and-Care-NHS-Trust_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2020

    Open published response
  6. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Silva Müller · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Silva Müller, a patient detained under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 at Millview Hospital, died on 13 March 2015 after being found in the boot of a burning car; the circumstances were recorded as unlawful killing following her absconding from hospital. The principal concerns were incomplete and contradictory records, handovers, risk assessments and care plans, inadequate staffing, and insufficient measures to prevent detained patients from absconding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ability of patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 to abscond from the ward

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The ability of Patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 being able to abscond. Whilst it is accepted that the Hospital has now put in place further measures to prevent patients from being able to abscond from the ward, such as increasing the height of the garden walls and put into additional security around the entrance door, patients have still been able to abscond. ”

    Source location

    Janet Silva Müller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Carmarthenshire & Pembrokeshire

    AI-generated summary

    Laura Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laura Hill, aged 21, was admitted to a psychiatric ward after a serious overdose and later absconded twice before being found hanging from a tree in a wooded area. The concerns identified included information-sharing failures, stretched staffing, training needs around police handovers, absconding, personality disorders and detention powers, and the ward door policy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the ward door policy to prevent or promptly detect patient absconding

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) The door policy on the Ward needs to be reviewed as a patient was able to abscond without staff noticing. ”

    Source location

    Laura Hill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain an up-to-date door-locking policy covering authorisation and recording requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “St Caradog is an open adult admission ward. It is not a secure or locked ward. The ward has the option to lock its door, although this has to be done in line with guidance, as provided by the 1983 Mental Health Act – Code of Practice. An up to date policy is in place to guide staff in relation to the locking of doors on such units as well as the recording of these instances.”

    Source location

    2015-0092-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The ward’s current door-locking policy and continuous risk and observation assessments are relied on instead of further door-policy changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. The Door Policy on the ward needs to be reviewed as a patient was able to abscond without staff noticing.”

    Source location

    2015-0092-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 February 2015

    Open published response
  8. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Walker, who had depression, suicidal ideation and a history of impulsive self-harm attempts, died after leaving the hospital ward and hanging himself in nearby woodland. Concerns included insufficient risk care planning, unexplained reductions in observation levels, the time taken to declare him missing and inform police, and the scalability of the ward’s external fences.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Scalable fences surrounding ward external common areas

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) At the time of the incident the fences surrounding the external common areas of the ward were of a scalable height by any patient determined enough to do so. It is accepted that this has been subsequently addressed. ”

    Source location

    Mr Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Alter hospital fences to make them more difficult to climb over while keeping garden doors open.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Fences Opal Ward at Langley Green Hospital is an open ward and so there is no requirement to have fences at a particular height, as would be the case for a secure unit. Had Mr Walker or any other patient at that time been considered a risk of absconding then staff would have taken steps to ensure appropriate supervision; this may have included locking the door to the garden. As you know, the fences throughout Langley Green Hospital have been subsequently altered to make it much more difficult to get over. This was done in order to make it possible to always keep the doors to the garden open, as this promotes a more therapeutic environment. Absconding in the way Mr Walker did we believe was not foreseeable, for the reasons already set out.”

    Source location

    2013-0213-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 August 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An open ward does not require secure-unit-height fencing; supervision would be increased if staff identified an absconding risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Fences Opal Ward at Langley Green Hospital is an open ward and so there is no requirement to have fences at a particular height, as would be the case for a secure unit. Had Mr Walker or any other patient at that time been considered a risk of absconding then staff would have taken steps to ensure appropriate supervision; this may have included locking the door to the garden. As you know, the fences throughout Langley Green Hospital have been subsequently altered to make it much more difficult to get over. This was done in order to make it possible to always keep the doors to the garden open, as this promotes a more therapeutic environment. Absconding in the way Mr Walker did we believe was not foreseeable, for the reasons already set out.”

    Source location

    2013-0213-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 August 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient’s manner of absconding was not foreseeable based on the information available to staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Fences Opal Ward at Langley Green Hospital is an open ward and so there is no requirement to have fences at a particular height, as would be the case for a secure unit. Had Mr Walker or any other patient at that time been considered a risk of absconding then staff would have taken steps to ensure appropriate supervision; this may have included locking the door to the garden. As you know, the fences throughout Langley Green Hospital have been subsequently altered to make it much more difficult to get over. This was done in order to make it possible to always keep the doors to the garden open, as this promotes a more therapeutic environment. Absconding in the way Mr Walker did we believe was not foreseeable, for the reasons already set out.”

    Source location

    2013-0213-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 August 2013

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026