Recurring concern

Failure to provide requested on-call clinical review

First to latest report 27 Nov 2013 — 19 Dec 2023

Reports that mention this concern
9
Times this concern has been raised
9
Stated actions linked to this concern
14

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated on-call process to respond to requests for patient review or clinical advice, including non-attendance, unresponsiveness, refusal to attend or failure to provide the requested review by registrars or on-call specialty clinicians.

What is not included
  • Excludes delays in routine or pre-arranged consultant review where no request for on-call clinical input is involved.
  • Excludes generic staffing shortages, workload or inadequate cover unless they directly result in failure to respond to a requested on-call review.
  • Excludes failures of clinical decisions after the requested review has been completed.
  • Excludes failures limited to emergency call triage, ambulance response or other escalation processes where on-call clinical review is not the deficient control.

Reports and published responses 9 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Ann Waylett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Ann Waylett underwent surgery for a humerus fracture and developed ongoing low blood pressure and intermittent oxygen requirements. She later suffered a cardiac arrest and died in hospital after, according to the report, necessary medical intervention was not provided. Concerns included failures to provide medical reviews, lack of access to NEWS charts and confusion about responsibility for her care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of on-call orthopaedic doctors to attend requested reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The inquest heard that nursing staff requested reviews by the on-call orthopaedic doctors on multiple occasions, without the doctors attending to carry out a review. A junior doctor described the junior orthopaedic staffing levels in the hospital as “dangerous”. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Ann Waylett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  2. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracy Wood was admitted to Hellesdon Hospital with a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and died on 3 June 2021 after being found unresponsive in her room following an earlier incident involving a prohibited item. The principal concerns included insufficient staffing and one-to-one support, failures in clinical assessment and risk management, inadequate record keeping, delayed emergency response, and shortcomings in the investigation and incident report.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide timely psychiatric doctor assessment when requested

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Following Tracy ████████ on the evening of 1 June 2021 the Duty Psychiatric Doctor was called to attend to see and assess Tracy, but did not attend. She was assessed by nursing staff but she was not seen by a Psychiatric Doctor as requested by them, until the next morning during a review meeting ”

    Source location

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve junior and trainee doctor induction to cover escalation of psychiatric and physical health concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In discussion with the Matron for this area her account is that the Duty Doctor was asked to attend however had to prioritise other tasks given that Tracy was unharmed and responding well to 1:1 discussion with the staff on the ward. This is reflected in the patient record. The next morning Tracy was seen by her regular doctor when he knew her well. It is noted within the record that the ward staff were aware the Duty Doctor had not been able to attend but they did not escalate any further concerns for the reasons stated. However, it is not clear if the Duty Doctor discussed this decision with the senior on-call medic; an action for the Trust has been to improve the induction for junior and trainee doctors to include the escalation process for both psychiatric and physical health concerns and to implement improvements to the handover format.”

    Source location

    Response from Hellesdon Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement improvements to the clinical handover format.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In discussion with the Matron for this area her account is that the Duty Doctor was asked to attend however had to prioritise other tasks given that Tracy was unharmed and responding well to 1:1 discussion with the staff on the ward. This is reflected in the patient record. The next morning Tracy was seen by her regular doctor when he knew her well. It is noted within the record that the ward staff were aware the Duty Doctor had not been able to attend but they did not escalate any further concerns for the reasons stated. However, it is not clear if the Duty Doctor discussed this decision with the senior on-call medic; an action for the Trust has been to improve the induction for junior and trainee doctors to include the escalation process for both psychiatric and physical health concerns and to implement improvements to the handover format.”

    Source location

    Response from Hellesdon Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

  3. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Mandy Jane DICKERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mandy Jane Dickerson attended the Urgent GP Care Centre on 26 April 2020 after several days of diarrhoea and vomiting, but was discharged without assessment by the medical team. She died at home on 30 April 2020 from sepsis. The principal concerns included a non-mandatory and unreliable sepsis template, inadequate recording and communication of key observations, and confusion about referral responsibilities when specialist assessment was requested.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a policy directing specialty registrar responses to out-of-hours assessment requests

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I have referred in (3) above to the situation with respect to the referrals to the speciality registrars out of hours. I was provided with information about many different policies and procedures but I did not hear evidence as to any policy directing how a speciality registrar should respond to a request for assessment when even allowing for the missing important observations, enough information was conveyed to mandate (in Dr ████████ and Dr ████████ opinions) a medical assessment. ”

    Source location

    Mandy Jane DICKERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update UGPC streaming guidance and add an addendum requiring clinician agreement or documented disagreement followed by immediate ED referral under Mandy’s Rule.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has worked with Atrumed Healthcare to update the ‘Streaming Guidelines for the Urgent GP Clinic (UGPC)’ (appendix 1) to ensure more clarity in the system for referral from UGPC to the Hospital.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedfordshire Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

  4. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Alan Hodgson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Alan Hodgson died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 14 January 2021. The report describes failures to recognise the severity of his condition, delays in acting on and reporting imaging, failures to follow the vascular pathway, inadequate communication and continuity of care, and an insufficient review of the circumstances leading to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the on-call Registrar to review a patient when called for advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Failure by the on-call Registrar to review a patient in the early hours of the morning when called for advice by the FY1 doctor; ”

    Source location

    Mr Alan Hodgson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  5. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Lilian SALES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Lilian Sales, who was frail and had several comorbidities, was admitted to hospital on 13 December 2019 and died on 4 January 2020 after her health deteriorated. Concerns included incomplete records, difficulties contacting on-call medical staff, and a failure to request GP monitoring of her capillary blood glucose after discharge. The inquest concluded that she died from aspiration pneumonia, the cause of which was not clear from the evidence.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of on-call medical staff to respond reliably to requests to attend patients

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Nurses had difficulty in contacting front line on call medical staff on two occasions. Several members were contacted before anyone attended. Bleeps are now to be provided to all on call medical staff. However, some of the team had bleeps and still did not respond to the requests to attend the patient. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Lilian SALES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redesign the clinical escalation pathway to provide a compliant seven-day service and increase medical cover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly we have redesigned the clinical escalation pathway with providing a compliant 7-day standard service. This has increased the medical workforce required to improve cover for the patients. Access to medical personnel has improved through this. This is set to improve further with the Urgent and Emergency Pathway Reset program led by the Chief Operating Officer that encompasses system-wide changes to improve early access for patients and facilitate timely treatment. A dedicated Project Management team is set up to expedite this process looking at our medical workforce.”

    Source location

    2020-0233-Response-from-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Urgent and Emergency Pathway Reset programme and use a dedicated project team to improve timely medical access and workforce capacity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly we have redesigned the clinical escalation pathway with providing a compliant 7-day standard service. This has increased the medical workforce required to improve cover for the patients. Access to medical personnel has improved through this. This is set to improve further with the Urgent and Emergency Pathway Reset program led by the Chief Operating Officer that encompasses system-wide changes to improve early access for patients and facilitate timely treatment. A dedicated Project Management team is set up to expedite this process looking at our medical workforce.”

    Source location

    2020-0233-Response-from-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use bleep tracking and smartphone video calling to track and improve access to on-call medical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Nurses had difficulty in contacting front line on call medical staff on two occasions. Several members were contacted before anyone attended. Bleeps are now to be provided to all on call medical staff. However, some of the team had bleeps and still did not respond to the requests to attend the patient.”

    Source location

    2020-0233-Response-from-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit escalation through NEWS and incident reporting, provide feedback on failures, and empower nurses to contact consultants when local escalation fails.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bleep tracking system and the use of smart phones with video calling facilities is in place to enable tracking and access to our medical work force. Inability to access doctors to escalate problems is captured through our incident reporting system (Datix) and actions are enabled through this. Feedback to defaulters for not accessing properly is part of this and if there are avoidable lapses identified then they are put through an internal process. In this way the system is strengthened significantly.”

    Source location

    2020-0233-Response-from-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital-Kings-Lynn-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response

  6. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Douglas Robert Owens developed acute cardiac failure, hypotension, aspiration pneumonia and multi-organ failure after cataract surgery, treatment for raised intraocular pressure, ongoing eye pain and painful urinary retention. He died in intensive care on 7 July 2018. Concerns included arrangements for urgent ophthalmic transfer, specialist assessment, monitoring and review of deterioration, fluid documentation, and recording medication doses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide on-call specialist review in the Emergency Department when needed

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That the Deceased was not seen by a speciality doctor in the Emergency Department notwithstanding the need for him to be seen. Unless action is taken there may be a continuing risk that patients in the Emergency Department will not be seen by on call doctors in speciality disciplines, in particular, ophthalmology, even when the need arises in that Department. ”

    Source location

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement an ophthalmology emergency protocol covering handover, internal patient pathways and specialty attendance in the Emergency Department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matter of an agreement with Spire Fylde Coast Hospital for the urgent transfer of patients to the Ophthalmic Unit at Blackpool Victoria Hospital has been considered and discussed at length with relevant consultant colleagues. After much deliberation, it was felt that an agreement with Spire Fylde Coast Hospital may not be sufficient to prevent similar incidents from occurring and thus the focus was directed to the development of more responsive and effective protocols in our existing services, to ensure that handover from Spire Fylde Coast Hospital to the Emergency Department (ED) and then ophthalmology would be performed quickly and comprehensively.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response

  7. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Ruth Hilda Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ruth Hilda Smith died on 16 April 2014 at Huddersfield Royal Infirmary after developing a haemothorax following insertion of a central venous line, with sepsis, altered liver function and pneumonia also recorded as causes. Concerns included delays in medical review, inadequate nursing observations, and poor nursing and medical record keeping during the evening of 15 April and early hours of 16 April 2014.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to chase up requested doctor attendance and review

    Wider context from the report

    “Nursing Care At 22.05 Mrs Smith was found to have an elevated MEWS score and as a result a request was made for an FY 1 Doctor to review. Evidence was given by a senior charge nurse( who provided an overview of nursing care to Mrs Smith, but who was not directly involved in her care) that following this Mrs Smith should have undergone hourly observations. This did not happen. There was reference to observations being undertaken at 00.30 but these were not recorded. Further observations were incomplete The FY1 Doctor did not attend the ward until 00.30. There was no record within the notes to suggest that enquiries were undertaken between 22.30 and 00.30 to chase up the attendance of the FY 1 Doctor. I have the following concerns: 1. No attempts were made to ensure a doctor attended and reviewed Mrs. Smith between 22.30 and 00.30. 2. The level of nursing monitoring (hourly observations) taking place for much of the period between 22.30 on the 15th April and 03.25 on the 16th April. 3. The standard of the nursing record keeping. ”

    Source location

    Ruth Hilda Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  8. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Ethan Robert Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ethan Johnson was born following an urgent Caesarean section, with no respiratory effort or heart rate, and died after intensive care treatment was withdrawn. The concerns included a lack of effective leadership, support and escalation when an abnormal CTG was identified. The inquest concluded that delayed delivery resulted in a lost opportunity to deliver him earlier and provide further medical treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure consultant attendance when requested

    Wider context from the report

    “(3)When the consultant on call was requested to attend he indicated that he would do so later. No one on the unit had the leadership role to insist upon his attendance. ”

    Source location

    Ethan Robert Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify staff responsibilities for patient reviews, senior-help escalation and upward-escalation timescales in writing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the ward the CTG did not require immediate intervention, so when the doctor had not attended within a reasonable timescale it was escalated appropriately. We have written to every member of staff clarifying their responsibilities if they are asked to review a patient, as well as what to do if senior help has been unable to attend. This includes timescales for upward escalation.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed a revised SBAR handover communication tool in practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new, specifically dedicated Matron for Labour Ward has ensured that a revised handover communication tool (SBAR) is embedded in practice, so that a succinct common language is in place to enable the medical staff to make an appropriate assessment of when to attend. There is now a Manager of the Day on the Maternity Unit.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recirculate the written escalation policy to all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are existing clear instructions for all midwifery staff, from new Band 5 Midwife to Matron level and also for all levels of medical staff in respect of escalation to a Consultant.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The CTG did not require immediate intervention, and staff escalated appropriately when the doctor did not attend within a reasonable timescale.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the ward the CTG did not require immediate intervention, so when the doctor had not attended within a reasonable timescale it was escalated appropriately. We have written to every member of staff clarifying their responsibilities if they are asked to review a patient, as well as what to do if senior help has been unable to attend. This includes timescales for upward escalation.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The consultant attended within 14 minutes, which was considered appropriate for the case concerned.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Consultant attended delivery suite within 14 minutes of being called. This is an appropriate time for the case for which he was called (i.e. not ████████).”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clear escalation instructions already exist for all midwifery and medical staff, including escalation to a consultant.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are existing clear instructions for all midwifery staff, from new Band 5 Midwife to Matron level and also for all levels of medical staff in respect of escalation to a Consultant.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

  9. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Edna Elsie Mary Eden · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edna Elsie Mary Eden, who had been living independently, was admitted to hospital after feeling unwell and reporting recent right-sided chest pain. She remained in A&E and the AMU for approximately fourteen and a half hours before being seen by a doctor, then arrested and could not be revived. The report identified missed opportunities involving delayed medical review, failure to recognise or escalate abnormal findings, inadequate communication, incorrect observation scoring, and lack of antibiotic cover.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of Doctors for nursing requests for review

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Nursing staff were not able to make contact with Doctors to review Mrs Eden. When this continued, the problem was not escalated to more senior staff. ”

    Source location

    Edna Elsie Mary Eden · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a hospital referral procedure covering Emergency Department referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All referrals to the Hospital pass through the Emergency Department. On 14 January 2014 the Trust introduced a new Procedure for dealing with referrals to the hospital. Although some aspects of this new procedure are underway the electronic section is expected to go live in six weeks’ time. The electronic system will ensure that instead of using the bleep system to notify inpatient teams that there is a patient in the Emergency Department or that there is a GP referred patient who needs to be reviewed a message will be sent via Smartphone. The Specialist Registrar receives an e-mail alert and then allocates the job within the team. On receiving the e-mail it will be the inpatient team’s goal to see the patient within one hour of referral thereby ensuring no delays.”

    Source location

    2013-0317-Response-by-Heatherwood-Wexham-Park-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement electronic Smartphone referral notifications with Specialist Registrar allocation and a one-hour inpatient-team review goal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All referrals to the Hospital pass through the Emergency Department. On 14 January 2014 the Trust introduced a new Procedure for dealing with referrals to the hospital. Although some aspects of this new procedure are underway the electronic section is expected to go live in six weeks’ time. The electronic system will ensure that instead of using the bleep system to notify inpatient teams that there is a patient in the Emergency Department or that there is a GP referred patient who needs to be reviewed a message will be sent via Smartphone. The Specialist Registrar receives an e-mail alert and then allocates the job within the team. On receiving the e-mail it will be the inpatient team’s goal to see the patient within one hour of referral thereby ensuring no delays.”

    Source location

    2013-0317-Response-by-Heatherwood-Wexham-Park-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a 24-hour Central Hub with patient tracking, referral and bleep management, workload oversight, handover, task allocation, escalation and senior-manager staffing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has plans to introduce a 24 hours a day Central Hub system and the timescales for actions are stated in the enclosed action plan. It is envisaged the Hub will be located at Wexham Park Hospital and be equipped with IT systems and run by senior managers who will be responsible for ensuring the following:”

    Source location

    2013-0317-Response-by-Heatherwood-Wexham-Park-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 February 2014

    Open published response

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026