Recurring concern

Failure to reliably monitor participants during organised sporting activities

First to latest report 21 Oct 2013 — 14 Mar 2025

Reports that mention this concern
3
Times this concern has been raised
4
Stated actions linked to this concern
0

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated arrangements to monitor participants during organised sporting activities, including designated welfare or consciousness monitoring, course or venue checks, participant-count reconciliation, communication between officials or marshals, and escalation when a participant is unaccounted for or appears unwell.

What is not included
  • Excludes ordinary event staffing or supervision deficiencies where no participant-monitoring or participant-accountability safety function is identified.
  • Excludes clinical treatment, first aid or emergency response after a participant has been reliably detected as unwell.
  • Excludes monitoring of employees, patients, prisoners or members of the public outside an organised sporting activity.
  • Excludes hazards arising solely from venue design, equipment or activity conditions where participant monitoring is not the deficient control.

Reports and published responses 3 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Robert EASTWOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 29 June 2024, 15-year-old Alexander Eastwood became unresponsive after taking part in a kickboxing competition in Wigan. He was found to have a significant brain bleed, underwent surgery, and was declared deceased on 2 July 2024. The investigation identified concerns about the lack of guidance or regulation for children participating in contact sports, including minimum standards for medical support, rest periods, welfare checks, risk assessments and critical incident planning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake welfare checks on child contact-sport participants

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the current course of investigation, it is apparent that there is no guidance or regulation of contact sports involving children’s participation. 2. This is important, because no base line or minimum standards of what safeguarding or necessary risk management is set out for those who plan or organise an ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ match where physical force may be used between or against a child participant. 3. Under current circumstance, arrangements for each, and every contact sport contest involving a child, is left to the judgement of an organiser who may have recourse to principles provided by a sports association, if the match is to meet official status. If a match is unofficial or unsanctioned, there is no guideline of what minimum standards must be met to provide safeguarding for a child participant. 4. This includes a. no minimum standard of what medical support may be required, b. maximum rounds or periods of rest c. welfare checks on participants being undertaken, d. no risk assessment and critical incident plan 5. In the current investigation, these concerns relate to the sport of Kick Boxing, but the identified issues appear to be of wider significance in terms of ‘contact ’ sports involving children. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Robert EASTWOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct regulation of sport does not fall within the government’s role or functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You raised a number of concerns about the current system and I am keen to consider how best to address them. I am mindful that the government does not, and should not, regulate sport directly. However, I am concerned that the current system, which allows individual clubs to decide whether to affiliate to a National Governing Body and their associated standards, does not offer sufficient protection to children and parents.”

    Source location

    Response from Department For Culture, Media And Sport
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 March 2025

    Open published response

  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón died while performing as a Mexican wrestler at a Lucha Libre event. After he lost consciousness and suffered cardiac arrest, there were delays in recognising the emergency, summoning assistance, starting CPR and providing effective resuscitation. The report also identified inadequate event briefing, unclear emergency roles and procedures, communication difficulties, delayed ambulance access, and a confused handover to ambulance staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of designated monitoring of performers’ wellbeing and consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When Mr González Barrón lost consciousness, there was a delay before it was recognised that this was not part of the performance. He was 51 years old and undergoing very vigorous exertion, but there was nobody at the wrestling match tasked specifically with ensuring that he was well and that, for example, he had not lost consciousness. ”

    Source location

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  3. North and West Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Belfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Belfield, aged 63, died from exposure and hypothermia after leaving the Buttermere Sailbeck Fell Race route in poor weather, falling on the fell-side and coming to rest in a pool of water. The race organisers had miscalculated the number of runners and retirees and did not realise he was missing until his wife raised the alarm. Concerns included inadequate recording and checking of participants, unclear responsibility for reconciling race numbers, and unreliable communication between race control and marshals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of reliable communication between race control and course marshals

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) No system was in place to ensure that an accurate record was kept, and referred to, of the participants in the race and those who had retired so that at the conclusion of the race it could be easily ascertained if anyone was missing. (2) The emphasis was on counting the total numbers of participants and retirees, rather than checking off the race numbers against an accurate record of the race numbers of those who had started. Thus, as happened in Mr Belfield’s case an inaccurate count meant that there was no recognition that one runner was missing. (3) There did not appear to be any one single person, either the race organiser, or a nominated official in the race organisation, who had the responsibility to check the race numbers of those starting with the race numbers of those finishing, taking into account the race numbers of those who have retired. A single person should have had that responsibility. (4) There was no reliable means of communication between the race control and the marshals out on the fells so that each of them were aware of the number of participants in the race, those who had retired, and where they had retired. (5) Thus it was not possible to “monitor” the runners around the course as required by the FRA Safety Requirement number 8; the higher the “risk” to participants in the race, because of terrain, weather conditions, length of the race etc, the higher the need for an effective means of communication, which should be planned into the preparations for the race. (6) When the marshal at checkpoint 3 notified race control of an inaccurate number of runners who passed through checkpoint 3 there was no consideration or investigation as to the reasons for the inaccuracies. (7) There is potential for an element of “number confusion” if left over race numbers are used or reused. There should be an emphasis for allocated race numbers to start with the figure 1 rather than the figure 0 ”

    Source location

    Brian Belfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to monitor runners around the course

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) No system was in place to ensure that an accurate record was kept, and referred to, of the participants in the race and those who had retired so that at the conclusion of the race it could be easily ascertained if anyone was missing. (2) The emphasis was on counting the total numbers of participants and retirees, rather than checking off the race numbers against an accurate record of the race numbers of those who had started. Thus, as happened in Mr Belfield’s case an inaccurate count meant that there was no recognition that one runner was missing. (3) There did not appear to be any one single person, either the race organiser, or a nominated official in the race organisation, who had the responsibility to check the race numbers of those starting with the race numbers of those finishing, taking into account the race numbers of those who have retired. A single person should have had that responsibility. (4) There was no reliable means of communication between the race control and the marshals out on the fells so that each of them were aware of the number of participants in the race, those who had retired, and where they had retired. (5) Thus it was not possible to “monitor” the runners around the course as required by the FRA Safety Requirement number 8; the higher the “risk” to participants in the race, because of terrain, weather conditions, length of the race etc, the higher the need for an effective means of communication, which should be planned into the preparations for the race. (6) When the marshal at checkpoint 3 notified race control of an inaccurate number of runners who passed through checkpoint 3 there was no consideration or investigation as to the reasons for the inaccuracies. (7) There is potential for an element of “number confusion” if left over race numbers are used or reused. There should be an emphasis for allocated race numbers to start with the figure 1 rather than the figure 0 ”

    Source location

    Brian Belfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026