Recurring concern

Unreliable senior oversight of safety incident reviews

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First reported 26 Oct 2015•Latest report 30 Jan 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of senior oversight within safety incident, death or adverse-event review processes, including delayed or absent senior review, inadequate scrutiny of conclusions, failure to challenge deficient findings and failure to initiate appropriate further action after review.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in the underlying incident investigation, evidence gathering or factual accuracy where senior oversight of the review is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes generic clinical leadership, management oversight or governance failures without a direct safety-incident-review connection.
  • Excludes failures to implement safety actions after a properly completed senior review where the review and oversight process itself was reliable.
  • Excludes routine clinical review, patient-care review or audit processes that are not reviews of safety incidents, deaths or adverse events.
Reports
7

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
7

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
10

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Capita Business Services Ltd1
Capita PLC1
Care Quality Commission1
Department of Health and Social Care1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust1
London Borough of Bromley1
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency1
Metropolitan Police Service1
Mills Family Limited1
Ministry of Defence1
Sunrise Care Home1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    James Collier SIDDONS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Collier Siddons, who had very severe frailty and multiple co-morbidities, was admitted to hospital after sustaining a fractured left humerus at a nursing home. He subsequently developed aspiration pneumonia and pyelonephritis and died suddenly from sepsis on 31 January 2022. Concerns were raised that the investigation into his fracture was flawed, that the organisation lacked detailed investigation guidance and routine training, and that relevant issues were not communicated promptly by the local authority.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of senior management involvement in investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The investigation into the circumstances of Mr Siddons suffering a fracture was flawed such that lessons that might prevent an incident which could result in a future death have not been learnt a. It failed to explore all the scenarios that might have accounted for fracture. b. It was in part delegated to a deputy manager without terms of reference c. Mills Family senior management was not involved d. The investigation’s conclusions were based on assumptions ”

    Source location

    James Collier SIDDONS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen serious-incident investigations through senior-management notification, Director of Care sign-off, root-cause analysis, and evidence-based conclusions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. To re-emphasise to all managers and deputy managers that all serious incidents should be notified to the senior management team in line with company policies. Further, re-emphasise that input from the Director of Care, Mandy Finn, should be sought before any investigation report or serious incident report is finalised and circulated.”

    Source location

    Response from Mills Family Ltd
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 January 2025

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David John Morris, aged 78, developed oesophageal cancer after delays in diagnosis and treatment, later undergoing gastrostomy surgery. He developed a gastrostomy leak, peritonitis and septic shock, and died in hospital on 16 May 2022 after further surgery. The concerns included delayed recognition and treatment of the leak and sepsis, poor clinical records, deficiencies in the investigation, and ineffective controlled-drug management systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to effectively review how deficient investigation reports gain executive approval

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The initial serious investigation report into Mr Morris’s death was unfit for purpose. The report to investigate or even identify the Registrar who reviewed Mr Morris on the evening of 3rd May 2022. Since then, no effective review has been undertaken by the Trust upon how this deficient report gained executive approval. ”

    Source location

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Learning Review Group sign-off with Board Executive attendance for quoracy when approving patient safety investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On completion of Patient Safety Incident Investigations (PSIIs) there is a Learning Review Group (LRG) which reviews the contents of the reports to ensure adequate exploration of key issues has occurred and that the family has had an opportunity to input into the investigation; and ensures the improvement action plan both aligns with learning identified and is sufficiently robust to counteract the existing safety issues identified. The Terms of Reference for this meeting have been updated and now include a Board Executive (or nominated deputy) who must be in attendance for quoracy when signing off investigations.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust will respond separately to the concerns about care and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the Barking, Havering & Redbridge University Trust will also be responding separately to your concerns and that the London region of NHS England is”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response
  3. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Nicola FORSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nicola FORSTER, a Metropolitan Police Service Sergeant, was found hanging by a ligature at her home on 28 September 2022, and her death was confirmed by paramedics. The inquest concluded that she intentionally took her own life following a deterioration in her mental health exacerbated by actions of her employer. The report raised concerns about poor management, institutional defensiveness, and a fear among junior officers of speaking out about management.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of organisational review and investigation systems to act independently of senior management

    Wider context from the report

    “Although I was informed during the Inquest process about various changes that have been made to MPS Employment Policy and Processes since Nikki's death, including the introduction of a new 'Raising Concerns' Policy in May 2023, I believe there remains evidence of a culture of poor management and institutional defensiveness, as highlighted in the Baroness Casey Review, which these changes do not address. There is no point in encouraging concerns to be raised whilst this culture persists. My investigation into Nikki’s death revealed clear evidence of officers, particularly the more junior ranking officers, having a fear of speaking out about their management and also an unwillingness, by the L&D Senior Management Team, to listen independently to the concerns raised. Furthermore the PSU (as well as the DPS investigation after Nikki’s death and your representation at the Inquest) appeared only to seek to support the role of senior management; even though the Inquest found that aspects of Nikki’s management had been seriously deficient and had contributed to her death. This appeared to me to confirm the criticism made by Baroness Casey that the MPS “starts from a position that nothing wrong has occurred” and their “systems support wrongdoers”. ”

    Source location

    Nicola FORSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide dedicated operational and practical support and a single point of contact for officers and staff giving evidence at inquests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At all times, it is made clear to officers and staff that they are the Coroner’s witness, not the Commissioner’s witness, and their evidence is their own. The MPS also has a dedicated team within its Inquiry & Review Support Command (IRSC), who provide operational and practical support to police officers and staff who give evidence at inquests, where the Commissioner is an interested party. This inquest team provide a single point of contact for witnesses, both prior to and during inquest proceedings.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use inquest outcome reviews to identify case-specific learning and wider themes, then share identified improvements through organisational learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The IRSC also work closely with DLS to review inquest outcomes for both case specific learning and to identify themes that arise through analysis of different inquest proceeding. The MPS has introduced guidance for managers following the death of a colleague and a chief officer provides additional oversight of all inquest proceedings, where it is considered that workplace relationships may be a potential factor. This is improving how the MPS seeks to learn and ensure that any identified improvements are shared through wider organisational learning, for example changes to leadership training and wellbeing support.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide managers with guidance following a colleague’s death and apply chief-officer oversight where workplace relationships may be a potential factor in an inquest.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The IRSC also work closely with DLS to review inquest outcomes for both case specific learning and to identify themes that arise through analysis of different inquest proceeding. The MPS has introduced guidance for managers following the death of a colleague and a chief officer provides additional oversight of all inquest proceedings, where it is considered that workplace relationships may be a potential factor. This is improving how the MPS seeks to learn and ensure that any identified improvements are shared through wider organisational learning, for example changes to leadership training and wellbeing support.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The DPS investigation was independent of Learning and Development and did not seek to support its leaders; an independent authority found no misconduct case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The investigation was independent of L&D, and did not seek to support the leaders within L&D. In accordance with the statutory regulations, once the investigation was completed, it was considered by an independent Appropriate Authority, who reviewed the evidence and concluded that the line manager had no case to answer for misconduct, as defined in the Police (Conduct) Regulations.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inquest witnesses received support while giving their own evidence, including when that evidence was frank or critical of the MPS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At inquest the Commissioner was represented by the Directorate of Legal Services (“DLS”). Nicola Forster’s line manager was separately legally represented as she was given Interested Person status at inquest. All police witnesses, except one individual, who gave evidence at inquest were supported by the MPS. You will be aware that some witnesses gave frank and often critical evidence about the MPS, this did not change the support they were provided.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma collapsed during separate military selection runs at Whittington Barracks and later died after being taken to hospital. Both were found to have metabolic acidosis, acute kidney injury, rhabdomyolysis and sickle cell trait; the final causes of death remained under investigation, with the most likely cause of collapse described as sickle cell trait combined with military exercise. The principal concern was the risk of death or harm to non-UK selection candidates, including the need to consider screening for sickle cell trait.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the clinical oversight board to review or audit near misses

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Joint Lessons Learnt Panel and Learning Account process to investigate incidents, assign recommendations, disseminate learning and monitor completion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reporting processes have also been enhanced; any similar future incident will be investigated promptly and jointly by the medical and health and safety teams. These include automated notification of Recruiting Group’s Chief Medical Officer and Head of Health and Safety, to enable them to trigger an investigation by a newly established Joint Lessons Learnt Panel. This panel includes senior Recruiting Group and Army colleagues in operational, clinical, and health and safety leadership roles. The Panel has an enduring remit to review all reported accidents and near misses within 96 hours and make appropriate recommendations, although in practice incidents are reviewed within 48 hours. The panel also directs a suitably qualified individual or body (such as Recruiting Group’s Clinical Oversight Board) to conduct a more detailed Learning Account investigation.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit incident processing through Clinical Oversight Board, joint assurance forums, Defence oversight and a commissioned external review of Sickle Cell Trait risk management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As detailed in the response to Matter of Concern 3a above, all actual and ‘near miss’ incidents are reviewed at the monthly Clinical Oversight Board. Audit takes place at the quarterly Joint Health and Safety Executive Manager’s Conference, the quarterly Joint”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 11 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response
  5. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Frank Charles Medley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Frank Charles Medley presented with acute weakness in all four limbs, but an MRI scan that was considered urgent was delayed for four working days. He underwent surgery for multiple paraspinal abscesses and died on 14 July 2019. The principal concerns included delays and inadequate prioritisation of imaging, deficiencies in the Trust’s adverse incident review, and shortcomings in systems for detecting adverse outcomes and coordinating relevant departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient senior clinical oversight of review conclusions

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Trust's review of this case was seriously deficient in the following instances: a. At no point were members of the family spoken to for their views or concerns regarding the death up to and including the inquest. b. The date of death was 14 July 2019. The Report was incomplete eight months later in March 2020 when it was suspended during the first Covid wave. The report was not completed before the inquest on 23 February 2021. This is not in accordance with NHS guidance; c. The case was inappropriately allocated to a structured judgement review; d. The "Summary of the Incident" contains substantial factual inaccuracies to such an extent that it is deeply misleading; e. Mr Medley's death was due to complications of sepsis. The report failed to note that due to admission for query sepsis at the same hospital 11 days before, that: i. the EWS score was sufficient to trigger the septic shock pathway; ii. the nurse correctly identified that the septic shock pathway should be followed and drew this to the attention of "a doctor"; iii. that due to the referrals taking place between specialties at this time the relevant specialty responsible for dealing with this issue cannot be identified and made no entry in the medical records (this raises similar issues to those concerns raised in the Regulation 28 report concerning Mrs Gillian McKinley at the same Trust); iv. that, despite the patient observations being readily available to the treating consultant orthopaedic surgeon the following morning and the nurse having documented the septic shock pathway should be activated in the notes, the consultant orthopaedic surgeon failed to note this both at the time and during the preparation of his witness statement for the inquest; v. the error was only detected by the Trust's Legal Services Department when preparing for the inquest 19 months after the event. f. That the consultant physician responsible for Mr Medley's care appreciated that his symptoms constituted a medical emergency, that the MRI scan should be completed on 2 July 2019 but took no action himself to expedite the scan. There is no documented evidence in the medical records regarding junior doctors attempts to expedite the scan; g. The consultant physician responsible for Mr Medley's care after input from the neurologists on 3 July 2019 made no attempts to expedite the scan or to contact tertiary neurosurgical services; h. On 2 July 2019 the treating clinicians suspected infective complications high in the cervical spine but only undertook a chest x-ray and blood cultures without considering sending a urine sample for analysis, considering an echocardiogram or OPG; i. Mr Medley's scan should have been completed within 24 hours of request in accordance with NICE guidance, which was not cited anywhere in the report, and that the priority attached to the scan on 2 July 2019 placed Mr Medley in the lowest priority category when he should have been in the highest priority category. This mistake was repeated on 3 July 2019 when Mr Medley was placed in the middle priority category. There is no documentation as to any rationale for the priority allocation; j. The scan when it was performed on 5 July 2019 was not a contrast scan necessary to accurately delineate foci of infection resulting in a further scan using contrast to be performed later that day. k. That prioritisation of scans within the radiology department depended to a considerable extent on a personal attendance by clinicians at the department or speaking to radiologists rather than solely on clinical need; l. There was insufficient senior clinical oversight of the conclusions drawn. ”

    Source location

    Mr Frank Charles Medley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a senior core group to oversee action-plan implementation and monitor embedding into Trust processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A core group has been established to oversee the implementation of this action plan led by the Associate Director of Quality and Safety, the Deputy Medical Director and Director of Nursing to ensure senior oversight of the issues raised. Please be assured that this group will continue to meet until all actions have been embedded as business as usual into Trust processes with clear reporting and monitoring processes in place.”

    Source location

    2021-0057-Response-from-Royal-Blackburn-Teaching-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce weekly Executive review of divisional investigations before SIRI Panel submission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A weekly Executive review of Divisional investigations due at SIRI Panel has been introduced from 21 April to monitor the quality of reports prior to submission. This aims to ensure that the quality of the investigation may be identified earlier and at a senior enough level to require any further improvements to be made without delaying the process or submission to your court. A pro forma for Serious Incident investigations, with a front sheet for sign off each stage, has been developed in line with the National Patient Safety Strategy and PSIRF requirements; which prompts investigators to clearly link the problems, learning and recommendations to individual actions that are focused on preventing the same incident reoccurring. I understand a pilot version of this proforma was received favourably by one of your team at an inquest last week.”

    Source location

    2021-0057-Response-from-Royal-Blackburn-Teaching-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 7 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response
  6. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Margery Annie Astill · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margery Annie Astill was admitted to the Evington Centre under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act. On 2 September 2016, she collided with another agitated patient, fell, and was diagnosed with unsurvivable head injuries; she died three days later. Concerns included ineffective referral and incident-reporting systems, inadequate communication with family members, and delays in providing first aid after falls. The inquest also found that there was no care plan, the ward was understaffed, and not all patient observations were completed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in senior review of reported incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Diary systems for ensuring referrals to different specialisms were not effective, such as for physiotherapy and the failure of these systems was not identified until the inquest was held. Furthermore, the system for entering and updating/amending incident reporting was unclear and reported incidents were not reviewed by a senior employee in a timely fashion on this occasion. ”

    Source location

    Margery Annie Astill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate daily incident analysis supported by the Patient Safety Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MHSOP currently formally review all incidents weekly however there is a system in place for daily incident analysis which is supported by the Trust’s Patient Safety Team that assures that the correct processes are being followed.”

    Source location

    2017-0440-Leicestershire-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 July 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Daily incident analysis, supported by the Patient Safety Team, is considered sufficient to assure that correct incident-review processes are followed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MHSOP currently formally review all incidents weekly however there is a system in place for daily incident analysis which is supported by the Trust’s Patient Safety Team that assures that the correct processes are being followed.”

    Source location

    2017-0440-Leicestershire-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 July 2017

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Allan Richard Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Allan Richard Beasley, who had vascular dementia, was admitted to a care home after he could no longer manage at home and experienced multiple falls. Following a further fall, he was diagnosed with cervical spine fractures, developed a chest infection, deteriorated and died. Concerns included inadequate falls-risk assessment, failures to record and escalate falls, inaccurate observation records, and incomplete monitoring and review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of senior staff to correctly review falls incident forms

    Wider context from the report

    “(8) The falls incident forms were not correctly reviewed by senior staff. ”

    Source location

    Allan Richard Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026