Recurring concern

Ineffective controls preventing access to railway tracks

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First reported 27 May 2015•Latest report 4 Mar 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to preventing or restricting access to railway tracks, including physical barriers or mitigation measures and responses to identified railway-access risks or recommended remedial actions.

Not included

  • Excludes generic failures in investigation, documentation, training, staffing or governance unless they are directly tied to a dedicated railway-track-access control.
  • Excludes railway hazards unrelated to preventing access to the tracks.
  • Excludes general infrastructure or highway safety deficiencies that do not concern access to railway tracks.
Reports
24

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
31

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
60

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Network Rail21
British Transport Police3
Alexandra Park and Palace Charitable Trust1
Arriva Rail North Limited1
Broxtowe Borough Council1
Department for Education1
Derbyshire County Council1
Erewash Borough Council1
Father of the deceased1
First MTR South Western Trains Limited1
London Borough of Hackney1
London North Eastern Railway Limited1
London & South Eastern Railway Limited1
Mother of the deceased1
Nottinghamshire County Council1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Elizabeth HAMLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 8 March 2016, Susan Elizabeth HAMLETT walked onto a railway line and lay across the tracks, where she was killed instantly by a train. The investigation identified that an access gate provided little deterrence to railway access and that a more substantial fence had not been installed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate physical barriers at the railway access gate

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The British Transport investigation revealed that the deceased gained access to the railway line through an access gate at Lower Farm Road, Bromham, Bedfordshire. The gate is of wooden construction and provides little deterrence or hindrance to someone wanting to gain access to the railway. The gate has a wooden fence around it of a similar height. (2) The investigation identified that the area around the wooded track access gate, at the western side of the bridge, should be removed and replaced with a more significant fence as a matter of urgency. It is understood that this has not been undertaken. ”

    Source location

    Susan Elizabeth HAMLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Jakovas Fofonovas · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jakovas Fofonovas died on 23 May 2015 after accessing the railway and being struck by a train near Abbey Wood railway station. Concerns were raised that unsafe bridge features enabled access to the railway and that recommendations to improve safety and restrict public access had not been implemented by the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to restrict public access to the railway

    Wider context from the report

    “Recommendations in The BTP Post Fatality Report to create a safer environment at the bridge and restrict public access to the railway had not been effected by the time of the inquest. The court did not have the benefit of Network Rail spokesperson in court to provide evidence of future plans ”

    Source location

    Jakovas Fofonovas · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace the old footbridge with a safer structure incorporating standard-height railings, an encased railway span, ramps, safer pedestrian exits and no mid-elevation turnback.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the works currently being carried out by Network Rail and Balfour Beatty on behalf of Crossrail at Abbey Wood Station the original footbridge has now been demolished. It has been replaced with a completely new and much improved specification footbridge which accommodates the additional railway tracks which have been laid at Abbey Wood.”

    Source location

    2016-0077-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install three-metre acoustic fencing with anti-climb extensions along both sides of the track and adjacent to Mottistord Road.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, as set out below we are in the process of installing acoustic fencing along both sides of the track at a height of 3m. Additionally this will have anti-climb extensions fitted at certain sections. This fencing is designed to prevent access to the railway tracks.”

    Source location

    2016-0077-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install anti-climb guards above the footbridge railings at the steps, ramps and main span.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the shoulder of the steps/ramps and the main span there is an anti-climb guard at a greater height than the railings as further mitigation. In addition there is the acoustic fencing and anti-climb wire extensions to prevent anyone accessing the track if they were to climb over the railings.”

    Source location

    2016-0077-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove old building materials from beneath the footbridge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “v. Building materials under the bridge offer aids to climbing down”

    Source location

    2016-0077-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2016

    Open published response
  3. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Lee Connelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Lee Connelly was found deceased beside railway tracks near footbridge 57 between Walkden and Atherton after sustaining injuries consistent with being struck by a train. The principal concern was that the approximately five-foot walls of the steps leading to the footbridge could allow a person of reasonable athletic ability to access the railway track, creating a risk of future fatalities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate restriction of public access to the railway track from the steps accessing footbridge 57

    Wider context from the report

    “i. Due to the height of the walls of the steps which are used to access footbridge 57 on the railway line between Walkden and Atherton train stations, a person of reasonable athletic ability could gain access to the railway track, which could lead to future fatalities at this location on the railway ”

    Source location

    Adam Lee Connelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install shorter palisade pales on the lower flight to connect with the boundary fence and raise the parapet to at least two metres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bridge is not known to Network Rail as being used by members of the public to gain access to the infrastructure. However, as a consequence of this event, I can confirm that we intend to undertake the following works:”

    Source location

    2015-0284-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the upper-flight stepped parapet with engineering brick and bullnose units to prevent scaling and access behind the lower-flight palisade.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bridge is not known to Network Rail as being used by members of the public to gain access to the infrastructure. However, as a consequence of this event, I can confirm that we intend to undertake the following works:”

    Source location

    2015-0284-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2015

    Open published response
  4. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mathew Lee Hoare · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mathew Lee Hoare was found on a live rail near Wandsworth Road Train Station after entering Clapham High Street Station and accessing its platforms and tracks after hours. He sustained fatal injuries after being electrocuted and struck by an oncoming train; concerns related to ineffective security equipment and the ease of access through widely spaced yellow tape.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of after-hours station and track access barriers to prevent access

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The lack of effective security equipment preventing access to the station and tracks after the hours of operation. (2) The ease at which Mr Hoare was able to access the station and tracks by climbing through widely spaced yellow tape. ”

    Source location

    Mathew Lee Hoare · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install barriers to separate rail infrastructure where access is unnecessary, including fencing SouthEastern infrastructure from LOROL infrastructure at the station.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For our part, safety is a core value for Network Rail and we are continually striving to reduce fatalities on the railway through a number of initiatives an example of which is the installation of barriers to separate rail ‘streams’ where access is not needed to Network Rail infrastructure; an example of this can be seen at the Station where the SouthEastern railway infrastructure (which does not offer services from the Station) is fully fenced from the LOROL infrastructure.”

    Source location

    2015-0203-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Station access and management are outside the infrastructure owner's management because the station is operated by the train operator.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail Infrastructure Limited (“Network Rail”) owns, operates and maintains the rail infrastructure including the track and signalling equipment across the UK. Clapham High Street Station (“the Station”) is not operated by Network Rail but is managed by the operator of the majority of trains stopping at the station, LOROL. Although the station is not an asset under our management, but noting that the recommendations in your report concern access to the station and the tracks we have sought clarity from LOROL. LOROL has been able to assist with some information particularly in respect of changed practices at the Station, which we hope will assist in responding to your concerns.”

    Source location

    2015-0203-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 May 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for station access information and practices rests with the station operator, which provided the relevant clarification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail Infrastructure Limited (“Network Rail”) owns, operates and maintains the rail infrastructure including the track and signalling equipment across the UK. Clapham High Street Station (“the Station”) is not operated by Network Rail but is managed by the operator of the majority of trains stopping at the station, LOROL. Although the station is not an asset under our management, but noting that the recommendations in your report concern access to the station and the tracks we have sought clarity from LOROL. LOROL has been able to assist with some information particularly in respect of changed practices at the Station, which we hope will assist in responding to your concerns.”

    Source location

    2015-0203-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 May 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026