Recurring concern

Failure to reliably escalate patient safety concerns to primary care

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 5 Dec 2014•Latest report 4 Nov 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures by care, community, mental-health, supported-accommodation or other services to identify when a patient's safety concern requires primary-care involvement and to contact, refer to or obtain a response from the patient's GP or appropriate primary-care service, including unclear escalation guidance, failure to arrange GP attendance and failure to follow up intended GP support.

Not included

  • Excludes routine communication or notifications to primary care that do not concern a patient-safety issue requiring GP involvement.
  • Excludes failures in specialist, emergency, hospital or social-care referral pathways where primary-care escalation is not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes failures occurring after primary care has been reliably contacted and has accepted responsibility, unless the asserted concern is a separate failure of GP clinical care.
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, documentation or care-coordination deficiencies unless they directly impair escalation of a patient-safety concern to primary care.
  • Excludes the existing broader concern about notifying primary care of changes in patient care when the assertion concerns notification of a status change rather than escalation of an active safety concern requiring GP involvement.
Reports
9

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
15

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission2
NHS England2
A & B Healthcare Limited1
Brighton and Hove City Council1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Dorset Council1
Dorset Police1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
East Riding of Yorkshire Council1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Homerton Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
H & R Healthcare Limited1
Jigsaw Homes Group Limited1
Ministry of Justice1
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Brown Townend · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Brown Townend, who had diabetes and other comorbidities, developed an infected foot wound that progressed to sepsis despite hospital treatment, and she died on 15 October 2023. Concerns arose about the care provided by carers, including brief visits, failure to escalate poor nutrition, sickness and early warning signs, inaccurate records, and failure to follow up or escalate refusals of care and medical intervention.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up on intended GP support

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the evidence a number of concerns arose as to the level of care Ms Townend received from the carers employed by A&B Healthcare. These include: a) Carers at times spent no more than 15 minutes, on one occasion 8 minutes, with Ms Townend. Bearing in times the tasks, document keeping and care to administer and considering Early Warning Signs have there was no attention to detail; Their duties when there included to prepare meals, conduct personal care if required and talk to the service user. 8 to 15 minutes is not an adequate time to conduct these tasks; ; b) Carers did not escalate any concerns when Ms Townend was not eating. As Ms Townend had comorbidities and was at risk of infection nutrition was very important; c) Carers did not escalate any concerns when Ms Townend was unwell with sickness. There were a number of times Ms Townend presented with having been sick and this was not considered as a concern; d) Carers did not accurately record concerns regarding Early Warning Signs (EWS) or escalate when they were present. The EWS were always recorded as no concerns. This was not correct as there were occasions where Ms Townend was displaying signs that were Early Warning Signs which should have been escalated; e) Carers did not follow up with Ms Townend when she had indicated she was seeking GP support as she was feeling unwell. This was recorded in the Observation Log that Ms Townend said she would contact her GP however the proceeding carers did not enquire whether this had been done; f) Although Ms Townend was deemed to have capacity carers did not escalate any concerns when Ms Townend was making unwise decisions to refuse personal care, decline food and decline medical intervention. This meant that she was sitting at times in her own faeces and becoming weak and it was not considered whether she needed to be reassessed regarding her capacity. ”

    Source location

    Janet Brown Townend · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake an unannounced assessment covering visit duration, nutrition and hydration, health monitoring, escalation, record keeping, governance, safeguarding and decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both inspections of Bridlington found no concerns regarding the deployment of staff and the published reports include positive feedback from people about the support they received. In response to the concerns raised by the coroner concerning the death of Janet Brown, the CQC has received an action plan from the provider addressing the duration of staff visits. We intend to undertake an unannounced assessment of the service which will include staff having adequate time to meet people’s needs. CQC only neglects the carrying out of personal care, however, adequate”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Neither inspection raised concerns about staff failing to escalate health concerns, and the earlier inspection found appropriate healthcare referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Neither inspection of Bridlington raised concerns about staff not escalating concerns about people. The inspection of Bridlington in January 2020 found staff supported people to access health care professionals and referrals were made when required. (Appendix 1). In response to the concerns raised by the coroner concerning the death of Janet Brown, the CQC has received an action plan from the provider addressing how staff will monitor people’s health and well-being. We intend to undertake an unannounced assessment of the service which will include how people are supported to live healthier lives and how the provider will monitor peoples care (Appendix 1, Appendix 2).”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The January 2020 inspection found no concerns about staff supporting people to access healthcare services and support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The inspection of Bridlington in January 2020 found no concerns regarding how staff supported people to access healthcare services and support (Appendix 1). In response to the concerns raised by the coroner concerning the death of Janet Brown, the CQC has received an action plan from the provider addressing their systems for monitoring people’s health effectively within the staff team. We intend to undertake an unannounced assessment of the service which will include governance processes and oversight of people’s care.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

    Open published response
  2. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Carol Patricia Cole · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carol Patricia Cole was found collapsed and unresponsive at home on 15 May 2020 after being prescribed medication and having a history including depression, unstable personality disorder and previous overdoses. The inquest concluded that her death was suicide. Concerns were raised that processes for sharing Public Protection Notices in the Dorset Council area may have resulted in the GP not receiving information about concerns regarding her mental health, creating a missed opportunity for assessment, support or treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure PPNs reach GPs for Dorset Council residents

    Wider context from the report

    “iii. In Dorset there are 2 Local Authorities that cover the County, BCP Council and Dorset Council. If MASH receive a PPN about a resident in the BCP Council area the current arrangement is that MASH send the PPN directly to the GP as required. If they receive a PPN about a resident in the Dorset Council area the current process is that they do not send it directly to the GP but send it directly to the Dorset Adult Access team at Dorset Council, who will then send it to the GP. iv. At the time of her death Carole resided within the Dorset Council area. A PPN was submitted to MASH regarding Carole on 25.4.20 which raised concerns regarding her mental health. The MASH team determined the PNN should be shared with the Dorset Adult Access team to share with the GP in line with the process. v. At the Inquest the representative from the GP surgery confirmed there was no record of the PNN being received by them, which led to a missed opportunity for Carole to be assessed by her GP. vi. The process currently in place, which I understand has been agreed by both Dorset Council and Dorset Police, of preventing the MASH team from sending the PNN directly to the GP, may result in the GP not being informed of the contents of the PPN which may result in a person not receiving an assessment, support or treatment. I am not aware of a reason why the MASH team cannot send it directly to the GP, as they do for those residents in BCP council area, to avoid such missed opportunities to take action which may lead to a future death. 2. I have concerns with regard to the following: i. There could be missed opportunities to share PPNs relating to residents within the Dorset Council area with agencies or professionals due to the current processes in place between Dorset Police and Dorset Council which could lead to a future death. I therefore request that Dorset Police and Dorset Council review their current processes in place regarding the sharing of PPNs by MASH, especially to General Practitioners for the residents within the Dorset Council area. ”

    Source location

    Carol Patricia Cole · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review PPN-sharing processes with Dorset and BCP Adult Social Care partners to identify safeguarding risks and consistency improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You therefore requested that Dorset Police and Dorset Council review their current processes in place regarding the sharing of PPNs by MASH, especially to General Practitioners for the residents within the Dorset Council area.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Police_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a further review with Health and Social Care partners of PPN-sharing processes, using national best practice to identify improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Identification of this risk has prompted a further review with Health partners which is scheduled to commence on 12 April 2022. Police, Health and Social Care will work together to review the current process, what is working well and where improvements can be made based on national best practice from other areas.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Police_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review current PPN-sharing processes with Dorset Police and BCP Council to identify improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The request was made that Dorset Police and Dorset Council review their current processes in place regarding the sharing of PPNs by MASH, especially to General Practitioners for the residents within the Dorset Council area. We reviewed the current PPN process with Dorset Police and Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole (BCP) Council between 16/02/2022 and 16/03/22. This involved members of the operational management team at Dorset Council and Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole (BCP) Council and Dorset Police Public Protection Unit meeting to analyse current steps in the process. This identified the following areas of improvement:”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Council_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend Dorset Police and Dorset Council PPN-sharing processes to align with BCP processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) Amend the current process of sharing PPNs between Dorset Police and Dorset Council to align with BCP processes. This requires work to ensure the MASH has adequate capacity and access to up-to-date information about a person’s GP. To have immediate impact on the current process, Dorset Council will fund additional staffing resources to MASH to assist with the sharing of PPNs to GPs to allow time for a wider system review of MASH to be completed. The plan is to complete recruitment by end of May 2022.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Council_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fund and recruit additional MASH staff to support sharing PPNs with GPs, with recruitment planned by the end of May 2022.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) Amend the current process of sharing PPNs between Dorset Police and Dorset Council to align with BCP processes. This requires work to ensure the MASH has adequate capacity and access to up-to-date information about a person’s GP. To have immediate impact on the current process, Dorset Council will fund additional staffing resources to MASH to assist with the sharing of PPNs to GPs to allow time for a wider system review of MASH to be completed. The plan is to complete recruitment by end of May 2022.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Council_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Meet with Dorset Police, BCP and health partners, including GP safeguarding leads, to discuss PPN-sharing processes and improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ii) A meeting has been arranged between Dorset Council, Dorset Police MASH, BCP and health partners including GP safeguarding leads in April 2022 to discuss current PPN sharing processes, including what is working well and areas for improvement. This was the earliest opportunity to do so, so that all parties could be represented.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Council_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek approval to align a partnership review of Adult MASH PPN sharing with the Children’s MASH review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iii) Share learning from the Regulation 28 report at Dorset’s Safeguarding Adult Review in April 2022 and seek approval to align a full partnership review of PPN sharing within Adult MASH with the Children’s MASH review which will take place in July 2022.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Council_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the Adult Access Team process to forward PPNs to relevant agencies regardless of Adult Social Care involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iv) Amend Dorset Council’s internal process so that the Adult Access Team forward PPNs to relevant agencies or professionals regardless of whether the person is known or not known to Adult Social Care. This was immediately actioned and implemented on 25/02/22.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Council_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police cannot share PPNs with GPs directly because it lacks access to the Dorset Care Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The review also identified that for the Police to carry out the sharing of PPNs to GPs there would be a requirement for Police to have access to the Dorset Care Record which it currently does not have.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Police_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Dorset Council Adult Social Care staff will be responsible for sharing PPNs with GPs using the Dorset Care Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On 28 March 2022, it was agreed that Dorset Council will fund a member of staff from Adult Social Care to co-locate with Dorset Police in the MASH. This role would be responsible for sharing with GPs and have access to the Dorset Care Record. In the interim I am aware that the Dorset Adult Access Team promptly streamlined their working practices in February 2022 to overcome the issue that resulted in the failure to share the PPN with the GP in the case of Ms Cole.”

    Source location

    2022-0033-Response-from-Dorset-Police_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2022

    Open published response
  3. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Katie Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katie Emma Corrigan had a history of chronic pain, anxiety and depression, and developed an addiction to pain-relieving medication. She obtained medication from multiple sources, and the report raised concerns that doctors, pharmacists and alert systems did not prevent her from obtaining sufficient opiate medication to cause her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of doctors considering opiate prescriptions to contact the registered GP

    Wider context from the report

    “The GP who gave evidence at the inquest, Dr ████████ from Bodriggy Health Centre in Hayle, stated that she had never been contacted by any other doctor considering the prescription of opiate or other medication to Mrs Corrigan. She was able to procure the medication in sufficient quantities first to require an emergency admission to hospital and latterly to result in her death. Similarly, the registered GP was not contacted by any dispensing pharmacist checking whether the prescription was appropriate. After Dr ████████ became aware of the two on-line pharmacies who had dispensed the medication to Mrs Corrigan that led to her admission into hospital, she attempted to raise an alert through NHS England, in order that the unsuitability of prescribing opiate medication to Mrs Corrigan could be raised with clinicians. This was sent out regionally but Dr ████████ has since been advised there is no formal procedure for circulating Patient Alerts to pharmacies on a national level. I am further given to understand that non NHS contacts would only receive a redacted version of the alert in any event. What seems clear is that the alert proved ineffective in preventing Mrs Corrigan from improperly obtaining sufficient quantities of opiate medication to result in her death. ”

    Source location

    Katie Emma Corrigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inspect each registered online provider identified from the inquest and review their medication-prescribing management processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC has inspected each of the registered online providers that you identified from the inquest into Ms Corrigan’s death that Ms Corrigan may have used. At each inspection, management processes for prescribing medications were reviewed and if concerns were identified we took regulatory action against the provider or the inspection report shared details of the areas needing improvement.”

    Source location

    2021-0045-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Submit proposals to DHSC for legislative changes addressing regulatory safety gaps in independent online primary care services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since January 2021 CQC has been in discussions with, and submitted, proposals for legislative changes to the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), to improve CQC’s ability to take action against independent providers of online primary care services that are putting people’s lives at risk. In particular, we are looking to address safety gaps in the following areas:”

    Source location

    2021-0045-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share key learning and practice points from the inquest with relevant providers and stakeholders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where CQC identifies that regulations are not being met, we use our enforcement powers to require improvements to be made. We continue to do this and will share key learning and practice points from the inquest into the death of Katie Corrigan.”

    Source location

    2021-0045-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue using enforcement powers to require improvements when online providers fail to meet regulatory requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where CQC identifies that regulations are not being met, we use our enforcement powers to require improvements to be made. We continue to do this and will share key learning and practice points from the inquest into the death of Katie Corrigan.”

    Source location

    2021-0045-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish guidance setting expectations for providers to inform patients’ GPs about prescribed medicines and assess safety when information sharing is declined.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC has published guidance for providers¹. The guidance describes the expectations of providers to ensure a patient’s GP is informed of prescribed medications from their service. We also expect that should the patient decline to consent for the sharing of such information to take place, the prescriber should consider whether it is still safe to continue and accept the full responsibility for their actions and act in line with GMC prescribing guidance.”

    Source location

    2021-0045-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response
  4. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Elsie Yvonne Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elsie Yvonne Taylor, aged 68, fell at home on 15 September 2020, sustained rib fractures and a pneumothorax, and died later the same day after deteriorating in hospital. Concerns included incomplete recording of her reported decision to decline hospital admission and the advice given, lack of information about the consultation and deterioration symptoms, and no attempt to contact her GP or family despite her living alone.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to contact the GP or a family member when a patient living alone requires follow-up

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) The deceased lived alone and suffered with COPD and IHD. No attempt was made to contact the GP of the deceased or a family member despite the fact it was known that the deceased lived alone (it was noted in the EPR). ”

    Source location

    Elsie Yvonne Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Gary Leyland · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Gary Leyland was found deceased in his supported accommodation on 13 November 2019 after taking excessive prescribed medication, with the inquest conclusion recording suicide and morphine toxicity. Concerns included failures to contact medical or mental health services after suicidal thoughts were disclosed, poor documentation and handover information, the use of security staff for welfare checks without clear evidence of training, and the absence of an updated risk assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to redirect concerns or contact the person's GP

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The Court heard evidence that Oldham Council who commissioned the supported accommodation through Jigsaw Homes Group. The Court heard evidence part of the contract provision for the service includes the fact that Threshold ( the brand of Jigsaw Homes which provided the Spring Street accommodation ) must comply with certain policies which included risk assessment and risk management and Safeguarding Adults. However no evidence was provided to the Court as to any self-harm or suicide policy available to staff relating to how they should deal with such issues which may arise. In this case Spring Street clearly took responsibility by virtue of their plan (welfare checks, update risk assessment etc) for Mr Leylands welfare once they were put on notice of the Probation Service concerns. No attempt was made to re-direct the Probation Service to another agency ie Mr Leylands GP nor was any attempt made by Spring Street to contact Mr Leylands GP. ”

    Source location

    Mr Gary Leyland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Karl James Willis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karl James Willis was found deceased at home, with toxicology showing amitriptyline at a concentration within the reported fatal range and morphine sufficient to increase its toxicity. The inquest recorded the medical cause of death as aspiration pneumonitis and amitriptyline and morphine toxicity, with a conclusion of misadventure. Concerns included online access to amitriptyline without adequate checks, the ability to provide inaccurate information, and the option not to inform the patient’s GP.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure that the GP is informed

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Permitting the patient the option of not having the GP informed removes an otherwise effective safeguard. The GP had worked with extreme care and supported the patient over many months to try and reduce his excessive reliance on polypharmacy. ”

    Source location

    Karl James Willis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The provider could not share consultation details with the patient’s GP because there was no legal justification to breach confidentiality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You finally highlight the concern that Karl was given an option to refuse to have the details of his consultation with the private on-line provider to be shared with his own GP. We have checked the website for the provider which has been involved in this case and note that it is recommended that information is shared with a patient’s own GP. As you will appreciate, whilst most often in a patient’s best interest information to be shared, the bar at which it is appropriate for confidentiality to be breached is set high and in the tragic circumstance of Karl Willis, there would have been no legal justification to have breached his confidentiality and informed his GP or anyone else involved in his care.”

    Source location

    2018-0256-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 September 2018

    Open published response
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Christiana Pelle · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christiana Pelle developed a grade 4 sacral pressure ulcer while living at home under the care of community nursing and a planned care package. The ulcer became infected, and she later died in hospital after contracting pneumonia while receiving inpatient treatment. The principal concerns were unclear guidance about when nurses should involve a GP and inadequate systems for sharing information and escalating concerns between community nursing, other agencies, and the care provider.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear guidance for Community District Nursing team nurses on when to involve a community patient’s GP

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Lack of clear guidance and thus ongoing uncertainty on the part of the nurses in Homerton’s Community District Nursing team as to when they should seek the involvement of a community patient’s GP; ”

    Source location

    Christiana Pelle · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Philip Richard David BREATNACH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip Richard David Breatnach's circumstances are referred to in the Record of Inquest. The concerns relate to online applications for medication, inadequate checking of answers and failure to contact his GP, and the prescribing of Dihydrocodeine by a prescriber who had not seen him, including concerns about the quantity, suitability for migraine, and dosing instructions. The inquest concluded with a finding of MISADVENTURE (DEPENDENCE ON DRUGS).

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to contact the patient’s GP to verify medication application answers

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Mr Breatnach (and anybody else) is able to apply online for medications (2) That applying online, if the application form is not thoroughly checked, allows the applicant to lie or give false or misleading answers to critical questions which is what Mr Breatnach did. (3) There was no evidence that the prescriber made any effort to contact Mr Breatnach’s GP to find out if the answers that he gave were true. (4) Prescribing Dihydrocodeine, a potentially addictive drug, used for the treatment of moderate to severe pain to a patient who the prescriber has never seen appears to fly in the face of good prescribing practice. (5) The amount of Dihydrocodeine prescribed appears to be excessive. (6) I understand from the evidence that I heard at the Inquest that Dihydrocodeine should not be prescribed for migraine which is the reason Mr Breatnach gave for asking for this medication. (7) The instructions were that the Dihydrocodeine should be taken every four to six hours as required. The evidence at the Inquest was that taking Dihydrocodeine in this way, potentially suggesting that eight tablets could or should be taken every twenty four hours until the whole of the one hundred and twenty six tablets given are used up is I heard not the way Dihydrocodeine should be prescribed. (8) Prescribing this number of tablets would therefore seem to be completely inappropriate and fails to understand that medications such as Dihydrocodeine can be used as currency. The medication came in three packets – one containing one hundred tablets and the other two containing twenty eight tablets each. The two packets containing twenty eight tablets each were never found and this raises the possibility that Mr Breatnach was able to sell them, although I have no evidence that he did. (9) This way of prescribing completely undermines the diligent and careful GP’s efforts to control this man’s medication over use. ”

    Source location

    Philip Richard David BREATNACH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Leslie HYDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Leslie Hyde died after taking an overdose of medication that had been stopped, with the sedatory effect contributing to his death. The report raised concerns that his referral for a psychiatric medication review was not appropriately addressed, that he was not seen within the required period or followed up, and that the re-referral system was not fit for purpose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to contact the GP about the referral

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) On the 14th April 2014, GP Dr. Peter Devlin having anxieties expressed to him by one of the Community Mental Health Workers concerning Paul Hyde’s deteriorating condition, sought advice from the Assessment and Treatment Team of the Community Mental Health Services. He spoke to Graham Walton who advised him that he should refer Mr. Hyde back to ATS (Assessment and Treatment Service). He therefore wrote a letter on the 15th July, 2014 and this was sent so that it arrived on the same day, expressing his anxiety. (2) The request was for Mr. Hyde to see a Psychiatrist to carry out a medication review. It is clear that this Medication Review needs to be carried out by the Psychiatrist in a face-to-face review with the patient. (3) The referral was not appropriately addressed until some 14 days in to the 28-day period within which the patient is required either to have been seen by ATS or the Psychiatrist or the GP. It was decided, though very poorly documented that the Psychiatrist should phone the GP to see whether, after discussion, it was possible for the GP to prescribe a new medication for Mr. Hyde. It should have been obvious from the start that this was not a direction for this referral to take. There seems to be no facility for the Psychiatrist to be involved in the assessment procedure and indicate a course him or herself. There should be. In any event, no contact was made with the GP and there is apparently no follow up system so no one seems to have picked up that not only was Mr. Hyde not seen within the 28-days of referral, but in fact that he was not seen at all i.e. he was lost to follow up. (4) From the point of view of Mr. Hyde, the re-referral system was not fit for purpose. In the event, Mr. Hyde took an overdose of the medication which had been stopped, although he still had some tablets, and the very sedatory effect that he had complained about kicked in, resulting in his death. ”

    Source location

    Paul Leslie HYDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate named Consultant Psychiatrists to GPs and arrange meetings to clarify referral roles and expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are always striving to improve the interface between primary care and secondary mental health services. In order to improve relationships between GPs and Consultant Psychiatrists, GPs have been allocated named Consultant Psychiatrists. Meetings between the psychiatrists and GPs have been arranged. ████████ is leading on this to ensure both GPs and psychiatrists are clear on their roles and the expectations of referrals. Work is on-going to ensure there is a joined-up approach for our service users and their families and there is continual learning and improvement. Mr Hyde’s experience has been shared (anonymously) with staff to drive home the lessons to be learned. In addition, to ensure widespread learning, feedback from the case has been given to ████████ Director of Nursing Standards and Safety.”

    Source location

    2014-0527-Response-by-Sussex-Partnership-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 December 2014

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026