Recurring concern

Unreliable armed police containment and call-out procedures

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First reported 12 Aug 2015•Latest report 8 Jul 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in dedicated armed-policing containment and call-out arrangements, including defining or communicating whether containment is overt or covert, timing and content of announcements, briefing officers on the tactic and its rationale, and other directly associated operational instructions needed to prevent confusion during entry and containment.

Not included

  • Excludes general firearms training or competence deficiencies that are not specifically connected to containment and call-out procedures.
  • Excludes weapon handling, shooting accuracy, firearms authorisation and wider armed-policing deployment decisions where the containment and call-out process is not the deficient control.
  • Excludes failures in post-operation recording, investigation or learning after the containment and call-out procedure has operated reliably.
  • Excludes generic police communication or briefing failures without a material armed-policing containment or call-out context.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
3

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
5

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

College of Policing1
Metropolitan Police Service1
West Midlands Police1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Coventry and Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    SEAN FITZGERALD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 4 January 2019 in Coventry, Sean Fitzgerald emerged from the rear door of a house during a West Midlands Police firearms operation and was shot in the chest by a police firearms officer. He died at 6.55pm despite first aid and medical treatment. The report identifies concerns about inconsistent guidance and training on when to announce “armed police” and how firearms officers should position themselves near property entrances, including the risks associated with close proximity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide specific briefing discussion or direction on when to announce “armed police”

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Training and practice in relation to timing of any announcement of “armed police” in police firearms operations involving containment of properties In the police operation in which Mr Fitzgerald was killed, the officers employed the tactic of “contain and call out with limited entry.” This involves firearms officers “containing” a property by surrounding it and providing firearms cover with their weapons; creating a breach by forcing entry; and “calling out” the subjects inside (directing them to leave through the point of breach), without the officers themselves entering. In evidence, it was explained that this is a very common tactic, which is used in a range of scenarios. ████████ a former senior firearms officer and armed policing lead within the College of Policing, gave evidence in the inquest. He explained that an integral part of the tactic is for officers to announce their presence by loud shouts of “armed police.” This warns those inside the property that it is the police forcing entry and informs them that the officers are armed. It was explained that this warning helps to avoid confusion and encourage compliance, thereby reducing the risk of harm to officers and occupants. The timing of the announcement is plainly important, and any potential for confusion or for making the announcement at the wrong time risks fatal consequences. ████████ said that the timing of any such announcement is not prescribed by national training or guidance, and that there is no “template” for when it should be done, although he understood that it would usually be made after achieving a breach (e.g. breaking down a door). The procedural and training documents (both national and from WMP) which were put in evidence in the inquest gave no detailed guidance on the subject. The Chief Firearms Instructor at WMP, ████████, gave evidence that WMP trains its officers to make the announcement after achieving a breach. The evidence of the officers involved in the operation as to the recommended or standard practice was inconsistent. The Strategic Firearms Commander said that he expected officers to announce themselves as armed police as soon as they were in position. The Operational Firearms Commander said that the shout should first be made as soon as the chainsaw was being applied to the door and again as the breach was made. One further member of the team said that he thought best practice was to give the shout as the chainsaw was being applied, but acknowledged that he had not done so on this occasion. Several other members of the team thought that proper practice was only to make the announcement after the door had been breached. The firearms briefing told the officers that method of entry would be conducted and “[o]nce breached, challenges will be made at the threshold and suspects will be handcuffed”. There was no further discussion or direction about when the officers should first announce their presence. In the event, the officers at the front of the property did not shout “armed police” before breaking down the two doors at the front of the property. Before any announcement was made, Mr Fitzgerald left through the rear door of the premises and was shot by Officer K, who was providing rear containment. In these circumstances, I am concerned that the guidance and training given to firearms officers on tactics of containing and entering properties (and specifically in relation to the containment and call out with limited entry tactic) does not ensure a clear and consistent understanding of when they should announce their presence, or what factors to consider in deciding when to make the announcement. I am also concerned that the topic was not the subject of more specific discussion or direction in the briefing. It is important that officers conducting these kinds of highly challenging firearms operation should have proper guidance on this subject. If the approach of different officers is inconsistent, there is the clear potential for mistakes to be made and for the lives of officers and others to be put at risk. I appreciate that expert firearms training officers are best placed to produce any further guidance, and that it may not be possible to have a hard and fast rule. However, the inconsistent views of highly trained officers which were given in this inquest indicate that the subject ought to be further addressed in training and in formal guidance. ”

    Source location

    SEAN FITZGERALD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear and consistent guidance and training on timing and factors for announcing “armed police” during containment and call-out operations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Training and practice in relation to timing of any announcement of “armed police” in police firearms operations involving containment of properties In the police operation in which Mr Fitzgerald was killed, the officers employed the tactic of “contain and call out with limited entry.” This involves firearms officers “containing” a property by surrounding it and providing firearms cover with their weapons; creating a breach by forcing entry; and “calling out” the subjects inside (directing them to leave through the point of breach), without the officers themselves entering. In evidence, it was explained that this is a very common tactic, which is used in a range of scenarios. ████████ a former senior firearms officer and armed policing lead within the College of Policing, gave evidence in the inquest. He explained that an integral part of the tactic is for officers to announce their presence by loud shouts of “armed police.” This warns those inside the property that it is the police forcing entry and informs them that the officers are armed. It was explained that this warning helps to avoid confusion and encourage compliance, thereby reducing the risk of harm to officers and occupants. The timing of the announcement is plainly important, and any potential for confusion or for making the announcement at the wrong time risks fatal consequences. ████████ said that the timing of any such announcement is not prescribed by national training or guidance, and that there is no “template” for when it should be done, although he understood that it would usually be made after achieving a breach (e.g. breaking down a door). The procedural and training documents (both national and from WMP) which were put in evidence in the inquest gave no detailed guidance on the subject. The Chief Firearms Instructor at WMP, ████████, gave evidence that WMP trains its officers to make the announcement after achieving a breach. The evidence of the officers involved in the operation as to the recommended or standard practice was inconsistent. The Strategic Firearms Commander said that he expected officers to announce themselves as armed police as soon as they were in position. The Operational Firearms Commander said that the shout should first be made as soon as the chainsaw was being applied to the door and again as the breach was made. One further member of the team said that he thought best practice was to give the shout as the chainsaw was being applied, but acknowledged that he had not done so on this occasion. Several other members of the team thought that proper practice was only to make the announcement after the door had been breached. The firearms briefing told the officers that method of entry would be conducted and “[o]nce breached, challenges will be made at the threshold and suspects will be handcuffed”. There was no further discussion or direction about when the officers should first announce their presence. In the event, the officers at the front of the property did not shout “armed police” before breaking down the two doors at the front of the property. Before any announcement was made, Mr Fitzgerald left through the rear door of the premises and was shot by Officer K, who was providing rear containment. In these circumstances, I am concerned that the guidance and training given to firearms officers on tactics of containing and entering properties (and specifically in relation to the containment and call out with limited entry tactic) does not ensure a clear and consistent understanding of when they should announce their presence, or what factors to consider in deciding when to make the announcement. I am also concerned that the topic was not the subject of more specific discussion or direction in the briefing. It is important that officers conducting these kinds of highly challenging firearms operation should have proper guidance on this subject. If the approach of different officers is inconsistent, there is the clear potential for mistakes to be made and for the lives of officers and others to be put at risk. I appreciate that expert firearms training officers are best placed to produce any further guidance, and that it may not be possible to have a hard and fast rule. However, the inconsistent views of highly trained officers which were given in this inquest indicate that the subject ought to be further addressed in training and in formal guidance. ”

    Source location

    SEAN FITZGERALD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft additional guidance for inclusion in authorised professional practice on armed policing and post-incident procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following consultation with stakeholders, most notably the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), who were also in receipt of a letter of concern regarding the same matter, additional guidance has been drafted for inclusion within The College authorised professional practice on armed policing (APP-AP) and the authorised professional practice on post-incident procedures following death or serious injury. The amended APP will be published within the next 2-3 weeks and in the interim the guidance has been published in a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) national circular and circulated to all police forces in the UK for immediate implementation. The amended guidance has been included in a practical scenario that formed the basis of this year’s annual College national Post Incident Manager (PIM) training which all PIMs must receive.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the amended authorised professional practice guidance within the stated two-to-three-week timeframe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following consultation with stakeholders, most notably the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), who were also in receipt of a letter of concern regarding the same matter, additional guidance has been drafted for inclusion within The College authorised professional practice on armed policing (APP-AP) and the authorised professional practice on post-incident procedures following death or serious injury. The amended APP will be published within the next 2-3 weeks and in the interim the guidance has been published in a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) national circular and circulated to all police forces in the UK for immediate implementation. The amended guidance has been included in a practical scenario that formed the basis of this year’s annual College national Post Incident Manager (PIM) training which all PIMs must receive.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the interim guidance in an NPCC national circular and circulate it to all UK police forces for immediate implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following consultation with stakeholders, most notably the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), who were also in receipt of a letter of concern regarding the same matter, additional guidance has been drafted for inclusion within The College authorised professional practice on armed policing (APP-AP) and the authorised professional practice on post-incident procedures following death or serious injury. The amended APP will be published within the next 2-3 weeks and in the interim the guidance has been published in a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) national circular and circulated to all police forces in the UK for immediate implementation. The amended guidance has been included in a practical scenario that formed the basis of this year’s annual College national Post Incident Manager (PIM) training which all PIMs must receive.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2025

    Open published response

  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Dean Christian JOSEPH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Christian JOSEPH broke into his former girlfriend’s home, took her hostage with a knife and remained in the property during an approximately one-and-a-half-hour siege. He was shot by a firearms officer when he moved the knife to the hostage’s throat. Concerns included differing understandings of whether armed containment was overt or covert, the lack of guidance from a trained hostage negotiator for the first officer on scene, possible gaps in guidance about TASER effective range, and shortcomings in post-incident police procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure a consistent understanding of overt or covert armed containment

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Different officers had a different understanding of whether the armed containment was overt or covert. ”

    Source location

    Dean Christian JOSEPH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify overt and covert/discreet containment and require commanders to communicate the containment type in firearms training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPS, however, will in future make clear in training to both firearms officers and commanders what is meant by overt and covert/discreet containment according to the APP. The MPS will ensure that TFCs are aware of the need to communicate to containment officers what type of containment is being carried out.”

    Source location

    2015-0319-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 August 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the College of Policing to consider whether national armed-policing guidance and firearms training need greater specificity on containment types.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NPCC will also work with the College of Policing to consider whether the APP and/or the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum needs to be more explicit in this area.”

    Source location

    2015-0319-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 August 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026