Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. City of London

    AI-generated summary

    KERRY TERESA SINGH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kerry Teresa Singh died on 14 July 2025 after urgent extraction of a failing pacemaker lead caused a tear to the superior vena cava, severe bleeding and unsuccessful resuscitation. The report identified delays in involving a tertiary centre, failures to review a critical test result and complete a referral, inadequate systems for patient involvement and task monitoring, and a lack of internal investigation or review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for independent investigation and review of serious clinical omissions

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Given the seriousness of the omissions by the responsible consultant, which were apparent from her witness statement provided to me in advance of the inquest, I am concerned that the William Harvey Hospital and the Trust did not undertake, prior to the inquest, any internal investigation or review of its care and management of the Deceased, whether by means of a mortality review or otherwise. 7. I am concerned that an absence of a system to ensure that serious omissions are investigated and reviewed, independently of the inquest process, will result in failures to make necessary improvements for patient safety and thereby the risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    KERRY TERESA SINGH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce reporting of patient-safety concerns identified during inquest preparation or other reviews, share relevant documents and regularly review inquest cases through the Patient Safety Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust Patient Safety Incident Response Policy and Plan already recognise that inquest review and preparation may identify patient-safety issues and learning. In order to strengthen the practical application of this requirement, the Trust is reinforcing the expectation that staff, including clinical and legal services, report patient-safety concerns identified during inquest preparation or other review processes so that they can be considered through the appropriate governance route and a proportionate learning response determined. Relevant documents, including witness statements, where appropriate, will be made available within the risk-management system to support patient-safety review, and a list of inquest cases will be shared with and reviewed regularly by the Patient Safety Team.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    JOHN SOUTHAM KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Southam Keen, who had a known ascending aortic aneurysm, developed sudden chest pain radiating to his back and neck at home on 19 August 2023. Paramedics recorded the aneurysm incorrectly as abdominal and took him to a local acute hospital rather than directly to a specialist arterial centre; after a delay, he suffered cardiac arrest before surgery, sustained a fatal hypoxic brain injury and died on 24 August 2023. The report raises concerns about the paramedics’ assessment, SWAST NHS’s inadequate incident review, and confusing and unclear ambulance guidance on suspected aortic dissection.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate analysis and organisational learning from clinical incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “1) It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of SWAST NHS’s clinical review, that there was inadequate analysis of this incident by SWAST NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided by attending paramedics not being identified and analysed properly – therefore whether there were any appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not considered by SWAST NHS. All clinical witnesses that gave evidence at the inquest (with the exception of the author of SWAST NHS’s clinical review) stated that the combination of knowing that Mr Keen had an ascending aortic aneurysm with him presenting with sudden onset chest pain radiating to his back, should have alerted attending paramedics to the real possibility of an aortic dissection. Given this and the gravity of this potential situation, it is clear that Mr Keen should have been taken directly from his home to the tertiary arterial centre by emergency ambulance transfer. If this had happened, Mr Keen would have undergone life-saving cardiothoracic surgery a number of hours earlier than he did. SWAST NHS’s clinical review did not identify (until the error was pointed out to them during the coronial investigation) that attending paramedics incorrectly recorded that Mr Keen had an abdominal aortic aneurysm, as opposed to an ascending aortic aneurysm. Accordingly, the clinical review did not consider how this error may have occurred. The clinical review went on to conclude that Mr Keen was not demonstrating symptoms to attending paramedics which would indicate a possible aortic dissection – at the inquest, the author of SWAST NHS’s clinical review maintained that this was SWAST NHS’s view and, even when taking into consideration Mr Keen’s correct medical history (having an ascending aortic aneurysm) together with his presenting symptoms of sudden onset rad iating chest pain, SWAST NHS did not consider that an aortic dissection was a potential differential diagnosis that needed urgent investigation. The inquest heard from an associate specialist in emergency medicine and consultant cardiologist, both of whom considered that Mr Keen’s presentation and known medical history should have resulted in there being a high degree of suspicion that he was suffering with an aortic dissection on 19 August 2023. It is also clear that the consultant in emergency medicine who assessed Mr Keen when he arrived at hospital, and who considered his known history and his presenting symptoms on that day, held such suspicion and immediately ordered imaging to confirm whether there was an aortic dissection. Therefore, a clear finding of fact was made at the inquest that SWAST NHS’s clinical review fell into error when it concluded, firstly, that it was reasonable for attending paramedics to consider it unlikely that Mr Keen was suffering an aortic dissection and, secondly, that Mr Keen was correctly taken for assessment to the local acute hospital. If SWAST, during their internal review and investigation, do not identify an accurate factual background together with any concerns in relation to clinical care provided by their clinicians, and do not take steps to try and learn from these incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided by SWAST NHS. ”

    Source location

    JOHN SOUTHAM KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review investigation processes to strengthen clinical oversight and scrutiny of investigation reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the feedback received, we have undertaken a review of our processes. While this has not identified the need for immediate structural changes, we will continue to strengthen clinical oversight and scrutiny of investigation reports to minimise the risk of similar issues occurring in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue strengthening clinical oversight and scrutiny of investigation reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the feedback received, we have undertaken a review of our processes. While this has not identified the need for immediate structural changes, we will continue to strengthen clinical oversight and scrutiny of investigation reports to minimise the risk of similar issues occurring in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The process review identified no need for immediate structural changes to investigation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the feedback received, we have undertaken a review of our processes. While this has not identified the need for immediate structural changes, we will continue to strengthen clinical oversight and scrutiny of investigation reports to minimise the risk of similar issues occurring in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response
  3. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Francis Leech · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis Leech, who had advanced dementia and other significant medical conditions, died on 26 August 2024 after a decline following severe facial injuries inflicted by another care home resident. The principal concerns were that the resident’s aggressive behaviour and associated risks were not properly reflected in updated care and behavioural support plans, and that management and the subsequent internal investigation failed to identify or address these deficiencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigations to identify care-plan deficiencies and prevent their repetition

    Wider context from the report

    “The care home resident who inflicted the facial injuries on Mr. Leech lived with advanced dementia, and over the six weeks leading up to that incident had been showing signs of unpredictably aggressive and violent behaviour. Although many of these episodes had been the subject of incident reports, neither his care plan nor his behavioural support plan had been properly updated to reflect these episodes, the risk which he presented, and measures to be taken to reduce that risk. The evidence at inquest showed that: (a) staff at the care home did not understand the importance of updating the care plan and behavioural support plan; (b) management at the care home had not instituted a system of checking and ensuring those plans were updated; and (c) the internal investigation carried out by the care home after the assault on Mr. Leech failed to recognize the deficiencies in those plans, or to put in place measures to ensure that those deficiencies were not repeated. ”

    Source location

    Francis Leech · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require dementia expertise to assist investigations involving residents living with dementia.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of incident investigations, the Home acknowledges that the investigation into the incident involving Mr Leech did not identify gaps within the care plans and Behavioural Support Plans in place. Having reflected upon this, steps have been taken to require that an individual with dementia expertise assist in completing internal investigations where an individual involved is considered to be living with dementia. By introducing this additional expertise to the investigation process, we believe that this will allow for more in depth scrutiny of care arrangements and behaviours, and for appropriate actions to be taken.”

    Source location

    Response from Adept Care Homes (Bowood Court)
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response
  4. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Isaac Charles ARROWSMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Isaac Arrowsmith, aged 19, died on 2 January 2026 after repeated hospital attendances for chest pain, breathing difficulty and coughing blood, followed by deterioration at home and an unsuccessful resuscitation. The report identified concerns about failure to recognise the clot risk associated with haemoglobin Rainier disease, failure to make a virtual ward referral that would have led to hospital admission, and shortcomings in the Trust’s internal investigation and learning processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigations to identify important issues in care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Lack of knowledge, or recognition of the same, in relation to the risk of a clot when a patient has haemoglobin Rainier disease. I heard evidence that there was a base level of understanding amongst the emergency department team at the hospital, whereby they knew it was high red blood cells and this increased the risk of clots, but all were falsely reassured by Isaac's almost normal haemoglobin and haematocrit, the recent venesection and that Isaac was on aspirin. I heard evidence that these are false reassurance and I have not heard any evidence from the trust as to how they are going to share this learning. Clearly, all clinicians cannot know the ins and outs of all rare conditions, but I was not assured or any process whereby they are aware that they need to seek further advice. I heard evidence from the Christie Hospital that they are producing an alert card for their patients to give to clinicians in emergency department settings which will assist, but not all patients will be under the Christie or have the alert card in all circumstances. 2. Failure to identify the key causative issue in the Trust's internal investigation or internal processes The court, and most importantly Isaac's parents, became aware for the first time during the course of the evidence that the referral to the virtual ward had not been made on 31 December, and that had it been, Isaac would not have been accepted and he would have therefore remained in hospital. He would have been in hospital when he deteriorated on 2 January and would therefore have been given full, successful, resuscitation at the time, such that he would not have died when he did. There had been an internal multi disciplinary review tool undertaken which had not identified this issue. This was not a complex issue to identify, and was identified very quickly by the trust's legal team when asked during the course of the evidence. I have received a statement which suggests this was a genuine mistake, made on the back of an assumption. As well as showing lack of critical analysis, it shows a lack of understanding of the virtual ward service. The latter I understand is being addressed by the trust in light of the evidence heard at the inquest but I heard no evidence to suggest that the quality of investigation or analysis is being improved. Whilst the inquest investigation is distinct to the trust investigation, the court is reliant to a large extent on the findings and disclosures made by the trust, taking into account they have a duty of candour and a duty to the court. I am concerned that the investigation process has failed to highlight a very important issue in care, and, if this is the case for other investigations, the opportunity to learn from issues and put in place action to prevent future deaths is lost. My concern has been compounded by details of an inquest I heard on 18 May, the day before Isaac's inquest, in which questions arose about the trust's internal processes, transparency and learning and the trust legal team is aware of those details. That inquest is not the subject of this report but is additional context to the concern raised. ”

    Source location

    Isaac Charles ARROWSMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain or access all relevant healthcare records for future patient safety investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust will obtain and/or gain access to all relevant healthcare records as part of any patient safety investigation to ensure that all relevant information is considered as part of the review”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire NHS Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a standard MDT review commissioning email template specifying required clinical specialities and professional groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. The introduction of a standard MDT review commissioning email template which specifies the required clinical specialities and professional groups contributing to each review”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire NHS Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop an MDT review quick-reference guide for consistent patient safety reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Development of an MDT review quick-reference guide to provide staff with clear and consistent guidance on undertaking patient safety MDT reviews, which is due to be completed by 20 July 2026”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire NHS Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the MDT review report template with prompts covering clinical referral processes and other key enquiry areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. The MDT review report template is being reviewed and will be updated to include specific prompts relating to the review of clinical referral processes and other key areas of enquiry, which is due to be completed by 20 July 2026”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire NHS Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver focused MDT review and After Action Review training through specialty and departmental meetings alongside the established Patient Safety Investigation programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Delivering focused bitesized MDT review and After Action Review training through specialty and departmental meetings to strengthen staff knowledge and promote a consistent approach to reviews, complemented by the Trust’s dedicated full-day Patient Safety Investigation training programme”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire NHS Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed MDT review training as an ongoing resource and support clinical leaders to cascade learning across clinical teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Embed MDT review training as an ongoing educational resource and support Clinical Leads, Senior Sisters and Matrons to cascade learning throughout clinical teams”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire NHS Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2026

    Open published response
  5. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    John McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John McKinlay died at Beech Hill Grange nursing home on 19 November 2025 after receiving end-of-life care. His death involved natural causes alongside a subdural haematoma and fractured neck of femur associated with a series of falls, including inpatient falls at Good Hope Hospital, Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital. The principal concern was that some falls may have occurred without the observation required by his falls risk assessment and care plan, and that evidence was not provided of investigations into falls at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate falls and implement adequate learning actions

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence from witnesses was that Mr McKinlay had a total of 4 falls whilst an inpatient at the University Hospitals of Birmingham: on the 11th September 2025 at Good Hope Hospital, 28th September 2025 at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and on the 10th and 12th November 2025 at Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Some, potentially all, of the falls occurred when Mr McKinlay was not receiving the appropriate level of observation in accordance with his falls risk assessment and care plan. He sustained a femur fracture requiring operative fixation from the fall on the 11th September and an acute bleed of a pre-existing subdural haemorrhage on the 28th September. He did not have any investigations into the November falls as he was already receiving end of life care and there was no clinical evidence of injury. There has been a mortality review of the events at Good Hope Hospital, including the fall on the 11th September. However, evidence has not been provided of investigations into the falls at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital. It therefore cannot be determined that appropriate lessons have been learnt and adequate action taken creating a risk the situation has not improved. ”

    Source location

    John McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review every reported patient fall through local and central falls-team processes, identify learning, and implement appropriate corrective actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All patient falls within our organisation are reviewed locally and also centrally by our governance and falls teams. We have a dedicated falls team and part of their role is to review every reported incident where a patient has suffered a fall. The service runs Monday to Friday. Each of Mr McKinley’s falls were incident reported and reviewed by a member of the falls team in a timely manner prior to the incident being closed.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate fall-related learning and required actions to ward staff through Listen Learn Share forms and electronic RADAR alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Listen Learn Share form was also completed with the learning identified and actions required and this was circulated to all staff to read.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide falls training covering the learning identified from the incidents, with staff attendance completed or being arranged.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On 17 November 2025 the ward manager completed their local investigation into the incident and completed a Listen Learn Share form highlighting the non-adherence to the falls procedure and reminding staff of the importance of ensuring that relevant assessments were completed and a recommendation that they all re-familiarise themselves with the Trust falls procedure. The specific learning identified included; that staff must familiarise themselves with the post fall retrieval procedure to ensure that they are retrieving patients from the floor using the correct methods, to ensure that documentation is thorough in order to record specifics about a patient fall including what footwear the patient was wearing, what exactly was discussed with the patient’s next of kin, and also ensuring post fall observations are completed as per the Trust standards.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing local and corporate falls reviews, learning, and actions were considered sufficient; no further action was proposed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A summary of the incident and findings from the scoping were also presented at a weekly Patient Safety Incident Review Group meeting on 8 January 2026. This meeting is chaired by a Deputy Chief Medical Officer and attended by specialty medical directors, senior nursing teams and governance leads. After considering the incident, the group concluded that there was no requirement for a formal investigation as the incident had already been thoroughly reviewed locally and the team had already reflected on the incident and put appropriate actions in place to prevent a similar incident occurring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The falls team considered no further investigation necessary from its perspective, leaving further investigation to the ward team’s local process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The falls team reviewed the incident on Monday 29 September 2025 and the incident was deemed to be low harm in light of the NORSe neurosurgery review above, therefore, no further investigation was deemed to be required by the falls team and this remained for local investigation by the ward team.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action was considered necessary for the November fall because the patient was receiving end-of-life care under the medical team’s plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the morning of 10 November 2025 the falls team contacted the ward team confirming that they had reviewed the incident and downgraded the severity of the fall from moderate to low harm as there were no significant injuries noted following medical reviews. Again, the falls team reviewed the RADAR form, the clinical noting, observations recorded and assessments completed as well as reading the notes to understand the course of events and management plan going forward. At this stage it was recorded that Mr McKinlay continued on the end-of-life pathway and no further action was deemed necessary as per the medical team plan. It is noted that Mr McKinlay’s daughter was made aware of the fall at 13.35 hours.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response
  6. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Delwyn PREECE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Delwyn Preece, a 64-year-old man, died at Rotherham Hospital on 19 August 2025 from a hypoxic brain injury following deliberate self-suspension by ligature while he was an informal patient at an acute mental health hospital. The principal concerns were repeated granting of leave without documented mental state examinations or risk assessments, poor and retrospective record-keeping, and shortcomings in the patient safety investigation arising from unfamiliarity with the medical records system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient safety incident investigators to correctly identify retrospective medical record entries

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Patient Safety Incident Investigation authors were unfamiliar with the medical records system which lead to the retrospective entries not being identified correctly, therefore the investigation did not make any finding. However, with more understanding, it is likely the retrospective entries in the medical records who have been identified and their relevance realised which would have altered the content and findings of the report. ”

    Source location

    Delwyn PREECE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Ioannou, a 61-year-old non-verbal man receiving 24-hour residential care, died after a cardiac arrest on 24 June 2025 following treatment for a problem with his PEG apparatus. An autopsy identified an infection at the PEG site that spread to his small intestine and caused peritonitis. The principal concerns were that the death was not investigated under NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework, and that the cause and timing of the infection and possible communication failures were not fully explored.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from communication failures in the care of patients with profound learning disabilities

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Barts Health Trust chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mr Ioannou’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Firstly, despite an autopsy, the aetiology and precise timing of Mr Ioannou’s fatal infection was not fully understood. In a functioning clinical governance setting, both the possibility of the trust having missed a pre-existing infection at the time of the treatment on 23rd June 2025 or the prospect that the treatment itself caused the infection should have been explored. Secondly, in the context of the treatment of a patient with a profound learning disability where communication failures may have contributed to poor care, a valuable learning opportunity was missed. ”

    Source location

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate the case under the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Barts Health Trust chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mr Ioannou’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Firstly, despite an autopsy, the aetiology and precise timing of Mr Ioannou’s fatal infection was not fully understood. In a functioning clinical governance setting, both the possibility of the trust having missed a pre-existing infection at the time of the treatment on 23rd June 2025 or the prospect that the treatment itself caused the infection should have been explored. Secondly, in the context of the treatment of a patient with a profound learning disability where communication failures may have contributed to poor care, a valuable learning opportunity was missed. ”

    Source location

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ruariri Thomas STEWART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ruariri Thomas Stewart, aged 29, died from fatal cocaine toxicity at Weaver Lodge Independent Hospital on 31 July 2025 after a period of unescorted leave during which he probably obtained cocaine. The report identifies concerns about failures in documentation, communication, information sharing, leave decision-making, substance-misuse management, record keeping, and the quality of post-incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigations failing to identify and report safety issues

    Wider context from the report

    “12. The post event reflective practice report from AFG does not identify any of these issues. The "summary of issues / concerns highlighted" are wholly positive. Post incident reflection and investigation is an important tool to improve practices and prevent future deaths. Similar concerns about the quality of investigations by AFG were raised in a Regulation 28 report issued by the Manchester City Coroner in 2022 in relation to a death in 2019 (Shona Campbell). ”

    Source location

    Ruariri Thomas STEWART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all future serious incidents in accordance with the PSIRF framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All future serious incidents will be reviewed in accordance with PSIRF framework.”

    Source location

    Response from Alternative Futures Group
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response
  9. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Creagan, an 81-year-old woman with heart failure, underwent emergency abdominal surgery in February 2025 and was later admitted with breathing difficulties, anaemia and a suspected gastrointestinal bleed. She died in hospital on 17 March 2025; the inquest determined that untreated and undiagnosed infective endocarditis caused her death. Concerns included the failure to investigate the source of her worsening infection, the missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, inadequate monitoring of her heart failure, and the decision not to conduct a Patient Safety Framework investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate deaths under the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “1. BHRUT chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mrs Creagan’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Decisions were reached at two clinical governance meetings that meaningful learning could not flow from a governance investigation into the circumstances of Mrs Creagan’s care. Such decisions appear to be incongruous with; a. The inaccurate cause of death initially offered by the Trust, b. The failure to investigate the seat of Mrs Creagan’s burgeoning infection after her pneumonia resolved. c. The missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, d. The failure to monitor the development of Mrs Creagan’s heart failure during her inpatient treatment. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Coroner’s Case Review Meeting as a formal governance mechanism for multidisciplinary oversight of inquest and coronial cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To have good governance process to support these decisions, HM Coroner will be aware that the Trust has now established a Coroner’s Case Review Meeting (CCRM) as part of its formal coronial governance arrangements.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require multidisciplinary clinical review of relevant coronial cases, including cases involving concerns about diagnosis, deterioration, monitoring, treatment or missed opportunities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has reflected carefully on the concern expressed in the Report that meaningful learning should have flowed from the circumstances of Mrs Creegan’s care. We accept the need to demonstrate clearly, in coronial cases, that learning is being actively pursued and is not dependent on PSIRF alone. Our revised approach is that coronial cases of this nature will be considered through the CCRM and, where relevant, alongside other existing review methodologies so that there is explicit multidisciplinary scrutiny, clear senior clinical oversight, and a documented record of the Trust’s appraisal of the care and the resulting actions.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use multiple review routes, including MDT, mortality, complaints, clinician reflection and CCRM reviews, rather than relying solely on PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust agrees that learning should not be constrained by whether a case meets a particular PSIRF learning response threshold. In these cases, a number of review methods have been, and continue to be, used to examine the care provided and identify learning. These include:”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify in governance arrangements that PSIRF is one learning mechanism and not the Trust’s sole route for reviewing deaths or responding to coronial concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Clarification within governance arrangements that PSIRF is one mechanism for learning, but not the sole route by which the Trust reviews deaths, identifies learning, or responds to coronial concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BHRUT is responsible for responding to the broader concerns raised about Mrs Creegan’s care and the application of PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to ensure we adequately address your concerns on PSIRF. I note you have also copied your report to Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust (BHRUT) who will respond to the broader concerns you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing clinical reviews, mortality review, governance meetings and reflection had identified sufficient learning, so a PSII would not add further learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The group was asked to reflect specifically on whether declaring a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) would have generated additional learning beyond what had already been obtained. A full clinical timeline had already been completed; a Trust Mortality review and the case had been discussed at Trust wide meetings with senior medical representation. Reflective learning was also presented by the Quality and Safety Team to seek clinical colleagues’ views on whether the incident had been managed appropriately by the Quality and Safety Advisor with a focus on ensuring optimal care and outcomes for patients going forward.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response
  10. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Barry HARMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry Harmer was found deceased at home on 11 April 2024 after sustaining a neck injury he had likely inflicted upon himself. He had been known to community mental health services, had agreed to voluntary psychiatric admission, and was awaiting a bed while remaining at home. Concerns included inadequate pursuit and communication regarding bed availability and home safety responsibilities, the absence of an earlier face-to-face psychiatric review, and shortcomings in the robustness and timely review of the investigation and learning process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of robustness in incident learning and patient safety incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Whilst evidence was given at the Inquest of fresh and additional learning that had arisen during the coronial investigation and as a result of the evidence given in person by Oxford Health staff and others, it was clear that the initial Incident Learning Huddle and subsequent Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) undertaken in 2024 lacked robustness and did not appear to have been revisited in the light of the emerging family concerns and evolving evidence during the coronial investigation. The need for proactive backwards reflection on internal investigations is essential in informing learning going forward. ”

    Source location

    Barry HARMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to revisit internal investigations in light of emerging concerns and evidence

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Whilst evidence was given at the Inquest of fresh and additional learning that had arisen during the coronial investigation and as a result of the evidence given in person by Oxford Health staff and others, it was clear that the initial Incident Learning Huddle and subsequent Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) undertaken in 2024 lacked robustness and did not appear to have been revisited in the light of the emerging family concerns and evolving evidence during the coronial investigation. The need for proactive backwards reflection on internal investigations is essential in informing learning going forward. ”

    Source location

    Barry HARMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026