Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Frank Charles Medley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Frank Charles Medley presented with acute weakness in all four limbs, but an MRI scan that was considered urgent was delayed for four working days. He underwent surgery for multiple paraspinal abscesses and died on 14 July 2019. The principal concerns included delays and inadequate prioritisation of imaging, deficiencies in the Trust’s adverse incident review, and shortcomings in systems for detecting adverse outcomes and coordinating relevant departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Factual inaccuracies in adverse-incident review summaries

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Trust's review of this case was seriously deficient in the following instances: a. At no point were members of the family spoken to for their views or concerns regarding the death up to and including the inquest. b. The date of death was 14 July 2019. The Report was incomplete eight months later in March 2020 when it was suspended during the first Covid wave. The report was not completed before the inquest on 23 February 2021. This is not in accordance with NHS guidance; c. The case was inappropriately allocated to a structured judgement review; d. The "Summary of the Incident" contains substantial factual inaccuracies to such an extent that it is deeply misleading; e. Mr Medley's death was due to complications of sepsis. The report failed to note that due to admission for query sepsis at the same hospital 11 days before, that: i. the EWS score was sufficient to trigger the septic shock pathway; ii. the nurse correctly identified that the septic shock pathway should be followed and drew this to the attention of "a doctor"; iii. that due to the referrals taking place between specialties at this time the relevant specialty responsible for dealing with this issue cannot be identified and made no entry in the medical records (this raises similar issues to those concerns raised in the Regulation 28 report concerning Mrs Gillian McKinley at the same Trust); iv. that, despite the patient observations being readily available to the treating consultant orthopaedic surgeon the following morning and the nurse having documented the septic shock pathway should be activated in the notes, the consultant orthopaedic surgeon failed to note this both at the time and during the preparation of his witness statement for the inquest; v. the error was only detected by the Trust's Legal Services Department when preparing for the inquest 19 months after the event. f. That the consultant physician responsible for Mr Medley's care appreciated that his symptoms constituted a medical emergency, that the MRI scan should be completed on 2 July 2019 but took no action himself to expedite the scan. There is no documented evidence in the medical records regarding junior doctors attempts to expedite the scan; g. The consultant physician responsible for Mr Medley's care after input from the neurologists on 3 July 2019 made no attempts to expedite the scan or to contact tertiary neurosurgical services; h. On 2 July 2019 the treating clinicians suspected infective complications high in the cervical spine but only undertook a chest x-ray and blood cultures without considering sending a urine sample for analysis, considering an echocardiogram or OPG; i. Mr Medley's scan should have been completed within 24 hours of request in accordance with NICE guidance, which was not cited anywhere in the report, and that the priority attached to the scan on 2 July 2019 placed Mr Medley in the lowest priority category when he should have been in the highest priority category. This mistake was repeated on 3 July 2019 when Mr Medley was placed in the middle priority category. There is no documentation as to any rationale for the priority allocation; j. The scan when it was performed on 5 July 2019 was not a contrast scan necessary to accurately delineate foci of infection resulting in a further scan using contrast to be performed later that day. k. That prioritisation of scans within the radiology department depended to a considerable extent on a personal attendance by clinicians at the department or speaking to radiologists rather than solely on clinical need; l. There was insufficient senior clinical oversight of the conclusions drawn. ”

    Source location

    Mr Frank Charles Medley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce weekly Executive review of divisional investigations before SIRI Panel submission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A weekly Executive review of Divisional investigations due at SIRI Panel has been introduced from 21 April to monitor the quality of reports prior to submission. This aims to ensure that the quality of the investigation may be identified earlier and at a senior enough level to require any further improvements to be made without delaying the process or submission to your court. A pro forma for Serious Incident investigations, with a front sheet for sign off each stage, has been developed in line with the National Patient Safety Strategy and PSIRF requirements; which prompts investigators to clearly link the problems, learning and recommendations to individual actions that are focused on preventing the same incident reoccurring. I understand a pilot version of this proforma was received favourably by one of your team at an inquest last week.”

    Source location

    2021-0057-Response-from-Royal-Blackburn-Teaching-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 7 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and use a Serious Incident investigation pro forma with staged sign-off and links between problems, learning and preventive actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A weekly Executive review of Divisional investigations due at SIRI Panel has been introduced from 21 April to monitor the quality of reports prior to submission. This aims to ensure that the quality of the investigation may be identified earlier and at a senior enough level to require any further improvements to be made without delaying the process or submission to your court. A pro forma for Serious Incident investigations, with a front sheet for sign off each stage, has been developed in line with the National Patient Safety Strategy and PSIRF requirements; which prompts investigators to clearly link the problems, learning and recommendations to individual actions that are focused on preventing the same incident reoccurring. I understand a pilot version of this proforma was received favourably by one of your team at an inquest last week.”

    Source location

    2021-0057-Response-from-Royal-Blackburn-Teaching-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 7 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response
  2. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Gillian McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gillian McKinlay, aged 68, was admitted to Royal Blackburn Hospital on 23 April 2018 with a provisional diagnosis of small bowel obstruction. A nasogastric tube requested by clinicians was not sited before her death four hours later, and the Coroner considered this contributed to the death. Concerns included unclear responsibility for patients in the Accident and Emergency Department, failure to undertake or escalate a clinically indicated review, and inadequacies in the Trust's investigation and subsequent measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the serious incident investigation to identify why NG tube placement failures were not escalated or referred back to requesting teams

    Wider context from the report

    “1. For patients remaining for a considerable period of time in the Accident and Emergency Department there is no clear indication or understanding as to who is responsible for the overall patient's clinical care. 2. EWS scores indicated that a clinical review was mandated for which there is no evidence in the medical records that any such review took place by A & E medical staff or that the matter was referred to any of the on call clinical teams. 3. When the NG tube was unable to be sited and no obvious clinical review in response to the EWS scores had occurred, there is no evidence of escalation by the nursing staff either through the nursing hierarchy or the medical hierarchy. 4. The Trust's Serious Incident Review to identify the root causes of the incident raises the following concerns concerning the adequacy of the Trust's investigation and measures taken: a. NG tube not sited - the Trust's response does not address why there was a failure of escalation or referral back to the requesting teams and the updated action plan that "training on insertion should shorten time taken to decompress" is inadequate; b. that the EWS score mandated review by the acute care team (whoever that may be for these purposes-see first point), there is no evidence in the medical records apart from a blood gas that any such review took place or that any treatment occurred; c. the investigating consultant had informal conversations during the investigation with a middle grade doctor who had performed the arterial blood gas but was unable to state who this was, why no medical records were created and why no action was taken; d. the report states that there was a "correct escalation of the EWS at every stage" for which no evidence has been provided and appears to be factually incorrect; e. medical records created by the surgical registrar were in accurate as they were completed by a junior doctor and not checked; f. that no audit has taken place to ascertain whether the Trust's measures have had the appropriate effect. ”

    Source location

    Gillian McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure factual accuracy and evidential support for reported EWS escalation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. For patients remaining for a considerable period of time in the Accident and Emergency Department there is no clear indication or understanding as to who is responsible for the overall patient's clinical care. 2. EWS scores indicated that a clinical review was mandated for which there is no evidence in the medical records that any such review took place by A & E medical staff or that the matter was referred to any of the on call clinical teams. 3. When the NG tube was unable to be sited and no obvious clinical review in response to the EWS scores had occurred, there is no evidence of escalation by the nursing staff either through the nursing hierarchy or the medical hierarchy. 4. The Trust's Serious Incident Review to identify the root causes of the incident raises the following concerns concerning the adequacy of the Trust's investigation and measures taken: a. NG tube not sited - the Trust's response does not address why there was a failure of escalation or referral back to the requesting teams and the updated action plan that "training on insertion should shorten time taken to decompress" is inadequate; b. that the EWS score mandated review by the acute care team (whoever that may be for these purposes-see first point), there is no evidence in the medical records apart from a blood gas that any such review took place or that any treatment occurred; c. the investigating consultant had informal conversations during the investigation with a middle grade doctor who had performed the arterial blood gas but was unable to state who this was, why no medical records were created and why no action was taken; d. the report states that there was a "correct escalation of the EWS at every stage" for which no evidence has been provided and appears to be factually incorrect; e. medical records created by the surgical registrar were in accurate as they were completed by a junior doctor and not checked; f. that no audit has taken place to ascertain whether the Trust's measures have had the appropriate effect. ”

    Source location

    Gillian McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    BETTY ANNIE TADMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Betty Annie Tadman died after an unwitnessed fall at home caused a pelvic fracture with extensive local haemorrhage. She was treated for suspected urosepsis and deep vein thrombosis, but no imaging was conducted despite signs of possible injury, and the pelvic fracture and internal bleeding were not diagnosed. Concerns were also raised that the Trust did not investigate the death or review it through its morbidity and mortality processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct a serious incident investigation after a death

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The Trust did not conduct a serious incident investigation following Mrs Tadman’s death when the post-mortem cause of death established a pelvic fracture with severe haemorrhage. Evidence heard at the inquest confirmed that this case was not discussed at the trust morbidity and mortality review or any other forum giving rise to concerns that lessons had not been learned. ”

    Source location

    BETTY ANNIE TADMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Hariharan Harichandra · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hariharan Harichandra, a 65-year-old man, fell from an electric wheelchair in hospital on 5 December 2019, sustaining a neck fracture, and died at The Royal Free Hospital on 19 December 2019. The concerns included errors in reporting and reviewing the CT scan, incomplete falls assessment, insufficient consideration of wheelchair safety equipment and spinal condition, and failure to record a severe adverse reaction to a naso-gastric tube.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly explain CT scan interpretation errors

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that: (a) The error by the original clinician who interpreted the CT scan images of 5th December 2019 has not been properly explained. (b) The Consultant Radiologist who reviewed the CT scan images of the 5th December 2019 should have noticed the clear and obvious neck fracture. Although there were 2 scans of the 5th December 2019 to review, it appeared that the clinician most probably reviewed only one of them. There ought to be a system in place when ensuring that a scan review can only be completed if all the scans taken are reviewed by a second clinician. (c) The Falls Assessment Tool was not properly completed or reviewed by staff; (d) Hospital staff have no training in how to assess and deal with private equipment brought from outside such as an electric wheelchair and the safety features of such devices; (e) By hospital staff not recording Mr Harichandra’s adverse reaction to the Naso-Gastric tube insertion, future clinicians would have been unaware of this severe reaction when treating him and considering how his important nutritional needs should be met had he survived. ”

    Source location

    Hariharan Harichandra · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The reporting error raised no fitness-to-practise concerns and posed no material danger to other patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The reporting error/discrepancy has been discussed with the Responsible Officers of both Health Education England and the Royal Free Hospital and no fitness to practice concerns have been raised, nor is there a material danger to other patients.”

    Source location

    2021-0001-Response-from-Royal-Free-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 January 2021

    Open published response
  5. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Eddie Coffey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eddie Coffey was born at Lister Hospital in a poor state, with a low heart rate and symptoms of hypoxia, and required resuscitation before transfer to neonatal intensive care. He died at Luton & Dunstable Hospital from perinatal asphyxia. Inquest evidence identified gross failures in monitoring and managing the foetal heart rate during labour, and raised concerns about whether the same situation could recur and whether other maternity units were following incorrect guidelines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigation to determine directly responsible factors

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Serious Incident Report prepared on behalf of East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust concluded that the Investigation was unable to determine the factors that were directly responsible for the death of baby Eddie Coffey. This conclusion was directly contradicted by evidence at the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Eddie Coffey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain future independent clinical opinions under formal terms of reference.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When obtaining an independent third-party or independent clinical opinion in the future the trust will ensure this is done on a more formal basis with clear terms of reference.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Lister-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a standard operating procedure for LMNS oversight of serious incident investigations and action plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the Directors of Midwifery and the LMNS Programme Lead have agreed a standard operating procedure for LMNS oversight of SI investigations and action plans going forward.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Lister-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Bring the coroner’s report to the attention of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, my officials have brought your report to the attention of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB). HSIB is a key part of our commitment to improve patient safety and the culture of learning in the NHS. The HSIB conduct independent maternity investigations that meet the Each Baby Counts criteria and a defined criteria for maternal deaths so that the NHS learns quickly from what went wrong and uses this to prevent future tragedies. Where HSIB identifies systemic risks, it can consider making national recommendations for system change.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Dept.-for-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS providers and local health partners are responsible for implementing the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework and supporting standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHSEI is currently working with early adopters to pilot the new Framework. The learning from this pilot will be used to inform the final version of the Framework. Until this is finalized, NHS providers and their local health partners should review the introductory framework and Patient Safety Incident Investigation standards⁴ and begin to consider what they will need to do to support their implementation.”

    Source location

    2020-0287-Response-from-Dept.-for-Health-and-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2021

    Open published response
  6. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Rory Attwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rory Attwood died at home on 9 October 2018 after an acute cardiac event attributed by the pathologist to excessive MDMA consumption. The report raised concerns that he had fallen between gaps in health and social care services and that his GP was not involved in the internal investigation after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to involve primary care contacts in internal or serious incident reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “After his death the charity MIND wrote to me and expressed concerns that Rory had fallen between gaps in services. This was addressed in the internal investigation undertaken by ABUHB, however it is surprising that his GP was not involved in this review and Dr ████████ told me that GPs are rarely asked to participate in these investigations. In order that lessons can be learned and opportunities identified for better partnership working around patients, it would seem appropriate that the patient’s primary care contact (especially when being supervised in the community) be involved in internal / serious incident reviews. ”

    Source location

    Rory Attwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review practices governing GP involvement in Serious Incident Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further to your report, I am pleased to inform you that the Aneurin Bevan University Health Board has reviewed its practices with regard to GP involvement in Serious Incident Reviews.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a process and pro forma to share pertinent information and invite GPs routinely to Serious Incident Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Furthermore, the Mental Health and Learning Disabilities Division has devised a process and pro forma to aid the timely sharing of pertinent information, and to ensure that GPs are routinely invited to participate in reviews of Serious Incidents. Copies of both documents are enclosed for your information. Whilst I must highlight that only a small number of GP Surgeries within the Gwent area are managed by the Health Board and the vast majority are managed independently, it is hoped that this process will enable the Health Board to engage with both managed and non-managed GP surgeries when conducting Serious Incident Reviews.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the pro forma to notify GPs of relevant unexpected deaths, request salient information, and invite review participation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The MH & LD Division will use a pro forma to notify the GP of an unexpected death of a patient in the Division. This will be sent by email from the Division’s Quality and Patient Safety (QPS) department to the GP Practice.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with the Primary Care and Community Division after the trial period to review the GP notification process and take forward suggested amendments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is suggested that this process is tried for 6 months; following which, the MH & LD Division will liaise with the Primary Care and Community Division to review the process and take forward any suggested amendments.”

    Source location

    2021-0086-Response-from-Aneurin-Bevan-University-Health-Board-Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response
  7. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Geoffrey Peter Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Geoffrey Peter Banks, aged 64, took 44 co-codamol tablets after pulling open a locked medicine cupboard at his assisted accommodation on 1 January 2020. He was admitted to hospital and died on 8 January 2020 from an acute heart attack; the overdose contributed to his death, although it was not possible to determine whether it was accidental or deliberate. Concerns were raised about the lack of safe medication storage for residents needing supervision and about the apparent investigation being perfunctory and conducted by an untrained staff member.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of untrained staff to conduct incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The deceased resided at Oak Priory and was the tenant of a privately rented flat in a scheme from a housing provider. He was on a care package provided by Comfort Call under a contract from Stoke on Trent Council. He received visit four times per day principally to administer medication. The medicine was kept in a locked kitchen cupboard in his flat. He had been identified as not being able to manage his own medication. The tenant was easily able to pull open the cupboard door and the barrel of the lock fell out. He overdosed on medication. There appears to be no system of safe storage in place where a resident has been identified as being in need of supervision with medication. (2)The apparent investigation into the incident was perfunctory and carried out by an untrained member of staff. ”

    Source location

    Geoffrey Peter Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Perfunctory incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The deceased resided at Oak Priory and was the tenant of a privately rented flat in a scheme from a housing provider. He was on a care package provided by Comfort Call under a contract from Stoke on Trent Council. He received visit four times per day principally to administer medication. The medicine was kept in a locked kitchen cupboard in his flat. He had been identified as not being able to manage his own medication. The tenant was easily able to pull open the cupboard door and the barrel of the lock fell out. He overdosed on medication. There appears to be no system of safe storage in place where a resident has been identified as being in need of supervision with medication. (2)The apparent investigation into the incident was perfunctory and carried out by an untrained member of staff. ”

    Source location

    Geoffrey Peter Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate to Extra Care Scheme managers that they must review investigations conducted by others for adequacy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the meantime, we will communicate to ECS managers during February 2021 that they must at the very least review investigations carried out by others at their schemes to ensure that they are adequate.”

    Source location

    2020-0256-Response-from-Comfort-Call-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Council assessments and reviews were undertaken by trained, qualified social workers, not untrained staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have conducted a review into our records and we are clear that, in relation to any assessment and review undertaken by the Stoke-on-Trent City Council these were all undertaken by a trained and qualified social worker. The notes on the case file and the assessment and support plan for GB was completed by a qualified social worker and while no specific risk assessment in relation to medication had been undertaken a range of assessments were in place and had been done by a suitably qualified member of staff. Any internal review of a death that raised any concerns would be undertaken or overseen by the Principal Social Worker or Assistant Director (Adult Social Care).”

    Source location

    2020-0256-Response-from-Adult-Social-Care-Health-Integration-and-Wellbeing-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2020

    Open published response
  8. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    June Patricia Margaret PARLOUR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    June Parlour was an inpatient with disseminated terminal cancer when she received morphine doses exceeding national and hospital guidelines. Her condition deteriorated, and she later died of opiate toxicity; the overdose significantly hastened her death. Concerns included staff awareness of morphine guidance, inaccurate hospital guidance and incident reporting, education and auditing for doctors, unclear prescribing instructions, and communication and escalation failures between staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to detect incorrect IV morphine dose guidance in incident-report review

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was concerning that even the hospital’s own Serious Incident report had incorrectly quoted the hospital’s guidelines as to the safe dose of IV morphine and that neither the investigatory team or any of the clinical staff who subsequently read that report had picked up on this. ”

    Source location

    June Patricia Margaret PARLOUR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorrect quotation of hospital IV morphine dose guidelines in Serious Incident reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was concerning that even the hospital’s own Serious Incident report had incorrectly quoted the hospital’s guidelines as to the safe dose of IV morphine and that neither the investigatory team or any of the clinical staff who subsequently read that report had picked up on this. ”

    Source location

    June Patricia Margaret PARLOUR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish trained investigating officers and a team-based process for patient safety incident investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has been selected as one of the early adopters for the new NHS Patient Safety Incident Response Framework, which commenced on the 2 November 2020. In establishing the new framework ESNEFT has put in place a number of highly trained investigating officers to lead the patient safety incident investigations, utilising relevant clinical experts within the process. Through a team approach to investigations, greater scrutiny of the information and evidence provided will be undertaken and will support a timely response to incidents and the identification of improvements required. The framework aims to ensure investigations are undertaken in a timely manner and with a greater involvement of patients, families and carers.”

    Source location

    2020-0186-Response-from-East-Suffolk-and-North-Essex_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 November 2020

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mr William Ivan McKibbin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr William Ivan McKibbin died at Trafford General Hospital on 20 August 2018 following complications of a traumatic brain injury sustained in an unwitnessed fall in hospital. The report raised concerns about bed-rail and bed-brake checks, the culture of openness and candour, communication between specialists and hospital sites, incident investigations, and the process for learning from deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of guidance for identifying, securing and gathering evidence in clinical incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “4. In view of the importance of robust and reliable investigations into clinical incidents to reducing the risk of future deaths, it is a matter of concern that no guidance currently exists for on-call managers and investigators as to quickly identifying, securing and gathering relevant evidence. Improvements in gathering evidence would assist the Trust in reliably identifying the underlying cause or causes of incidents, which in turn would better inform actions to be taken with a view to reducing the risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Mr William Ivan McKibbin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the newly developed First Responder document Trust-wide for every inpatient fall to record the immediate scene and required post-fall information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, in response to the learning arising out of the review of Mr McKibbin’s care, a First Responder document has been developed and brought into use Trust-wide from September 2020, included as part of the updated Falls Investigation template. This document has been designed to support staff in investigating the immediate scene following an inpatient fall. Key considerations for completion of the First Responder document have been disseminated to staff using the “Feedback Friday” campaign. This has included communicating that the First Responder document must be completed for all falls, even where patient harm is not suspected.”

    Source location

    2020-0185-Response-from-Manchester-University-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted.pdf
    Page 7 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Sylvia Scully · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sylvia Scully became unwell with sudden abdominal pain and vomiting and attended Tameside General Hospital on 9 February 2020. A radiologist initially reported another patient’s scan in error, and the correct diagnosis of hollow viscus perforation was made after her condition had deteriorated so severely that she could not withstand emergency surgery; she died in hospital on 10 February 2020. Concerns included variations in radiologists’ access to systems and equipment for out-of-hours reporting, the absence of a formal investigation into her care, and the lack of a Rapid Assessment and Treatment Model for walk-in emergency patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of routine clinical governance processes to initiate formal Serious Untoward Incident investigations or similar investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Notwithstanding the circumstances of Mrs Scully’s death, the Trust’s routine clinical governance processes have not resulted in a formal Serious Untoward Incident investigation or similar taking place in respect of the care and treatment provided to her. This is a matter of concern given the great importance to patient safety of robust and effective investigations being undertaken in a timely fashion; ”

    Source location

    Sylvia Scully · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have senior clinicians undertake Case Review and Lessons Learned reviews for relevant patient-safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is appreciated that this level of scrutiny is not always apparent and evident for the purpose of the Inquest therefore, the Trust’s Integrated Governance Team have considered how they can evidence different responses to patient safety incidents, including Multi-Disciplinary Team reviews, complaints investigations and expert opinions, which occur outside of a formal SUI process. A new ‘Case Review and Lessons Learned’ document has been produced which will be provided as part of the coronial disclosure process. Senior Clinicians with the expertise in the area of concern will undertake such case reviews. The findings and lessons learned document will be presented in a ‘Case Review and Lessons Learned’ report which the Trust intend on disclosing as part of the coronial process for the benefit of the family and Court if a serious incident investigation is not required.”

    Source location

    2020-0156-Response-from-NHS-Tameside-and-Glossop-Integrated-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing incident investigation processes and review were considered sufficient, so a formal serious untoward incident investigation was not undertaken.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to address your concerns, I would first like to take the opportunity to explain the Trust’s incident investigation process, which was effective at the time of Mrs Scully’s attendance. I hope by explaining this and various other types of investigations the Trust undertake, it will provide you with reassurance that whilst a Serious Untoward Incident was not undertaken in Mrs Scully’s case, her treatment and care was reviewed by the Trust.”

    Source location

    2020-0156-Response-from-NHS-Tameside-and-Glossop-Integrated-Care_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 October 2020

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026