Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Raihana Oluwamidalo Awolaja · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Raihana Oluwamidalo Awolaja, who was tracheostomy-dependent and required one-to-one nursing care, was left unsupervised at her residential care home for approximately fifteen minutes. Secretions blocked her tracheostomy, causing respiratory compromise and cardiac arrest; she was later resuscitated but died of hypoxic ischaemic brain injury. The principal concerns included inadequate supervision and staffing, possible shortcomings in training and communication, and concerns about the care provider’s investigation and handling of concerns raised by next of kin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Flawed investigations failing to identify systemic failures and learning

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That there may be culture of cover up at the TCT, in that they carried out a flawed investigation after this incident, pushing blame onto an innocent individual and thereby avoiding highlighting systemic failures and learning and thus risking lessons that should be learned are lost that could prevent future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Raihana Oluwamidalo Awolaja · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a revised incident management policy and process based on national best practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Incident Management Policies and Processes: We have developed and implemented a revised incident management policy and process that incorporates national best practice standards to ensure robust and consistent handling of all incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen the clinical governance framework to identify recurring themes and trends and support organisational learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Clinical Governance Framework: Significant investment has been made in strengthening our clinical governance framework. This enhancement enables us to better identify and respond to recurring themes and trends, promoting continuous organisational learning and improvement.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the national Patient Safety Incident Response Framework for incident investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• PSIRF Implementation: We have fully implemented the national Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) to guide all incident investigations, ensuring a consistent, transparent, and learning-focused approach.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all incidents through multidisciplinary panels representing the organisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Multidisciplinary Panels: All incidents are now reviewed by multidisciplinary panels comprising representatives from across the organisation, facilitating a comprehensive and collaborative review process.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply internal governance oversight to externally commissioned investigations and scrutinise their findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Internal Oversight of External Reviews: Investigations commissioned externally are now subject to additional internal oversight through our governance procedures. This internal review ensures that external findings are scrutinised rigorously and challenged appropriately to maintain high standards of accountability.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct thematic reviews of serious incidents and use findings to inform staff training and service improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Thematic Reviews: We conduct thematic reviews of all serious incidents to identify recurring issues. The findings from these reviews directly inform staff training and ongoing service improvements.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response
  2. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Lorraine Parker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lorraine Parker died on 30 March 2024 after surgery conducted on 23 January 2024; the inquest recorded that her death involved cancer, necessary surgical treatment, and delay in diagnosing and managing an anastomotic leak. The report raises concerns about the Royal Berkshire Hospital’s death investigation processes, including delayed meetings and escalation, poor or defensive structured judgement reviews, unreliable records, and insufficient scrutiny of cases reported to the coroner.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the death investigation process

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On the evidence I have seen from the three inquests referred to, the Royal Berkshire Hospital’s death investigation process is not working well. ”

    Source location

    Lorraine Parker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce structured forms and meeting documentation to capture concerns, learning, recommendations and actions from morbidity and mortality reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Morbidity and mortality meetings are undertaken in each specialty where a death happens as part of specialty clinical governance processes. A systematic way for teams to capture learning is in place and set out below. The Trust also attaches Appendix 2, a set of forms to support the review process, designed to highlight any issues that may have arisen in care, together with a means of recording any recommendations and actions. This process is well established for specialties including intensive care and renal medicine and has been introduced into M&M meetings for general surgery from May 2025 with the learning captured within the clinical governance minutes. Specialty clinical governance minutes are disseminated to specialty team members by email as well as to the governance team and stored on a Trust shared drive where all specialty clinical governance minutes are held.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Restructure General Surgery morbidity and mortality reviews to include SJR and PSIRF learning, consultant-led contemporaneous records, escalation of unresolved issues and wider dissemination.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The specialty is now using the M&M slides (Appendix 2) to capture learning and highlight areas of concerns. Examples are given in Appendix 3 of this. Any challenging areas requiring further discussion will be brought to the next consultant meeting to allow time for full exploration, and the learning brought back to the following governance for dissemination. The documenting and contemporaneous note-taking of these discussions will be by the consultant body. The M&M process within the specialty is currently being restructured to ensure learning points from Structured Judgement Reviews (SJRs)”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change General Surgery SJR allocation so a subspecialist conducts the review and a second, preferably external-subspecialty, surgeon reviews and signs it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “General surgery have made changes to how structured judgement reviews are performed. Historically, cases were allocated to an individual GI surgeon, who may not have had the same subspecialist interest (e.g. colorectal surgery, upper GI surgery, and bariatric surgery) as the particular case being examined. It has been agreed that moving forward the SJR will be performed by a person with the same subspecialist interest, with and then reviewed by a second surgeon, preferably from outside that subspecialty. Both surgeons will sign off on this and have their name attached to the report. This subspecialty engagement and sense checking of reviews should provide a robust approach with more thoughtful outcomes.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a parallel anaesthetist-led SJR to add an independent anaesthetic perspective and identify learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also introduced a parallel anaesthetist led SJR to strengthen the review and identify learning, in recognition of the different perspectives that surgeons and anaesthetists can bring to the same case.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust considers its established death investigation processes robust and sufficient to underpin learning and patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. On the evidence I have seen from the three inquests referred to, the Royal Berkshire Hospital’s death investigation process is not working well.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response
  3. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    June Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    June Thompson died on 1 November 2023 from radiation-induced metastatic sarcoma following radiotherapy for cervical cancer. She underwent a hindquarter amputation after a CT scan showed that the cancer had spread to her lungs, but the surgical team and multidisciplinary team were not informed of the change from a potentially curative to a palliative condition. Concerns included proceeding with major operations without full knowledge of disease progression, failure to report and investigate the error, and the absence of policy or guidance for processing medical reports received from other hospitals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate errors to establish why they happened and prevent recurrence

    Wider context from the report

    “• The error has not been investigated to establish why it happened and how to prevent a reoccurrence. ”

    Source location

    June Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report and investigate the incident under the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The incident has now been reported and investigated in line with the Trust’s implementation of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. The learning from the inquest and this investigation has been highlighted at the Trust-wide Safety Learning and Improvement Conversation and circulated to all clinical teams. It will also be presented at the next Sarcoma Surgery Clinical Governance meeting, Trust Clinical Governance Committee and the OUH Mortality Review Group over the next 2 months.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response
  4. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy, an 89-year-old hospital inpatient, died after being pushed to the floor by a fellow patient on 3 March 2022, suffering bilateral humeral fractures and deteriorating before her death on 15 March 2022. The inquest found that inadequate assessment and management of the fellow patient’s psychiatric, behavioural and cognitive needs materially contributed to the incident and death. It also identified inadequate analysis of the incident in the hospital’s internal investigation, including failure to identify relevant prior incidents and consider appropriate learning and recommendations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from serious incidents and consider recommendations for future care

    Wider context from the report

    “At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

    Source location

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate analysis of serious incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

    Source location

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit two Learning Response Leads and provide them with mandatory training to conduct and support safety reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Recruitment to x2 Learning Response Lead posts.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit two Patient Safety Partners to participate in governance and scrutinise safety investigations and final reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Recruitment of two Patient Safety Partners. The remit of the Patient Safety Partner role is set out in the National Patient Safety Strategy through the Framework for Involving Patients in Patient Safety. Patient Safety Partners are lay people, who have extensive experience of receiving care and on occasion, may have been involved in safety incidents. As such, they provide a different perspective on patient safety, removing the potential of influence by organisational bias or historical systems.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a new safety-incident investigation policy incorporating new investigation methods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Developed a new policy for the investigation of safety incidents, which includes new investigation methods”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redesign quality-concern governance to support transparent multidisciplinary review and assurance of resulting improvement actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Redesigned our governance processes to further promote transparency and proactive multidisciplinary review of quality concerns and undertaking assurance work on any actions implemented as a result of those concerns. We have done this by ensuring:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework process for recording, escalating, commissioning and overseeing system-based safety reviews with patient and family involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In June 2024, in line with other NHS Organisations across England, University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust (UHP) transitioned to the use of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) and ceased the use of the Serious Incident Framework (SIF).”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response
  5. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ida Jean Lock died on 16 November 2019 after suffering a lack of oxygen during delivery on 9 November 2019, resulting in severe hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage. The report describes missed opportunities for enhanced care and obstetric input, delays in responding to fetal distress, and initially ineffective neonatal resuscitation. The principal concerns include the Trust’s alleged lack of candour and transparency, deficient clinical and maternity governance, inadequate investigations, gaps in mandatory and remedial training, and inappropriate grading of the harm suffered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of assured ongoing funding for MSNI investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “18. The MSNI is now hosted by the CQC with funding secured for the next two years but no certainty as to ongoing funding after this date. These independent investigations by specialist skilled investigators into the most serious of events is an essential safeguard to the lives of mothers and unborn children. 19. Without an assurance that funding will continue beyond 2027 I am concerned that significant harm events to mothers and babies and deaths such as Ida's will go unrecorded and lessons that should be learned to prevent future maternal and baby deaths will go unnoticed, and there will be a risk of future maternity deaths. ”

    Source location

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 9 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Nationally led MSNI funding prevents assurance about funding continuing beyond 2027.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “E. Funding for MSNI”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board
    Page 7 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response
  6. Northumberland

    AI-generated summary

    Renate MARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Renate MARK suffered an unwitnessed inpatient fall in hospital on 24 April 2024, sustaining a cervical spinal fracture and subdural haematoma, and died there on 25 April 2024 after receiving palliative care. Concerns included that she was assessed as a level 3 falls risk but was not under direct observation, that investigations relied on the incorrect belief that the fall was witnessed, and that too many patients at risk of falls were being monitored through peripheral vision. Further concern was raised about insufficient scrutiny of witness accounts during the Trust’s investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient scrutiny of witness accounts during investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) I am concerned there is not greater scrutiny of witness accounts as part of the Trust's investigation process in particular given the concerns raised by the deceased's family early in the investigation and the other witness accounts to provide earlier learning to prevent future events. ”

    Source location

    Renate MARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish accurate circumstances of falls during investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The deceased was assessed as a level 3 falls risk meaning she was to be kept under line of sight in case of falling. Witness statements served in advance of the inquest stated the fall was witnessed. It was however eventually accepted in evidence that the fall was in fact unwitnessed. The precise circumstances of the fall could not be determined. All of the investigations undertaken by the Trust relied upon the incorrect understanding that the fall was witnessed and observations were in line with Trust falls policy, when they were not. ”

    Source location

    Renate MARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require trained Governance Leads to participate in all internal investigations and ensure witness statements receive managerial or Deputy Director sign-off before finalisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to this concern, the Trust Governance Leads, who are trained in investigation management, will be involved in all internal investigations in order to ensure in depth scrutiny of witness accounts following an incident. Where any deficiencies or further information / clarification is needed, this will be fed back to the investigating officer to action. The Governance Leads will also ensure that the statements collated as part of the Trust investigation, are signed off at a Managerial/Deputy Director level adding an additional layer of scrutiny before final sign off.”

    Source location

    Response from Northumbria NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Brief Ward 9 clinical staff on accurate witnessed and unwitnessed fall terminology and its use in incident reporting and communications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The incident concerning Mrs Mark occurred on Ward 9 of the Northumbria Specialist Emergency Care Hospital (NSECH). As an immediate response, the Trust is in the process of briefing the ward team, which includes all clinical staff, on what constitutes a 'witnessed' and 'unwitnessed' fall and the importance of ensuring that this terminology is understood and used accurately, where an incident occurs. The briefing will explain the importance of using accurate terminology is understood and used when information is disclosed to family following a falls incident, in order to allow for a robust internal Trust investigation and in circumstances”

    Source location

    Response from Northumbria NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Integrated Falls Prevention Policy to define witnessed and unwitnessed falls, remove peripheral vision terminology, and replace it with line-of-sight wording.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of a Trust wide response, the Trust's Strategic Falls Group provides on the strategic direction and actions that are to be taken by the Trust where there is a patient safety incident concerning a falls risk. As a direct response to the concerns raised by HM Coroner in the PFD Report, the group has been tasked with undertaking a review of the Trust's current Integrated Falls Prevention Policy and to provide further detail within this policy, including the inclusion of a glossary, citing definitions of wording contained in the policy, which is to include the definition of a 'witnessed' and 'unwitnessed' fall. The use of the term 'peripheral vision' will be removed from the policy and replaced by the wording 'in line of sight' so as to avoid any potential confusion by staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Northumbria NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew John LYNCH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew John Lynch was attacked in the garden of his supported living accommodation in Birmingham on 11 July 2023 and was killed by decapitation. The concerns included whether medication non-compliance and a change of address had been adequately followed up, the quality of mental health assessments, and information sharing and training between mental health services, the council, housing providers and support workers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigations to verify relevant witness information and clinical address records

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Internal investigation: The internal investigation did not address how and whether the offender’s use of medication should have been monitored after the clinic visit on 12/05/23. This was important as non compliance with medication was a risk factor for relapse. In addition, during the inquest the trust confirmed they had not spoken to the CPN who attempted to visit the offender on 24/05/23 to verify whether they had attended the old or new address. This was a critical issue as the new address had not been updated on the clinical notes. This raises a concern about the quality of the investigation and whether the Trust is adequately learning from incidents. ”

    Source location

    Matthew John LYNCH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Meet and Greet workers in community mental health team receptions to verify demographic, contact and accommodation information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The review also found the process for updating and tracking address changes was not robust enough. To strengthen this process as referenced in the report, the team has implemented a “meet and greet” role to improve the accuracy of address updates and ensure better coordination. I will go into more detail around this point under point three.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind clinical staff to record address and contact-number changes on the service-user demographic record in Rio.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also written to all clinical staff to remind them that if they are notified of a change of address (or contact number) that this is recorded on the service user demographic information in Rio, the electronic patient record, which updates the “front page” and not just in the “progress notes”.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2025

    Open published response
  8. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    JAVED IQBAL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Javed died on 1 June 2024 after deliberately igniting his room with flammable liquid and sustaining major burn injuries and smoke inhalation, followed by multi-organ failure. The report identified concerns that staff did not recognise and appropriately act on serious acute mental health issues, including not escalating worsening mood and irrational behaviour to the GP in writing. It also identified the absence of a formal internal post-death investigation and outstanding internal training that had not addressed these concerns.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a formal internal post-death investigation report

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence demonstrated there is a continuing risk that All Care In One Ltd staff will not recognise and take appropriate action when a service user presents with serious acute mental health issues. For example: (1) At a fundamental level staff did not understand what is in the best interests of a service user: (a) Carers did not want to embarrass Javed, therefore they felt justified in making repetitive inaccurate contemporaneous records recording behaviour and mood as well despite having serious concerns about his worsening mental health and triggering an urgent call to his GP; (b) Then, having contacted the GP two days before his death, the care co-ordinator did not action the request from the GP to send an email setting out these serious concerns in writing. (2) There was no formal internal post-death investigation report. (3) Whilst some post-death internal training has been identified it remains outstanding despite 8 months passing since the death. However, I was not satisfied this training has recognised the above concerns. ”

    Source location

    JAVED IQBAL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    June PHILLIPS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    June Phillips lived in a care home and, while taking clopidogrel, fell on 7 April 2023 and subsequently deteriorated. She was admitted to hospital on 24 April, where a CT scan confirmed a large traumatic subdural haemorrhage; she died on 30 April 2023. The substantive concerns were inaccurate care home records, failure to update fall-risk assessments, and an inadequate post-falls investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate investigation of post-fall incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The post falls investigation did not adequately investigate the circumstances of the fall. There is a concern that this creates a risk of future deaths as lessons are not learnt from incidents. ”

    Source location

    June PHILLIPS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update falls risk assessments within 24 hours and document follow-up in care records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The documentation following a resident having a fall in the home is as follows the falls risk assessment (screening for tools part one and part two) are updated within 24 hours this is then followed through and documented within the care records. A root analysis tool along with an incident investigation form has now been implemented.”

    Source location

    Response from Willow Grange Care Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement root-cause analysis and incident-investigation tools for falls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The documentation following a resident having a fall in the home is as follows the falls risk assessment (screening for tools part one and part two) are updated within 24 hours this is then followed through and documented within the care records. A root analysis tool along with an incident investigation form has now been implemented.”

    Source location

    Response from Willow Grange Care Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold staff meetings reinforcing accurate incident assessment, timely reporting and compliance with policy and guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Staff meetings have been held following June Phillips fall where it has been discussed the importance of documenting and reporting accurately and timely. A Staff meeting took place as of 11th March 2025 to inform the staff of the Coroners Court hearing regarding June Phillips and to discuss the importance of completing an accurate assessment of each accident and incident and also reacting promptly and in accordance to policy and updated guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from Willow Grange Care Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 March 2025

    Open published response
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    John Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Tompkins died on 25 July 2024 after hepatic artery embolisation and right-sided portal vein embolisation were undertaken simultaneously rather than sequentially. He subsequently developed acute-on-chronic liver failure and died from consequential multiorgan failure. Concerns included limited internal review of the circumstances and the Trust’s apparent failure to consider NatSSIPS2 standards when undertaking or reviewing the procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited internal review of procedure-related circumstances

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned that there was limited internal review of the circumstances of Mr Tompkins’ death, following identification that the procedures were undertaken at the same time; 2. Further and linked to the above, I am concerned that the Trust seemingly did not consider the NatSSIPS2 standards either when undertaking the procedures, nor in detail as part of its review following the inquest. ”

    Source location

    John Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider NatSSIPS2 standards in detail during internal review

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned that there was limited internal review of the circumstances of Mr Tompkins’ death, following identification that the procedures were undertaken at the same time; 2. Further and linked to the above, I am concerned that the Trust seemingly did not consider the NatSSIPS2 standards either when undertaking the procedures, nor in detail as part of its review following the inquest. ”

    Source location

    John Tompkins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026