Recurring concern

Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of explicitly multi-agency communication procedures that impair the timely, accurate and complete exchange of safety-relevant information between involved agencies, including the anchor's prison-services communication failure.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, training, staffing or coordination deficiencies where no explicitly multi-agency communication procedure is identified.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's internal communication process.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway, system or hazard when that concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes neutral descriptions of multi-agency working without an identified unsafe communication condition.
Reports
134

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
145

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
303

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England17
Ministry of Justice14
HM Prison and Probation Service10
Home Office8
Recipient name withheld6
Metropolitan Police Service5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
National Police Chiefs’ Council4
Care Quality Commission3
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Police3
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Philip David Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip David Taylor had mental health difficulties, was admitted to a private psychiatric unit outside the NHS North Wales area, and died by suicide at home on 23 August 2023 after discharge to the Home Treatment Team. The concerns included inadequate information sharing and coordination between the Health Board and the private unit, including delayed or missing discharge documentation and no agreed written standards for communication and documentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of agreed minimum information-sharing standards between the Health Board and private psychiatric facilities

    Wider context from the report

    “e. There was no evidence at Inquest of any written agreement or standard operating procedure or similar between the Health Board and private facility as to minimum standard requirements or expectations between both organisations e.g. what documentation should be shared, how it is to be shared, when documentation should be shared, the timeliness of sharing documentation etc. f. It is concerning that such minimum standards are not set out and agreed between the Health Board and this private psychiatric unit in a situation where many patients are likely to be treated there. It is not known whether or not such minimum standards or Agreement exists with other out of area private units. g. In the event that patients are to be treated in private units out of the area then there will be a risk of future deaths if such minimum standards regarding sharing of information and communication are not set and agreed between the Health Board and private facility. There had been no consideration of this as part of the actions arising from the Health Board’s own investigation. ”

    Source location

    Philip David Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standard operating procedure governing information sharing, repatriation and discharge planning, and key documentation for out-of-area acute placements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The learning from the inquest of Mr Taylor has identified that a standard operating procedure is required (SoP) and must include the requirements for sharing information, joined up planning for repatriation and/or discharge and standards for the development and sharing of key documentation.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor compliance with the standard operating procedure through local and divisional Putting Things Right meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A multi-disciplinary task and finish group has been established, chaired by the Head of Integrated strategy and development, who is leading on the development of the SoP in collaboration with both operational and clinical teams. Progress will be overseen by the MHLD Policy and Procedure Group. Following ratification, the Task and Finish Group will oversee the launch and implementation of the SoP and compliance with the SoP will be monitored through established local and divisional Putting Things Right Meetings. I am advised that the SoP will be fully ratified by the end of August 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The framework agreement and internal policy adequately govern information sharing; concurrent discharge letters are not contractually required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Elysium internal policy is to ensure the relevant information is given to home teams so that they can follow up within 72 hours (as was done here). In case it is of assistance to put the issue in context, the contract we have with Surrey requires that information only within 5 days of discharge.”

    Source location

    Response from Elysium Healthcare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response
  2. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen COSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Coster died from meningoencephalitis owing to Streptococcus pneumoniae after becoming seriously unwell while detained at HMP Lewes. The inquest found delays in providing treatment and transferring him to hospital, with concerns including inadequate observations and assessment, poor record keeping, failures to escalate, and breakdowns in communication and leadership between prison and healthcare staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a protocol or policy for healthcare-prison communication when monitoring sick prisoners on the wing at night

    Wider context from the report

    “c. Healthcare staff failed to provide the prison staff with an adequate care plan so that Stephen Coster could be monitored effectively. Evidence was heard that there was no protocol or policy in place regarding communication between Healthcare staff and Prison staff for the monitoring of sick prisoners on the wing at night. ”

    Source location

    Stephen COSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Breakdown in healthcare-prison communication about emergency hospital transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “e. There was a breakdown in communication between healthcare staff and prison staff regarding transferring a sick prisoner to hospital as an emergency. Further, there was inadequate information included on the paperwork prepared by healthcare staff about Stephen Coster’s condition resulting in delay in arranging for his urgent escort and transfer to hospital. ”

    Source location

    Stephen COSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an agreed system clarifying prison welfare checks, healthcare clinical observations, required check levels and clinically appropriate inpatient transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The prison has also conducted a further review, together with healthcare, to consider how best to manage the care and monitoring of unwell prisoners. An agreed system is now in place which clarifies that prison staff are responsible for welfare checks and medical staff are responsible for clinical observations. Healthcare staff inform prison staff of the need for checks on a particular prisoner and what level of check is required. Where healthcare feel it is clinically appropriate, a move to the inpatient unit at the prison will be facilitated so that healthcare staff are present to undertake all observations.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the escort-review findings with healthcare staff to improve communication and clarify urgency during hospital escorts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the death of Mr Coster and the PPO’s recommendations, the Deputy Governor and Head of Safety conducted a review into the circumstances of the prison escort to hospital. Their findings identified a need for improved communication with and greater clarity from healthcare staff to ensure that urgency of the matter is made clear to prison staff. This has been shared with healthcare.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Amanda Hitch · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amanda Hitch died on 12 February 2022 after deliberately jumping in front of a train intending to die. She was receiving community mental health treatment. Concerns included important clinical information not being visible to the care team, structured risk-management tools not being specifically considered, and railway-station attendances not being reliably passed to her care coordinator under a multi-agency support plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the multi-agency support plan to clearly state limitations on information from unstaffed station attendances

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There was also evidence about the measures that the British Transport Police had taken, seeking to provide additional support by setting up multi- agency support plan, which provided a system for alerting a number of people including the deceased’s care co-ordinator, when she attended at railway stations. In fact, for various reasons, although there are several known attendances at railway stations, none were passed on to the care co- Ordinator. The evidence at the inquest was that British Transport Police does not have the resources always to provide information about attendance at unstaffed stations (although in fact, one such attendance had been known about but was not passed on). The plan as presented does not make it entirely clear what the limitations in relation to information from attendances at unstaffed stations may be, and should it remain the position that BTP lacks the resources to identify all such attendances at railway stations by persons at specific risk of suicide on the railway, there is a risk that those expecting to receive information under such a plan may not realise that the plan will often not assist where its subject is attending unmanned stations. ”

    Source location

    Amanda Hitch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Anthony McKessy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Anthony McKessy had learning disabilities and care needs and developed alcoholic liver disease following regular and prolonged alcohol use. He deteriorated after admission to Stepping Hill Hospital and died there on 18 February 2023. The principal concerns were poor communication and information sharing between agencies, lack of coordinated care, and insufficient recognition of how his health, social care and learning disability needs interacted, including the extent of his capacity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor communication and information sharing between agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that he had significant leaning difficulties and his capacity was limited. He was known to agencies. Despite this the inquest heard evidence that steps to reduce the risks were not taken due to: 1. Poor communication/information sharing between agencies which meant that there was no coordination of care and no clear overview of his needs; and 2. A lack of recognition by agencies involved with him of his health issues and their inter relationship with his social care and learning disability needs including the extent to which he had capacity. This was compounded by limited Care Act assessments ”

    Source location

    Mark Anthony McKessy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce peer discussions so managers oversee individual social-care assessments and reviews and strengthen social-work practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We continue to improve front line practice to ensure our frontline teams increase their knowledge and confidence in completing holistic assessments. To ensure management oversee individual assessments and reviews we are introducing peer discussions to strengthen social work practice. The social care and specialist learning disability health team are co-located to support a joined-up approach to interventions. This is further supported by managers across social care and health meeting on a weekly basis, using the forum to refer individuals for a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport Integrated Care Partnership
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 October 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a joint learning event involving agencies supporting people with learning disabilities to strengthen information sharing and practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There will be a joint learning event in January 2024 in relation to Mr McKessy’s life and death. All the agencies involved in supporting people with a learning disability in Stockport will be in attendance and agree a joint action plan to further strengthen information sharing and improvements to practice. We will also liaise with Mr McKessy’s family, if they wish to be involved, to share their experiences of the health and social care”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport Integrated Care Partnership
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree a joint action plan following the learning event to improve information sharing and practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There will be a joint learning event in January 2024 in relation to Mr McKessy’s life and death. All the agencies involved in supporting people with a learning disability in Stockport will be in attendance and agree a joint action plan to further strengthen information sharing and improvements to practice. We will also liaise with Mr McKessy’s family, if they wish to be involved, to share their experiences of the health and social care”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport Integrated Care Partnership
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust cannot directly access patients’ full clinical histories through current systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All Stockport GPs use the Emis Clinical system, including our community and out of hours services. This means that community and out of hours services directly accessing individual patient clinical records. At the current time, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust cannot directly access a patient’s full clinical history. I can confirm that there is ongoing work within Greater Manchester to extend sharing of information across healthcare services.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport Integrated Care Partnership
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 October 2023

    Open published response
  5. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Manoel Messias Santos · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Manoel Messias Santos, a Brazilian national detained in prison and facing immigration detention and possible deportation, was found hanging in his cell in the early hours of 2 November 2020 and was declared dead at 3.30am. The jury found that his understanding of his immigration position made a material contribution to his death and identified failures in notifying him about the IS91 notice and communicating his immigration position. The report also raised concerns about delays in notification and case handling, access to legal advice, communication between agencies, dissemination of learning, and staff understanding of the policy on opening cell doors at night.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of communication between immigration and sentence-planning agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Communication issues between the agencies dealing with immigration and sentence planning may lead to confusion and uncertainty for FNOs. 7. I appreciate that any legal advice for FNOs should be from a legal adviser. I am encouraged that the probation service (who employ community offender managers) is seeking to develop a cohort of probation officers specialising in FNOs and immigration. There are now 201 SPOCs across 12 regions and a hub lead developing this model and leading engagement with the SSHD. There is no such model in the prison in respect of “prison offender managers” who also liaise with the SSHD about FNOs. ”

    Source location

    Manoel Messias Santos · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a national Foreign National Offender coordination hub to support the interface between probation and the Home Office.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To implement a change programme that supports Foreign National Offenders (FNO) nationally, a specific coordination hub has been developed by the Probation Service. Seconded probation practitioners have been allocated to the Home Office to support the work in increasing efficiencies in the interface. Further to the probation specific strand on the joint HMPPS/FNO removal centre taskforce, the seconded members of staff support front line practice and respond to any escalations or obstacles that are brought to their attention.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate seconded probation practitioners to the Home Office to support frontline practice and resolve escalated interface obstacles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To implement a change programme that supports Foreign National Offenders (FNO) nationally, a specific coordination hub has been developed by the Probation Service. Seconded probation practitioners have been allocated to the Home Office to support the work in increasing efficiencies in the interface. Further to the probation specific strand on the joint HMPPS/FNO removal centre taskforce, the seconded members of staff support front line practice and respond to any escalations or obstacles that are brought to their attention.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing potential technological improvements to support timely and secure information exchange with prison officials.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Digitalisation improvements have allowed for engagements with FNOs to be raised on internal databases along with any vulnerability concerns promptly after interactions, while IPT Officers have access to a Ministry of Justice system, to ensure immigration contact and records are widely shared. We will continue to review where further technological improvements can be made to ensure the timely and secure exchange of information between itself and prison officials.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 October 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Home Office and healthcare provider will respond separately to concerns about foreign national prisoner support and inter-agency communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have raised some concerns regarding the management and support of Foreign National prisoners, specifically the signposting and facilitating of access to legal advice and communication between the Home Office, HMPPS and Healthcare. I understand that the Home Office and Practice Plus Group (the healthcare provider at HMP Belmarsh) will be providing a separate response. Further to this, you have raised concern with Operational Support Grades’ (OSG) understanding of the night state policy at HMP Belmarsh.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Practice Plus Group cannot respond directly to improving communication between immigration, sentence-planning and prison agencies because the matter relates to other agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are now 201 SPOCs across the 12 regions and a hub lead developing this model and leading engagement with the SSHD. There is no such model in the prison in respect of “prison offender managers” who also liaise with the SSHD about FNOs.”

    Source location

    Response from Practice Plus Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 October 2023

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Lauren Elizabeth Bridges · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lauren Elizabeth Bridges, who was detained under the Mental Health Act and treated in out-of-area mental health placements, died on 26 February 2022 after a ligaturing incident two days earlier. The report identified concerns about delayed discharge and repatriation, the distance from home, missed opportunities to move her closer to home, and inadequate communication between relevant organisations. It also identified wider concerns about shortages of local mental health beds and reliance on independent providers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate communication between mental health care providers and relevant parties

    Wider context from the report

    “The jury identified inadequate and insufficient communication between Dorset Healthcare NHS Trust, The Priory and relevant parties. I heard evidence that Dorset Healthcare NHS Trust have appointed a designated Care Co-ordinator for its Out-of-Area patients. Having a single point of contact will alleviate some of the communication issues identified. I heard evidence from The Priory as to some of the challenges it faces when dealing with the NHS commissioning bodies, be they Hospital Trusts or Integrated Care Boards. The Priory is just one of the several independent providers of mental health care. 1. The Priory deals with 42 NHS separate commissioning bodies. 2. There are multiple software programmes for record keeping for these organisations, which makes transfer and sharing of clinical information cumbersome and difficult, as direct sharing is not possible. 3. These bodies have varying processes and requests for communication. 4. There is no national standard process for referrals into the independent sector nor for discharge/repatriation to the ‘home team’. ”

    Source location

    Lauren Elizabeth Bridges · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Variation in commissioning-body processes and communication requests

    Wider context from the report

    “The jury identified inadequate and insufficient communication between Dorset Healthcare NHS Trust, The Priory and relevant parties. I heard evidence that Dorset Healthcare NHS Trust have appointed a designated Care Co-ordinator for its Out-of-Area patients. Having a single point of contact will alleviate some of the communication issues identified. I heard evidence from The Priory as to some of the challenges it faces when dealing with the NHS commissioning bodies, be they Hospital Trusts or Integrated Care Boards. The Priory is just one of the several independent providers of mental health care. 1. The Priory deals with 42 NHS separate commissioning bodies. 2. There are multiple software programmes for record keeping for these organisations, which makes transfer and sharing of clinical information cumbersome and difficult, as direct sharing is not possible. 3. These bodies have varying processes and requests for communication. 4. There is no national standard process for referrals into the independent sector nor for discharge/repatriation to the ‘home team’. ”

    Source location

    Lauren Elizabeth Bridges · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an out-of-area inpatient-care procedure requiring regular contact and documentation with patients, families, carers and treating clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. As referred to during the inquest, we have appointed a dedicated Out of Area Coordinator post, which is a clinical post. We have also written and implemented a SOP for the ‘Use of Out of Area Acute and Psychiatric Intensive Care (PICU) Mental Health Inpatient beds: Therapeutic inpatient care and proactive discharge planning’. The SOP includes standards to be met in respect of regular contact and recording of that contact with patients who are out of area, and their families / carers, as well as with clinicians working in out of area providers overseeing that care.”

    Source location

    Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 November 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a live Microsoft Teams handover channel linked to electronic records for documenting bed-flow updates, discussions and decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Clinical Site Managers now use a live Microsoft Teams channel for communicating updates between them on requirements around bed flow, which is linked to patient electronic records. This replaces previous paper handover records and ensures that there is documentation of bed flow discussions and decisions, for example, if there are moves of patients between wards in order to create bed capacity in a specific ward to facilitate an admission, that this is”

    Source location

    Response from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 November 2023

    Open published response
  7. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony John Friend · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony John Friend, who was living with the effects of a brain tumour and required regular personal care, sustained a significant head injury on 17 April 2023 after slipping through a sling while being hoisted from a chair to his bed. He was discharged home for palliative care and died there on 20 April 2023. The principal concern was that an old toileting sling had previously been judged unsuitable and unsafe, but remained at his property and continued to be used, with shortcomings identified in communication, supervision and arrangements for safer alternatives.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate concerns about continued unsafe sling use in writing to care agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest, I heard evidence that: 1) As long ago as 28.11.22 (nearly 5 months before the accident which led to Mr. Friend’s death ), ████████, an Occupational Therapist employed by HWHT, had concluded that the sling being used at the time of the accident on 17.4.23 ( the “old toileting sling” ) was no longer suitable for Mr. Friend, ensured that two more suitable slings were provided instead, but did not remove the old toileting sling from Mr. Friend’s property; 2) During a home visit to Mr. Friend’s address on 2.2.23, ████████ noted that the old toileting sling was still being used, and made clear to Mr. Friend’s family and carers that it was “not safe to use”, but again did not remove it from the property; 3) During a home visit to Mr. Friend’s address on 6.3.23, ████████, another Occupational Therapist employed by HWCT, noted that the old toileting sling was still being used by family and carers, and that although the two more suitable slings provided by her colleague ████████ would be difficult to fit, they were nonetheless safer to use. ████████ told the inquest that in hindsight she “should not have allowed [ carers ] to carry on using the unsafe sling” and that she did not know why she had not taken time to show carers how to use the safer slings which had been provided; 4) During a home visit to Mr. Friend’s address on 17.4.23 (just prior to the accident ) in order to assess Mr. Friend for a new sling, ████████ noted that the old toileting sling was still being used. However, she told the inquest that despite her misgivings about it, she did not remove it from the address, and still expected carers to carry on using it for the next two weeks until a new sling arrived. She described this decision as “an oversight” on her part; 5) ████████ also told the inquest that: (a) she should have ensured that Mr. Friend’s carers were present for the home visit and sling assessment on 17.4.23 ( which they were not ); and (b) she should have contacted his new carers ( Divine Health Services Ltd. ) after that visit, to discuss their use of the sling; 6) At no time did either ████████ appear to have communicated their concerns about the continued use of the old toileting sling in writing to either of the agencies which were providing care for Mr. Friend at the relevant times. ”

    Source location

    Anthony John Friend · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and disseminate a step-by-step focus card for identifying unsafe equipment, documenting removal warnings, and educating occupational therapy staff on its use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a Trust we recognise that more timely action was required about removal of older slings so we have in partnership with a range of professionals designed a focus-on-card around a step by step guide for staff when they identify unsafe equipment in a patient’s home. This is a direct impact from this serious incident. This will act as a useful reminder document that staff will have access to when visiting patients in their homes and will be a vital part of new starter’s induction packs.”

    Source location

    Response from Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing CHC-mediated handover captured all relevant information, including sling concerns, so direct outgoing-to-incoming contact was not necessary in this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of this meeting, the management team reviewed the detailed care plan that had been prepared by CHC based on information provided by ourselves and provided to Divine Health Care as part of the process of finding a new care provider. Although the handover was from CHC to Divine Health Care and not directly from Bluebird Care to Divine Health Care, all of Bluebird Care’s concerns regarding the sling were very clearly documented within this detailed 14-page document. Our identity as the outgoing care provider was also included within this document. This document was shared with Divine Health Care in advance of them carrying out their assessment and agreeing to take over Mr Friend's package of care.”

    Source location

    Response from Bluebird Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2023

    Open published response
  8. Somerset

    AI-generated summary

    Jonathan Paul Bost Mann and Margaret Jean Costa · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 12 August 2021, Jonathan Paul Bost Mann and Margaret Jean Costa were involved in a plane crash after weather conditions deteriorated while Mr Mann was flying above cloud, which he was not qualified to do. Both suffered catastrophic injuries incompatible with life. The principal concerns were that the Distress and Diversion Cell did not obtain or share critical information about the pilot, aircraft and weather, and that incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications with Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the assistance provided.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain accurate shared understanding and communication between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control

    Wider context from the report

    “The D&D cell did not request or receive any critical information about (i) the pilot’s capabilities (i.e that he could not instrument fly and/or fly in cloud); (ii) the plane’s capabilities (i.e. that it was not equipped to allow the pilot to instrument fly) (iii) the weather conditions at the selected diversion aerodrome (to ensure that the weather was more favourable to the conditions at the home aerodrome). Checklists and aide memoires were not used by those on the ground and, consequently, there was a lack of knowledge and/or appreciation of the unsuitability of the selected airport (Exeter) as a viable diversion destination; despite it being the closest in geographic proximity. There was no immediate requirement for urgent assistance as the pilot had fuel for a further 1.5hours of flying time and so there was sufficient time for key information to be obtained, analysed and shared between the D&D Cell and Exeter ATC. The incorrect assumptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications between the D&D Cell and Exeter Air Traffic Control limited the ability of those on the ground to provide adequate assistance to a pilot in distress. ”

    Source location

    Jonathan Paul Bost Mann and Margaret Jean Costa · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Carole MCQUINN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carole MCQUINN underwent pancreatic surgery in February 2022 and subsequently experienced pancreatic leakage, abdominal collections and prolonged hospital treatment. After discharge without a discharge note, medication or follow-up appointment, concerns about infection were not adequately recorded or escalated, and a positive swab result was not reviewed until several days later. She was later admitted with suspected intra-abdominal sepsis and was found unresponsive in hospital; the inquest concluded that she died from a pulmonary embolism likely related to post-operative infection, inflammation and immobility.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record inter-hospital clinical communications

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The deceased had an emergency admission to York Hospital on 4/5/22 with suspected intra-abdominal sepsis. A York doctor was verbally tasked with communicating with the surgical team at Leeds to report back on a comparison of CT scans from both hospitals. No record of this contact - which was verbally reported in positive terms - was made by either hospital and no evidence could be provided as to who had spoken to whom and in what terms. Further, despite the lengthy and complex treatment the deceased had undergone in Leeds, and her attendance there the day prior to admission to York, no contact was made by the treating team at York with the treating team at Leeds, to allow for additional specialist input into the deceased's management and consideration of possible transfer of care. ”

    Source location

    Carole MCQUINN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and disseminate clinical record-keeping guidance to clinical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On review of this matter it became apparent that the Trust’s clinical record-keeping guidance was out of date. This was already on the work plan to be updated and will now be expedited. Once the guidance is finalised it will be shared with all clinical staff.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft and send a patient safety briefing to all staff on documenting clinician communications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Number | Recommendation | Action | Lead | Completion Date | Evidence Required 1 | Raise awareness amongst all clinicians of the need to document discussions and communications between clinicians within and external to the Trust | Patient Safety Briefing to be drafted and sent to all staff | Patient Safety Lead | September 2023 | Copy of briefing 2 | Ensure Trust policy and guidance is clear on requirements for clinical record keeping | Review and update of Trust guidance on clinical record keeping | Head of Information Governance | February 2024 | Policy/guidance published and awareness raised 3 | Raise awareness of this case amongst surgical colleagues to stress the importance of recording communications | Case is presented at Surgical Clinical Governance meeting | Consultant Surgeon | October 2023 | Minutes of meeting”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present the case to surgical colleagues at a Surgical Clinical Governance meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Number | Recommendation | Action | Lead | Completion Date | Evidence Required 1 | Raise awareness amongst all clinicians of the need to document discussions and communications between clinicians within and external to the Trust | Patient Safety Briefing to be drafted and sent to all staff | Patient Safety Lead | September 2023 | Copy of briefing 2 | Ensure Trust policy and guidance is clear on requirements for clinical record keeping | Review and update of Trust guidance on clinical record keeping | Head of Information Governance | February 2024 | Policy/guidance published and awareness raised 3 | Raise awareness of this case amongst surgical colleagues to stress the importance of recording communications | Case is presented at Surgical Clinical Governance meeting | Consultant Surgeon | October 2023 | Minutes of meeting”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use Patient Pass to coordinate and record referrals, information requests and advice between hospitals and specialist departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since this death the AMS CSU has started to use new IT software (Patient Pass) to improve coordination and recording of requests for information and advice. Patient Pass is a two-way messaging tool that is used to facilitate referrals and improve communication between hospitals and specialist departments. It is relied on by a number of specialist teams in LTHT to speed up referrals and support clinical process reliability. It improves record keeping as details of referrals and responses are automatically saved onto patients’ PPM+ records and it also provides the organisation with a full audit trail for information governance purposes.”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust has no record or recollection of any communication from York Hospital about the deceased’s admission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. As explained in the evidence for the inquest the Trust has no record of contact made by clinicians from York Hospital about the deceased’s admission there on Wednesday 4/5/22 or on Thursday 5/5/22 and no member of the surgical team recalls a discussion about the deceased with anyone in York on either day.”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Heather Findlay was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act at Mile End Hospital and ran away while on escorted leave on 11 June 2020. She was later found by a member of the public in a nearby park; the inquest concluded that she died by suicide, with a medical cause of death of hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and ████████ toxicity. The principal concerns included staff preparedness and procedures when a detained patient absconds, unclear responsibilities between ELFT and the police, communication of suicide risk, and the adequacy of risk grading and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate the appropriate level of suicide risk to police

    Wider context from the report

    “6. ELFT staff all told me that, after Ms Findlay had run off, they still graded her as medium rather than high risk. She had had long term suicidal thoughts, had made previous attempts on her life and, prior to being admitted to hospital on 20 May 2020 had purchased ████████ and had planned to take this to kill herself. However, she had appeared to improve in hospital, and had been granted 15 minutes’ escorted leave twice a day since 1 June without incident. At one point in her evidence it appeared to me that the matron, taking the point that by running away Ms Findlay had acted in a manner that was wholly unexpected by the trust, was of the view that Ms Findlay should then have been re-categorised as high risk. However, following re-examination by counsel for ELFT the matron appeared to retract this and to return to her former position that, even after she had run away Ms Findlay was only of medium risk to herself. It is of course a matter of clinical opinion what risk grading a patient should be given, and no person can see into the future. However, • the jury found a failure by ELFT to recognise that, by 11 June 2020, Ms Findlay was at imminent risk of suicide by ████████; and • any investigation following a death like Heather Findlay’s presents an opportunity for sober and searching reflection. So I am concerned that an element of positional bias may have influenced the thinking of ELFT staff. I am concerned about this particularly because, when giving evidence at inquest, the ELFT serious incident investigation author was adamant that it was only appropriate for the HCA who called the police on 11 June 2020 after Ms Findlay had run away, to tell the police of a risk of self harm not of a risk of suicide. Her rationale for this was that the last time Ms Findlay had articulated a plan to kill herself, was when she was found in hospital with a ligature round her neck on 28 May 2020. This position seems lacking the necessary reflection. I draw your attention to earlier prevention of future deaths reports (PFDs) as follows: • Sent to ELFT on 8 June 2023 by Assistant Coroner Buckett following the inquest touching the death of Hilary (Billy) Guedalla, including concern regarding the failure of ELFT to inform the police of the serious suicide risk that the deceased posed to themselves; and the confusion among staff about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing. • Sent to ELFT on 25 January 2023 by me following the inquest touching the death of Andrew Largin, including concern about omissions from a serious incident investigation. • Sent to ELFT on 20 October 2021 by me following the inquest touching the death of Freeda Glausiusz, including concern about a lack of learning culture at ELFT. ”

    Source location

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to volunteer the trust's risk grading when reporting a patient to police

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Evidence was given that the police classify a person at high risk as: the risk is immediate and there are substantial grounds for believing immediate risk of self harm. I was told by the MPS that, at the time of reporting to the MPS, trusts should volunteer their own grading of the patient’s risk. The police said that they will not necessarily following the trust grading, but they regard it as a significant factor and it should form part of the MPS thinking. ELFT witnesses told me that if the police did not ask for the trust’s grading then the trust would not offer it. I was told that, until April 2022 the grab pack prepared by ELFT for the MPS in such a situation was printed out and handed to police if & when the police attended the ward. It is now filled out on a portal as part of the reporting procedure. However, it is not clear to me how far the grab pack aligns with local policies, whether all useful information (including the trust’s grading of risk) is recorded as a matter of routine, and how far the police and the trust are using the same terminology with the same definitions. It seems that this would benefit from consideration. ”

    Source location

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Right Care, Right Person approach with health partners, aligning policies, terminology and information requirements for risk assessment and police support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, ████████, wrote to Health and Social Care Partners on 24th May 2023, to set out the Met Police’s intention to implement the national Right Care, Right Person approach. Under Assistant Commissioner ████████ a team is now working to put this in place, and an initial senior board has taken place with senior health and social care providers to work towards RCRP implementation. This is also in parallel with the work being done by health care providers on the London mental health concordat. A key aspect of this is working with all of the”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns concern East London Foundation Trust and Metropolitan Police policy, making NHS England inappropriate to respond to them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns in your Report relate to organisational policy at East London Foundation Trust as well as policy within the Metropolitan Police Service. NHS England is not therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to many of the concerns raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026