Recurring concern

Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of explicitly multi-agency communication procedures that impair the timely, accurate and complete exchange of safety-relevant information between involved agencies, including the anchor's prison-services communication failure.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, training, staffing or coordination deficiencies where no explicitly multi-agency communication procedure is identified.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's internal communication process.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway, system or hazard when that concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes neutral descriptions of multi-agency working without an identified unsafe communication condition.
Reports
134

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
145

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
303

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England17
Ministry of Justice14
HM Prison and Probation Service10
Home Office8
Recipient name withheld6
Metropolitan Police Service5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
National Police Chiefs’ Council4
Care Quality Commission3
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Police3
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Pauline Keen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Pauline Keen fell at home in January 2021, sustained an acetabular fracture, and was later transferred to Harrier Lodge Care Home after hospital admission. Her mental health deteriorated, and although assessment under the Mental Health Act concluded that she should be admitted, there was a failure to ensure that the application was made without delay amid uncertainty over bed communication responsibilities. She died on 24 April 2021 from multiorgan failure, sepsis and bronchopneumonia.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a policy governing communication between KMPT and the Kent County Council AMHP service to ensure timely Mental Health Act applications

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There is no policy in place between KMPT and Kent County Council AMHP service as to how the organisations communicate with one another to ensure that applications under the Mental Health Act are made as soon as reasonably practicable without delay to patients. ”

    Source location

    Pauline Keen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Alban Stanley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samuel Alban Stanley died in hospital on 26 April 2020 from injuries sustained during an episode of high-risk behaviour related to his Prader-Willi syndrome. The report raised concerns about inadequate support for him and his family, limited access to appropriate services, and poor communication between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate timely communication and follow-up action between agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The evidence at the inquest also revealed that communication between agencies involved in his short life was inadequate. It is possible that had information been shared in a timely manner and actions taken as a result then more support could have been provided to Sammy and his family. Had he, and his family, had more practical help and support this may have made a difference to his high-risk behaviour and ultimately his death. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Alban Stanley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the Children’s Commissioner’s Office and Information Commissioner’s Office to identify ways to improve data sharing in child safeguarding cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Working together to safeguard children (2018), is clear that local areas should have a comprehensive range of effective, evidence-based services in place to address needs, and that effective sharing of information between practitioners and local organisations and agencies is key. We agree that missed opportunities to share information in a timely manner can have severe consequences for the safety and welfare of children and young people. On the 23rd May 2022, the Department for Education made a statement in Parliament about the final report arising from the review of Children's Social Care. To support delivery of recommended changes, the department are already working with the Children’s Commissioner’s Office and the Information Commissioner's office (ICO) to identify ways to better improve data sharing in child safeguarding cases.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Invest in new strategic leadership posts to improve inter-agency dialogue and provide rapid escalation and resolution.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “KMCCG have worked with NELFT, acute and community trusts, KCC, NHS England and wider partners to improve communications regarding children and young people who have the most complex presentations and are considered at risk. KMCCG has invested in new strategic leadership posts whose role is to drive improved dialogue across agencies and to provide a route for rapid escalation and resolution. Since Sammy’s death, KMCCG have worked in collaboration with system partners to develop and implement shared Kent and Medway escalation policy and protocols. This enables rapid identification of children and young people who need senior leader oversight to ensure appropriate care.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway Clinical Commissioning Group
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement shared Kent and Medway escalation policies and protocols for complex, high-risk children and young people.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “KMCCG have worked with NELFT, acute and community trusts, KCC, NHS England and wider partners to improve communications regarding children and young people who have the most complex presentations and are considered at risk. KMCCG has invested in new strategic leadership posts whose role is to drive improved dialogue across agencies and to provide a route for rapid escalation and resolution. Since Sammy’s death, KMCCG have worked in collaboration with system partners to develop and implement shared Kent and Medway escalation policy and protocols. This enables rapid identification of children and young people who need senior leader oversight to ensure appropriate care.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway Clinical Commissioning Group
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create joint posts across local authority and primary care to identify children with additional needs early and coordinate care rapidly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since Sammy’s death, KMCCG has made investments in posts and mechanisms to improve the offer for children and young people with neurodevelopmental presentation. A number of joint posts have been created across the Local Authority and Primary Care so that children and young people with additional needs are identified early and care is coordinated rapidly around the child and family.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway Clinical Commissioning Group
    Page 5 · response
    Published 17 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Kent local authority is responsible for undertaking assessments and providing services for children in need, including disabled children.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am sorry to hear that Samuel was not offered the care and treatment that he needed to keep him safe, and for the poor communication between the agencies that were supposed to provide this care. Local authorities have a duty under s17 of the Children Act 1989 to carry out an assessment of children in need and to provide services to them for the purpose of safeguarding and promoting their welfare. Working together to safeguard children (2018), sets out that safeguarding partners should agree with their relevant agencies the levels for the different types of assessment and services to be delivered, including services for disabled children. Safeguarding partners should then publish a threshold document setting out local criteria for action, including procedures and processes for cases relating to disabled children. It would therefore be for Kent local authority to undertake this.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2022

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Terance Alfred RADFORD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terance Alfred Radford, aged 87, died at the scene on 19 April 2019 after being struck by a car driven at speed by a male driver. The report identified concerns about the Home Detention Curfew Policy, including the release of prisoners directly from segregation, insufficient assessment of risk to others, and a lack of multi-agency information sharing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a multi-agency information-sharing framework for assessing and managing risk during Home Detention Curfew release

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The national Home Detention Curfew Policy contains no framework for multi-agency information sharing with regards to the assessment and management of risk for those deemed eligible for early release under the terms of the Policy. ”

    Source location

    Terance Alfred RADFORD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the HDC Policy Framework to require necessary multi-agency information sharing before release decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The national Home Detention Curfew Policy contains no framework for multi-agency information sharing with regards to the assessment and management of risk for those deemed eligible for early release under the terms of the Policy. Response: The HDC Policy Framework will be amended to ensure that the necessary information-sharing takes place before there is a decision to release on HDC.”

    Source location

    2022-0014-Response-from-Ministry-of-Justice_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response
  4. Greater Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jos Tarse-Joy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jos Tarse-Joy was born by emergency caesarean section at 41 weeks after his high-risk pregnancy was not explicitly identified to his parents or care team, no induction had been arranged, and CTG monitoring was not used on admission. He was born in very poor condition, sustained severe brain damage following hypoxia, and died at Royal Oldham Hospital on 15 December 2020. The principal concerns included communication and documentation failures, lack of appropriate monitoring and induction planning, unclear escalation processes, and wider issues concerning maternity-service layout and national guidance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate the planned pre-41-week induction pathway

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The inquest heard evidence that the consultant would not have advised that the pregnancy proceed beyond 41 weeks and that an induction of labour would be offered before his mother reached that date. Disjointed lines of communication with the community midwifery team and poor communication with his parents meant that they were all unaware of that. As a consequence there was no plan for an induction of labour in place. The inquest heard that improvements had been made within the trust but poor lines of communication with community teams increased the risk of death of a baby. ”

    Source location

    Jos Tarse-Joy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a uniform, interoperable format for maternity records across clinical systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To improve women's access to maternity records, in June 2021 an additional £52 million was announced to fast track the provision of online maternity records. This backs the long-term plan commitment to ensure everyone has access to their maternity notes and information electronically by 2023/24. An initial component of this was to create an agreed uniform format for the notes both in terms of layout and content. This then has been taken to ensure “interoperability” – that is that the notes will be shared irrespective of clinical system.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 January 2022

    Open published response
  5. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Martin Thomas Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martin Thomas Brown collapsed in his cell at HMP Lancaster Farms on 10 December 2018, suffered a cardiac arrest and died despite resuscitation attempts. A post-mortem examination did not establish a cause of death. Concerns related to prison staff training and familiarity with the ERIC system, healthcare liaison with the ambulance service, and communication during medical emergencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate communication between healthcare personnel at medical emergency scenes and prison or ambulance control

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) For the attention of the Governor, the evidence disclosed a need for the training of prison staff in relation to responses to medical emergencies and familiarisation with the ERIC (Emergency Response in Custody) system (2) For the attention of the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need for healthcare to liaise with North West Ambulance Service over the handling of medical emergencies involving the ambulance service (3) For the attention of the Governor in partnership with the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need to devise a better means of communication between healthcare personnel at the scene of a medical emergency and the prison control room / ambulance control. ”

    Source location

    Martin Thomas Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with NWAS to define clinician training needs and incorporate ambulance-control communication guidance into the HMP Lancaster Farms emergency-response procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(2) For the attention of the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need for healthcare to liaise with North West Ambulance Service over the handling of medical emergencies involving the ambulance service”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct joint prison-healthcare debriefs after incidents to identify communication lessons involving healthcare, the communications department and NWAS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following incidents, debriefs occur jointly with the Prison and healthcare. This is an opportunity to consider the communication taken place between healthcare, the communication department and NWAS. Any emerging lesson learnt will be captured at this early stage.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a dedicated radio net enabling clinicians and the prison communications room to communicate directly and relay information securely during medical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An alternative solution was the provision of a mobile phone for healthcare to utilise to make the call, however, the phone signal in HMP Lancaster Farms is not reliable. Following the inquest, the Head of Healthcare met with the new Safer Custody Governor, and it was agreed that a spare radio net will be utilised so that the clinician can speak directly to the prison’s communications room (rather than via Oscar 1) to provide more information directly which can then be relayed to the clinician, who would also be able to answer any questions posed by the ambulance service. The clinician can also contact the communications room directly to ask for progress reports. As the net will only be accessible to the communications room and healthcare, this will mean confidential and sensitive information can be relayed.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor the new emergency-communication system through staff feedback, healthcare incident reviews and safety-huddle and organisational learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This new system was trialled in an exercise on the 18th January 2022. This approach proved to be successful. This went live on the 31st of January. Supportive training regarding the new process has been provided to relevant staff and will now form part of the response process for all emergencies. This new system will be monitored via staff feedback and review of healthcare incidents which are logged for each Code Red/ Blue. This will be shared at the safety huddles and within the wider organisation to share best practice.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a dedicated radio channel to connect clinicians directly with ambulance services through the communications room during medical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new process has been implemented at HMP Lancaster Farms to ensure healthcare staff can communicate efficiently and effectively with the prison control room and the ambulance service during medical emergencies. By utilising a spare radio channel available on the prison radio network clinicians will now have the ability to speak directly to the ambulance service via the communication room when an emergency is underway. This will enable them to relay information and answer any questions posed by the ambulance service without disruption or delay, as well as receive progress reports on the ambulance’s arrival.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-HMPPS-response_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Restrict access to the emergency radio network to the communications room, healthcare staff and first responders on scene.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Also, the radio network will only be accessible to the communications room, healthcare and those first on scene to safeguard any confidential information.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-HMPPS-response_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Using the wing phone could delay emergency communication and leave the patient without a nurse while the clinician makes the call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Potential solutions were discussed, and these included accessing the wing phone to make the call, however, it was noted that this would mean the clinician leaving the patient to ring an outside line. Prison telecommunication systems require a phone code to access an outside line which further increases the time taken to make a call. The patient may then be left without a nurse in attendance whilst this telephone call is taking place.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A mobile phone was not a reliable communication solution because phone signal at HMP Lancaster Farms was unreliable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An alternative solution was the provision of a mobile phone for healthcare to utilise to make the call, however, the phone signal in HMP Lancaster Farms is not reliable. Following the inquest, the Head of Healthcare met with the new Safer Custody Governor, and it was agreed that a spare radio net will be utilised so that the clinician can speak directly to the prison’s communications room (rather than via Oscar 1) to provide more information directly which can then be relayed to the clinician, who would also be able to answer any questions posed by the ambulance service. The clinician can also contact the communications room directly to ask for progress reports. As the net will only be accessible to the communications room and healthcare, this will mean confidential and sensitive information can be relayed.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response
  6. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Ellery · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Ellery was found ████████ in his prison cell on 31 October 2016. The report identified a 19-minute delay in informing the ambulance service and no direct communication method between ambulance call-centre staff and the prison staff providing basic life support. These issues delayed information sharing and impeded the provision of resuscitation guidance, giving rise to concerns about risks to other deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a direct communication method between ambulance service call centre staff and prison staff providing basic life support

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was no method of communication to allow the Ambulance Service call centre staff to communicate directly with the nurse and officers who were providing basic life support to Mr Ellery. This delayed the relaying of specific information with respect to Mr Ellery’s condition by the prison to the Welsh Ambulance Service. It also impeded the ability of the ambulance service operator to provide guidance to those attempting to resuscitate Mr Ellery. This may affect the use of a defibrillator. In circumstances where not all prison staff are trained in the provision of CPR, it might also prevent the ambulance service operator providing instruction to first responders, or reduce the effectiveness of the same. ”

    Source location

    Robert Ellery · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Devise a Local Operating Protocol governing direct communication between prison staff providing basic life support and the Welsh Ambulance Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At a local level, in recognition of the concerns raised by yourself, a Local Operating Protocol has been devised. HMP Cardiff will pilot the use of a mobile phone carried by the Orderly Officer and Night Orderly Officer to enable direct communication with the Welsh Ambulance Service. This will ensure updates from the scene can be provided directly to allow the Ambulance Service call centre staff to communicate directly with the nurse and officer providing basic life support to a patient. Our Local Operating Protocol sets out the following operational objectives:”

    Source location

    2021-0390-Response-from-HMP-Cardiff_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot mobile phones carried by the Orderly Officer and Night Orderly Officer to enable direct communication with the Welsh Ambulance Service during emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At a local level, in recognition of the concerns raised by yourself, a Local Operating Protocol has been devised. HMP Cardiff will pilot the use of a mobile phone carried by the Orderly Officer and Night Orderly Officer to enable direct communication with the Welsh Ambulance Service. This will ensure updates from the scene can be provided directly to allow the Ambulance Service call centre staff to communicate directly with the nurse and officer providing basic life support to a patient. Our Local Operating Protocol sets out the following operational objectives:”

    Source location

    2021-0390-Response-from-HMP-Cardiff_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 November 2021

    Open published response
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Joseph MARTIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joseph Martin approached Metropolitan Police Service officers near Westminster Bridge on 3 June 2021, after concerns had been raised about his mental health and safety. The inquest found that he was suffering a psychotic relapse at the time of his death, but the exact circumstances were unclear. The report raised concerns that important information about his mental health and vulnerability was not shared between police forces and that individual errors and wider system weaknesses failed to provide a safety net.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate safety-critical mental-health and medical information to relevant agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “Joseph Martin was reported as a person of concern to the PSNI on 28 May 2021 by staff at the hostel where he lived. His consultant psychiatrist called the PSNI on 1 June 2021 and raised very grave concerns about what he described as a vulnerable missing person, explaining that Mr Martin had suffered a psychotic relapse, and voicing significant worries about his safety and about the safety of others. The doctor re-iterated and reinforced all of this on 2 June, when the PSNI rang him to say that they did not consider any further action required. He was told that it would be looked into further. However, when the MPS contacted the PSNI on the morning of 3 June, these concerns were not relayed. I was told that the contacts had not been noted on the missing person report or the occurrence log by the investigating officer. Then the officer tasked with calling the MPS back did not conduct a search of all records, and so did not see the contacts. Finally, when a PSNI officer rang Mr Martin’s mother to say that her son had approached MPS officers, and she told the officer how very worried she was about her son’s mental health, the officer did not then call the MPS back. I appreciate that by then he thought that Mr Martin was going to go to hospital, but Mr Martin had not been detained and in any event the hospital needed the crucial medical history that had been given. There were individual errors, and more significantly a system that does not seem to have provided a safety net. ”

    Source location

    Joseph MARTIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. London City

    AI-generated summary

    Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 29 November 2019, Usman Khan carried out a terrorist attack at Fishmongers’ Hall, fatally stabbing Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt before being fatally shot by firearms officers on London Bridge. The report raised concerns about risk assessment and communication for events involving high-risk offenders, and about the assessment, information-sharing, supervision and management of terrorist offenders released into the community.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate between offender managers and event organisers before extremist offenders attend events

    Wider context from the report

    “This case gives rise to concern that an extremist offender may be permitted to attend an event or venue without there having been proper communication between the probation and police officers responsible for managing the offender and the event organisers and/or venue hosts. ”

    Source location

    Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 14 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write to accountable officers of registered English higher education providers, sharing the coroner’s report and asking them to consider risk assessment and external-venue information-sharing changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Office for Students accepts recommendations MC1, MC2 and MC5 in full. Our proposed response to each of these recommendations is to write to the accountable officers at all registered higher education providers in England. In writing to these providers we will make them aware of the report and ask them to consider carefully those recommendations and decide whether they may need to take steps to change their approach to risk assessment of events and of programmes of higher education that involve continued contact with offenders in prisons or after their release into the community. We will also ask them to consider whether further steps should be taken in relation to information sharing with external venues to inform them of high-risk features of events, including for instance the attendance of recently released serious offenders.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-Office-for-Students_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fund and deploy specially trained CT Nominal Management officers, with accountable senior regional roles for terrorist-risk offender management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “16. Furthermore, CTPHQ has since invested c.£12million per year in dedicated and specially trained CT Nominal Management officers who will attend all CT specialist MAPPA (Category 4) meetings. Their training includes proper communication between those managing the offender and event organisers and/or venue hosts. Additionally, CTPHQ are committed to ensuring terrorist offenders are managed by trained officers, with appropriate guidance, and senior roles have been assigned in each region of the CTP network to provide accountability for the management of all terrorist risk nominals, including specialist CT MAPPA arrangements in line with the Independent Review and recommendations on ‘core group’ joint case work.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-West-Midlands-Police_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage higher education colleagues to encourage effective communications between event organisers and host venues for high-risk events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• I will engage with colleagues in the higher education sector to encourage action be taken to implement this recommendation.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-Department-for-Education_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage Office for Students colleagues to encourage higher education providers to consider event-organiser and host-venue communications in risk-management procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• My officials have spoken to colleagues at the Office for Students to encourage them to take action and I welcome their intention to write to all English higher education providers to draw attention to this recommendation, with the aim of encouraging them to consider effective communications between event organisers and host venues as part of their event and risk management procedures.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-Department-for-Education_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise MAPPA guidance to require consideration of disclosure to relevant event hosts and clearer recording of disclosure decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• MAPPA guidance requires disclosure to be considered at every discussion, and disclosure will be made where the MAPPA agencies conclude that the offender’s risk may be effectively managed only by making disclosure to specified individuals or bodies. We will revise the guidance, so that it states explicitly that consideration must be given to disclosure to an event host organiser, where relevant, which would facilitate wider discussion outside MAPPA around event security. The MAPPA minutes template is being updated so that decisions on disclosure are more clearly recorded.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-MoJ_Published
    Page 9 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response
  9. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emma Day died in the street on 26 May 2017 from multiple stab wounds and was found to have been unlawfully killed. The report describes a history of domestic violence, coercive and controlling behaviour, threats to her life and protective orders that had expired shortly before her murder. Principal concerns included failures to share and record risk information, inadequate domestic-violence training and guidance, and a system failure in handling reports of domestic violence within the Child Maintenance Service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a procedure for responding to threats and passing information to other authorities

    Wider context from the report

    “f) Asked about the Domestic Homicide Report’s reference to systemic issues, Mr Gilchrist’s own words were that in May 2017 is where the system fell down. There should be a threat procedure and how to initiate it and pass information to other authorities ”

    Source location

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ben Buster KING was detained under the Mental Health Act at Jeesal Cawston Park and died in hospital on 29 July 2020 after becoming unwell following respiratory problems and receiving sedative medication. The inquest identified concerns including failure to diagnose obesity hypoventilation syndrome, inadequate consideration of promethazine, failure to recognise the seriousness of a life-threatening situation, and wider care, observation, record-keeping and hospital communication issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide timely responses to care staff seeking clarification of discharge and escalation plans

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Advice given on discharge appears to be unclear and contradictory. The expert Respiratory Consultant referred to the advice as being “inadequate, unclear and inaccurate”. On the Discharge Form provided on 9 July 2020 it is noted “Plan – home as Ben is back to normal, self, red flags and safety netting covered, to return in the event of any difficulty.” On discharge from ED on 10 July 2020 (second occasion) the hospital record states that Ben King is to return home, encouraged to lose weight, fluids are to be encouraged and “with no need to monitor his sats unless clinically unwell with sats in 60s%”. Not all of this information was included in the Discharge Form on 10 July 2020. The Discharge Form provided “Other” – “seen by respiratory team, they are happy to send him home, they have clerked their advice on the paper. Cpap and O2” On 12 July 2020 the Discharge Plan provided “Home”. The advice from the Respiratory Consultant seen on 3 July 2020 was for CPAP to stop. Evidence was heard from the Care staff at JCP that they were unclear as to what the plan was with regard to Ben and specifically as to when Ben was to be returned to Hospital. One of the Doctors at JCP contacted the ED, NNUH to try to ascertain what the advice was and was unable to get any substantive response. Email contact was made with the Respiratory Team but no response was received until after Ben King’s death on 28 July 2020. ”

    Source location

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide community clinicians access to hospital correspondence, including discharge letters, through the ICE electronic results system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The importance of clear liaison and communication between hospital and community teams is obvious and the Hospital has accordingly made its electronic results system (ICE) available to clinicians in the Community and through this route they can access correspondence, such as discharge letters. This is however only an initial step towards enhancing the digital capability of our Norfolk healthcare system which fortunately is one of the least digitally developed of any in the country. We know that establishing comprehensive and robust lines of communication will be hugely enhanced by establishing an electronic patient record (EPR) system of the type used in many other areas of the NHS. We are in active discussions with regional and national colleagues to develop the case for the EPR across Norfolk and Waveney.”

    Source location

    2021-0250-Response-from-Norfolk-and-Norwich-University-Hospitals_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 July 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026