Recurring concern

Unsafe emergency call handling

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the emergency call-handling process that impair location identification, information transfer, triage, escalation, reassessment, caller advice or appropriate resource deployment, including the anchor's failure to obtain riverfront coastguard location references and the delayed provision of a prison gate location.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in coastguard staffing or service coverage that are not failures of emergency call handling.
  • Excludes clinical assessment, treatment or other downstream response failures after the call-handling process has ended.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, policy or information-system deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to unsafe emergency call handling.
  • Excludes failures in non-emergency communication processes that do not concern handling an emergency call.
Reports
79

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
109

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
150

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care13
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust7
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust7
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust6
Devon & Cornwall Police4
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
NHS Pathways4
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Police3
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors3
North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust3
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Thomas Burt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Thomas Burt died at home on 15 May 2025 after a spontaneous rupture of an arterio-venous malformation at the back of his right ankle caused severe bleeding. The report raises concerns about communication between the careline service and ambulance services, including failure to pass on key information, delays in escalating the emergency, inadequate recording of information, and the loss of opportunities to provide basic first-aid advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain or provide basic clinical advice during careline emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “5) I heard that an EMA can hold a call and speak to a CSN to get basic first aid advice or join the CSN into the call. Given the volume of blood that had already been lost in this case, I am concerned that this opportunity to give clinical advice was lost especially as the call had come in via a careline operator. ”

    Source location

    Derek Thomas Burt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend failed-callback procedures to require Careline re-contact and consideration of three-way clinician communication when direct contact cannot be established.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has reviewed the learning arising from this inquest and has amended its local operating procedure relating to failed callback processes. This guidance now specifically includes circumstances where calls originate from Careline providers.”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review use of Careline functionality during initial 999 calls to improve communication pathways and maximise available technology.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust recognises the potential benefits of utilising Careline technology to support clinical assessment and the provision of appropriate advice in circumstances where conventional telephone contact is not possible. In addition to the changes already implemented within the clinical callback process, SECAMB is currently reviewing how similar functionality may be utilised by Emergency Medical Advisors at the point of the initial 999 call. This work remains ongoing and no final solution has yet been agreed;”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and strengthen access to clinical inline support by relaunching staff guidance and formalising expectations in the call-handling procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust's operating model enables Emergency Medical Advisors (EMAs) to access real-time clinical support from clinicians, including Clinical Safety Navigators, when additional advice, guidance or decision-making support is required. This includes circumstances where calls present with complex clinical needs, unusual circumstances or communication challenges.”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share and discuss the PFD learning with the ambulance service medical directors group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, within its remit as a membership organisation for UK NHS ambulance services, AACE does share learning from PFDs across the sector. In relation to this specific PFD report, we recognise that the points of concern relate to:”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recommend that each ambulance service review local procedures for handling calls from telecare providers and assess three-way calling availability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. We were unaware, at a national level, of the facility for ambulance services to hold three-way conference calls with careline operators and their users. We do consider that the use of this function would be extremely helpful in certain circumstances where there is any ambiguity as to the acuity of the clinical condition of the user / person needing assistance. AACE has shared and discussed this PFD with the ambulance service medical directors group (NASMeD) and have recommended that each ambulance service reviews their own local procedures into handling calls from telecare providers and to establish if their three-way calling is available.”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routine three-way conference calling will not be introduced because operational complexity and variable call scenarios make it disproportionate or ineffective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 1 Following operational and technical review, Appello Careline Limited does not consider that routinely offering three-way (conference) calling would be proportionate or effective, given the operational complexity and variability of call scenarios.”

    Source location

    Response from Appello Careline Operations Director
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The specific case concerns should be addressed by Appello and SECAMB, rather than by the national ambulance membership organisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With respect to the matters of concern in relation to the care of Derek Burt, AACE is not in a position to respond; the specific details relate to and should subsequently be addressed by both Appello and SECAMB.”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The organisation cannot mandate or instruct ambulance services, whose local procedures and implementation decisions remain their responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “AACE is a private company owned by the English and Welsh Ambulance NHS trusts. It exists to provide ambulance services with a central organisation that supports, co-ordinates and assists with the implementation of nationally agreed policies and guidance. It is a membership organisation representing all UK NHS ambulance services and our primary focus is the ongoing development of ambulance service provision and the improvement of patient care. AACE possess the intellectual property rights of the Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee (JRCALC) UK ambulance service clinical practice guidelines (the “JRCALC guidelines”). AACE is not constituted to mandate or instruct ambulance services; however, it has national influence via the regular meetings of ambulance chief executives and chairs, along with a network of national specialist groups.”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Internal ambulance processes concerning note-taking, auditing, clinical advice and escalation fall outside the respondent’s ability to influence or comment on them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “TEC Quality response to points 4 and 5:”

    Source location

    Response from Telecare Services Association
    Page 7 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational concerns about ambulance care are the responsibility of SECAMB, which is best placed to respond directly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England’s Ambulance Team have reviewed this Report and have advised that the concerns raised relate to operational matters, which are the responsibility of the local ambulance service; SECAMB NHS Foundation Trust, who will be best placed to respond to the concerns raised. We note that SECAMB have also been addressed in your Report and will respond directly to the concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Charles FORREST · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Charles Forrest, aged 85, suffered a witnessed fall outside his home on 30 September 2025 and later an unwitnessed fall at home on 1 October 2025. Ambulance attendance was delayed and subsequently cancelled before the second fall, after which he was taken to hospital and died from an unsurvivable head injury. The concerns were that callers were told an ambulance was being arranged and were not given reliable information about expected waiting times, potentially limiting informed decisions about waiting or escalating worsening symptoms.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to inform callers when no ambulance is being arranged

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard that the NHS Pathways system tells call handlers to advise callers that an ambulance is being arranged. However I heard that within SECAMB category 3 and category 4 dispositions are validated by clinical staff before being added to the Dispatch queue for an Ambulance to be allocated. I heard that this was in line with National Guidance from The Association of Ambulance Chief Executives. Therefore, callers are not informed that no ambulance is being arranged at the time of their call. I also heard that the NHS Pathways does not allow callers to be advised of the estimated time that they may have to wait for ambulance attendance. The evidence was that SECAMB have requested that the wordings provided by NHS Pathways be altered so that there is provision to give further information to callers about how long they may wait for an ambulance to attend but this has previously been declined by NHS England. I consider that both of the above matters mean that patients cannot make informed decisions about whether they wait for the arrival of an ambulance or escalate worsening symptoms on the basis that they anticipate that an ambulance is being arranged so will be with them shortly when this may not be the case. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Charles FORREST · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with ambulance services to develop standard scripts for situations where Ambulance Response Programme standards will not be met.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For 999 calls, all ambulance services should have in place call exit scripts and procedures for dealing with response delays when under operational pressure. NHS England has Resource Escalation Action Plan (REAP) levels which are used to manage operational pressures across ambulance services. NHS England supports a position that callers should be provided with sufficient information to make informed decisions, including whether an ambulance has been dispatched to the patient.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England & NHS Improvement
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 August 2026

    Open published response
  3. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver Charles Major Shelley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Charles Major Shelley became seriously unwell on 22 July 2024 with symptoms including a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced consciousness. After no ambulance was dispatched, his parents took him to hospital, where he was treated for meningococcal septicaemia but died approximately 7.5 hours after arrival. The report identified concerns about the lack of a sepsis algorithm for emergency medical advisors and the training and description of those advisors’ role.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway for emergency medical advisors during 111/999 calls

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway to assist the emergency medical advisor (EMA) during 111/999 calls At 14:51 hours on 22nd July 2024, Oliver’s parents called 999 indicating their concern that Oliver was suffering from meningitis as he was suffering from a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced level of consciousness. The EMA began a triage using NHS Pathways algorithm but as they were unable to prioritise any of the listed symptoms, they requested operational support at 14:57 hours, to ask if there was a meningitis pathway within the system. This call was concluded at 15:51 with the EMA indicating to Oliver’s parents that a call back was scheduled within 20 minutes. A call back was not undertaken until 1 hr and 41 minutes later and in the absence of a response a further unsuccessful call was made 2 hrs and 18 minutes later before Secamb closed the referral. In the meantime, Oliver’s parents made the decision to convey Oliver to hospital arriving there at around 15:55 hours. On attendance it was recognised that Oliver was gravely unwell and despite maximal supportive management sadly died from overwhelming meningococcal septicaemia 7.5 hours after his arrival. In their investigation, Secamb acknowledged that the EMA’s management of the 999 call was not compliant and have taken the opportunity to offer ongoing training. However, it was also recognised EMA’s found it challenging to triage individuals when multiple signs and symptoms were present in relation to a possible sepsis diagnosis and that having a dedicated sepsis algorithm would assist them in being able to provide an appropriate response to callers and to ensure appropriate management. This has important implications for prioritising ambulance disposition, which may also include the ability of a paramedic to attend at the earliest opportunity to give antibiotics. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Charles Major Shelley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A separate sepsis algorithm pathway is unnecessary because sepsis screening is embedded across multiple symptom-based NHS Pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is noted that the health advisor sought advice from a Senior Non-Clinician as they wanted to know if there was a specific Pathway for meningitis before then passing the case to the clinical queue for inability to prioritise a main symptom. It is important to highlight that as NHS Pathways is a non-diagnostic clinical assessment tool 'Meningitis' (or any other condition) would not present as a pathway option, however, questions regarding septicaemia and meningitis are covered in a variety of symptom-based pathways and when answered positively result in an ambulance dispatch. In essence, rather than one ‘sepsis algorithm’ pathway, NHS Pathways has embedded a ‘sepsis’ algorithm into a wide range of symptom-based pathways where sepsis could”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 September 2026

    Open published response
  4. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Alexander Ferdinand MAYHEW (known as Ned) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 6 May 2024, 16-year-old Ned Mayhew was found hanging in a wooded area after leaving school and was taken to hospital, where his death was confirmed on 9 May 2024 following brain stem testing. The principal concern was that routing an emergency call reporting an apparently deceased person to the police before the ambulance service may result in valuable minutes being lost during the limited period in which treatment might prevent death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in routing emergency calls concerning apparently deceased persons to ambulance services

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard expert evidence from a Consultant Intensive Care Physician, who explained that there is a limited window of time (approximately ten minutes) during which emergency life-saving treatment can be provided to a person who has applied a ligature, such that cerebral hypoxia may be prevented. Cerebral hypoxia, if not reversed, may ultimately lead to cardiac arrest and death. The expert confirmed that if medical intervention is delivered within this critical period, death may be prevented. The expert further confirmed that a person who has applied a ligature may appear deceased to an observer, for example, displaying no movement and being unconscious, while nevertheless remaining within that ten-minute window during which the outcome may still be altered. I also heard evidence regarding the Public Emergency Call Service Code of Practice (“PECS”). I was told that where a member of the public contacts emergency services to report the discovery of an apparently deceased person, the call would likely be directed to the police in line with the PECS. In addition, I heard that where a caller is unsure which emergency service they require, the operator must connect the caller to the police, in accordance with a request made by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Having considered the expert evidence, I am of the view that in these critical circumstances every second is of importance. The process of routing a caller to the police, who may then refer the matter to the ambulance service and/or instruct an ambulance to attend, carries a risk that valuable minutes may be lost. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Alexander Ferdinand MAYHEW (known as Ned) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage operational partners to consider the proposed change and decide whether to adopt it as standard practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We coordinate closely with emergency service organisations and BT, as the 999 call handling agent, to ensure that the Code of Practice reflects agreed operational practice and supports the prioritisation of life-saving interventions. Following receipt of your report, we have engaged with the relevant operational partners who can advise on the proposal (BT, ambulance services, and policing, including through the 999 Liaison Committee and consultation with the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)) to consider the issues raised and decide whether the proposed change”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with operational partners to reflect any agreed improvements appropriately in the PECS Code of Practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Thank you again for bringing this matter to our attention. We hope this response provides assurance that the issues you have identified are being considered with the seriousness they deserve, and that DSIT will continue to work with operational partners to ensure any agreed improvements are reflected appropriately in the PECS Code of Practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage ambulance services and the 999 Liaison Committee to consider default ambulance routing for uncertain reports of apparently deceased people.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Policing has asked BT to engage formally with ambulance services and the 999 Liaison Committee to consider whether, in cases where a caller describes the discovery of a body or an apparently deceased person and is unsure which service is required, calls should default to routing to the ambulance service, which ambulance colleagues have agreed to and the appropriate PECS governance process and training will be updated. This proposal reflects the principle that clinical need should take primacy where there is any possibility that life remains.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce expectations that police control rooms immediately notify ambulance services when life extinction is uncertain, using guidance and assurance activity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, UK policing will reinforce national expectations that, where there is any uncertainty as to whether life is extinct, police control rooms must immediately notify ambulance services and not await on-scene confirmation. While this expectation already exists in operational practice, it will be re-emphasised through guidance and assurance activity in light of the issues highlighted by this case.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support development of rapid call-transfer functionality between police and ambulance services to address identified mis-routing without caller re-dialling.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Policing also supports the continued development of technical solutions, such as onward call connect or rapid call transfer functionality, which would enable emergency calls to be transferred swiftly between police and ambulance services when initial mis-routing is identified, without requiring the caller to re-dial. Although responsibility for such functionality does not sit with policing, we are actively supporting its development and adoption where available.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational delivery of emergency services, including police and ambulance response and control-room decisions, is outside the department’s responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We were very saddened to hear of the case involving Ned, and we wanted to thank you for raising this important matter so that it can be considered by the relevant authorities accordingly. We recognise the seriousness of the issues raised and welcome the opportunity to respond. While we are not responsible for the operational delivery of emergency services, including police and ambulance response or control room decision-making, we maintain the Public Emergency Call Service (PECS) Code of Practice on behalf of the 999/112 Liaison Committee. The Liaison Committee is the primary governing body responsible for the technical and operational oversight of the UK's Public Emergency Call Service.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BT and emergency services develop and implement the detailed operational policies and processes for handling emergency calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Code of Practice is not a formal policy statement, but provides guidance to organisations on the handling of 999/112 public emergency telephone calls between the Call Handling Agents and the Emergency Authorities in the UK. The detailed operational policies and processes set out within the Code are developed and implemented by BT, as the call handling agent, and the emergency services, drawing on their operational expertise. We work with these partners to bring forward agreed updates to the PECS and ensure that changes are formally reflected and applied consistently across the emergency call system.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational partners decide whether the proposed change should be adopted into standard practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We coordinate closely with emergency service organisations and BT, as the 999 call handling agent, to ensure that the Code of Practice reflects agreed operational practice and supports the prioritisation of life-saving interventions. Following receipt of your report, we have engaged with the relevant operational partners who can advise on the proposal (BT, ambulance services, and policing, including through the 999 Liaison Committee and consultation with the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)) to consider the issues raised and decide whether the proposed change”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for developing and adopting rapid call-transfer functionality does not sit with policing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Policing also supports the continued development of technical solutions, such as onward call connect or rapid call transfer functionality, which would enable emergency calls to be transferred swiftly between police and ambulance services when initial mis-routing is identified, without requiring the caller to re-dial. Although responsibility for such functionality does not sit with policing, we are actively supporting its development and adoption where available.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Policing cannot unilaterally change BT routing practices or default routing rules because PECS amendments require multi-agency agreement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For completeness, it may be helpful to note that changes to BT call handler practice or default routing rules require multi-agency agreement and formal amendment to PECS, and cannot be directed unilaterally by policing. Similarly, UK policing does not consider it safe or appropriate for police or BT call handlers to undertake enhanced clinical triage, as this risks further delay and unintended harm.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police and BT call handlers will not undertake enhanced clinical triage because it risks further delay and unintended harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For completeness, it may be helpful to note that changes to BT call handler practice or default routing rules require multi-agency agreement and formal amendment to PECS, and cannot be directed unilaterally by policing. Similarly, UK policing does not consider it safe or appropriate for police or BT call handlers to undertake enhanced clinical triage, as this risks further delay and unintended harm.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2026

    Open published response
  5. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Jardine Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jardine Williams, a 29-year-old mental health nurse, died on 24 March 2025 after making a 999 call reporting worsening mental health, suicidal thoughts, a plan and an intention to carry it out. The report raised concerns about unclear and confused communication between the North West Ambulance Service and Cumbria Health on Call, including a delay in returning the call after repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact her. The report did not find a causative link between that delay and the outcome, and stated that her intent could not be determined on the balance of probabilities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to return calls from CHOC to NWAS after the third failed contact attempt

    Wider context from the report

    “As outlined above, I heard evidence that Miss Williams had made a 999 call which had been answered by the Northwest Ambulance Service (‘NWAS’) who, in turn passed the information to CHOC. (1) I found that the flow of information and communication between NWAS and CHOC was unclear and at times appeared to be confused. The information passed to CHOC at the outset, following the 999 call, appeared to be limited and may not have provided the receiving handler with the full picture of the situation. I was concerned that full and accurate information was therefore not passing between NWAS and CHOC. (2) Thereafter between 18.14 and 18.54 hours, 4 attempts were made by CHOC to call Miss Williams, but no successful contact was made. At 19.48 hours NWAS called CHOC for an update regarding Miss Williams. I heard evidence that as per the agreed procedure, a third and final attempt at contact would be made. By this stage however four unsuccessful attempts had already been made to contact Miss Williams, and the third attempt to contact her had been made at 18.25hours. I considered that the flow of information between CHOC and NWAS appeared to have confused on this issue. At 20.43 hours a further call was made to CHOC from NWAS for an update on the case, and again it was confirmed that no successful contact had been made with Miss Williams. Therefore, the call was taken back by NWAS approximately 2 hours 18 minutes after the third unsuccessful attempt was made to contact Miss Williams. Thereafter, an ambulance attended Flat 2 Harraby Green Hall at 20.58 hours. I did not find that there was a causative link between the call not being returned to NWAS after the third unsuccessful attempt to contact Miss Williams, and the eventual outcome. I was concerned that, in terms of the procedure, the call should have been returned by CHOC to NWAS after the third failed attempt to contact Miss Williams at 18.25 hours, but that the call was not returned to NWAS by CHOC until 20.43 hours. ”

    Source location

    Jardine Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass full and accurate information between NWAS and CHOC

    Wider context from the report

    “As outlined above, I heard evidence that Miss Williams had made a 999 call which had been answered by the Northwest Ambulance Service (‘NWAS’) who, in turn passed the information to CHOC. (1) I found that the flow of information and communication between NWAS and CHOC was unclear and at times appeared to be confused. The information passed to CHOC at the outset, following the 999 call, appeared to be limited and may not have provided the receiving handler with the full picture of the situation. I was concerned that full and accurate information was therefore not passing between NWAS and CHOC. (2) Thereafter between 18.14 and 18.54 hours, 4 attempts were made by CHOC to call Miss Williams, but no successful contact was made. At 19.48 hours NWAS called CHOC for an update regarding Miss Williams. I heard evidence that as per the agreed procedure, a third and final attempt at contact would be made. By this stage however four unsuccessful attempts had already been made to contact Miss Williams, and the third attempt to contact her had been made at 18.25hours. I considered that the flow of information between CHOC and NWAS appeared to have confused on this issue. At 20.43 hours a further call was made to CHOC from NWAS for an update on the case, and again it was confirmed that no successful contact had been made with Miss Williams. Therefore, the call was taken back by NWAS approximately 2 hours 18 minutes after the third unsuccessful attempt was made to contact Miss Williams. Thereafter, an ambulance attended Flat 2 Harraby Green Hall at 20.58 hours. I did not find that there was a causative link between the call not being returned to NWAS after the third unsuccessful attempt to contact Miss Williams, and the eventual outcome. I was concerned that, in terms of the procedure, the call should have been returned by CHOC to NWAS after the third failed attempt to contact Miss Williams at 18.25 hours, but that the call was not returned to NWAS by CHOC until 20.43 hours. ”

    Source location

    Jardine Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the incident collaboratively with CHOC’s medical and digital operations leads to identify communication and referral-process learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since this inquest, NWAS’ Mental Health Liaison Lead contacted CHOC to review the incident collectively. This review was undertaken with CHOC’s Medical Director and Digital Operations/Programme Manager. CHOC have acknowledged the evidence already provided by NWAS that the incident should not have been transferred to CHOC due to the identified risk of suicide and that the information provided on this occasion ought to have contained more context. It was also acknowledged by CHOC that, as the incident was categorised as a Category 3 response, it should have been returned by CHOC following the third unsuccessful attempt to make contact, which did not occur.”

    Source location

    Response from Northwest Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  6. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Lucy Ann THORNTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lucy Ann THORNTON died on 18 February 2025 after suspending herself; the time of death and whether there was a missed opportunity to prevent this could not be ascertained. The report raises concerns about call handlers’ training and understanding of procedures for incidents involving hanging, including response categorisation and failure to telephone THORNTON for further information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient understanding of Category 1 response criteria for hanging incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “The level of training and understanding of relevant call handling procedures and processes by those employed as call handlers in relation to incidents concerning hanging: 1 The procedures direct a Category 1 response (7 minutes) when the person has the means to suspend themselves and has stated that is there present intention. The call handler believes that a Category 1 response is, "When they are going to die now". 2 The procedures direct that when the call handler does not have all relevant information they should telephone the person and ask questions in relation to the person's present situation. The call handler was on the Isle of Wight. THORNTON was in Southsea. The call handler did not call THORNTON as she felt she was too remote (geographically). ”

    Source location

    Lucy Ann THORNTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Request national review of whether Category 1 disposition is appropriate for patients threatening to hang themselves.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This incident and your Prevention of Future Deaths report will be formally reported to the national NHS Pathways group. It has also been raised at the National Heads of Emergency Operations Centre meeting, with a request that existing pathways be reviewed to consider whether a Category 1 disposition is appropriate in such circumstances.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory refresher training and updated materials on suicidal-patient call management, escalation, response categories, information gathering, and risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additional training has been introduced for all call handlers to reinforce the appropriate management of calls involving suicidal patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with national bodies to strengthen guidance and NHS Pathways for risks involving suicidal patients and potential hanging.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust remains fully committed to learning from this incident and to strengthening its systems and processes to reduce the risk of similar occurrences in the future. We will continue to work with national bodies to ensure that guidance and NHS Pathways appropriately reflect the risks associated with suicidal patients, including those involving potential hanging.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National NHS Pathways bodies are responsible for deciding whether Category 1 responses are appropriate for potential hanging incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At present, there is no NHS Pathways outcome that results in a Category 1 response for a patient threatening to hang themselves, even where means are present. A Category 1 response is only triggered where a patient is actively in the process of hanging.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

    Open published response
  7. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Ali Hussain · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Ali Hussain died on 16 May 2025 at Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham, from complicated appendicitis with perforation, peritonitis, severe intra-abdominal sepsis and multiple organ failure. The report identifies missed opportunities to recognise worsening illness and sepsis and to arrange face-to-face assessment, particularly on 14 May 2025. Concerns include unreliable handling and transfer of clinical information, unclear Category 3 ambulance-call criteria, and inadequate communication with families.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient skills among non-clinicians to safely transfer Category 3 calls to NEMS

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Category 3 calls are viewed by non- clinicians at the EMAS Emergency Operations Centre, who do not have sufficient skills to safely transfer calls to NEMS, as the inclusion/exclusion criteria are open to interpretation 5. There is no agreement between EMAS and NEMS as to the criteria for transfer of a category 3 call, including whether or not a previous clinical validation would preclude transfer to NEMS ”

    Source location

    Adam Ali Hussain · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require clinicians to review available information and make all Category 3 transfers through a clinical-only process, ending manual pushes to NEMS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Historically, non-clinical staff reviewed Category 3 calls in the EOC, creating risk where inclusion and exclusion criteria required clinical interpretation. To address this, in January 2026, EMAS implemented a significant change to operational practice:”

    Source location

    Response from East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The manual push pathway will remain paused, with no reinstatement planned while agreed safety actions remain incomplete.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have ensured the manual push remains paused and there are no plans for reinstatement of this pathway at this point in time, as not all actions agreed have been completed. Several codes that were being automatically transferred to NEMS by EMAS have also ceased since December 2025 and we are in the process of reviewing these with other similar services across the East Midlands to assess whether they should be removed on a larger scale.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns other than concern three are better addressed by EMAS, NEMS and Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We consider that the third concern listed above falls within NHS England’s remit and we have endeavoured to address this concern below. The remaining concerns would be better addressed by EMAS, NEMS and Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board (ICB), who have also been sent your Report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response
  8. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jake Kieran Hartwright · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jake Kieran Hartwright developed severe illness associated with bowel ischaemia and had a cardiac arrest at home on 16 January 2025. He died at Queens Medical Centre in the early hours of 17 January 2025 from multiple organ failure secondary to extensive bowel ischaemia. The report identified serious issues in the urgent care pathway, including missed opportunities to arrange a Category 2 ambulance and problems with clinical information transfer and management of Category 3 calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient skills among non-clinicians to safely transfer Category 3 calls to NEMS

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Category 3 calls are viewed by non- clinicians at the EMAS Emergency Operations Centre, who do not have sufficient skills to safely transfer calls to NEMS, as the inclusion/exclusion criteria are open to interpretation ”

    Source location

    Jake Kieran Hartwright · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Keep the manual push pathway paused pending completion of all agreed safety actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have ensured the manual push remains paused and there are no plans for reinstatement of this pathway at this point in time, as not all actions agreed have been completed. Several codes that were being automatically transferred to NEMS by EMAS have also ceased since December 2025 and we are in the process of reviewing these with other similar services across the East Midlands to assess whether they should be removed on a larger scale.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review automatic transfer codes with comparable East Midlands services to assess whether wider removal is appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have ensured the manual push remains paused and there are no plans for reinstatement of this pathway at this point in time, as not all actions agreed have been completed. Several codes that were being automatically transferred to NEMS by EMAS have also ceased since December 2025 and we are in the process of reviewing these with other similar services across the East Midlands to assess whether they should be removed on a larger scale.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    End manually pushed calls and route referrals through Directory of Services or automated ITK pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NEMS confirms that it has not continued with manually pushed calls since 3rd December 2025. Prior to 27th June 2025, Category 3 calls assessed by EMAS as potentially suitable for management within the Urgent Care Coordination Hub (UCCH) were at times manually pushed to NEMS. In practice, this meant that an EMAS Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) colleague would transfer a case directly into the NEMS clinical queue, based on the agreed inclusion and exclusion criteria at that time.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham Emergency Medical Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen governance, clinical oversight and operational boundaries for urgent care pathway referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the evidence unfolded during the inquest, it became clear that the manual push model had the unintended consequence of positioning NEMS in a role more akin to an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), rather than functioning as an urgent care provider operating within a clearly defined admission avoidance model. This was neither aligned with national GIRFT (Get it Right First Time) guidance nor consistent with the intended purpose of an Urgent Care Coordination Hub. GIRFT describes UCCHs as a single point of access supporting admission avoidance, coordinating community-based responses and enabling ambulance crews to access alternatives to conveyance. Since this time, we have strengthened our governance arrangements to ensure clear operational boundaries, robust clinical oversight, and full alignment with urgent primary care guidelines, thereby preventing a recurrence of this situation.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham Emergency Medical Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require clinicians to review available information and make all Category 3 transfers through the clinical push model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Historically, non-clinical staff reviewed Category 3 calls in the EOC, creating risk where inclusion and exclusion criteria required clinical interpretation. To address this, in January 2026, the Trust implemented a significant change to operational practice:”

    Source location

    Response from East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about the urgent care pathway, CAD information, Category 3 call handling and transfer criteria should be addressed by EMAS, NEMS and the ICB.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We consider that the third concern listed above falls within NHS England’s remit and we have endeavoured to address this concern below. The remaining concerns would be better addressed by EMAS, NEMS and Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board (ICB), who have also been sent your Report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2026

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Bates · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lewis Bates was reported missing after leaving his mother and stepfather’s house, having previously expressed an intention to end his life if he could not see his children. His body was found approximately two hours and 21 minutes after the missing-persons report. Concerns included the absence of guidance for call handlers about reasonable enquiries, advice to contact healthcare providers, and apparent confusion about the applicable police response process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to correctly distinguish between missing-person reporting and the Right Person Right Care initiative

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Having considered the audio recording and transcript of the 999 call with the utmost care, I am concerned that the call handler appears confused as to whether she was dealing with the call as a missing persons report or under the Right Person Right Care initiative. I am concerned such confusion was a relevant factor in the appropriate police response to the 999 call not being provided on this occasion. ”

    Source location

    Lewis Bates · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Missing Person and RCRP policies, consult stakeholders, and progress senior-officer sign-off to clarify their distinction and reduce operational confusion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP will conduct a full review of both the Missing Person and RCRP policies to identify areas of overlap and potential confusion. Following this review and wherever appropriate:”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver enhanced call-handler and supervisor training on vulnerability assessment, complex cases, escalation decisions, and supervisory quality assurance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Rather than imposing rigid lists, GMP will strengthen decision-making through enhanced training and guidance for call handlers. This will include:”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the FCCO Sherlock guidance system with revised instructions for distinguishing Missing Person and RCRP procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alongside the re-publication of amended policies, the Public Protection Division will work closely with the Force Contact, Crime and Operations (FCCO) Branch to ensure that revised guidance is made available to all call handlers and their supervisors. This will be delivered to respective teams and police staff via additional training. This measure is designed to prevent any further confusion and ensure consistency in decision-making.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 December 2025

    Open published response
  10. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Elaine TARBUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elaine TARBUCK died after an accidental fall at home, sustaining a head injury and exsanguinating before she was found unresponsive on 29 March 2025. The report identified concerns about the assessment and information gathering by emergency services, delays in arranging forced entry, and the application of the ‘Right Care, Right Person’ policy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Sub-optimal information gathering and evaluation of emergency category

    Wider context from the report

    “5. There was accepted sub-optimal information gathering and evaluation of the category of this emergency with an example of poor training resulting in inappropriate language being used by a call handler. ”

    Source location

    Elaine TARBUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately evaluate concern-for-welfare emergencies requiring forced entry

    Wider context from the report

    “3. In fact, calls to the non-emergency 101 and 999 emergency lines evaluated that this was a non-critical emergency and a presumed medical event. This created a significant delay before it was appreciated that entry would need to be forced and the Fire and Rescue Service were requested to attend. ”

    Source location

    Elaine TARBUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver targeted training briefs on Concern for Welfare criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response, a number of collaborative measures have been implemented to address this issue and strengthen inter-agency working. These include:”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Host GMP supervisor and manager visits to the NWAS control room to observe triage and decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response, a number of collaborative measures have been implemented to address this issue and strengthen inter-agency working. These include:”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update national RCRP guidance to clarify risk assessment and address emerging learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College is reviewing the RCRP toolkit to ensure it provides clearer guidance on the assessment of risk in control rooms, including how to handle ambiguous or borderline cases where the threshold for police attendance may not be immediately clear.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide continuing THRIVE training, refresher training and monitoring to improve risk assessment and decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Relevant staff have received additional training around the THRIVE model to ensure consistent and effective risk assessment and decision-making across all RCRP-related incidents. Initial THRIVE training was delivered to all staff between August 2023 and February 2024, and all new staff continue to receive THRIVE training as part of their induction. This model underpins GMP’s approach to prioritising incidents and allocating resources, ensuring that responses are proportionate, appropriate, and aligned with the principles of RCRP. Where audit findings identify issues with the application of THRIVE assessments, staff are required to undertake refresher training and are subsequently monitored and supported to ensure compliance and a clear understanding of the model.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 9 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish enhanced FCCO scrutiny, performance audits, dip sampling, performance plans and dashboard monitoring for RCRP compliance and signposting accuracy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As such, a number of measures have been implemented to address these concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 8 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and test an upgraded RCRP assessment tool integrating thematic pathways and presenting relevant guidance during questioning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support improved information gathering a new RCRP assessment tool was developed in early 2025. This new assessment tool was developed with the aim of supporting call handlers to better navigate the often-complicated nature of CFW calls and their interdependencies with other areas of business. This new assessment tool is currently undergoing testing within the FCCO.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 8 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and amend the existing RCRP assessment tools, including question wording, ordering and NWAS definitions, to improve information gathering and risk identification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst testing of the new RCRP assessment tool is ongoing, GMP’s RCRP project team is currently reviewing the current assessment tool to ascertain if amendment can be made to better support call handlers in understanding the nature of concern and to ensure they are professionally curious when managing CFW calls. This work is currently focusing on the wording and order of the question scripts as well as considering whether further questions can be added to the assessment tool to improve service delivery.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 9 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor the impact of RCRP and refine guidance using operational feedback and case reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The intent of RCRP is to ensure individuals received the most appropriate care from the most appropriate agency. However, we understand the concerns and recognise that its implementation must be sensitive to the nuances of real-world emergencies. The College continues to monitor the impact of RCRP and is committed to refining the guidance based on operational feedback and case reviews such as this.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and operate the RCRP policy and partner-agency pathways for assessing concern-for-welfare calls and directing responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP’s RCRP project was developed under the oversight of Greater Manchester’s Deputy Mayor. Each thematic response pathway was agreed prior to launch with relevant partners including (but not limited to) local authorities, health services (including NWAS) and mental health service providers. RCRP was launched in Greater Manchester on the 30th September 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS requires a confirmed location and clear medical need before deploying an ambulance under its Concern for Welfare procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst it is acknowledged that, in the case of Ms Tarbuck, NWAS did deploy a resource following a call made to us, it is important to note that this deployment was not in line with our current procedures for Concern for Welfare incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Despite inadequate questioning, signposting the caller to NWAS was consistent with Right Care, Right Person principles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is acknowledged that the questioning and identification of risk was sub-optimal, meaning there was insufficient evidence or good reason to confirm either a location or a physical health need (both of which are required deployment criteria for NWAS). As the caller and Mrs Tarbuck’s daughter believed she had indeed fallen and/or was deceased within her home address, however, further questioning by the police call handler would likely have identified the evidence to support the notion that NWAS was the most appropriate emergency agency to attend to address a medical concern. As as such, the advice to contact NWAS was in line with RCRP principles.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS is not the expected primary responder to welfare calls involving no confirmed medical need, given its ambulance function.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• As an ambulance service, NWAS’s primary function is to prioritise and respond to the medical needs of patients, whether this is face-to-face or via other methods, therefore, it is not expected primary response for those who have no medical need to require our assistance.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS is responsible for remotely assessing physical-health concerns and ordinarily providing the appropriate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP are not the most appropriate agency to respond to physical health matters. Call Handlers are trained to use the RCRP assessment tool which assists them in identifying whether an incident involves a real and immediate risk to life or risk of serious harm, but they are not trained to triage physical health concerns or identify a suitable operational response to such concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 July 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026