Recurring concern

Failure of ambulance information systems to transfer safety-critical clinical and operational information

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First reported 17 Apr 2014•Latest report 18 Jun 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated ambulance-service information-transfer process where clinically important information from callers, hospitals, NHS 111, GPs or other relevant services is not conveyed to ambulance crews or treating clinicians in time for safe decision-making.

Not included

  • Excludes failures concerning information that is not clinically or operationally material to ambulance decision-making or patient transfer.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, documentation or communication deficiencies that are not explicitly tied to the ambulance information-transfer process.
  • Excludes delays caused solely by hospital bed capacity, ambulance handover congestion or response-resource shortages when no information-transfer failure is identified.
  • Excludes failures in unrelated hospital, social-care or mental-health information systems.
Reports
12

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
13

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
12

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
Department of Health and Social Care2
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
College of Policing1
Devon & Cornwall Police1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Essex Police1
First Aid Cover Ltd1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee1
Medequip Assistive Technology Limited1
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence1
National Police Chiefs’ Council1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
NHS England1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Charlotte Louise ALDERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Charlotte Louise Alderson became seriously unwell from 17 December 2022 and died on 21 December 2022 after a rapidly progressing beta haemolytic streptococcus infection led to septic shock and multi-organ failure. Concerns were raised about the differing outcomes produced by the CENTOR and FEVERPAIN scoring systems, the need for improved tools to identify sepsis or risk of sepsis early, and failures of the NHS Interoperability Toolkit handover between 111 and 999 services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Interoperability toolkit for information handover between 111 and 999 services

    Wider context from the report

    “c. During the course of the evidence presented at this Inquest, the Court heard that the Interoperability toolkit (ITK) used to handover information between 111 and 999 services will on occasions fail, requiring the manual backup of a telephone call. This was identified as a national issue which, although not frequent, when it occurs carries a significant risk of critical information not being passed due to human error. I am concerned that in such circumstances the manual backup is not adequate and there is a risk that significant information is not passed thereby increasing a risk to life. ”

    Source location

    Charlotte Louise ALDERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manual transfer of information from 111 to 999 mitigates patient-safety risks when the electronic interoperability transfer fails.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, you raised concerns regarding system failures of the Interoperability toolkit (ITK) when transferring incident information from 111 to 999 and the associated risks to patient safety. The ITK is an interoperability standard, which sets out how information is securely exchanged from 111 and 999 and was introduced to speed up this transfer. The established procedure for transferring”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response
  2. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Marta Elena Vento · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marta Elena Vento was working alone as a hotel receptionist in Bournemouth when she was fatally beaten in an unprovoked attack on 9 December 2020. The report raises concerns about the sharing of remand prisoners’ risk information with sentencing courts, continuity of mental healthcare after release from prison, risk assessment of violent offenders managed by MOSOVO units, and access to patient information through the National Record Locator.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of National Record Locator access for South West ambulance care in Dorset

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was given by the Head of Clinical Development and Organisational Development at South West Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust (SWAST) that in the South West region all Integrated Care Boards (ICBs), apart from the ICB in Dorset, NHS Dorset, are at some stage of implementing the use of NRL so that SWAST can access this information to assist in the provision of care to those they treat. Evidence was given that as this would limit the information SWAST had access to about a patient in Dorset, this would impact upon the care provided to those in Dorset by SWAST which could lead to a future death. ”

    Source location

    Marta Elena Vento · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue participating in regional and national work to adopt National Record Locator information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Dorset and the Dorset Care Record (DCR) Partnership are involved in the regional and national work to adopt sharing information via the National Recorder Locator and were in fact founding members of the One South West Programme. This is a complex area and although a number of ICSs in the South-West are making progress, there is much work to be done. The issue is not as simple as suggested, and the current focus of the work across the One South West programme is supporting ambulance crews to access care plans supporting patients with frailty and palliative care. The One South West programme would need to expand their activity significantly to also support the sharing of mental health care plans. We would actively support the expansion of this work.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish Dorset Care Record capability to share information through the National Record Locator and begin sharing records with other services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Meanwhile in the absence of this capability DCR is looking to have the technical capability to share information with others using NRL from March 2026 onwards. Currently our system supplier has not been able to deliver this capability. Importantly, this will meet the national deadline set by NHS England, which is important because the benefit of using a single system to share is enjoyed when all parties are consistent. Shortly after this, DCR will then start sharing records to others using NRL, which will mean that SWASFT can access the data through this method.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with Dorset Healthcare to transfer its information into the Dorset Care Record during 2025.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The DCR partnership is continuing to work with Dorset Healthcare to share their information to DCR in 2025, another critical part of the solution. This has been highlighted as an urgent area of focus for the Dorset Healthcare team.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The allegations about NHS Dorset’s involvement in National Record Locator work are not factually accurate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to point out that some of the allegations made are not factually accurate regarding the involvement of Dorset ICB in addressing the issues of connection to the National Record Locator.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The system supplier has not delivered the technical capability needed to share Dorset Care Record information through the National Record Locator.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Meanwhile in the absence of this capability DCR is looking to have the technical capability to share information with others using NRL from March 2026 onwards. Currently our system supplier has not been able to deliver this capability. Importantly, this will meet the national deadline set by NHS England, which is important because the benefit of using a single system to share is enjoyed when all parties are consistent. Shortly after this, DCR will then start sharing records to others using NRL, which will mean that SWASFT can access the data through this method.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Dorset Healthcare must share mental health care plans, while SWASFT must improve ambulance-crew uptake of its existing information-sharing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although this technical capability is essential, there are other critical requirements, including that Dorset Healthcare NHS Trust shares the mental health care plans (and other data), and that SWASFT themselves make sure that their existing system has a significantly improved uptake by their ambulance crews.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    SWASFT’s prioritisation of the National Record Locator approach has delayed delivery of direct Dorset Care Record access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Dorset remain keen to work with SWASFT to enable access to Dorset Care Record directly, which is a possibility today, meaning that SWASFT personnel could access all the information held on our ICS shared care record (DCR). However, SWASFT have prioritised the NRL approach to sharing data, meaning that the delivery is pushed back.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Solutions to information visibility across system partners lie with multiple organisations rather than solely within the Integrated Care Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, it is recognised that this is not the first Prevention of Future Deaths notice that has been issued where the lack of visibility/accessibility of important information across system partners has been raised. The solutions to this lie across different partner organisations and not within the ICB. In order to ensure that there is active scrutiny of this area and to ensure that progress is being made a risk has been opened on the system risk register where all system partners have a role in ensuring active mitigation of any ongoing risk.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Dorset ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 March 2025

    Open published response
  3. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Lachlan Charles Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lachlan Charles Campbell died on 1 November 2022 after being found outside a railway station in a distressed and possibly drug-affected state, where he remained for several hours in heavy rain and cold conditions. The report identifies concerns about delays in ambulance attendance, incomplete information sharing between ambulance and police services, and police officers not providing shelter, warmth, or timely medical attention. The inquest concluded that these failures contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain and share complete contact information for ambulance disposition decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Information sharing between SWAST and D&CP. A number of issues were revealed during the course of the evidence. a) A concern for welfare call was received by police at circa 00:15. Officers attended on scene at circa 01:00 and chased an ambulance at 01:42 only to find one had not been previously called resulting in an initial delay of nearly 1.5 hours. b) The initial caller had been a bus driver. His mobile details were not taken and so SWAST was unable to call him back for further information they required. When police officers were asked for their numbers, they provided their shoulder numbers, not their mobile numbers. SWAST thus had incomplete information when considering what disposition was appropriate. c) Police Officers were advised the call had resulted in a Category 2 disposition but were not provided with an ETA. The target time was 18 minutes but an ambulance did not arrive until 06:15, some 4.5 hours later. Had Officers been aware of the likely delays, their evidence was that they would have considered other options (such as conveying Lachlan to hospital in their car.) d) In reaching a Category 2 disposition, SWAST understood the Officers were remaining with Lachlan. In the event, they left him to deal with an unresolved domestic violence incident. At inquest, evidence was given that, had this been known to SWAST, a Category 1/2 disposition may have been reached. e) In the event Officers had concluded there was a need to convey Lachlan to hospital, it would have meant there were no available Officers in the Penzance area. While this is a matter for police to reflect upon, it was notable the Officers’ supervisor was not contacted to discuss options. f) The inquest heard that in other countries (USA) there are arrangements in place for police to drop victims in need of urgent treatment at hospital (eg stabbings) without being detained for extended periods (current handover for ambulance crews in excess of 2 hours.) If ambulance delays are set to continue and police may need increasingly to convey patients to hospital, is there value in considering whether arrangements of this nature would be beneficial? ”

    Source location

    Lachlan Charles Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train SWAST control-room staff to obtain accurate contact and incident information during calls with police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both the police and SWAST control room staff are trained to ensure that they have asked for and received accurate information in the course of any calls held with one another. In the future this will ensure that that SWAST have a contact number for the scene of the incident.”

    Source location

    Response from South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require officers using the police control room to explain why they cannot call 999 directly, and train police and ambulance personnel to record relevant information when liaising.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If our officers call for an ambulance through the police control room, they are asked if there is a reason that they cannot do this themselves (such as the need to commence CPR, or other environmental factors). Police control room and SWAST personnel are trained to record all relevant information when contacting or otherwise liaising with SWAST.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon and Cornwall Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2025

    Open published response
  4. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Douglas ARMSTRONG · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Douglas ARMSTRONG had an unwitnessed fall at home on 16 December 2023 and sustained a fractured neck of femur that was not identified by care agency responders or a district nurse. His hospital arrival and likely surgery were delayed by around 18 hours, and he died in hospital on 5 January from aspiration pneumonia resulting from the injury. The principal concern was that responders may lack the skills, knowledge, training, or communication needed to identify such injuries or recognise when further assessment is required.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate the limits of responders' diagnostic ability to ambulance services

    Wider context from the report

    “Following his fall at home the Deceased was visited by two representatives of the care agency. They did not appreciate that he had suffered a fractured neck of femur. They placed more reliance than was justified upon his assertion that he had not hurt himself and was not in pain. The information supplied during their verbal communication with the ambulance service did not result in the latter appreciating the need for a personal attendance or visual assessment. Fractured neck of femur is a common consequence of falls in the elderly and requires prompt attention. Those providing a response system should have the skills, knowledge and training necessary to identify the problem or to appreciate that they cannot do so, and to communicate the limits of their diagnostic ability to the ambulance service. I was told that the responders acted in accordance with their existing training and have had no additional training since these events, nor was I told that any is planned. I am concerned that responders attending a similar call might be unable to assist effectively and would appreciate their employers addressing this by considering whether opportunities exist to improve the situation. ”

    Source location

    Douglas ARMSTRONG · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Regan Smith died at Kings College Hospital on 31 January 2023 after previously undiagnosed diabetes led to severe metabolic acidosis, multiorgan failure and acute liver failure. An abnormal blood glucose reading obtained by ambulance staff was not effectively handed over or recorded at hospital, resulting in his discharge without further glucose testing or treatment. The report identifies concerns about incompatible information systems, reliance on verbal handover during a period of high acuity, and the absence of national standards for emergency department handovers and confirmation of basic observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of directly compatible ambulance and hospital IT systems for immediate availability of clinical information

    Wider context from the report

    “The information to save Regan’s life (his abnormal blood glucose reading) was in the possession of the NHS at a time when lifesaving treatment could have been given to him on the 25th January 2023. Regan’s death occurred as the result of an identifiable single point of failure (the ineffective handover process), as this led to a significant and known clinical finding being unavailable to his treating clinicians. Evidence heard that the handover system in Regan’s case was reliant on both ambulance and Accident and Emergency personnel making and receiving a verbal handover. The IT systems used by the Ambulance and Hospital Trusts are not directly compatible, and therefore clinical information (such as blood glucose level test results) are not immediately available to hospital personnel in every case. It was heard that Regan’s verbal only handover occurred during a period of very high acuity. On the 25th January 2023 the unit was exceptionally busy, the staff there had a high number of other sick children to care for, there was no cubicle space available, and the staff had not been able to take any of their scheduled breaks. When Regan did see a clinician, it was in the corridor. It was heard in evidence that there was no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, in relation to the conduct of patient handovers at Accident and Emergency Units. In addition, there is no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, to ensure basic observations are confirmed as being received by the receiving Accident and Emergency personnel. ”

    Source location

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient handover processes to ensure significant clinical findings are available to receiving clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “The information to save Regan’s life (his abnormal blood glucose reading) was in the possession of the NHS at a time when lifesaving treatment could have been given to him on the 25th January 2023. Regan’s death occurred as the result of an identifiable single point of failure (the ineffective handover process), as this led to a significant and known clinical finding being unavailable to his treating clinicians. Evidence heard that the handover system in Regan’s case was reliant on both ambulance and Accident and Emergency personnel making and receiving a verbal handover. The IT systems used by the Ambulance and Hospital Trusts are not directly compatible, and therefore clinical information (such as blood glucose level test results) are not immediately available to hospital personnel in every case. It was heard that Regan’s verbal only handover occurred during a period of very high acuity. On the 25th January 2023 the unit was exceptionally busy, the staff there had a high number of other sick children to care for, there was no cubicle space available, and the staff had not been able to take any of their scheduled breaks. When Regan did see a clinician, it was in the corridor. It was heard in evidence that there was no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, in relation to the conduct of patient handovers at Accident and Emergency Units. In addition, there is no national protocol, no national standard operating procedures, and no National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance, to ensure basic observations are confirmed as being received by the receiving Accident and Emergency personnel. ”

    Source location

    Regan Edwin James SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop IT support linking ambulance and emergency department systems to improve electronic clinical information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The rapid exchange of clinical information verbally remains an integral part of communication. However, work is ongoing with NHSE to provide IT support that can deliver improved sharing of electronic information across systems. Linking the ambulance computer aided despatch system and electronic patient record collected by ambulance services with emergency departments data will provide better information about the patient journey.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out an ambulance dataset linking ambulance-service and emergency-department data through the emergency care data set.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, to support learning and system improvement, an ambulance data set is also currently being rolled out across England. This will be achieved by linking patient data collected by ambulance services with data collected by emergency departments through the emergency care data set.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local process improvements and ambulance information systems provide an adequate response to clinical handover and patient-record concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the formal clinical handover of patients, there are a number of protocols that should be followed. This includes standards set out by the General Medical Council on how patient information should be shared, and the NHS standard contract which sets out targets on handover delays. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of protocols across England is at a local level. I understand that ESNEFT submitted evidence during the inquest which set out actions being taken locally to improve processes which you have considered and were content with. EEAST advise that in the East of England, all hospital A&Es have information systems to provide records of patients arriving by ambulance and that they are ensuring that ambulance patient care records are available as part of the assessment of patients who arrive at A&E by ambulance.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implementation and oversight of clinical handover protocols across England are the responsibility of local organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding the formal clinical handover of patients, there are a number of protocols that should be followed. This includes standards set out by the General Medical Council on how patient information should be shared, and the NHS standard contract which sets out targets on handover delays. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of protocols across England is at a local level. I understand that ESNEFT submitted evidence during the inquest which set out actions being taken locally to improve processes which you have considered and were content with. EEAST advise that in the East of England, all hospital A&Es have information systems to provide records of patients arriving by ambulance and that they are ensuring that ambulance patient care records are available as part of the assessment of patients who arrive at A&E by ambulance.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 September 2024

    Open published response
  6. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Sharon Louise Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sharon Louise Kelly, who had a long history of mental health and alcohol problems and frequent suicide attempts, informed a family member that she would kill herself on the anniversary of her baby son’s death. On 27 June 2019, an ambulance attended her property but did not enter while awaiting delayed police attendance; when services eventually entered, Ms Kelly was deceased. The concerns included delays and communication between ambulance and police services, risk assessment and police response procedures, and arrangements for urgent mental health assessments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of sufficiently clear EEAS training on communicating relevant recorded information to ambulance crews for dynamic risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “Whether there is sufficiently clear training at EEAS in relation to (1) identifying relevant flag markers to ensure police attendance at a property where appropriate and 2) communicating relevant information from relevant records to ambulance crews to ensure that dynamic risk assessments take place on the basis of all relevant information (in light of decision making and delays on 27 June 2019) ”

    Source location

    Sharon Louise Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Aston Neil McLean · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    In the early hours of 6 August 2014, Aston Neil McLean was pursued by Thames Valley Police and was trapped underneath an armed response vehicle after a collision. Ambulance staff declared him deceased at the scene, but subsequent evidence indicated that the vehicle could likely have been lifted within 4½ minutes and that he may have survived if it had been lifted soon after the collision. The principal concerns relate to guidance on recognising life extinct, declaring death where extraction is delayed or difficult, defining “similar massive injuries”, and ensuring ambulance crews have relevant information from local fire services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance crews to have relevant information about fire service vehicle-lifting equipment

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) It was clear from the evidence in this case that the crew attending did not know that the fire service had equipment which would have enabled them to lift the vehicle off Aston within a short space of time. This could clearly form an important part of key decision making at scenes like this. I invite you to consider incorporating within your guidelines the recommendation that local ambulance services should obtain relevant information from their local fire service on this point, and include this in local guidance. ”

    Source location

    Aston Neil McLean · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón died while performing as a Mexican wrestler at a Lucha Libre event. After he lost consciousness and suffered cardiac arrest, there were delays in recognising the emergency, summoning assistance, starting CPR and providing effective resuscitation. The report also identified inadequate event briefing, unclear emergency roles and procedures, communication difficulties, delayed ambulance access, and a confused handover to ambulance staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide a competent handover to ambulance services

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The handover to LAS was confused, with mixed messages as to whether the automated external defibrillator had delivered a shock or not. No person took charge of a competent handover to LAS. ”

    Source location

    César Cuauhtémoc González Barrón · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Hall, a six-year-old boy, became acutely unwell on 23 October 2017 and died in the early hours of 24 October 2017 after developing meningococcal septicaemia. The report identified concerns about NHS 111 disposition information not being transferred to ambulance and treating clinicians, delays in ambulance availability information, and conflicting guidance about the significance of his heart rate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer the NHS 111 Service’s original disposition information to ambulance crews and treating clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “1. It is apparent that there is a failure in the process of the transfer information regarding a patient's original disposition by the NHS 111 Service to the ambulance service and the treating clinicians on the ground. In Oliver’s case a non-clinician NHS Pathway Advisor using the NHS Pathway algorithms identified a ‘severe illness and a rash suggestive of septicaemia’ following a 5-minute phone call with his mother. As identified at inquest meningococcal septicaemia was Oliver’s actual cause of death and the NHS 111 Service identified this as a possible risk at 13.00, some 5 hours 45 minutes before it was diagnosed by a medical clinician. In response to their algorithms the NHS 111 Service implemented a disposition of ‘emergency ambulance response for septicaemia’ and an automatic referral was made to the 999 service. This disposition and a ‘severe illness and a rash suggestive of septicaemia’ were included in the information transferred to the East of England Ambulance Service. However, it was then identified that the current East of England Ambulance Service system does not provide the ambulance crew (and therefore in this case subsequently the GP’s) with that information. The message made available to the crew simply read ‘headache/abdo-pain/fever- no access issues, patient not alone 38.8’. Both the ambulance crew and GP’s stated in their evidence that had they known the original disposition from the NHS 111 Service had been suggestive of septicaemia it would have informed their decision-making processes and may have changed their clinical management of Oliver. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult other ambulance trusts to share best practices and solutions for recording and transmitting patient disposition information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is currently in consultation with our colleagues in other UK Ambulance Trusts who use the same Computer Aided Dispatch system, some of which also use the same triage system (Pathways) as UK 111 providers.”

    Source location

    2019-0198-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft and issue dispatch instructions specifying pertinent information, including NHS 111 disposition descriptions, for transmission to attending resources.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this work is ongoing the Trust is drafting an instruction, which will be issued to all Dispatch staff, outlining the pertinent information that needs to be passed to attending resources. This will include for 111 calls the disposition description as determined by Pathways.”

    Source location

    2019-0198-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The organisation is not constituted to mandate or instruct individual ambulance services on local information-sharing processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To clarify, AACE is a private company owned by the English Ambulance NHS Trusts. It exists to provide ambulance services with a central organisation that supports, coordinates and implements nationally agreed policy. Our primary focus is the ongoing development of the English ambulance services and the improvement of patient care. We are a company owned by NHS organisations and possess the intellectual property rights of the JRCALC UK ambulance service clinical practice guidelines. AACE is not constituted to mandate or instruct ambulance service wherever we do have national influence via the regular meetings of ambulance Chief Executives and Trust Chairs along with a network of national specialist sub-groups.”

    Source location

    2019-0198-response-by-Association-of-Ambulance-Chief-Executives
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  10. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Williams underwent a procedure to remove an infected foot-surgery screw and later developed severe leg pain, bilateral paraesthesia, worsening back pain, and suspected cauda equina. There were delays in ambulance attendance and Emergency Department admission, and concerns about incorrect call triage, failure to escalate his worsening condition, and communication about an arranged admission bed. His condition deteriorated with sepsis, multi-organ failure and worsening heart failure, and he died on 26 January 2019.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate arranged admission-bed information to ambulance crews

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The amount of time taken for the ambulance to arrive which was markedly outside the Trust’s guidelines. (2) The failure by the call handler to both escalate Mr Williams worsening condition and her incorrect use of the haemorrhage algorithm. (3) When the ambulance transported Mr Williams to the NNUH he was kept on board the vehicle awaiting a space in the Emergency Department, despite a bed already arranged several hours before by the GP. This information was unknown to the crew and resulted in several hours delay in Mr Williams being investigated and treated which may have contributed to his death by sepsis. The Trust’s Business Continuity Manager was unaware until the inquest that the call handler had erred in failing to escalate and in using the wrong algorithm. He gave evidence that the Trust does not have an algorithm dealing with neurological deficit only a question asking if the patient is conscious. Given that Mr Williams had paraesthesia to both legs and the GP’s concerns about cauda equina this would seem to be a potentially dangerous gap in the Trust’s triaging system, placing patients at risk. In evidence the reasons given for the call handlers failure was that they did not know why she failed to escalate Mr Williams’ worsening condition and why she used the wrong algorithm and that the supplier of their IT software (the triage system), were reluctant to add a neurological algorithm, the reason for this is unclear. When asked the manager accepted that as the customer surely (the trust) could state that a neurological algorithm was necessary but merely that the supplier was reluctant. It is unknown why the paramedic crew were unaware of the arranged admission bed and the manager accepted in evidence that he had not made any enquiries about this, prior to inquest. Again, this failure in communication is one which I feel places other patients at risk of death and is unacceptable. This is not an isolated incident (death) and it appears that there are system failures within your organisation which should be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the CAD supplier to alter call duplication so pertinent destination information transfers into the active call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the initial call the HCP called and asked for the patient to be conveyed to the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital, the clinician requested for the patient to be taken to the Emergency Assessment Unit. When we received a 999 call from the property identifying that the patient’s condition had deteriorated the dispatcher allocated on the new call as it was of a higher priority, in line with 20180525 Ambulance System Indicators. Due to the dispatcher assigning to the new call it is apparent that information pertaining to the destination of the patient was omitted as the information is sent to the crew using data. We are in communications with the CAD supplier to make an alteration to the duplication process which would allow pertinent information to be transferred from the original call into the call which EEAST are “running on”.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require dispatch staff to transfer pertinent information manually into new calls until the technological solution is available.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having a technical solution will minimise risk of human error. As an interim arrangement we will ask all dispatch staff to ensure that any pertinent information of this kind is transferred into the new call, until there is a technological resolution in place.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share CAD information-recording and transmission best practice and solutions with other ambulance services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also working with our colleagues in other Ambulance Services who use the same CAD to share best practice and solutions with regards to how information is recorded and subsequently transmitted to attending resources.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026