Recurring concern

Failure to provide clinically required fluids

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First reported 9 Sep 2014•Latest report 7 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to provide, administer or maintain clinically required oral or intravenous fluids, including prolonged or repeated omissions and inadequate provision where the need for fluids is identified by the patient's condition, prescription or care plan.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to fluid-balance recording, review, electrolyte monitoring or escalation when fluid provision itself was adequate.
  • Excludes generic staffing, communication, documentation or bed-capacity deficiencies unless they directly result in failure to provide clinically required fluids.
  • Excludes failures concerning unrelated treatments, medicines or nutritional provision where fluids are not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes fluid restriction or withholding when it is clinically indicated and safely managed.
Reports
11

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
12

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
7

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Care Quality Commission1
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Hinchingbrooke Hospital1
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1
Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust1
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust1
York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Springall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Springall, who had a learning disability and was immunosuppressed, was taken to hospital with pneumonia and sepsis after being found unresponsive. She remained in an ambulance outside the emergency department for almost six hours amid exceptional pressures, and the report raises concern that delays in clinical assessment, blood testing and treatment may place similarly unwell patients at increased risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide timely intravenous fluids and antibiotics to ambulance-held patients with suspected infection

    Wider context from the report

    “My concern is that notwithstanding the hospital Trust seems to have made welcome improvements, patients such as Janet Springall remain at risk. The Trust continues to experience significant pressures due to patient numbers, and unwell patients continue to remain in ambulances for some time before they are able to access the emergency department. When a very unwell patient has to remain on an ambulance due to very high demands placed upon a hospital emergency department, believed by paramedics to have a life-threatening infection, then in the absence of a blood test and the timely administration of any necessary intravenous fluids and antibiotics, the chances of such a patient surviving can be significantly reduced by the time the patient is able to access the emergency department. Janet Springall was very unwell by the time she arrived at hospital and was likely to die. Any realistic prospect she may recover had subsided by around 7.30pm, some 2.5 hours after arrival at hospital. Other patients may not be as unwell as Janet was upon arrival at hospital, and may therefore have more chance of surviving, but they too may deteriorate significantly whilst remaining in the ambulance before it can be confirmed they have an infection and receive timely medical attention and treatment. I believe it is necessary for to raise this concern, but it is not for me to be prescriptive about what should / can be done. ”

    Source location

    Janet Springall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Care Quality Commission will provide a separate response to the concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and Blackpool Teaching Hospital NHS Trust to ensure we adequately address your concerns. CQC have advised they will be providing a separate response to your concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The internal review found no evidence that CQC advised the trust not to treat patients remaining on ambulances.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal review has found no evidence; written or verbal within our records that CQC advised the trust not to treat patients on ambulances. CQC remain committed to encouraging care services to improve by working with the trust and system partners to ensure that patients receive safe and timely care, including during periods of sustained operational pressure.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providing operational clinical advice about where or how specific patients should be treated falls outside CQC’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For clarity, CQC inspectors do not provide operational clinical advice to providers, including advice about how or where treatment should be delivered to specific patients. This is not within CQC remit, and inspection teams are trained to ensure that their role is to assess and report on the quality and safety of care, rather than to direct clinical practice. CQC recognises that informal conversations during inspections can sometimes lead to differing interpretations and CQC are committed to being as clear as possible about the limits of our role. However, CQC are unable to evidence that a conversation covering these issues took place during our inspection.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Joanne Louise STONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joanne Louise Stones, who had Anti-Phospholipid Syndrome and Addison’s Disease, was admitted with abdominal pain and diagnosed with acute cholecystitis with gallstones. Her condition deteriorated and she died in intensive care on 17 September 2023. Concerns included delays in prioritisation, treatment with fluids and antibiotics, recognition of her Addison’s Disease, and consideration of her underlying conditions in her treatment plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in administering fluids

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was delay in Joanne receiving fluids, which led to hypoglycaemia which was then not treated promptly. ”

    Source location

    Joanne Louise STONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adherence to existing Trust Sepsis guidance will ensure fluids are prioritised in unwell patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding giving fluids, adherence to the Trust Sepsis guidance will ensure that fluids are prioritised in unwell patients such as Ms Stones.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2025

    Open published response
  3. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Allan Arthur Watt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Allan Arthur Watt became increasingly unwell over several months and was ultimately admitted with an inoperable ischaemic bowel; he died on 20 September 2019. Concerns included delays in medical assessment after admission and a further delay before he received intravenous fluids and antibiotics. The report states that these delays may have denied him any chance of survival, although he may already have been too ill to survive on arrival.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in initiating prescribed intravenous fluids and antibiotic treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) Mr Watt arrived at A&E at 8pm, he was seen within an hour by a nurse practitioner and admission arranged. However after he got onto the ward at 2am he did not see a doctor to be clerked in until 10.30. Both Allan’s family and I as coroner felt this delay was unacceptable. (2)After Allan had been clerked in and IV fluid and antibiotic advised he did not receive an IV line or a first dose of antibiotic until 3pm –it was now 19 hours after he had arrived in A&E and in that period he had received no fluid or drug treatment. (3)Allan died at 18.45, evidence suggested that he may have been too ill to survive even at the time he arrived in the A&E department but I have no doubt that the want of timely assessment and treatment denied him any chance at all. It is my hope that attention to these concerns will indeed prevent future deaths at your hospital. ”

    Source location

    Allan Arthur Watt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID CRAIG KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Kerr was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and subsequently sustained a fractured neck of femur in a further ward fall after removing his oxygen. He became increasingly unwell and died on 27 April 2019; the inquest recorded accidental death, with respiratory failure and extensive idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis as the medical cause of death. Concerns included poor care on Ward D2, inadequate hydration and fluid recording, and too few clinical observations for a seriously unwell patient.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate provision of fluids to seriously unwell patients

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Between 24th and 26th April DK was allowed to become increasingly dehydrated; on 24th April he received a total of 300mls of fluid and the input/output chart was not filled in on 25th/26th April, despite the fact that he was seriously unwell. ”

    Source location

    DAVID CRAIG KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out a Trust-wide quality-improvement project covering hydration and nutrition using recognised improvement methodology.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, to ensure that learning is applied across the organisation, we have embarked on a Quality Improvement Project focussed on all aspects of hydration and nutrition. This will be supported by the transformation team using recognised quality improvement methodology to achieve rapid and sustainable change.”

    Source location

    2020-0100-Response-from-Stockport-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out a Trust-wide fundamental-care framework containing common nutrition and hydration standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, to ensure that learning is applied across the organisation, we have started the roll-out of a fundamental care framework across the Trust which includes common best practice standards for the management of nutrition and hydration.”

    Source location

    2020-0100-Response-from-Stockport-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The records showed positive, though declining, fluid balance, so the response disputes that the patient became increasingly dehydrated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Between 24th and 26th April 2019, Mr Kerr was allowed to become increasingly dehydrated; on 24th April he received a total of 300mls of fluid and the input/output chart was not filled in on 25th/26th April, despite the fact that he was seriously unwell.”

    Source location

    2020-0100-Response-from-Stockport-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response
  5. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Darren John Goddard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren John Goddard underwent an elective trans-rectal ultrasound of the prostate and subsequently developed sepsis, becoming acutely unwell and dying on 18 April 2019. The principal concerns included delayed recognition and treatment of sepsis, delays in triage, antibiotics, fluids and critical care, and the information provided about sepsis risks and symptoms following the procedure.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide timely and appropriate fluids

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) Subsequent failure to provide timely and appropriate fluids and antibiotics. ”

    Source location

    Darren John Goddard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide ongoing Sepsis training on the Sepsis 6 bundle and NEWS documentation, escalation and implementation to medical and nursing staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Further training of Triage nursing staff and doctors of the sepsis 6 bundle and”

    Source location

    2020-0060-Response-from-Dr-Hopkins-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2020

    Open published response
  6. South Yorkshire (West)

    AI-generated summary

    Joan Howard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joan Howard was admitted to hospital on 4 April 2019 with specialist dietary requirements and choked to death on 10 April 2019 after being given a sandwich that should not have been provided. The report identified failures to follow dietary guidance and hospital processes, act on information from her care home, provide appropriate fluids, and escalate concerns about inappropriate food. It found that neglect had contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of thickened fluids during outpatient appointments

    Wider context from the report

    “f) Joan was sent to an outpatient appointment with no thickener for fluids meaning that prior to her deterioration on the 9 April 2019 she had no access to fluids for the duration of her outpatient appointment and waiting. ”

    Source location

    Joan Howard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    For temporary transfers, existing host-ward responsibility, Electronic Whiteboard access and transfer policy address dietary-information communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to patients who are transferred from the ward temporarily, for example for an outpatient appointment or tests elsewhere within the Trust, it is accepted that inpatients remain the responsibility of the host ward in many aspects of their care, including nutrition and hydration. In addition, the outpatient or diagnostic area is able to access information from the EWB, to confirm or clarify the patient’s eating and drinking requirements. Our Patient Transfer Policy clarifies that the host ward must ensure up to date information about the patient is communicated to the receiving area to enable the immediate needs of the patient to be met on arrival.”

    Source location

    2021-0007-Response-from-Sheffield-Teaching-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    COVID-19 operational pressures prevent implementing all planned safety changes in the near future.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having outlined the actions we have agreed to take in response to this incident and to the PFD Report, I hope that I have been able to convey how seriously we have viewed this matter. Whilst we will be unable to implement all these changes in the near future, given the urgency of the situation in relation to COVID-19, we are absolutely committed to learning from Mrs Howard’s death and implementing the remaining actions at the earliest opportunity.”

    Source location

    2021-0007-Response-from-Sheffield-Teaching-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 January 2021

    Open published response
  7. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Julie MORREY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie MORREY died in Royal Stoke University Hospital on 10 January 2019 after presenting with renal failure and bronchopneumonia. The report raised concerns about inadequate communication between hospital departments, a lack of proactive nursing management, insufficient fluids for over 24 hours, and no senior clinician review during that period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide fluids during the patient's wait for a Renal Unit bed

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a clear lack of communication between the hospital departments as to which department was responsible for the patient after she was assessed by a renal specialist and a plan made for her care and whilst she awaited a bed on the Renal Unit during which time she was looked after on the AMU. During this time she was without fluids for over 24 hours. ”

    Source location

    Julie MORREY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ann Corfield was admitted to hospital with a urinary tract infection, low sodium levels and deteriorating mental health, later developing severe psychotic depression, poor oral intake and dehydration. She suffered a cardiac arrest and died after transfer between hospitals. Concerns included inadequate handover about anticoagulation, failure to administer prescribed prophylactic anticoagulation, poor completion of fluid balance charts, and the lack of suitably qualified staff to administer intravenous fluids at Park House.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff training to administer intravenous fluids in the psychiatric unit

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Further, I also heard evidence that the staff at Park House were not trained to administer intravenous fluids. This meant that Mrs Corfield had to be transferred to a North Manchester Hospital for intravenous fluids when she was in urgent need of specialist psychiatric care and treatment. I formed the view that ████████ was left extremely frustrated that he was unable to treat Mrs Corfield with intravenous fluids whilst she was a patient at Park House. ”

    Source location

    Ann Corfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN died on 7 June 2018 after presenting to A&E in a precarious state and later being found to have a perforated gastric ulcer. The report identified concerns about incomplete fluid monitoring, failure to administer prescribed potassium and sufficient intravenous fluids, missed ECG abnormalities, inadequate repeat blood testing, and delays in responding to her deterioration and providing planned treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide prescribed intravenous fluids

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) On the morning of the 7th at around 10.30 am. the attending Doctor wanted Mrs RAM-HENMAN to be given Cyclazine, intravenous fluids and for her to have a CT scan. None of this was achieved before her death two hours later. She should have at least received the intravenous fluids and the Cyclazine. Again it seems that at this stage there was a failure to realise that she had not been given the Potassium she had been written up for in A&E. ”

    Source location

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement prescribed intravenous fluid treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) An ECG was ordered which showed abnormalities likely associated with her low potassium level. This was not seen by the doctor who requested it. The signature on it is illegible. A second ECG should have been requested. It was not. She was written up for potassium in A&E as well as intravenous fluids but was given no potassium and only half a litre of intravenous fluids in her entire 24 hour admission. It was the view of the Doctors giving the evidence that she should have received at least four litres to deal with her depleted state. So instructions given within three to four hours of her arrival in A&E (at 12.12pm on 6/6/2018) were not implemented. Why not? ”

    Source location

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an Electronic Prescribing System to prevent recurrence of fluid and potassium administration problems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you will see, we have implemented a new SBAR telephone handover form (copy attached for reference) as part of the revision of the Emergency Department Safety Booklet. The form includes prompts for staff on drains and lines present, and medication issues. In the longer term, the implementation of an Electronic Prescribing System will ensure that the problems that”

    Source location

    2018-0306-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a Trust Safety Alert instructing staff to prescribe infusions in the normal drug-chart section rather than the once-only section.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SI investigation also showed that it has been habitual for some staff to use the “once-only” section of the drug prescription chart, when prescribing fluid/drug infusions. This section was designed to be used by ED clinicians who may need to prescribe antibiotics for patients with a suspected chest infection or who need pain relief, who are then discharged from ED. It is not appropriate to use this section for IV infusions and a Trust Safety Alert has been issued, instructing all staff not to use this section of the drug chart for infusions and that any such prescription should be completed in the normal section of the drug chart. A prompt will also be added to the front of the drug chart, reminding staff of this requirement.”

    Source location

    2018-0306-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a drug-chart front-page prompt reminding staff to prescribe infusions in the normal section.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SI investigation also showed that it has been habitual for some staff to use the “once-only” section of the drug prescription chart, when prescribing fluid/drug infusions. This section was designed to be used by ED clinicians who may need to prescribe antibiotics for patients with a suspected chest infection or who need pain relief, who are then discharged from ED. It is not appropriate to use this section for IV infusions and a Trust Safety Alert has been issued, instructing all staff not to use this section of the drug chart for infusions and that any such prescription should be completed in the normal section of the drug chart. A prompt will also be added to the front of the drug chart, reminding staff of this requirement.”

    Source location

    2018-0306-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 February 2019

    Open published response
  10. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Barry THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry Thompson, an insulin-dependent diabetic, died on 27 February 2016 while a patient on the Acute Medical Unit, after being admitted with sepsis from diabetic foot ulcers and hyperglycaemia. The report identified concerns about failure to provide insulin, fluids, adequate monitoring, antibiotics and medical review, as well as inaccurate and incomplete records and ineffective information sharing during transfer between departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of intravenous infusion delivery to provide the intended fluid dose

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Monitoring patients’ basic needs. There was difficulty encountered giving Mr Thompson saline by way of a drip. He was given an infusion of 1 litre over 4 hours at 17.30. At 23.00 it was found that the original cannula had become detached but the remaining fluid in the sac was 700mls. Mr Thompson’s bed was wet with saline fluid. He did not therefore receive the intended dose. He was not given a further injection of antibiotics 6 hours after the first nor was he written up for it. He was not given insulin. He does not appear to have been given any food whilst a patient or adequate fluid balance charts maintained. He was not seen by a doctor on the AMU. He was on a range of medication on admission to hospital for co-morbidities. The importance of this or otherwise was not assessed by staff. ”

    Source location

    Barry THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026