Recurring concern

Failure to provide continuity of patient care

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First reported 4 Sep 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the end-to-end patient-care continuity process, including unclear or unassigned responsibility, changing or excessive personnel, inadequate continuity between clinicians or services, and insufficient coordination that leaves care fragmented or without consistent oversight.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to a specific handover, record, referral or discharge control when continuity of patient care is not itself the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing shortages, workload or turnover concerns unless they directly result in failure to maintain continuity of patient care.
  • Excludes continuity failures in non-patient processes, such as equipment, premises or administrative workflows.
  • Excludes failures belonging to a more specific named safety system or pathway where that system is the supported parent boundary.
Reports
88

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
92

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care27
NHS England16
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Care Quality Commission3
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust3
North East London NHS Foundation Trust3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
King'S College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Janine Eugenie Pierrette KAISER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janine Eugenie Pierrette KAISER died at a nursing home on 21 October 2014 from lobar pneumonia, with suppurative cystitis, a sacral pressure ulcer, aortic stenosis, multiple myeloma and stroke also recorded. The principal concerns included missed turns, inaccurate or falsified records, inadequate pressure-mattress checks, poor recording of food and fluid intake, inadequate staff training and continuity, delayed referral to tissue viability nurses, and insufficient response to weight loss and safeguarding concerns. The inquest concluded that she died from significant natural disease, with a contributing sacral ulcer whose progress had been compromised by gaps in nursing care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor continuity of care staff

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was poor continuity of staff. ”

    Source location

    Janine Eugenie Pierrette KAISER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Tommy Faegh Faisali · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Tommy Faegh Faisali, who had hepatitis C causing cirrhosis and was methadone dependent, was found deceased in his accommodation on 30 September 2014. The inquest concluded that the medical causes of death included acute pulmonary oedema, methadone toxicity and liver failure due to cirrhosis, with the jury recording drug-related misadventure. Concerns included the lack of specialist psychiatric assessment despite GP referrals, inadequate risk assessment and documentation, and poor communication and continuity of care within mental health teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care in team-based mental health care

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) That staff within the mental health teams are not completing risk assessments or at least not appropriately documenting that they are. (5) That risks to patients, including risk of suicide is thus not appropriately communicated to other team members, thereby increasing the risks to those patients. (6) That risks arising from (5) are even more increased given the team approach to care and lack of continuity of care inherent in such ways of working. ”

    Source location

    Mr Tommy Faegh Faisali · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Barbara Mary Anne Mayer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barbara Mary Anne Mayer had a history of depression and was found drowned in a nearby pond on 16 November 2014 after leaving her house during the early hours. Concerns included carer fatigue not being followed up, lack of continuity in her care, treatments not being adequately discussed with her, and no urgent mental health assessment being available when she needed help on 14 November 2014.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide continuity of care

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Although seen regularly by the Crisis Team, Mrs Mayer was seen by a number of different people as a result of which no trusting relationship could be established. She had to repeat her history at each visit to a different person about personal details. ”

    Source location

    Barbara Mary Anne Mayer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment team functions, including ways to improve consistency of staff contact with service users.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment (CRHT) team provide a 24 hour service, assessing and supporting service users with intensive treatment for defined periods of time. It has a team of fifty staff supporting a significant number of people across a large geographical area. These factors mean that planning and coordinating consistent staff contact with a service user is a challenge.”

    Source location

    2015-0113-Response-by-Norfolk-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 March 2015

    Open published response
  4. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    James Paul COLTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Paul COLTON was a serving prisoner who became critically unwell on 29 August 2013 after a period of deteriorating health and died two days later in hospital. Concerns included failure to revisit his diagnosis or escalate treatment, inadequate analgesia, poor continuity and communication of care, and an extremely heavy workload affecting healthcare provision.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There appeared to be no continuity of care for Mr Colton, little or no adequate communication as between Healthcare nurses and doctors, and no coherent plan for his care. There appeared to be no appropriate review of Mr Colton's care or treatment. ”

    Source location

    James Paul COLTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign named nurses to inpatient patients and two nurses to each normal-location wing to improve continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise that in Mr Colton’s case there was a lack of continuity of care and I am able to notify you that every patient who is on the inpatient facility has a named nurse and this is identified on each cell door so that the discipline officers are also aware of the identity of the named nurse. For those individuals who are on normal location, there are two nurses assigned to each wing so that there is a greater continuity of care for all prisoners. There are also now regular nursing meetings to discuss individual patients that take place both in respect of physical and mental health patients.”

    Source location

    2015-0021-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2015

    Open published response
  5. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Matthew Holt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Matthew Holt had a history of serious self-harm attempts and died by an impulsive but deliberate act after taking an overdose that was not communicated to staff supervising his accommodation. The concerns included failure to provide intended treatment, failure of a referral process, lack of continuity and information-sharing, and insufficient consideration of risk, including that accommodation staff were unaware of his recent overdose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care caused by excessive involvement of different people

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Importantly, Mr Holt's parents described how too many people became involved in his care over a period preventing the necessary degree of continuity. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Matthew Holt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Philip Anthony Dean · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Philip Anthony Dean, who had chronic depressive illness and had become suicidal, jumped from Battersea Bridge into the River Thames on 13 August 2013 and died after being recovered and resuscitated. The principal concerns included inadequate continuity of care, discharge from the Home Treatment Team before psychology referral could be made, failure to record and communicate the GP’s concerns, insufficient assessment by medically qualified personnel, apparent under-resourcing, and an inadequate serious untoward incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient HHT funding for continuity of care and named designated workers

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the HHT is not sufficiently funded to allow continuity of care and named designated workers. ”

    Source location

    Mr Philip Anthony Dean · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commence a named-worker pilot for Home Treatment Team service users and review it after six months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Mental Health Implementation Guide suggests that HTT’s should provide a designated named worker, responsible for coordinating service users care, providing continuity of care, ensuring effective communication within the team and acting as a contact point for both service users and Carers. Although there are a number of practical issues that currently impact on the HTT’s ability to operate a system of designated workers, a pilot will be commenced, taking the learning from other HTT’s nationally, and reviewed in six months.”

    Source location

    2014-0172-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit nursing staff and increase the Wandsworth Home Treatment Team nursing establishment using allocated investment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of funding the HTT has been identified as being under resourced based on the expected number of contacts for the teams caseload and the number of crisis episodes which are expected to be completed per month. A Trust wide Acute Care Pathway Project, undertaken in March 2014 identified that Wandsworth HTT was under established by 3 Whole Time Equivalent (WTE) of nursing staff. Furthermore, the project identified that Wandsworth HTT took over the management of the Trust’s Crisis line in approximately 2009 without additional resource being provided equating to 2 additional WTE of nursing staff required. Medical staffing in HTT was not identified as a concern.”

    Source location

    2014-0172-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Temporary whole-team care coordination is the current arrangement for HTT service users without an existing Care Coordinator.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is committed to ensuring continuity of care for service users and although it is not within the Trust’s current Operational Policy for HTT’s to work with designated workers the policy does state that service users accepted for home treatment, who have been newly referred or re-referred to Mental Health Services and so do not have an existing Care Coordinator, will be temporarily care coordinated within the team, in the context of a whole team approach.”

    Source location

    2014-0172-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2014

    Open published response
  7. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Natasha Raghoo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Natasha Raghoo was admitted to The Dene Hospital in April 2012 for treatment related to bipolar disorder and was later detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act. She was found unresponsive in bed on 5 May 2012 and died from anaphylactic shock caused by an unknown allergen. Concerns included inconsistent physical observations, lack of ECG assessment, staff training in resuscitation and defibrillator use, and communication and handover problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear responsibility for stopping physical observations

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Physical observations of blood pressure, pulse and temperature were sporadic and few in number. This was cause for concern as Natasha had a raised blood pressure and had been commenced on treatment, Observations stopped two days prior to death and no member of staff was able to explain who was responsible for this action. ”

    Source location

    Natasha Raghoo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review, revise and reissue the observation policy, brief relevant staff, obtain responsibility acknowledgements, and audit implementation with spot checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lessons Learned and changes made”

    Source location

    2014-0100-Response-by-Partnership-in-Care
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 March 2014

    Open published response
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Stuart Irlam · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Stuart Irlam was suffering from severe depression and anxiety and had been discharged from the CHRTT while awaiting further contact from IAPT. On 13 November 2012, he hung himself from the banister at his home. The principal concern was that vulnerable patients could experience a feeling of abandonment and deterioration while waiting without a confirmed appointment or clear information about the next stage of treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure a known next appointment at discharge from CRHTT

    Wider context from the report

    “████████ Senior Clinical and Forensic Psychologist was engaged to conduct a Post Incident Review & Report. That report concluded at page 31 - "Putting the patient first - perceived gaps from the patient perspective" that a waiting time of 24 days between discharge from CRHTT and the first appointment with IAPT could not be construed as a delay. This issue arose at the Inquest hearing was the potential for a feeling of abandonment because of the discharge without any knowledge of how long it would be before the next contact; of having to wait for the next stage/step without knowing when that would be. Mrs Irlam was clear that her husband deteriorated over this period despite the close, and loving, support provided by her and their family. That her husband found this a most distressing and difficult time. Even if the General Panel do not consider a waiting time of 3 weeks plus to be a delay for someone with mental health issues I take the view that a waiting time of 2 weeks without knowing the next contact for help/treatment will be is not appropriate. My concern is for the welfare of other patients who will fall into this gap between treatments/counselling who, unlike Mr Irlam, do not have a close and supportive family and the effect on them. During the course of his evidence ████████ explained that the two organisations were working closer together administratively. He was not, however, able to respond to my line of enquiry as to why a patient could not be given an appointment with IAPT on discharge from CHRTT. My concern is this. It seems to me most important and appropriate that a vulnerable patient with mental health issues ought not to be exposed to a feeling of abandonment, likely to lead to a deterioration in their condition, and that they should (where possible) be given an appointment with IAPT on discharge from CHRTT, if that is the agreed next step. That would also deal with the issue that upon receipt of the awaited letter from IAPT the patient has to be proactive to engage the referral to IAPT. (1) That if a follow-up with or referral to IAPT (or any other organisation) is deemed appropriate upon discharge from CRHTT then such an appointment should be arranged before or upon discharge. (2) (3) ”

    Source location

    Michael Stuart Irlam · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026