Recurring concern

Failure to provide continuity of patient care

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First reported 4 Sep 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the end-to-end patient-care continuity process, including unclear or unassigned responsibility, changing or excessive personnel, inadequate continuity between clinicians or services, and insufficient coordination that leaves care fragmented or without consistent oversight.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to a specific handover, record, referral or discharge control when continuity of patient care is not itself the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing shortages, workload or turnover concerns unless they directly result in failure to maintain continuity of patient care.
  • Excludes continuity failures in non-patient processes, such as equipment, premises or administrative workflows.
  • Excludes failures belonging to a more specific named safety system or pathway where that system is the supported parent boundary.
Reports
88

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
92

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care27
NHS England16
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Care Quality Commission3
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust3
North East London NHS Foundation Trust3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
King'S College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Leslie Isaac LERNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leslie Isaac Lerner died on 3 June 2016 after treatment for a fractured shoulder, including application of an incorrect sling that caused a deep pressure sore and additional pain. The report identified concerns about inadequate senior review, analgesia, communication, handover, continuity of care, recognition of pneumonia and deterioration, and delay in initiating end-of-life care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity and active care

    Wider context from the report

    “17th May – 22nd May 2016 There is no evidence of any continuity of care. There is good evidence of “hands off” care and nursing. In spite of anxieties expressed by the Manager of Mr Lerner's Rest Home, who came to assess him on the 19th May having been told he was medically fit for discharge (which he was not) and by his nephew Mr Marsh that he seemed ‘chesty’ and so far as the Manager was concerned that she was worried about the sling which did not seem to be supporting his elbow and did not seem to be ‘right’, there was no appreciation of the possibility that the sling was causing half the problems at least that Mr Lerner was suffering. No efforts were made to see whether he was ‘chesty’; a Doctor was not called, another chest x-ray was not ordered and it was not until the next day he was found to have a bilateral pneumonia which needed intravenous antibiotics. In addition he was being nursed at the wrong angle and it seems clear that he couldn’t have been given any personal care such as washing, because if he had been, nursing staff or healthcare assistants would have seen the tightness of the sling and the damage that it was causing. ”

    Source location

    Leslie Isaac LERNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rohid Shergill, who had Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy and was fed through a nasogastric tube, died on 14 March 2016 after the tube was inserted into his lung and was used for feeding and medication. The principal concerns included inadequate checking of the tube position, uncertainty about parental understanding of pH testing, insufficient information-sharing between trusts, unclear care coordination, and possible contamination from repeated syringe use.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear responsibility for ensuring parental competence in NGT feeding

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Ensuring that parents of children fed in this way are completely happy with what they have to do, and understand the significance of it. There was clear confusion about whether this was the responsibility of the school nurse or the community nurses (then working separately). Urgent consideration should be given to an agreed protocol to ensure parental competence whenever an NGT is first used – in the community or in hospital. ”

    Source location

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear allocation of a named keyworker or lead nurse for community care coordination

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Clear guidance on a named keyworker / lead nurse who is responsible for coordinating the care of children cared for in the community. ”

    Source location

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Dermott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin Dermott, who had bipolar affective disorder and was serving a prison sentence, suffered episodes of mental illness while held at several prisons and died by hanging in his cell at HMP Risley on 19 May 2014. The concerns included inadequate mental health and psychiatric care, failures in care planning and communication, and failure to follow ACCT procedures; the jury concluded that deficiencies in mental health care and observation partly contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequacies in mental health care planning and communication

    Wider context from the report

    “The seriousness of the deceased’s condition was realised whilst the deceased was at HMP Durham although probably initially misdiagnosed. During a hyponamic episode which lasted a number of weeks the deceased was for a time left in a urine soaked cell, drinking and washing from the cell toilet at a time when he needed specialist hospital treatment. The evidence showed that his illness was not properly addressed. At HMP Durham a psychiatric referral for the purpose of compiling a care plan, including a plan for therapeutic medication was never completed and he was transferred to HMP Haverigg without any steps being taken to plan health care for the future, take action to avoid a recurrence of his illness or identify and deal with a relapse should one occur. At HMP Haverigg there was inadequate mental health cover with at times only one mental health nurse and no provision for psychiatric referral. He was transferred to HMP Kirkham. A lack of suitable psychiatric care facilities at HMP Kirkham (among other things) led to a transfer to HMP Risley, where due to inadequacies of care planning and communication deficits which had been a feature of the deceased’s care whilst in prison, the fact that the deceased was relapsing into depression was not recognised. The jury concluded that the deceased’s death by hanging was partly due to deficiencies in mental health care and failure to properly observe ACCT procedures. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Dermott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain nationally specified integrated stepped mental-health care, including consultant psychiatry, long-term care planning and continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Better integration of health care services within prisons has also been supported by the development of a national set of service specifications for primary care services (including GP and nursing services), mental health services and substance misuse services. The mental health service specification outlines the requirement for mental health services to provide an integrated stepped care model for mental health which enables patients to flow seamlessly between mild to moderate and severe and enduring stages based on clinical need and include the provision of a consultant psychiatrist. These service specifications were developed in December 2013 and set the outcomes and standards required from the services including long-term care planning and continuity of care.”

    Source location

    2016-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out the revised Person Escort Record and provide training so operational staff transfer relevant health information throughout custody transitions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is supporting the National Offender Management Services (NOMS) with their review of the Person Escort Record (PER). This revised form ensures that all current and relevant information, including health information, is held in one document and transfers with the prisoner from police custody through to reception into prison and during any subsequent prison transfer or release. The roll out of the paper form pilot is still ongoing and work is being undertaken to ensure PER training will be available to all operational staff. This is expected to be launched by March 2017. The digital PER form is being piloted in a couple of prisons and NOMS are leading on this work.”

    Source location

    2016-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 June 2016

    Open published response
  4. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Gillian Rose Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gillian Rose Taylor had a lengthy history of mental health issues and repeated suicide attempts. After being detained under the Mental Health Act and treated away from Powys because no acute bed was available locally, she remained under community mental health care until her death by hanging at home on 3 January 2016. The concerns included the lack of an acute treatment facility in Powys, resulting patient transfers, lack of continuity of treatment, and the possible adverse effect of this experience on her engagement with mental health professionals and risk of self-harm or suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) As a consequence of 1 above there is often a lack of continuity of treatment which can be to the detriment of the patient concerned. ”

    Source location

    Gillian Rose Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend and implement the Unable to Make Contact Protocol for CRHT staff responding to missed contacts and unavailable service users.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) I am aware that at the inquest you heard evidence from ████████ Acting Assistant Director for East Kent Acute Mental Health Services about the considerable efforts the Trust had begun implementing to mitigate the risk of similar deaths occurring. Following the inquest, the Trust continued in this work in addition to taking further steps, in particular, making changes to the ‘Unable to Make Contact’ Protocol. The Protocol has been subject to a further”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Kent-and-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot and audit the amended Unable to Make Contact Protocol, collating outcomes for reporting to Patient Safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iv) The new Protocol is being piloted in CRHTs trust wide for 3 months to help the teams to understand what changes may need to be made, in order to make this a robust and workable process. All CRHT staff have been asked to provide details to their manager each time the protocol is used during the pilot period with details of how it worked and of the outcome of events so that these can be audited. The outcome of this monitoring will be collated in mid June and will then report back into Patient Safety.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Kent-and-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Acute Service Line Welfare Check Protocol for inpatients and CRHT service users.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “vii) The new Protocol needs to be read in conjunction with the recently finalised ‘Acute Service Line Welfare Check Protocol’ which is a document that has been jointly developed with Kent police. A copy of this is enclosed for ease of reference. The ‘Welfare Check Protocol’ is applicable to in-patient’s and people under the care of the Crisis Resolution Home Treatment team.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Kent-and-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight the Unable to Make Contact Protocol during shift handovers, team meetings and individual supervision where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) Louise Clack, who was the senior member of Trust management at the inquest has briefed about the evidence given by the shift coordinator. The lack of conversance with the policy was disappointing. An immediate action from this was taken to ensure that the contents of the policy are highlighted to staff in shift handovers and team meetings, and where necessary, for this to be dealt with during individual supervision.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Kent-and-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch, train staff on and cascade the new Unable to Make Contact Protocol across CRHT teams, matrons and managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iii) The new ‘Unable to Make Contact’ Protocol was launched at the Acute Leadership Forum, with training given on 8 March 2016, cascaded to all CRHT teams. This has also been circulated to all matrons and managers and training is being provided at minuted team meetings. It has also been highlighted in the Acute Service Line Lessons Bulletin. The same process was used to launch the Acute Service Line Welfare Check, which has been effective.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Kent-and-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a fully functioning Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team providing acute hospital-level care at home.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A series of steps was taken. This involved establishing a fully functioning CRHTT which reduced the need for admissions out of county. Weekly discussions were put in place between Redwoods and local services to help get patients admitted to Redwoods when needed. Additional funding was allocated to the local service in Montgomeryshire, including for additional care co-ordination to help address out of county admissions. This was monitored on a weekly basis. The graphs attached at Appendix 1 (enclosed) show that the difficulties with admission significantly reduced for a sustained period. As the second graph indicates, acute admissions had been falling during October 2015 although they started to rise during November.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Powys-Teaching-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate additional funding for Montgomeryshire services, including additional care coordination to address out-of-county admissions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A series of steps was taken. This involved establishing a fully functioning CRHTT which reduced the need for admissions out of county. Weekly discussions were put in place between Redwoods and local services to help get patients admitted to Redwoods when needed. Additional funding was allocated to the local service in Montgomeryshire, including for additional care co-ordination to help address out of county admissions. This was monitored on a weekly basis. The graphs attached at Appendix 1 (enclosed) show that the difficulties with admission significantly reduced for a sustained period. As the second graph indicates, acute admissions had been falling during October 2015 although they started to rise during November.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Powys-Teaching-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A hospital admission does not require changing the patient's statutory care coordinator under the applicable mental health care arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As explained above additional funding was provided to strengthen care co-ordination. A Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team was also implemented providing acute hospital level care at home with which Mrs Taylor engaged. Mrs Taylor would have had a statutory care co-ordinator and care and treatment plan under the Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010. As set out in Paragraph 3.19 of the Code of Practice to Parts 2 and 3 of the Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 it is not necessary to change the care co-ordinator when a patient is admitted to hospital.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Powys-Teaching-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing statutory care coordinators and holistic care and treatment plans are considered sufficient to assure continuity for Welsh patients placed out of area.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Under the Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 (the Measure) all patients in Wales receiving secondary mental health services must have a care coordinator and a care and treatment plan. This applies to Welsh patients who are placed ‘out of area’. It is the responsibility of the ‘home’ health board to ensure the person receiving care and treatment has a care coordinator and a holistic statutory plan. The care coordinator would normally attend reviews wherever a patient is, whether in England or Wales, this safeguard should assure continuity of care for all Welsh patients.”

    Source location

    2016-0178-Response-by-Welsh-Government
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 May 2016

    Open published response
  5. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Marion Rose HOWES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marion Rose HOWES died before the inquest concluded on 3 February 2016; the circumstances are referred to in the Record of Inquest. The concerns included failures in discharge communication, coordination and continuity of care, two failed discharges, inadequate communication of a cancer diagnosis, and failure to recognise that she was dying, which was said to have resulted in an undignified and uncomfortable death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of accountable coordination and continuity of patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) In Mrs. Howes’ case there was a complete lack of co-ordination and continuity of care for her. Nobody took charge of her. Nobody was responsible and responsible for liaising with all the relevant firms so that she was dealt with comprehensively and by the appropriate people. It is suggested that consideration be given to the patient being appointed a named Consultant (not one who is just about to go on holiday) from the day of first admission and this Consultant should understand his or her duties with regard to the managing of the patient and ensuring that they are referred on to the appropriate forms and that the multi-disciplinary and multi-agency discussions take place. ”

    Source location

    Marion Rose HOWES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Baby Ryan Singh Bhogal · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ryan was a healthy baby and toddler who experienced increasingly frequent medical visits and multiple symptoms before being diagnosed with acute myeloid leukaemia and dying on 11 September 2015. The principal concerns were a lack of continuity and overall ownership in GP care, possible missed red flags and opportunities for earlier testing, and hospital systems for reviewing GP medical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity and overall ownership of treatment in general practice

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a lack of continuity and overall ownership in terms of treatment Ryan received at the GP practice. He was seen by different Doctor’s including Locum staff with no overall holistic approach. This surgery may wish to consider reviewing their policy and management of children who appear excessively for treatment to ensure that there is continuity of care and appropriate measures are in place. In addition you may wish to consider reviewing the systems in place in identifying “Red Flags” and seeking a second opinion or requesting further tests where symptoms or unexplained illnesses are identified for an extended period. ”

    Source location

    Baby Ryan Singh Bhogal · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    EMMA LOUISE BRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emma Louise Bray had a history of problems with mood and was assessed by mental health services in January 2015 after her mood deteriorated. Her family reported worsening symptoms, hopelessness, suicidal research and concerns about her medication, but several planned referrals, follow-up actions and communication of information did not occur. She hanged herself on 25 February 2015. Concerns included incomplete medication and treatment histories, failures in follow-up and referral, inadequate response to family information, failures to record emails, unclear medication-risk communication, and wider deficiencies in service guidance and monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about the designated contact between patients and the Intake team

    Wider context from the report

    “During the evidence I was told that a number of things had not happened that ought to have done: (a) A proper medication history was not taken on assessment (b) EB’s treatment and medication history were not obtained from either public or private sector providers. (c) Had EB’s history been obtained she should have been referred to a psychiatrist following assessment, to be seen and assessed within 14 days. (d) ████████ felt that there was an underestimate of the level and complexity of EB’s condition. (e) EB remained with the Intake team for the whole period of her contact with the service. This appears to have occurred because of a failure to make a referral rather than because of any positive decision to retain her within the team. (f) EB should have been referred to an appropriate service, probably initially the BIT. This would have provided her with better support and regular monitoring. (g) Even within the IT there was a failure to follow EB up. Telephone contact should have been made with her by seven days after the initial assessment. (h) There should have been regular contact with EB thereafter, initiated by IT. (i) Important information was provided by EB’s family about the changes in her presentation, most notably on 19 January, 22 January and then from 19 February 2015 onwards. Nothing happened in response to these reports. The information should have been placed before the Intake Team MDT to discuss her care. (j) Had the information been provided EB should have been seen by the team and, in response to the information of 19 February 2015 at the latest, had a psychiatric assessment. (k) The emails sent by EB’s family were not placed on her notes; accordingly other members of staff looking at her care were not aware of the family’s concerns. (l) Risks associated with the drug Sertraline do not appear to have been communicated to EB and her family. Were the drug was recommended by a psychiatrist who had not seen or assessed EB it was unclear where responsibility for advising about risk lay. On a systemic level, the following issues are of concern: (a) Absence of guidelines about what information must be obtained on assessment, including the medication history. (b) Absence of guidance about where that information should be obtained from: the patient / primary sources. (c) A lack of clarity amongst staff about when to retain patients under the IT and when to refer out of it intake to other services. (d) Lack of clarity about who should be the person between patients and the IT. (e) Lack of guidance about what to do when patients are not engaging directly with the IT but there is reason for concern about them. (f) A lack of monitoring / auditing of the passage of patients through the service to see whether cases are being managed and progressed as they ought to be. (g) An absence of guidelines giving staff timescales within which referrals should take place. (h) A lack of appreciation of the need to create a plan with timescales for further treatment / referral to take place. (i) A lack of clear information about the circumstances in which it is appropriate for a psychiatrist to make recommendations about the medication without a full medical history. (j) A lack of clear information about the circumstances in which it is appropriate for a psychiatrist to make recommendations about the medication without seeing the patient in person. (k) A lack of clarity about whose responsibility it is to communicate risks about medication to the individual when the medication is recommended by the WFAAT psychiatrist but prescribed by the GP. This was particularly the case with the Sertraline prescribed to EB, which apparently does have specific associated risks that must be warned of. (l) The lack of apparent process or procedure to ensure that emails sent to staff directly are placed on an individual’s notes. (m) Any proper understanding by staff of risk assessment in the context of self-harm. The risk assessment tool in use appeared very basic and not one that provided any real assistance to staff. ”

    Source location

    EMMA LOUISE BRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and implement AABIT standard operating procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The plan has five broad objectives within which your specific concerns have been addressed. These are:”

    Source location

    2015-0438-Response-by-NELFT-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 November 2015

    Open published response
  8. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    David John Pooley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David John Pooley, aged 66, was admitted to hospital after attempting to hang himself and was later found hanging in a ward toilet; his death was confirmed on 20 May 2015. Concerns included the absence of a named nurse until the day before his death and the resulting failure to carry out appropriate risk assessments, care planning and reviews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out the named nurse role

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Contrary to the trust’s policy, there was no named nurse allocated until the day before Mr Pooley’s death. The role of the named nurse had not therefore been carried out – this entails the devising of a risk assessment, care plans, one to ones, contact with the patient’s family etc. 2. The appropriate assessments and reviews were therefore not carried out. ”

    Source location

    David John Pooley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Tamara Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tamara Mills, who had longstanding asthma and repeated acute exacerbations, developed breathing difficulties during the night of 10th/11th April 2015 and died after paramedics were called. The principal concerns were fragmented care, inadequate coordination and communication, insufficient recognition of her deteriorating chronic respiratory condition, and the absence of a long-term management plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign overall clinical management responsibility

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Despite the presence of a significant number of health care professional involved in her care and some frequently, no single individual assumed management for her care overall 4. In the absence of no one individual assuming responsibility for her care, there was no plan directed towards her long term management and care identifying the chronic nature of her condition, seeking a sustained and balanced level of treatment, control and resolution of the recurring episodes. 5. Insofar as planning occurred it was in the last six months of her life and was in the form of an emergency plan directed towards the next and apparently accepted inevitable acute event, but not as a part of the necessary strategy to control and avoid such events. 6. Not only did those advised of such a plan fail to understand its limited objective they misinterpreted its purpose and consoled themselves in the false belief there was a purposeful strategy designed to protect this child in the long term. ”

    Source location

    Tamara Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Anthony Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin Anthony Forster died in his prison cell at HMP Durham on 14 September 2014 after taking drugs he had hidden within his body. Staff identified that he was under the influence of an unknown substance, but no thorough or clinical assessment was undertaken. The principal concerns included inadequate policies, training, assessment, observation, treatment planning, communication and emergency response to prisoners who may have overdosed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of healthcare and discipline staff to provide an integrated response to drug-related presentations

    Wider context from the report

    “9. As mentioned earlier the evidence indicated that there was a degree of complacency about prisoners presenting under the influence of drugs and the risks associated therewith (at handover one officer said to another “there are some prisoners sleeping it off”). Due to the scale of the issue, the potential risk to health of prisoners is such that there needs to be absolute clarity of response and care for prisoners who so present. The evidence indicated that a more integrated approach between healthcare staff and discipline staff would be beneficial notwithstanding there were good lines of communication between the two. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Anthony Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and consult on the Drugs and Alcohol Recovery Teams pathway and brief key leaders before wider circulation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A draft report and overarching pathway for Drugs and Alcohol Recovery Teams was produced at the end of November 2015. Following consultation between all contributors, including NHS England, the pathway is not designed to be a weighty document, but one that all practitioners and prison staff can use to understand the Drugs and Alcohol Recovery Team pathway, guidance, protocols and interventions. It is proposed the pathway features space to embed documents and hyperlinks to guidance.”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce monthly multidisciplinary substance misuse training for healthcare, discipline and other prison staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have introduced, under the leadership of Dr Bray, a monthly training event specific to all aspects of substance misuse issues which is held monthly on a Friday afternoon in the Prison Training Centre. The training event is open to all staff at the prison from all disciplines of the various organisations within the prison and wider region, both healthcare staff and discipline staff. Each session usually lasts for a couple of hours. The training is a mixture of white board training, discussion, group work, multi-disciplinary discussions, sharing information and experiences and clinical reviews. This training reinforces the seriousness of substance misuse and overdose issues and emphasises the inappropriateness and unacceptability of attitudes of complacency and acceptance towards the issues.”

    Source location

    2015-0453-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 October 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026