Recurring concern

Failure to provide continuity of patient care

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First reported 4 Sep 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the end-to-end patient-care continuity process, including unclear or unassigned responsibility, changing or excessive personnel, inadequate continuity between clinicians or services, and insufficient coordination that leaves care fragmented or without consistent oversight.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to a specific handover, record, referral or discharge control when continuity of patient care is not itself the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing shortages, workload or turnover concerns unless they directly result in failure to maintain continuity of patient care.
  • Excludes continuity failures in non-patient processes, such as equipment, premises or administrative workflows.
  • Excludes failures belonging to a more specific named safety system or pathway where that system is the supported parent boundary.
Reports
88

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
92

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care27
NHS England16
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Care Quality Commission3
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust3
North East London NHS Foundation Trust3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
King'S College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust2
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth George Alfred WHITTINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth George Alfred Whittington died following an operation, but the supplied text does not provide further circumstances of his death beyond referring to the Record of Inquest. The principal concerns included inadequate instructions and handover about management of his urinary catheter after bladder repair, failure to check a disconnected epidural despite increasing pain, incomplete blood transfusion and discharge documentation, and a delay to the initial operation because no Junior Doctor was present.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity between operating surgeons and postoperative consultants

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Following the operation Mr. Whittington’s last contact with his Consultant was immediately post operatively. Due to the system operated at the Royal Sussex County Hospital (along with many other hospitals as I understand it) the situation is that the operative surgeon will not see the patient again unless there is some specific reason to do so. Instead the patient will be seen by the on call surgical team for that particular day or part of the day. Mr. Whittington therefore saw a Consultant who did not know him and who did not understand either the condition that Mr. Whittington had come in to hospital with (Colovesical Fistula) or the fact that he needed an operation which had included a bladder repair as I have already pointed out (2 above). The surgeon wanted the urinary catheter to remain in situ for at least two weeks to allow the bladder repair that had been made at Mr. Whittington’s operation to heal. This was absolutely crucial and yet no specific instructions were given and the post-operative pathway which was being followed gave very little help in that respect either, save to suggest that the catheter should always be removed early, well prior to discharge. Had there been post-operative instructions and had there been a checklist for the Consultant picking up the ward rounds following the operation, the catheter would not have been removed and Mr. Whittington would not have died. If the Trust is insistent on perpetuating this lack of continuity between the Surgeon and the post-operative Consultant care there must be sufficient handover and sufficient clear instructions from the Surgeon doing the operation as to the post-operative care so as to protect the patient. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth George Alfred WHITTINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run mandatory daily morning Board Rounds across all wards and specialties to coordinate patient acuity, investigations, interventions and communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do operate a system of a consultant surgeon being the consultant for the week, this allows us to ensure our patients are seen by a consultant each day. To improve continuity of care and ensure the team are aware of each patient on the ward, on 25 February 2019 we introduced mandatory Board Rounds to take place in the morning, before the ward rounds, on all wards and in all specialities to facilitate improved communication between ward teams (doctors, nurses and allied health professionals). The principles of the Board Round are to confirm the patient acuity (how unwell they are), have they had any test results which require review, do they need any tests to progress their care, what interventions/actions need to be taken and when e.g. removal of catheter. The meeting occurs every morning.”

    Source location

    2019-0049-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  2. London (East)

    AI-generated summary

    Sophie Holman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sophie Holman, a 10-year-old girl with chronic asthma, died on 13 December 2017 after collapsing during a severe asthma attack while being taken to hospital. The report identifies concerns about inadequate long-term management, fragmented records, failure to recognise the cumulative severity and risks of her asthma, lack of a coordinated asthma action plan and safety-netting, and missed opportunities for specialist referral.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign overall responsibility for asthma care

    Wider context from the report

    “3) As in the case of two recent child asthma deaths resulting in Regulation 28 statements (Michael Uriely and Tamara Mills), despite the presence of numerous health professionals involved no single individual or organisation took overall responsibility for assuming management of her care overall. ”

    Source location

    Sophie Holman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share examples of effective asthma-service practice through the clinical networks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will also be working to improve access to specialist paediatric care in the community, as we know this will have a positive impact. Also through the clinical networks we will continue to share examples of best practice from areas that are”

    Source location

    2019-0035-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 May 2019

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jacqueline Marie Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacqueline Marie Elliott, who had a long-standing history of back pain, was found deceased at home on 9 August 2018. Post-mortem and toxicology findings identified reduced liver function and significant toxicity from a combination of drugs. Concerns included inaccurate prescription records, insufficient clinical notes and medication-review detail, prescribing of 100 tramadol tablets despite a recorded history of non-compliance and self-medication, and a lack of continuity of care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care preventing a clinician from maintaining an overview of the patient and her health

    Wider context from the report

    “5. There was a lack of continuity of care. Mrs Elliott saw a variety of different locum GPs. This meant that no clinician had an overview of her and her health. As a result, painkillers were repeatedly prescribed and other potential ways of managing her persistent back pain were not explored. This led to a significant reliance by Mrs Elliott on painkillers to manage her on going back problems. The inquest was told that the lack of continuity of care was due to a national shortage of GPs and was a national not local issue. ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline Marie Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review clinical staffing numbers and clinical sessions to support patient continuity and existing staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CCG is working very closely with the practice including:”

    Source location

    2019-0016-Response-by-Trafford-CCG-and-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 7 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response
  4. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Kiff · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Kiff experienced repeated consultations for vaginal discharge, urinary symptoms, heavy menstruation and lower abdominal pain before cervical cancer was diagnosed after an urgent referral in July 2013. The cancer had metastasised to the liver and, after treatment and subsequent decline, she suffered a cardiac arrest and died at Fairfield General Hospital on 14 October 2015. The report identified concerns about failure to follow cancer referral guidance, inadequate examination and history-taking, poor record-keeping and communication, lack of continuity of care, reluctance to perform internal examinations, and inadequate processes for reviewing test results.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of care

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was lack of continuity of care and a failure by doctors to fully appraise themselves of the clinical history ahead of consultation. The care provided to Ms Kiff was, on occasions, perfunctory. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Kiff · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Southampton and New Forest

    AI-generated summary

    Nigel Malloy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nigel Malloy fell from a second-floor window on 29 October 2017 while intoxicated with alcohol, suffered severe head injuries, and died in hospital two days later. He was alcohol dependent and had depressive symptoms, with previous similar falls and multiple hospital admissions, but concerns were raised that there was no information sharing or coordinated treatment plan between the relevant alcohol-support services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a coordinated plan to treat alcohol dependence

    Wider context from the report

    “The Deceased was alcohol dependant and suffered depressive symptoms. On 22 May 2017 he fell from a window in circumstances very similar to those on 29 October 2017 and on that occasion suffered head injuries and was taken to Southampton General Hospital. After this fall he was regularly drinking excess alcohol leading to multiple admissions to the Emergency Department at Royal Hampshire County Hospital Winchester operated by Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (HHFT), but was then discharged once sober without any follow up. On 22 September 2017 he referred himself to the Inclusion Service provided by South Staffordshire & Shropshire NHS Foundation Trust (SSSFT) and started to receive some assistance. On 16 October 2017 the deceased sustained a fall in the street and was taken to Winchester hospital for treatment of his head wound but discharged the same day. There was no sharing of information between the Alcohol Liaison service provided by HHFT and the Inclusion Service provided by SSSFT or coordinated plan to treat his alcohol dependence. ”

    Source location

    Nigel Malloy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a 24-hour referral service and dedicated pathway with the Inclusion Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A 24 hour referral service and dedicated pathway with Inclusion”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide alcohol-service inpatient access through weekly and arranged ad hoc Inclusion inreach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• At the time of Mr Malloy’s admissions to the Trust, Inclusion were running a weekly inreach service on a Sunday.”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain telephone and onsite liaison with Inclusion regarding referrals and referred patients receiving inpatient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Regular telephone liaison between Inclusion and the Trust when one of their users is an inpatient or in relation to referrals”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in a monthly multi-provider High Intensity User Group to identify further support for frequent attenders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Monthly High Intensity User Group involving multiple providers to discuss whether there is any further support which can be provided to high intensity users such as Mr Malloy”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing referral, liaison, follow-up and high-intensity-user arrangements are considered sufficient to address the reported concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As per our response to point 2 above, the Trust made the initial referral to Inclusion on 21.09.17 and subsequently liaised with them to arrange Mr Malloy’s first attendance and ensure that Mr Malloy had attended as planned.”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response
  6. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Daryl COLGAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lewis Colgan died immediately at Princes Risborough Station on 15 September 2017 after jumping onto the track in front of a northbound passenger train. Concerns included the robustness of supervision of care coordinators and care teams, continuity of mental health care during staff changes and sickness, the process for overdue Care Programme Approach meetings, and the robustness of the investigation and resulting actions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain continuity of engagement and care during key staff changes and sickness absence

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Lewis’ mental health care revealed issues with regard to management of staff changes and sickness and particularly coordination of continuity of engagement and care in the context of Lewis’ care plan in the absence of key participants in his care on long term sick leave, notably the roles of care coordinator and psychologist and, notwithstanding evidence indicating steps being taken to address staffing issues, there remains a concern that, given the personal nature of the mental health care provided to individuals and the significance of regular engagement with specific individuals, that provision of care in compliance with specified care plans may be compromised. ”

    Source location

    Lewis Daryl COLGAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Somerset

    AI-generated summary

    Edward Arthur Lundy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edward Arthur Lundy, who had a history of depression, was found hanging in a barn on 23 August 2016 and could not be revived. The concerns identified included a lack of continuity in his care, no psychiatric assessment despite a referral indicating this was needed, and insufficient documentation and discussion of care options and risks with his family. The report also states that evidence had not been produced showing that the proposed actions had been implemented or shared nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain continuity of care when patients have contact with multiple professionals

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Edward Lundy had contact with many professionals in a short period of time and that affected the continuity of his care. Proposed action to set up joint services review with provider organisations involved with an oversight report to be produced. 2. That upon Edward Lundy's discharge into the care of his family, there should have been independent consultation with the family and this should have been documented with the risks being explicitly discussed. Proposed action to ensure that the Psychiatric Liaison Operational Policy stated as such and to disseminate to all liaison teams via pathway meetings and local business meetings. 3. That the doctor referring Edward to the Lambeth Assessment and Liaison Team should have made it clear that he believed Edward should be seen by a psychiatrist. Proposed action that the Training Lead in the Trust be informed that GP trainees should receive risk management training, focussing on crisis intervention services e.g. when to consider CMHT/Home Treatment Team/Inpatient Admission. There has been no evidence produced as to compliance with the recommended actions. There has been no evidence produced as to the findings of the report and its proposed actions being started nationally so as to inform other Mental Health Trusts. That the family received no information as to the proposed actions having been followed through and any resultant changes in procedure. ”

    Source location

    Edward Arthur Lundy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    William Myers · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Myers, aged 79, was unlawfully killed; the medical cause of death was multiple stab wounds. The principal concerns related to inconsistent and inappropriate community care of his attacker, including failures to coordinate treatment, recognise warning signs, share relevant information, act on recommendations for Mental Health Act assessment, and maintain adequate records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent continuity of psychiatric care across teams and wards

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The care and treatment provided to Mr Lound's attacker ('the attacker') in 2015/16 whilst in the community was inconsistent and/or inappropriate management strategy. Instead of being treated by the same team of psychiatric clinicians, he was admitted to four different psychiatric wards during 2015. The consultants involved in his treatment did not confer sufficiently to produce a clear management plan. ”

    Source location

    William Myers · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a consistent Manchester divisional service model to improve continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is on-going work to develop a consistent divisional model of service delivery in Manchester. This is designed so that there is enhanced continuity of care for service users by simplifying and rationalising the service model. We have invested in clinical and operational leadership across Manchester to drive forward this consistent clinical model. The operational and clinical leadership of our Manchester service follows the divisional structure e.g. Lead Consultant for North Manchester Community Mental Health Team and Home-based Treatment Team with a Service Manager for North Manchester and Urgent Care.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen clinical and operational leadership, consultant supervision and recruitment oversight across Manchester services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is on-going work to develop a consistent divisional model of service delivery in Manchester. This is designed so that there is enhanced continuity of care for service users by simplifying and rationalising the service model. We have invested in clinical and operational leadership across Manchester to drive forward this consistent clinical model. The operational and clinical leadership of our Manchester service follows the divisional structure e.g. Lead Consultant for North Manchester Community Mental Health Team and Home-based Treatment Team with a Service Manager for North Manchester and Urgent Care.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reduce out-of-area placements and create local inpatient capacity to limit transfers and preserve continuity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• To reduce the use of Out of Area Placements and create capacity within the Trust Inpatient Services, to enable service users requiring inpatient care to be admitted as close to home as possible. Consistent with their needs, recovery focused and reduce the possibility of service users being transferred between units and teams unless it clinically indicated or in an emergency. We are aware that Out of Area Placements have a significant impact on continuity of care and the reduction of Out of Area Placements is a key work stream for the trust.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use patient-flow processes to identify high-risk individuals and minimise multiple-team involvement where clinically appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Patient Flow Team have responsibility to identify high-risk individuals where the concern regarding continuity of care is heightened and endeavour to admit to an appropriate consultant with previous knowledge of the patient if this is possible and clinically appropriate. It is the role of the Patient Flow team to minimise multiple team involvement and to attempt to ensure that high-risk patients will be admitted under the same team if this is possible.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review care-planning procedures to strengthen continuity and consistent management plans for high-risk individuals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The trust is reviewing all care-planning procedures in the light of the lessons learned from this case to ensure that there is continuity of care and a consistent management plan with particular emphasis on high-risk individuals. Discharge procedures have also been reviewed and high-risk patients should not be discharged without a completed formal discharge care plan and risk assessment with consultant oversight. The discharge care plans will include consideration of the risk of disengagement and non-compliance and the response to these.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response
  9. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Richard Drewry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Richard Drewry had a history of anxiety and low mood, with deteriorating mental health and episodes involving knives shortly before he was found with a ligature around his neck on 3 April 2017. He sustained fatal injuries, suffered an unsurvivable hypoxic brain injury, and died in hospital on 8 April 2017. The substantive concerns were failures by the Crisis Team to provide consistent and continuous care, make accurate and prompt records, and escalate concerns appropriately and promptly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure consistency and continuity of care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The failure of the Crisis Team to ensure consistency and continuity of care for the deceased, in particular the changing personnel who visited the deceased; ”

    Source location

    Michael Richard Drewry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the Modified Modified Continuity Index into routine reporting, trial it in one team, and then implement it across Crisis Teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is shortly to introduce the Modified Modified Continuity Index (MMCI) into its routine reporting systems, at both individual and team levels. This is a measure calculated using the total number of patient visits and the number of different clinical staff visiting the patients and gives a resulting score between 0 and 1, the more staff providing care to the patient the lower the score will be.”

    Source location

    2017-0386-Response-by-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuity of staff cannot always be provided because 24-hour crisis response requirements and high-intensity care create operational constraints.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Continuity of care is a challenge within our Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment Teams due to the service operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Staff work 12 hour shifts and need to be able to respond swiftly to urgent referrals, within 4 hours and 24 hours whilst also maintaining robust care and treatment for those patients already on their caseload.”

    Source location

    2017-0386-Response-by-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response
  10. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Lindsey Parker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Lindsey Parker had metastatic lung cancer and subsequently developed toxic epidermal necrolysis while receiving medical treatment. Her condition deteriorated on 8 July 2017, with concerns about delayed medical review, inadequate recognition and escalation of deterioration, gaps in observations and fluid-balance recording, lack of continuity in medical care, and the qualifications of out-of-hours coordinators. She died at Salford Royal Hospital on 9 July 2017.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity in medical care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A lack of continuity in medical care. According to the family's evidence, Mrs Parker was seen by 16 different doctors during the course of her last admission. Of these, seven were junior doctors (FY grade). ”

    Source location

    Mrs Lindsey Parker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mrs Parker was seen by three junior doctors, not seven.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During this admission period Mrs Parker would have been seen by three Junior Doctors who were assigned to ward M3. These were: ████████ (GPST1), ████████ (FY2) and ████████ (GPST2).”

    Source location

    2017-0378-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHS-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Multiple clinicians are normal practice because specialist input and full handover provide appropriate continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, Mrs Parker was seen by a number of different clinicians due to varying shift patterns, on call out of hours care and because Mrs Parker required the input of various different specialities. Nevertheless it should have been explained to Mrs Parker family why there was a need for all the various medical input. I do hope the above”

    Source location

    2017-0378-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHS-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026