Recurring concern

Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processes

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First reported 17 Sep 2013•Latest report 24 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in healthcare transfer procedures, coordination, responsibility, transfer documentation and provision of complete clinical information to the transporting or receiving team.

Not included

  • Ordinary shift handover with no transfer of the patient or care responsibility
  • Clinical treatment failures after a safe and complete transfer
  • Discharge to the community where no healthcare transfer process is involved
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
131

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
151

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England14
Department of Health and Social Care10
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust5
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB4
HM Prison and Probation Service4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Swansea Bay University Local Health Board4
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust4
Welsh Government4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Healthcare Inspectorate Wales3
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Nola-Reign Morgan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nola-Reign Morgan was born prematurely on 5 February 2024 after her mother developed suspected chorioamnionitis, and died three days later despite resuscitation and neonatal care. The report identified delays in transferring her mother to the labour ward and high dependency unit, a period without fetal monitoring, and gaps in national and local guidance and staff training on monitoring and managing suspected chorioamnionitis in pre-term pregnancies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in transferring patients between antenatal and HDU wards

    Wider context from the report

    “1. National Guidance. There is no national guidance in the antenatal setting to establish when and in what circumstances fetal monitoring should be used especially when chorioamnionitis is suspected. Further there is no specific guidance that has been brought to my attention to identify and treat chorioamnionitis in pre-term mothers. Clear guidance exists for intrapartum fetal monitoring but in this case the grey area between Nola-Reign's mother being nearly but not in active labour meant that there was confusion as to whether continuous monitoring should or could have been put in place. 2. Health Board Antenatal Fetal Monitoring Guidance. Following Nola-Reign’s death the serious incident review recommended new guidance to address antenatal fetal monitoring. However, the new local guidance for antenatal monitoring does not reference chorioamnionitis, transfer times or the need to consider continuous fetal monitoring. 3. Training. There is insufficient evidence from the Health Board of the nature or degree of training that has taken place since Nola-Reign’s death to assist obstetric and midwifery teams to identifying the risk of chorioamnionitis and to ensure adequate monitoring is in place in particular: 4. Delay in transferring between Antenatal and HDU wards. The delay in transferring Nola-Reign's mother from antenatal ward to HDU was over 1 hour in a situation when acuity was not raised. This issue was not identified by the Serious Incident Review yet was a material factor in the period when Nola-Reign's mother remained unmonitored and no steps have been taken to identify causes for delay and to avoid unnecessary delay occurring in the future. ”

    Source location

    Nola-Reign Morgan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify causes of transfer delays and take steps to avoid unnecessary delay recurring

    Wider context from the report

    “1. National Guidance. There is no national guidance in the antenatal setting to establish when and in what circumstances fetal monitoring should be used especially when chorioamnionitis is suspected. Further there is no specific guidance that has been brought to my attention to identify and treat chorioamnionitis in pre-term mothers. Clear guidance exists for intrapartum fetal monitoring but in this case the grey area between Nola-Reign's mother being nearly but not in active labour meant that there was confusion as to whether continuous monitoring should or could have been put in place. 2. Health Board Antenatal Fetal Monitoring Guidance. Following Nola-Reign’s death the serious incident review recommended new guidance to address antenatal fetal monitoring. However, the new local guidance for antenatal monitoring does not reference chorioamnionitis, transfer times or the need to consider continuous fetal monitoring. 3. Training. There is insufficient evidence from the Health Board of the nature or degree of training that has taken place since Nola-Reign’s death to assist obstetric and midwifery teams to identifying the risk of chorioamnionitis and to ensure adequate monitoring is in place in particular: 4. Delay in transferring between Antenatal and HDU wards. The delay in transferring Nola-Reign's mother from antenatal ward to HDU was over 1 hour in a situation when acuity was not raised. This issue was not identified by the Serious Incident Review yet was a material factor in the period when Nola-Reign's mother remained unmonitored and no steps have been taken to identify causes for delay and to avoid unnecessary delay occurring in the future. ”

    Source location

    Nola-Reign Morgan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Sunny Elise EYMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sunny Elise EYMOND died at Winchester Hospice on 27 May 2024 after a long history of anorexia nervosa, personality disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder, including hospital admissions and periods of forced feeding. The report identified communication and oversight failings during her transfer of care between Hampshire and Bristol services, including the absence of a robust care package, planned 1:1 professional support and a suitable risk management plan. Concerns were raised about the lack of national guidance and treatment pathways for cross-Trust transfers involving people with eating disorders and complex emotional needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear escalation procedures during complex case transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There is currently no national guidance on how best to manage and plan for Trust to Trust transfers of highly complex cases (in particular those involving patients with both a diagnosed eating disorder such as AN and complex emotional needs). Guidance is therefore required as to the need for: a) Senior management oversight of the transfer b) Risk assessments at the time of transfer c) Clear escalation procedures if concerns are raised during the transfer and d) Training on any such national guidance ”

    Source location

    Sunny Elise EYMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of senior management oversight of complex case transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There is currently no national guidance on how best to manage and plan for Trust to Trust transfers of highly complex cases (in particular those involving patients with both a diagnosed eating disorder such as AN and complex emotional needs). Guidance is therefore required as to the need for: a) Senior management oversight of the transfer b) Risk assessments at the time of transfer c) Clear escalation procedures if concerns are raised during the transfer and d) Training on any such national guidance ”

    Source location

    Sunny Elise EYMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Anne Pytches · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Anne Pytches died on 14 October 2023 during elective spinal surgery after suffering a covert probable arterial bleed, major haemorrhage and cardiac arrest while prone in the operating theatre. The report identifies concerns about emergency protocols, staff understanding and training, communication of clinicians’ practice limitations, and uncertainty about ambulance attendance and possible transfer to a tertiary centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of plan for transfer to a tertiary centre

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) There was some confusion about the roles and responsibilities when there was a concern that an ambulance was required to attend to a major event to a private hospital where the patient was undergoing surgery in an operating theatre. Evidence was that Mrs Pytches was suffering from a major haemorrhage with an uncertain aetiology. There is a concern that Mrs Pytches did not regain stability such that she could have been safely moved and there was no plan as to whether Mrs Pytches required transfer to a tertiary centre. Calling an ambulance without an understanding of specifically what was required could impact on a future death taking this resource from a community emergency. Mrs Pytches already had the attendance of qualified surgeons and anaesthetists whilst suffering a major haemorrhage that could not be treated by community paramedics, however well qualified and experienced as in this case. ”

    Source location

    Julie Anne Pytches · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain recurring major-haemorrhage and emergency scenario training, including escalation, blood-supply, role-clarity, documentation and transfer exercises.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Emergency reference guides are consistently available across all departments and include guidance for cardiac arrest and major haemorrhage in line with Nuffield Health Policy CL71 Medical Emergencies and Resuscitation Council guidelines. The availability, accessibility and use of these guides are routinely reviewed and reinforced through regular emergency scenario training and simulations to ensure staff familiarity and effective application in practice. Laminated emergency algorithms, including adult major haemorrhage pathways, are located on resuscitation trolleys and in key clinical areas.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use SBARD as a decision-support tool for escalation and transfer discussions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions / Measures already in place across all Nuffield Health hospitals:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate tertiary-referral criteria and senior clinician-to-ambulance communication into scenario-based training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further actions across Nuffield Health:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Calling emergency services was an appropriate response because transfer to an NHS facility providing Level 3 care would have been required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Emergency services were called to enable an urgent transfer of Mrs Pytches to an NHS facility that could provide Level 3 care. This was an appropriate emergency response for the critical clinical situation, where the Hospital did not have on site Intensive Treatment Unit facilities. A transfer would have been required if Mrs Pytches had survived and it was prudent and reasonable to make sure that this was available at the earliest possible opportunity.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Regulation 28 concerns did not contribute to the patient’s death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HM Coroner specifically noted that the Regulation 28 concerns did not contribute to this patient death.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Charles Worswick · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Charles Worswick, who had Parkinson’s disease, frailty and complex health needs, developed an infected spinal wound and died from sepsis at Stepping Hill Hospital on 19 May 2025. The principal concerns were unclear communication and documentation of the wound-care plan between the hospital and care home, together with unclear escalation arrangements and limited documentation of concerns and escalation attempts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain a clear, effective and documented communication system for wound management care plans

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that when he was discharged to the care home from the acute hospital that the care home felt that they did not understand what was required regarding wound care because the care plan regarding wound care was not clear .The Trust did not have a copy of what information had been provided. As a consequence of this, there was a lack of clarity regarding wound management. The Trust did not, the inquest was told have a clear procedure that ensured that there was a clear, effective and documented communication system in relation to care plans that included wound management. The home did not have a clear escalation policy for actions to be taken when a resident arrived, and their staff were unclear how they were being asked to manage a wound by the hospital. In addition, the documentation surrounding concerns and attempts to escalate was limited. ”

    Source location

    Richard Charles Worswick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require documentation of all hospital and community-team calls, unsuccessful attempts and mitigation for missing treatment plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the Inquest findings and I can confirm that the following action has been taken to ensure proper adherence to the existing policies and procedures going forwards particularly with regard to the re-admission of residents to the Home from hospital and arrangements for monitoring of wound care and clinical observations:”

    Source location

    Response from Bamford Grange Care Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record hospital admission and discharge-planning calls in Nourish with contact details, timing and required follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the Inquest findings and I can confirm that the following action has been taken to ensure proper adherence to the existing policies and procedures going forwards particularly with regard to the re-admission of residents to the Home from hospital and arrangements for monitoring of wound care and clinical observations:”

    Source location

    Response from Bamford Grange Care Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require referrals to tissue-viability nurses or community teams within 24 hours, including photographs and current treatment-plan information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the Inquest findings and I can confirm that the following action has been taken to ensure proper adherence to the existing policies and procedures going forwards particularly with regard to the re-admission of residents to the Home from hospital and arrangements for monitoring of wound care and clinical observations:”

    Source location

    Response from Bamford Grange Care Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a Trust-wide alert requiring two Transfer of Care documentation copies for care-home discharges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust issued a Trust wide alert on 20 November 2025 in relation to Transfer of Care documentation and action required from all areas to ensure two copies of the documentation are printed; one to go with the patient to the care home and one to be placed in the patient’s records. Please find a copy of the Trust wide alert attached.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit five care-provider discharges per ward to verify Transfer of Care documentation is retained in patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to provide assurance that this practice is fully embedded across the Trust, a Trust wide audit will take place. Five patient discharges to other care providers will be audited per ward for discharges which have taken place in December. The audit will be carried out in the first two weeks of February 2026 and will check that there is a copy of the Transfer of Care documentation within the patient’s record.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a task and finish group to improve discharge checklist quality and information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of this review, we have also identified that improvements are needed to the quality and information included in the discharge checklist. A task and finish group has been set up for this piece of work and will commence in January 2026.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve the quality and information included in the discharge checklist through the task and finish group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of this review, we have also identified that improvements are needed to the quality and information included in the discharge checklist. A task and finish group has been set up for this piece of work and will commence in January 2026.”

    Source location

    Response from Stockport NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response
  5. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Ms. Amy Jo Cross · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms. Amy Jo Cross was arrested on 9 June 2023, experienced reported drug and alcohol withdrawal symptoms, and died in a prison cell on 10 June 2023 after being found unresponsive before prescribed medication was administered. The report identified concerns about the transfer of healthcare information, including recent medication administration and physical observations, between police, court and prison healthcare providers, and the absence of a shared medical records system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for passing important healthcare information between criminal justice healthcare providers during conveyance

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There is no system to ensure that important healthcare information including recent administration of medicines and the results of physical observations is passed between separate providers of healthcare in the criminal justice system at the time a person is conveyed between the police, the court and the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ms. Amy Jo Cross · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue discussions with PECS to commence pilots enabling Liaison and Diversion services to access and update the Digital Person Escort Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England does commission Liaison & Diversion services, which also operate with police custody suites, addressing mental health and wider vulnerabilities. There is no indication that a referral was made in this case to Liaison & Diversion services at either Torquay or Exeter police custody suites. Liaison & Diversion services do not currently have access to enter information directly onto the DPER, but with an individual’s consent, they will share relevant health information with the police and the police will be responsible for updating the DPER. NHS England is in discussion with PECS to commence pilot schemes in London and West Yorkshire, whereby PECS will issue licences to Liaison & Diversion Services, to enable them to directly access the DPER and enter health information. The pilots are expected to commence in 2026 at the following sites:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 October 2025

    Open published response
  6. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Thompson Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thompson Elliott, a care home resident, was admitted to hospital with chest pains and discharged with changed opioid medication. Because the discharge letter could not be located, both old and new opioids were administered, resulting in an overdose; he later contracted influenza A in hospital and died after respiratory failure. The principal concerns were unclear procedures, inadequate medication recording and administration, and inconsistent staff decisions when discharge information was unavailable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear procedures for medication management when a discharge letter cannot be located

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence has revealed significant concerns with regard to the recording and administration of medication, when patients return to the care home, and a discharge letter cannot be located following a period in hospital. I am concerned that the evidence was that if a patient returned to the care home with new medication prescribed whilst in hospital to replace previously prescribed medication, and the patient’s discharge letter could not be immediately located, there would be uncertainty amongst staff as to the correct procedure to follow in such circumstances. Medication that had been stopped whilst in hospital due to its impact upon the patient’s kidneys continued to be administered on 18th and 19th December 2024, before it could be clarified with either the hospital or GP which was the correct medication. The new medication was not administered on either of those days. The evidence revealed that the new medication was not immediately recorded onto the patient’s electronic medication record (EMAR) and held in a cupboard pending clarification. Despite no clarification and following a 24-hour delay, it was then incorrectly added to the record as new and additional medication - not replacement medication. The medication had been changed to oxycodone due to the impact oramorph was having upon the patient’s kidneys. Due to the administration error in recording oxycodone as new and therefore additional medication, the patient was then given both oramorph and the new oxycodone medication on the morning and afternoon of 20th December 2024 which was 2 days following his discharge. This resulted in an opioid overdose. I am concerned that the evidence was such that it was not possible to determine exactly what efforts, if any, were made by staff to clarify the medication position with the hospital on either 18th, 19th or 20th December 2024 but medication continued to be administered. On 21st December 2024 a team leader was able to speak to the hospital and despite being advised that if there was no discharge letter to take all medications and clarify the position with the GP, a decision was made to only administer the old medication of oramorph and there no attempts to contact the GP. There were no attempts to contact 111 or Recovery at Home for advice. I am concerned that the evidence revealed that there was no policy or guidance document setting out the procedures, which staff must follow in such circumstances, which created confusion and inconsistent decision making resulting in a medication overdose and continued use of a medication that had been stopped in hospital due to the harm it was causing to the patient’s kidneys. The evidence raises a further concern that the procedure still remains unclear despite internal reviews following the death. I shall be glad to be told of any learning arising from this death and timescales and results of your review. ”

    Source location

    Mr Thompson Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce and disseminate a visual flow chart guiding staff through medication checks when residents return from hospital without discharge documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To remind staff, a visual flow chart has been introduced at the care home to provide clear, step-by-step guidance for staff involved in supporting residents returning from hospital where there is no accompanying discharge letter to support changes in medication. A copy of this flow chart, which has been shared and discussed with staff to embed awareness of it, accompanies this letter (enclosure 1). This flowchart is laminated and attached to the medication keys as an immediate prompt to staff. Additionally, there are copies of this flow chart in poster format on the wall of the care home's treatment room and there is a further copy contained within a dedicated discharge file held in the Deputy Manager's office. This dedicated file has been brought in following this case and contains the flow chart prompt and copies of Care UK's relevant up-to-date policies to which I refer below.”

    Source location

    Response from Care UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce hospital-return, discharge and medication-management policies through mandatory read-and-sign confirmation and refresher training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The care home leadership has reinforced Care UK's 'Admissions and Discharge Policy' (enclosure 2) and the 'How to Guide - Supporting a Resident Returning from Hospital' (enclosure 3) as well as the 'Medications Management Policy' (enclosure 4). These documents provide clear guidance to staff as to what to do in circumstances where a resident arrives and/or returns to the care home from hospital and there is insufficient/absent information regarding their discharge and attendant medications. All staff have completed a mandatory "read and sign" process to confirm that they have read and understood these documents, all of which have been discussed with staff as part of further refresher training sessions undertaken.”

    Source location

    Response from Care UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss imminent and new hospital discharges at daily and weekly clinical meetings so required information and follow-up actions are identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Home Manager and/or Deputy will ensure that any imminent or new discharges to the care home are discussed at the daily 10@10 meetings and weekly clinical review meetings to ensure staff are aware of the discharges, the relevant information is obtained and any matters requiring follow-up are actioned. In addition, it is also important to note that there is always a member of the management team available (seven days a week) and so at any time the discharge process is taking place, there are senior staff available to help deal with/advise on any issues arising with the discharge.”

    Source location

    Response from Care UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response
  7. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Gareth Idris Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gareth Idris Johnson attended hospital with a bilateral pulmonary embolism and underwent catheter-directed thrombolysis. He later died at University Hospital of Wales from complications following the procedure. The report identified suboptimal post-operative anticoagulation management, including a lack of clarity about the appropriate heparin level, and raised concerns about transferring critical-care patients to PACU because of building maintenance, capacity pressures and infrastructure risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of safeguards for moving patients requiring critical care during times of pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “Due to the age of the hospital building, maintenance is a constant battle. There are also capacity issues in Critical Care due to patient volumes. Building infrastructure had been a constant feature on the corporate risk register and was now scored at its highest level. Whilst measures have been put in place to safeguard against moving patients who require critical care from the Critical Care Unit, there remained fears that these systems would fail during times of pressure. ”

    Source location

    Gareth Idris Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write to Cardiff and Vale University Health Board to confirm clinical governance and safe clinical cover for future critical-care-unit maintenance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) To write to Cardiff and Vale UHB to confirm what clinical governance is in place to approve changes in the location of critical care and to ensure the appropriate clinical cover is in place to provide safe care during future planned maintenance of the critical care unit.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Developed an Electrical Failure Emergency Action Card covering power-failure response, vulnerable-patient evacuation, emergency decanting and business-continuity arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response, we have developed the Electrical Failure Emergency Action Card (E1, draft October 2025), which outlines: Immediate actions to confirm and respond to power failures, including switching to unaffected supplies and declaring an ICU emergency if required.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implemented a Critical Care Escalation Plan governing staffed bed capacity, patient prioritisation, delayed-transfer escalation, clinically led transfers and diversion arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Health Board recognises the challenges posed by patient volumes and infrastructure. To address these, we have implemented the Critical Care Escalation Plan (October 2024), which details:”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Developed a Major Incident Plan framework defining emergency command, reporting, escalation, evacuation, triage, patient transfer, communications and critical-care staff responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Major Incident Plan v1.04 (DRAFT) provides a comprehensive framework for emergency preparedness, in line with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Key elements include.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct annual stress testing and live major-incident exercises at least every three years, maintaining training records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Annual stress testing and live exercises at least every three years, with training records maintained by the Critical Care Directorate.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Regularly review and simulate critical-care escalation and major-incident plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Regular review and simulation of escalation and major incident plans.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide ongoing staff training in major-incident response and escalation procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Ongoing staff training in major incident response and escalation procedures.”

    Source location

    Response from Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Day-to-day operation and management of the hospital site and services remain the statutory responsibility of Cardiff and Vale University Health Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are longer term plans being reviewed and considered by the health board for the redevelopment of the University Hospital of Wales site. This response focuses on the short and medium-term actions I will be seeking the health board to review at the site to address patient safety and ensure the continuity of healthcare services to the local population. The day-to-day operation and management of the site and the healthcare services provided remains the statutory responsibility of Cardiff and Vale University Health Board (UHB). There are also actions, which will be highlighted to other health boards in Wales.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing estate was not the primary cause of the death, although estate improvements and resulting patient relocation contributed to it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are plans being explored for further capital investment at the University Hospital of Wales. While the condition of the existing estate was not the primary cause of Mr Johnson’s death, the need to make estate improvements led to the relocation of patients, which was a contributory factor. I hope the actions I have set out above will result in robust measures being put in place to manage patient moves in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response
  8. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Nora Elizabeth YOUNG · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Nora Elizabeth Young was admitted to hospital after taking overdoses of prescription medication on 22 and 23 August 2024. She was transferred to a ward with directions for cardiac monitoring, but no clinical handover or monitoring instructions were provided. She was later found unresponsive and not attached to monitoring, and resuscitation failed; unused medication was subsequently found among her belongings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clinical handover to receiving wards

    Wider context from the report

    “NO clinical handover to receiving ward. No instructions passed on from the doctor re cardiac monitoring. Patients own medication found in her belongings which had been with her, after her death allowing her the opportunity to take another overdose. ”

    Source location

    Susan Nora Elizabeth YOUNG · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a standard ED-to-EADU handover process and form that includes specialist requirements such as cardiac monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “vi. As a Trust, we are developing a communication process for handover with a task and finish group commencing 23rd May 2025. This includes leads from each department including ED and EADU. The flow chart is in the design phase, with an aim to commence the new process mid-June. Specialist requirements for the patient including cardiac monitoring will be included in the handover template. Once embedded, an audit will take place to monitor compliance and identify gaps needing further education and support.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit the implemented ED Patient Handover Form monthly from September until consistent compliance is demonstrated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support and evidence our addressing of all three matters of concern raised, we have included the updated Trust Transfer Policy, including the trust handover process which has been communicated and promoted to staff, the summary of the policy expectations that has been communicated to ED staff, evidence of the associated staff training undertaken and a copy of the ED Patient Handover Form now in use for all patient transfers. An audit of the implemented ED Patient Handover Form is scheduled in September and will be ongoing monthly until results demonstrate good and consistent compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the ED patient handover process and form for transfers, including communication of cardiac monitoring and other specialist requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “vi. As a Trust, we are developing a communication process for handover with a task and finish group commencing 23rd May 2025. This includes leads from each department including ED and EADU. The flow chart is in the design phase, with an aim to commence the new process mid-June. Specialist requirements for the patient including cardiac monitoring will be included in the handover template. Once embedded, an audit will take place to monitor compliance and identify gaps needing further education and support.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit compliance with the ED patient handover form monthly after the scheduled September audit until consistent compliance is demonstrated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support and evidence our addressing of all three matters of concern raised, we have included the updated Trust Transfer Policy, including the trust handover process which has been communicated and promoted to staff, the summary of the policy expectations that has been communicated to ED staff, evidence of the associated staff training undertaken and a copy of the ED Patient Handover Form now in use for all patient transfers. An audit of the implemented ED Patient Handover Form is scheduled in September and will be ongoing monthly until results demonstrate good and consistent compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  9. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Abdulrahman AlAjmi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Abdulrahman AlAjmi died at the London Clinic on 7 August 2024 from multiorgan failure after arriving in the UK for medical treatment in a substantially poorer condition than had been reported. The report found that the flight probably contributed to his death by exacerbating serious pre-existing medical conditions. Concerns included the absence of uniform systems for accepting and transferring overseas patients, ensuring that receiving services have accurate and up-to-date medical information, and safely treating patients who arrive more unwell than anticipated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure accurate and updated clinical information for referral acceptance and patient transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It was stated in evidence that patients often arrive in a substantially different (often worse) condition to that described to the receiving clinicians when they accepted the referral and agreed that they were able to provide treatment. This means that UK health providers may receive for treatment individuals who are more unwell than anticipated, potentially requiring expertise that is not held by the receiving treatment providers (albeit in this case they had an ICU team who were able to provide the necessary treatment). 3. The evidence provided showed that it is up to each individual hospital to determine whether they are willing and able to accept a referral and agree the process for transfer of the patient. The evidence indicated that process is not uniform and relies heavily on the accuracy of the information received from the referring medical staff, as well as it being appropriately updated should circumstances change. ”

    Source location

    Abdulrahman AlAjmi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providers have limited recourse to pursue proceedings against medical professionals based in third countries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted in the report, there is limited recourse for any provider, NHS or independent, to undertake proceedings against a medical professional based in a third country.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responding to the concern falls outside the respondent’s remit and is instead a matter for the Health Department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I don't believe a response sits within my remit and seems more for the Health Department [DHSC].”

    Source location

    Response from FCDO
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Health Department should liaise with the referring country’s health team to determine whether travellers are fit to travel.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It’s about people travelling to the UK for medical procedures in a worse condition than anticipated. This would be for [DHSC] to liaise with the Health Team in the country who has sent the referral to determine if they are well enough to travel.”

    Source location

    Response from FCDO
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 April 2025

    Open published response
  10. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Patricia Ann Catterall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patricia Ann Catterall’s care was transferred to a nursing home on 11 June 2024 after 207 days at Mold Community Hospital. Her blood sugar levels, previously checked three times daily, were checked once daily at the nursing home; her condition deteriorated and she was admitted to hospital on 19 June with HHS and sepsis, dying a few days later. The principal concern was that the nursing home’s pre-transfer assessment was not sufficiently robust and did not identify all relevant care information, including the frequency of her blood sugar monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure receipt of all relevant patient-care information before transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “That the process of assessment by the Nursing Home prior to the transfer of care to them was not sufficiently robust so as to ensure that all relevant information required for the safe care of a patient had been received and assessed prior to the patient being received into their care. Evidence was received that in the majority of cases (post Covid) there are no face to face assessments prior to patient transfer and that the assessment is therefore dependent on the documentation supplied to the Nursing Home by the Health Board which in some cases may result in not all relevant information being provided. In this instance evidence was given that the Nursing Home did not know that the deceased’s blood sugar levels were monitored three times per days whilst in the care of Health Board. ”

    Source location

    Patricia Ann Catterall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the pre-admission assessment document with prompts to obtain all required information, including diabetes information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Our pre-admission assessment document has been updated and includes prompts to ensure all information is requested prior to admission, this includes a section for diabetes, see attached pre-admission assessment document.”

    Source location

    Response from Pendine Park Care Organisation
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a Task and Finish Group of Community Hospital Matrons and Discharge Nurses to review the care-home discharge plan form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Task and Finish Group has been set up (consisting of Community Hospital Matrons and Discharge Nurses) to review the current form for suitability, and this work will specifically ensure that frequency of observations and medication is clearly defined within the document.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the care-home discharge plan form to define observation and medication frequencies clearly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the notice, our senior nursing team in the East Integrated Health Community have led work to understand the issue across the Health Board. This work has identified that whilst there is a standardised form for discharge plans into care homes, the level of detail is varied.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the finalized and approved form changes with the North Wales Care Home Forum.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Changes to the form, once finalised and approved, will be shared with the North Wales Care Home Forum, with support from the Quality Development Team (this team supports improvements in quality across commissioned care home services).”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the new form and supporting examples with teams through Team Meeting Safety Briefs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The new form, and examples to support learning, will be shared with teams and will be included on Team Meeting Safety Briefs.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop audit questions, complete peer-review monitoring, and report findings through monthly Matron Reports to local quality groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Audit questions will be developed to monitor these changes which will be completed by Ward Managers and Matrons and included in the peer reviews across our services. The audit findings will be included in the monthly Matron Reports into local quality groups for assurance.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 April 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026